U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Operations Center Event Reports For 12/01/97 - 12/02/97 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** 33331 33332 33333 33334 +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ |POWER REACTOR | |EVENT NUMBER: 33331 | +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ |FACILITY: QUAD CITIES REGION: 3 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 12/01/97 | |UNIT: [1] [ ] [ ] STATE: IL |NOTIFICATION TIME: 00:09 [ET]| |RX TYPE: [1] GE-3,[2] GE-3 |EVENT DATE: 11/30/97 | +------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 21:53[CST]| |NRC NOTIFIED BY: D. NOHR |LAST UPDATE DATE: 12/01/97 | |HQ OPS OFFICER: JOHN MacKINNON +-----------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+ NOTIFICATIONS | |EMERGENCY CLASS: NOT APPLICABLE +-----------------------------+ |10 CFR SECTION: |BRUCE BURGESS RDO | |AIND 50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D) ACCIDENT MITIGATION | | |NLCO TECH SPEC LCO A/S | | | | | | | | | | | +-----+----------+-------+--------+--------------+--+--------+-----------------+ |UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ | 1 | N Y 100 POWER OPERATION | 100 POWER OPERATION | | | | | | | | | +-----+---------------------------------------------+--------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | HIGH PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION (HPCI) SYSTEM DECLARED INOPERABLE DURING | | SURVEILLANCE TESTING. | | | | DURING THE QUARTERLY HIGH PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION VALVE TIMING | | SURVEILLANCE, THE 1-2301-29 (HPCI STEAM SUPPLY DRAIN LINE ISOLATION VALVE | | TO THE MAIN CONDENSER) VALVE WAS TIMED IN THE CLOSED DIRECTION AT 5.6 | | SECONDS. THE IN-SERVICE TESTING TIME REQUIRED FOR THIS VALVE IS 5.4 | | SECONDS. THE HPCI SYSTEM WAS DECLARED INOPERABLE AND A 14 DAY LIMITING | | CONDITION OF OPERATION WAS ENTERED PER TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.5.A, | | ACTION 3. REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING AND ALL OTHER EMERGENCY CORE | | COOLING SYSTEMS ARE FULLY OPERABLE, IF NEEDED. | | | | THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR WAS NOTIFIED OF THIS EVENT BY THE LICENSEE. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ |POWER REACTOR | |EVENT NUMBER: 33332 | +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ |FACILITY: DRESDEN REGION: 3 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 12/01/97 | |UNIT: [ ] [ ] [3] STATE: IL |NOTIFICATION TIME: 15:32 [ET]| |RX TYPE: [1] GE-1,[2] GE-3,[3] GE-3 |EVENT DATE: 12/01/97 | +------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 12:15[CST]| |NRC NOTIFIED BY: CAROL BARAJAS |LAST UPDATE DATE: 12/01/97 | |HQ OPS OFFICER: FANGIE JONES +-----------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+ NOTIFICATIONS | |EMERGENCY CLASS: NOT APPLICABLE +-----------------------------+ |10 CFR SECTION: |MARK RING RDO | |AIND 50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D) ACCIDENT MITIGATION | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +-----+----------+-------+--------+--------------+--+--------+-----------------+ |UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ | | | | | | | | | 3 | N Y 98 POWER OPERATION | 98 POWER OPERATION | +-----+---------------------------------------------+--------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | VALVE FAILURE CAUSES A POTENTIAL DIVERSION OF COOLING FLOW FROM THE REACTOR | | VESSEL DURING A DESIGN BASIS LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT. | | | | DURING PERFORMANCE OF A LOW PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION PUMP OPERABILITY | | TEST WITH THE TORUS AVAILABLE, THE TORUS COOLING OUTBOARD TEST VALVE, | | #3-1501-38B, COULD NOT BE CLOSED. IN RESPONSE, THE IN-SERIES TORUS | | COOLING INBOARD TEST VALVE, #3-1501-20B, WAS CLOSED TO SECURE THE FLOWPATH. | | DURING THE 10 MINUTES THAT BOTH VALVES WERE OPEN, A FLOWPATH EXISTED THAT | | WOULD HAVE DIVERTED COOLING FLOW FROM THE REACTOR VESSEL IN THE EVENT OF | | A DESIGN BASIS LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT. | | | | IN RESPONSE TO TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.7.D, PRIMARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION | | VALVES, THE INBOARD VALVE, #3-1501-20B, WAS DEACTIVATED IN THE CLOSED | | POSITION. TROUBLESHOOTING AND REPAIR ARE UNDERWAY ON THE OUTBOARD VALVE, | | #3-1501-38B, WHICH WAS STUCK IN THE MID-POSITION. | | | | THE LICENSEE INFORMED THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ |FUEL CYCLE FACILITY | |EVENT NUMBER: 33333 | +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ |FACILITY: PADUCAH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT |NOTIFICATION DATE: 12/01/97 | | RXTYPE: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 23:46 [ET]| |COMMENTS: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER |EVENT DATE: 12/01/97 | | 6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE |EVENT TIME: 10:00[CST]| | BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200 |LAST UPDATE DATE: 12/01/97 | | CITY: PADUCAH REGION: 3 +-----------------------------+ | COUNTY: McCRACKEN STATE: KY |PERSON ORGANIZATION| |LICENSE#: GDP-1 AGREEMENT: Y |MARK RING RDO | | DOCKET: 0707001 |FRED COMBS (NMSS) EO | +------------------------------------------------+ | |NRC NOTIFIED BY: MATT MAURER | | |HQ OPS OFFICER: JOHN MacKINNON | | +------------------------------------------------+ | |EMERGENCY CLASS: NOT APPLICABLE | | |10 CFR SECTION: | | |NBNL RESPONSE-BULLETIN | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +------------------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | A VACUUM CLEANER WITH A VOLUME GREATER THAN 5.5 GALLONS WAS FOUND IN A | | FISSILE CONTROL AREA. | | | | THIS EVENT WAS REPORTED AS A 24 HOUR CALL UNDER NRC BULLETIN 91-01. | | | | A VACUUM CLEANER WAS DISCOVERED IN A FISSILE CONTROL AREA (FCA) IN THE | | C-720 MOTOR SHOP. THE VOLUME OF THE VACUUM CLEANER EXCEEDED THE 5.5 GALLON | | LIMIT ESTABLISHED IN NCSA GEN-15, CONTROL 18, WHICH STATES "PORTABLE | | CONTAINERS USED WITHIN AN FCA SHALL BE LIMITED TO MAXIMUM 5.5 GALLON | | CAPACITY DRUM UNLESS OTHERWISE APPROVED BY NCS". 5.5 GALLON VACUUM CLEANERS | | SHOULD BE COLORED CODED (ORANGE/GRAY), TAGGED AND HAVE POTENTIALLY FISSILE | | MARKED ON THEM. THE VACUUM CLEANER DISCOVERED DURING WALKDOWNS CAN HOLD | | APPROXIMATELY EIGHT GALLONS. THE VACUUM CLEANER WAS STORED IN THE FCA TO | | MAINTAIN CONTROL OVER THE VACUUM CLEANER. THE LICENSEE THINKS THAT THE | | VACUUM HAS BEEN STORED IN THIS AREA SINCE AT LEAST 1995. | | | | THE VOLUME CONTROL ESTABLISHED IN NCSA GEN-15 WAS VIOLATED IN THIS EVENT. | | ACCUMULATION OF AN UNSAFE MASS IN THE VACUUM CLEANER WOULD HAVE BEEN | | REQUIRED TO SUPPORT A CRITICALITY. THIS DID NOT OCCUR, BUT ONE CONTROL FOR | | DOUBLE CONTINGENCY WAS VIOLATED LEAVING ONLY A SINGLE CONTROL IN PLACE. | | THIS EVENT IS REPORTABLE UNDER NRC BULLETIN 91-01, SUPPLEMENT 1 "FOR | | VIOLATIONS INVOLVING OPERATIONS THAT COMPLY WITH THE DOUBLE CONTINGENCY | | PRINCIPLE AND DO NOT MEET THE AFOREMENTIONED CRITERIA (LISTED ABOVE), BUT | | STILL RESULT IN A VIOLATION OF THE DOUBLE CONTINGENCY PRINCIPLE, SUCH AS | | EVENTS WHERE THE DOUBLE CONTINGENCY PRINCIPLE IS VIOLATED BUT CONTROL IS | | IMMEDIATELY RE-ESTABLISHED." | | | | FOLLOWING THIS DISCOVERY, THE VACUUM CLEANER WAS HANDLED IN ACCORDANCE WITH | | NCSA GEN-27 (CONTROLS INTERACTION BETWEEN THE EQUIPMENT AND FISSILE | | MATERIAL). ONCE CHARACTERIZED, THE VACUUM CLEANER WILL BE REMOVED FROM THE | | FCA AND STORED IN ACCORDANCE WITH GEN-27. | | | | THIS EVENT WAS CATEGORIZED AS A LEVEL 3 CRITICALITY SAFETY INCIDENT AND IS | | REPORTABLE UNDER UE2-RA-RE1030, REV. 2, APPENDIX D, CRITERIA A.4.a AS | | 24-HOUR EVENT REPORT. | | | | SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS: | | | | THE APPROXIMATELY EIGHT GALLON VACUUM CLEANER WAS ORIGINALLY DISCOVERED | | DURING A WALKDOWN. BECAUSE THE CONTENTS WERE UNKNOWN, IT WAS CONSERVATIVELY | | HANDLED AS POTENTIALLY FISSILE AND STORED IN THE FCA WITH A MINIMUM TWO | | FOOT EDGE SPACING BETWEEN IT AND ALL OTHER FISSILE/POTENTIALLY FISSILE | | MATERIAL. ALTHOUGH THE VACUUM CLEANER WAS INCORRECTLY STORED IN THE FCA, IT | | WAS NOT USED IN THE FCA TO COLLECT FISSILE MATERIAL. SINCE THE VACUUM | | CLEANER WAS NOT USED IN THE FCA TO COLLECT FISSILE MATERIAL AND THE VACUUM | | CLEANER WAS SPACED A MINIMUM TWO FOOT EDGE TO EDGE FROM OTHER FISSILE | | MATERIAL, THIS EVENT IS OF LOW SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE. | | | | POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED: | | | | THE MOST COMMON URANIUM WASTE COMPOUND FOUND AT PGDP IS UO2F2 (URANYL | | FLUORIDE). THE HISTORICAL MAXIMUM OPERATING ASSAY FOR PGDP HAS BEEN 2.0 wt% | | U-235. USING THESE MATERIALS, A CRITICALITY WOULD HAVE REQUIRED AT LEAST | | 600 POUNDS OF MATERIAL, APPROXIMATELY ONE AND A HALF CUBIC FEET. OPTIMAL | | MODERATION WOULD BE REQUIRED FOR A CRITICALITY UNLESS SIGNIFICANTLY MORE | | THAN 600 POUNDS OF UO2F2 WERE AVAILABLE. ACHIEVING THESE CONDITIONS WOULD | | REQUIRE GROSS VIOLATION OF NCSA GEN-15 REQUIREMENTS, WHICH PROHIBIT | | ACCUMULATION OF WASTE IN CONTAINERS WITH VOLUMES GREATER THAN 5.5 GALLONS. | | | | CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION, GEOMETRY, CONCENTRATION, ETC.): | | | | VOLUME - MAXIMUM 5.5 GALLON CONTAINERS INSIDE AN FCA. | | MASS - ACCUMULATION OF FISSILE MATERIAL IS PROHIBITED IN CONTAINERS GREATER | | THAN 5.5 GALLONS INSIDE AN FCA. | | | | ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL: | | | | THE VACUUM CLEANER HAD NOT BEEN USED INSIDE THE FCA TO ACCUMULATE FISSILE | | MATERIAL. HOWEVER, THE VACUUM CLEANER HAD BEEN USED IN PREVIOUS OPERATIONS. | | | | NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION | | OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES: | | | | NCSA GEN-15 PROHIBITS PLACING CONTAINERS WITH VOLUME GREATER THAN 5.5 | | GALLONS IN AN FCA. THIS CONTROL WAS VIOLATED BY PLACING A GREATER THAN 5.5 | | GALLON VACUUM CLEANER IN THE FCA. AN ADDITIONAL CONTROL PROHIBITS | | ACCUMULATION OF FISSILE MATERIAL IN ANY UNSAFE CONTAINER. | | | | CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEM AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED: | | | | THE VACUUM CLEANER WAS ROPED OFF IN ACCORDANCE WITH NCSA GEN-27. ONCE | | CHARACTERIZED, THE VACUUM CLEANER WILL BE REMOVED FROM THE FCA AND STORED | | IN ACCORDANCE WITH GEN-27. | | | | THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR WAS NOTIFIED OF THIS EVENT BY THE LICENSEE. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ |POWER REACTOR | |EVENT NUMBER: 33334 | +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ |FACILITY: BRAIDWOOD REGION: 3 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 12/02/97 | |UNIT: [ ] [2] [ ] STATE: IL |NOTIFICATION TIME: 04:59 [ET]| |RX TYPE: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP |EVENT DATE: 12/02/97 | +------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 02:41[CST]| |NRC NOTIFIED BY: TOM PETELLE |LAST UPDATE DATE: 12/02/97 | |HQ OPS OFFICER: JOHN MacKINNON +-----------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+ NOTIFICATIONS | |EMERGENCY CLASS: NOT APPLICABLE +-----------------------------+ |10 CFR SECTION: |MARK RING RDO | |AESF 50.72(b)(2)(ii) ESF ACTUATION | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +-----+----------+-------+--------+--------------+--+--------+-----------------+ |UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ | | | | | 2 | N Y 99 POWER OPERATION | 99 POWER OPERATION | | | | | +-----+---------------------------------------------+--------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | CONTAINMENT VENTILATION ISOLATION ACTUATION SIGNAL AND ALARM RECEIVED. | | | | | | THE LICENSEE RECEIVED A CONTAINMENT VENTILATION ISOLATION ACTUATION SIGNAL | | AND ALARM. IT WAS DETERMINED THAT THE 2AR012 (RADIATION MONITORS #11 & # | | 23) "CONTAINMENT BUILDING FUEL HANDLING INCIDENT" AREA RADIATION MONITOR | | HAD FAILED ITS DAILY AUTO CHECK SOURCE TEST; THIS GENERATED A TRAIN "B" | | CONTAINMENT ISOLATION SIGNAL. THERE WAS NO CONTAINMENT RELEASE IN PROGRESS | | AND ALL REQUIRED CONTAINMENT ISOLATION (VQ) VALVES WERE ALREADY CLOSED | | PRIOR TO THE EVENT. ATTEMPTS TO MANUALLY CHECK SOURCE THE SKID FAILED AND | | LIMITING CONDITION OF OPERATION ACTION 3.3.1-1a WAS ENTERED, WHICH REQUIRES | | THE CONTAINMENT (VQ) VALVES TO REMAIN CLOSED. THE LICENSEE IS INVESTIGATING | | THIS EVENT. | | | | THIS SAME INCIDENT OCCURRED BEFORE ON 11/30/97. SEE EVENT REPORT # 33327. | | | | THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR WILL BE NOTIFIED OF THIS EVENT BY THE LICENSEE. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+