U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Operations Center Event Reports For 03/26/96 - 03/27/96 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** 30170 30171 30172 30173 30174 30175 30176 30177 30178 30179 +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ |POWER REACTOR | |EVENT NUMBER: 30170 | +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ |FACILITY: WATTS BAR REGION: 2 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 03/26/96 | |UNIT: [1] [ ] [ ] STATE: TN |NOTIFICATION TIME: 12:15 [ET]| |RX TYPE: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP |EVENT DATE: 03/26/96 | +------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 08:55[EST]| |NRC NOTIFIED BY: WALLACE |LAST UPDATE DATE: 03/26/96 | |HQ OPS OFFICER: BOB STRANSKY +-----------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+ NOTIFICATIONS | |EMERGENCY CLASS: NOT APPLICABLE +-----------------------------+ |10 CFR SECTION: |BELISLE RDO | |AIND 50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D) ACCIDENT MITIGATION | | |NLCO TECH SPEC LCO A/S | | | | | | | | | | | +-----+----------+-------+--------+--------------+--+--------+-----------------+ |UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ | 1 | N Y 43 POWER OPERATION | 43 POWER OPERATION | | | | | | | | | +-----+---------------------------------------------+--------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | EMERGENCY GAS TREATMENT SYSTEM CONTROL SWITCHES MISALIGNED | | | | THE FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF A FACSIMILE SUBMITTED BY THE LICENSEE: | | | | "WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT IS IN MODE 1 AT 43% REACTOR POWER AND 475 MWe. AT | | 0855, DURING A SYSTEM WALKDOWN, IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT HAND-SWITCHES FOR | | BOTH TRAINS OF THE EMERGENCY GAS TREATMENT SYSTEM (EGTS) PRESSURE CONTROL | | ISOLATION DAMPERS WERE IN THE A-AUTO STANDBY POSITION. THE EGTS IS USED TO | | PROCESS AIR THROUGH HEPA FILTERS PRIOR TO RELEASE TO ATMOSPHERE DURING | | ACCIDENT CONDITIONS. NORMAL ALIGNMENT REQUIRES ONE TRAIN TO BE IN THE | | A-AUTO POSITION. WITH THE SWITCHES IN THE AS-DISCOVERED ALIGNMENT, THE | | EGTS WOULD STILL FUNCTION DURING AN ACCIDENT TO MAINTAIN NEGATIVE PRESSURE | | AND FILTER EFFLUENT. HOWEVER, THE SYSTEM WOULD NOT HAVE MET THE FLOW RATE | | IN THE REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE TIME (T.S. 3.6.9). THE AIR INLEAKAGE COULD | | HAVE EXCEEDED THE 250 CFM LIMIT REQUIRED BY TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS (T.S. | | 3.6.15) WITH BOTH SETS OF PRESSURE CONTROL DAMPERS IN SERVICE. UPON | | DISCOVERY, TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.0.3 WAS ENTERED. THE SWITCHES WERE | | RETURNED TO THE STANDBY ALIGNMENT AND TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.0.3 WAS | | EXITED. THE CAUSE OF THE MISALIGNMENT IS CURRENTLY UNDER INVESTIGATION." | | | | THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR HAS BEEN INFORMED OF THIS EVENT BY THE LICENSEE. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ |POWER REACTOR | |EVENT NUMBER: 30171 | +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ |FACILITY: DUANE ARNOLD REGION: 3 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 03/26/96 | |UNIT: [1] [ ] [ ] STATE: IA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 14:30 [ET]| |RX TYPE: [1] GE-4 |EVENT DATE: 03/25/96 | +------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 02:30[CST]| |NRC NOTIFIED BY: SUEPER |LAST UPDATE DATE: 03/26/96 | |HQ OPS OFFICER: BOB STRANSKY +-----------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+ NOTIFICATIONS | |EMERGENCY CLASS: NOT APPLICABLE +-----------------------------+ |10 CFR SECTION: |LANKSBURY RDO | |NINF INFORMATION ONLY | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +-----+----------+-------+--------+--------------+--+--------+-----------------+ |UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ | 1 | N Y 60 POWER OPERATION | 100 POWER OPERATION | | | | | | | | | +-----+---------------------------------------------+--------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | CONTROL ROD SCRAM INSERTION TIMES TO POSITION 46 ABOVE TECHNICAL | | SPECIFICATION LIMIT | | | | THE FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF A FACSIMILE SUBMITTED BY THE LICENSEE: | | | | "AT 0230 ON MARCH 25, 1996, WITH THE DUANE ARNOLD ENERGY CENTER AT 60% | | POWER, SCRAM INSERTION TIME TESTING WAS COMPLETED ON ALL (89) CONTROL RODS, | | AND SCRAM SOLENOID PILOT VALVE (SSPV) MAINTENANCE WAS COMPLETED ON 87 | | CONTROL RODS. THE TESTING INDICATED THAT THE AS-FOUND CORE AVERAGE SCRAM | | INSERTION TIME TO ROD POSITION 46 WAS 0.393 SECONDS, WHICH EXCEEDED THE | | TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION LIMIT OF 0.350 SECONDS, AND REPRESENTED AN AVERAGE | | 0.063 SECOND INCREASE OVER THE AS-LEFT CORE AVERAGE SCRAM TIME FOLLOWING | | THE STARTUP FROM THE LAST REFUELING OUTAGE APPROXIMATELY ONE YEAR AGO. IN | | ADDITION, SCRAM INSERTION TIMES TO NOTCH 46 FOR THE THREE FASTEST CONTROL | | RODS IN ANY TWO-BY-TWO ARRAY ALSO EXCEEDED THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION | | LIMIT OF 0.37 SECONDS. | | | | THE AVERAGE SCRAM INSERTION TIME REQUIREMENTS, BOTH FOR THE CORE AVERAGE | | AND THE AVERAGE OF THE THREE FASTEST CONTROL RODS IN ANY 2x2 ARRAY, WERE | | MET FOR ROD POSITIONS 38, 26, AND 06. | | | | THE MAXIMUM AS-FOUND SCRAM INSERTION TIME TO ROD POSITION 46 WAS 0.450 | | SECONDS. THE MINIMUM AS-FOUND SCRAM INSERTION TIME TO ROD POSITION 6 WAS | | 0.320 SECONDS. THE AS-LEFT CORE AVERAGE SCRAM INSERTION TIME FOLLOWING | | REPLACEMENT OF THE VITON SSPV DIAPHRAGMS (ON THE '118' VALVES ONLY) WAS | | 0.324 SECONDS. | | | | THE TESTING WAS PERFORMED VOLUNTARILY IN RESPONSE TO RECENT INDUSTRY | | OPERATING EXPERIENCE WHICH INDICATED POSSIBLE SCRAM INSERTION TIME | | DEGRADATION OVER TIME IN CONTROL RODS EQUIPPED WITH VITON SSPV DIAPHRAGMS | | (THE DAEC TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS DO NOT REQUIRE PERIODIC ON-LINE SCRAM | | TESTING OF A REPRESENTATIVE SAMPLE OF CONTROL RODS). THE TESTING WAS | | INITIATED ON MARCH 18, 1996. A VOLUNTARY LER WILL BE SUBMITTED." | | | | THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR HAS BEEN INFORMED BY THE LICENSEE. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ |POWER REACTOR | |EVENT NUMBER: 30172 | +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ |FACILITY: TURKEY POINT REGION: 2 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 03/26/96 | |UNIT: [3] [4] [ ] STATE: FL |NOTIFICATION TIME: 15:25 [ET]| |RX TYPE: [3] W-3-LP,[4] W-3-LP |EVENT DATE: 03/26/96 | +------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 13:40[EST]| |NRC NOTIFIED BY: KNORR |LAST UPDATE DATE: 03/26/96 | |HQ OPS OFFICER: BOB STRANSKY +-----------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+ NOTIFICATIONS | |EMERGENCY CLASS: NOT APPLICABLE +-----------------------------+ |10 CFR SECTION: |BELISLE RDO | |AIND 50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D) ACCIDENT MITIGATION | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +-----+----------+-------+--------+--------------+--+--------+-----------------+ |UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ | 3 | N Y 100 POWER OPERATION | 100 POWER OPERATION | | 4 | N N 0 REFUELING | 0 REFUELING | | | | | +-----+---------------------------------------------+--------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | ECCS ACCUMULATORS COULD HAVE BEEN PREVENTED FROM MITIGATING ACCIDENT | | CONSEQUENCES | | | | THE FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF A FACSIMILE SUBMITTED BY THE LICENSEE: | | | | "BASED UPON REVIEW OF A RECENT 10 CFR 50.72 NOTIFICATION BY ANOTHER | | LICENSEE [HOO NOTE: SEE EVENT REPORT #30106 FROM INDIAN POINT UNIT 2], | | FLORIDA POWER AND LIGHT COMPANY HAS DETERMINED THAT, UNDER CERTAIN | | ACCUMULATOR FILL ALIGNMENTS, THE PLANT MAY HAVE PUT THE THREE ACCUMULATORS | | AT TURKEY POINT IN A CONDITION THAT COULD HAVE PREVENTED THE ABILITY TO | | MITIGATE THE CONSEQUENCES OF AN ACCIDENT. | | | | PLANT OPERATING PROCEDURES PERMITTED THE CROSS CONNECTION OF THE NITROGEN | | FILL HEADERS CROSS-TIES BETWEEN THE REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM ACCUMULATORS. IN | | THE UNLIKELY EVENT OF A LARGE BREAK LOSS-OF-COOLANT-ACCIDENT DURING THE | | SHORT PERIOD OF CROSS-CONNECTION, PRESSURE COULD BE POSTULATED TO BLEED OFF | | THROUGH THE ONE ACCUMULATOR CONNECTED TO THE FAULTED REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM | | LOOP INTO CONTAINMENT. THIS LOSS OF PRESSURE IN THE ACCUMULATORS MAY OCCUR | | PRIOR TO THE CLOSURE OF THE NITROGEN FILL VALVES FOR EACH ACCUMULATOR. | | | | AS A RESULT, UNDER THE POSTULATED CONDITIONS DESCRIBED ABOVE, THE PRESSURE | | IN THE CROSS-CONNECTED ACCUMULATORS MAY BE LESS THAN THAT ASSUMED IN THE | | ACCIDENT ANALYSIS WHEN THE ACCUMULATORS ARE CALLED UPON TO OPERATE. | | OPERATING PROCEDURE 3/4-OP-064 HAS BEEN REVISED TO ALLOW ONLY ONE VALVE | | OPEN FOR EITHER THE LIQUID SPACE OR THE NITROGEN SPACE IF PRESSURE IN THE | | REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM IS GREATER THAN 1000 PSIG." | | | | THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR HAS BEEN INFORMED BY THE LICENSEE. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ |POWER REACTOR | |EVENT NUMBER: 30173 | +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ |FACILITY: COOPER REGION: 4 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 03/26/96 | |UNIT: [1] [ ] [ ] STATE: NE |NOTIFICATION TIME: 15:25 [ET]| |RX TYPE: [1] GE-4 |EVENT DATE: 03/25/96 | +------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 16:18[CST]| |NRC NOTIFIED BY: GREEN |LAST UPDATE DATE: 03/26/96 | |HQ OPS OFFICER: BOB STRANSKY +-----------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+ NOTIFICATIONS | |EMERGENCY CLASS: NOT APPLICABLE +-----------------------------+ |10 CFR SECTION: |MURRAY RDO | |NLTR LICENSEE 24 HR REPORT | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +-----+----------+-------+--------+--------------+--+--------+-----------------+ |UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ | 1 | N Y 100 POWER OPERATION | 100 POWER OPERATION | | | | | | | | | +-----+---------------------------------------------+--------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | LICENSEE 24-HOUR REPORT DUE TO FIRE SUPPRESSION SYSTEM BEING MOMENTARILY | | INOPERABLE DURING MAINTENANCE. | | | | THE FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF A FACSIMILE SUBMITTED BY THE LICENSEE: | | | | "ON 3/25/96, FROM 1618 TO 1621 CST, BOTH STATION FIRE PUMPS WERE TAKEN TO | | PULL-TO-LOCK TO SUPPORT FIRE PROTECTION (FP) SYSTEM RESTORATION AFTER | | SCHEDULED MAINTENANCE. PLACING BOTH FIRE PUMPS IN PULL-TO-LOCK RENDERED THE | | FIRE WATER SUPPRESSION SYSTEM INOPERABLE FOR APPROXIMATELY THREE MINUTES. | | IN ACCORDANCE WITH TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION SECTION 3.15.C.2.a, THIS 24 HOUR | | REPORT IS BEING MADE. A WRITTEN REPORT WILL BE PROVIDED WITHIN ONE WORKING | | DAY IN ACCORDANCE WITH TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION SECTION 3.15.C.2.b. THE | | PUMPS AND SYSTEM HAVE BEEN RESTORED TO OPERABLE STATUS. DURING THE EVENT, | | THE FIRE PUMPS WERE AVAILABLE FOR MANUAL INITIATION SINCE ONLY THE | | AUTOMATIC START FEATURE WAS DISABLED BY PLACING THEM IN PULL-TO-LOCK. THERE | | ARE NO ALLOWED OUT OF SERVICE TIMES FOR THE FP SYSTEMS BEING WORKED. THE | | PUMPS ARE TAKEN TO PULL-TO-LOCK TO PREVENT INADVERTENT PUMP AUTO STARTS | | WHILE THE FP SYSTEMS ARE BEING REFILLED FOLLOWING MAINTENANCE AND TO | | SUPPORT FLOW VERIFICATION TESTING." | | | | THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR HAS BEEN INFORMED BY THE LICENSEE. (SEE RELATED | | EVENT #30177). | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ |POWER REACTOR | |EVENT NUMBER: 30174 | +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ |FACILITY: BYRON REGION: 3 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 03/26/96 | |UNIT: [ ] [2] [ ] STATE: IL |NOTIFICATION TIME: 16:07 [ET]| |RX TYPE: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP |EVENT DATE: 03/26/96 | +------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 13:04[CST]| |NRC NOTIFIED BY: SHAW |LAST UPDATE DATE: 03/26/96 | |HQ OPS OFFICER: BOB STRANSKY +-----------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+ NOTIFICATIONS | |EMERGENCY CLASS: NOT APPLICABLE +-----------------------------+ |10 CFR SECTION: |LANKSBURY RDO | |AESF 50.72(b)(2)(ii) ESF ACTUATION | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +-----+----------+-------+--------+--------------+--+--------+-----------------+ |UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ | | | | | 2 | N Y 100 POWER OPERATION | 100 POWER OPERATION | | | | | +-----+---------------------------------------------+--------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | RCS LETDOWN ISOLATION DURING TESTING | | | | DURING PERFORMANCE OF AN ESFAS SLAVE RELAY SURVEILLANCE TEST FOR | | CONTAINMENT ISOLATION PHASE A, RCS LETDOWN ISOLATION VALVE 2-CV-8160 CLOSED | | AUTOMATICALLY. THE EVENT WAS CAUSED WHEN A JUMPER INSTALLED ON RELAY K-605 | | TO PREVENT VALVE CLOSURE POPPED OFF. LETDOWN RELIEF VALVE 2-CV-8117 | | LIFTED, AND DIRECTED FLOW TO THE PRESSURIZER RELIEF TANK. THE LICENSEE | | MANUALLY ISOLATED LETDOWN, AND REDUCED CHARGING FLOW TO COMPENSATE. THE | | RELIEF VALVE HAS RESEATED, AND NORMAL CHARGING AND LETDOWN FLOW PATHS HAVE | | BEEN RESTORED. | | | | THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR HAS BEEN INFORMED BY THE LICENSEE. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ |POWER REACTOR | |EVENT NUMBER: 30175 | +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ |FACILITY: VERMONT YANKEE REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 03/26/96 | |UNIT: [1] [ ] [ ] STATE: VT |NOTIFICATION TIME: 16:51 [ET]| |RX TYPE: [1] GE-4 |EVENT DATE: 03/26/96 | +------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 16:50[EST]| |NRC NOTIFIED BY: HENRIQUEZ |LAST UPDATE DATE: 03/26/96 | |HQ OPS OFFICER: BOB STRANSKY +-----------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+ NOTIFICATIONS | |EMERGENCY CLASS: NOT APPLICABLE +-----------------------------+ |10 CFR SECTION: |ROGGE RDO | |AOUT 50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B) OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +-----+----------+-------+--------+--------------+--+--------+-----------------+ |UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ | 1 | N Y 100 POWER OPERATION | 100 POWER OPERATION | | | | | | | | | +-----+---------------------------------------------+--------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | OPERATION AT SUPPRESSION POOL MAXIMUM OPERATING TEMPERATURE LIMIT MAY HAVE | | PLACED UNIT OUTSIDE OF DESIGN BASIS. | | | | THE INITIAL WORST-CASE CONTAINMENT ANALYSIS PERFORMED BY GENERAL ELECTRIC | | IN 1970 ASSUMED A LARGE BREAK LOSS-OF-COOLANT ACCIDENT WITH A LOSS OF | | NORMAL POWER AND NO FEEDWATER PUMPS AVAILABLE, AND AN INITIAL SUPPRESSION | | POOL TEMPERATURE OF 90øF. IN 1985, THE LICENSEE WAS GRANTED A TECHNICAL | | SPECIFICATION AMENDMENT (#88), WHICH PERMITTED THE INITIAL SUPPRESSION POOL | | TEMPERATURE TO BE INCREASED TO 100øF. | | | | IN 1981, NUREG-0783 STATED THAT THE WORST-CASE ANALYSIS SHOULD INCLUDE A | | LOCA WITH FEEDWATER FLOW TO THE REACTOR. THE ADDITIONAL MASS AND ENERGY | | RELEASED TO THE CONTAINMENT DUE TO THE FEEDWATER FLOW WOULD RESULT IN AN | | INCREASE IN PEAK SUPPRESSION POOL TEMPERATURE. THE LICENSEE DISCOVERED | | THAT FEEDWATER FLOW HAD NOT BEEN ACCOUNTED FOR IN THE ANALYSIS PERFORMED BY | | GE. ADDITIONALLY, THE LICENSEE HAS DETERMINED THAT A SMALL OR INTERMEDIATE | | BREAK LOCA COULD RESULT IN A HIGHER PEAK TEMPERATURE THAN THE LARGE BREAK | | LOCA. HOWEVER, THE ANALYSIS PERFORMED BY GE ASSUMED A MORE CONSERVATIVE | | DECAY HEAT MODEL (MAY-WITT) THAN USED BY GE IN RECENT ANALYSES. | | | | THE LICENSEE BELIEVES THAT THE CURRENT SUPPRESSION POOL ANALYSIS IS | | SUFFICIENTLY CONSERVATIVE, PROVIDED THE INITIAL SUPPRESSION POOL | | TEMPERATURE IS LIMITED TO 90øF. THE LICENSEE HAS IMPLEMENTED A STANDING | | ORDER THAT PROHIBITS PLANT OPERATION WITH A SUPPRESSION POOL TEMPERATURE OF | | MORE THAN 90øF. THE LICENSEE IS CURRENTLY REVIEWING APPLICABLE LICENSING | | DOCUMENTS TO DETERMINE THE EXACT LICENSING BASIS OF THE PLANT. THE NRC | | RESIDENT INSPECTOR WILL BE INFORMED BY THE LICENSEE. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ |POWER REACTOR | |EVENT NUMBER: 30176 | +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ |FACILITY: MILLSTONE REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 03/26/96 | |UNIT: [ ] [2] [ ] STATE: CT |NOTIFICATION TIME: 18:00 [ET]| |RX TYPE: [1] GE-3,[2] CE,[3] W-4-LP |EVENT DATE: 03/26/96 | +------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 17:34[EST]| |NRC NOTIFIED BY: BARREN |LAST UPDATE DATE: 03/26/96 | |HQ OPS OFFICER: BOB STRANSKY +-----------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+ NOTIFICATIONS | |EMERGENCY CLASS: NOT APPLICABLE +-----------------------------+ |10 CFR SECTION: |ROGGE RDO | |AIND 50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D) ACCIDENT MITIGATION | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +-----+----------+-------+--------+--------------+--+--------+-----------------+ |UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ | | | | | 2 | N N 0 COLD SHUTDOWN | 0 COLD SHUTDOWN | | | | | +-----+---------------------------------------------+--------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | LICENSEE HAS DISCOVERED THAT SEVERAL COMPONENTS MAY NOT BE FULLY | | ENVIRONMENTALLY QUALIFIED. | | | | THE LICENSEE HAS DETERMINED THAT SEVEN EQ SOLENOID VALVES MAY NOT BE FULLY | | QUALIFIED. THESE SOLENOID VALVES ARE USED IN SYSTEMS WHICH MAY HAVE TO BE | | MANIPULATED FOLLOWING A LOSS-OF-COOLANT ACCIDENT. THE LICENSEE PLANS TO | | FULLY QUALIFY THESE SOLENOID VALVES BEFORE STARTUP. | | | | THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR HAS BEEN INFORMED BY THE LICENSEE. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ |POWER REACTOR | |EVENT NUMBER: 30177 | +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ |FACILITY: COOPER REGION: 4 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 03/26/96 | |UNIT: [1] [ ] [ ] STATE: NE |NOTIFICATION TIME: 18:13 [ET]| |RX TYPE: [1] GE-4 |EVENT DATE: 03/26/96 | +------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 15:56[CST]| |NRC NOTIFIED BY: GREEN |LAST UPDATE DATE: 03/26/96 | |HQ OPS OFFICER: BOB STRANSKY +-----------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+ NOTIFICATIONS | |EMERGENCY CLASS: NOT APPLICABLE +-----------------------------+ |10 CFR SECTION: |MURRAY RDO | |NLTR LICENSEE 24 HR REPORT | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +-----+----------+-------+--------+--------------+--+--------+-----------------+ |UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ | 1 | N Y 100 POWER OPERATION | 100 POWER OPERATION | | | | | | | | | +-----+---------------------------------------------+--------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | LICENSEE 24-HOUR REPORT DUE TO FIRE SUPPRESSION SYSTEM BEING MOMENTARILY | | INOPERABLE DURING MAINTENANCE. | | | | THE FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF A FACSIMILE SUBMITTED BY THE LICENSEE: | | | | "ON 3/26/96, FROM 1556 TO 1600 CST, BOTH STATION FIRE PUMPS WERE TAKEN TO | | PULL-TO-LOCK TO SUPPORT FIRE PROTECTION (FP) RESTORATION AFTER SCHEDULED | | MAINTENANCE. PLACING BOTH FIRE PUMPS IN PULL-TO-LOCK RENDERED THE FIRE | | WATER SUPPRESSION SYSTEM INOPERABLE FOR APPROXIMATELY FOUR MINUTES. IN | | ACCORDANCE WITH TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION SECTION 3.15.C.2.a, THIS 24-HOUR | | REPORT IS BEING MADE. A WRITTEN REPORT WILL BE PROVIDED WITHIN ONE WORKING | | DAY IN ACCORDANCE WITH TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION SECTION 3.15.C.2.b. THE | | PUMPS AND SYSTEM HAVE BEEN RESTORED TO OPERABLE STATUS. DURING THE EVENT, | | THE FIRE PUMPS WERE AVAILABLE FOR MANUAL INITIATION SINCE ONLY THE | | AUTOMATIC START FEATURE WAS DISABLED BY PLACING THEM IN PULL-TO-LOCK. THERE | | ARE NO ALLOWED OUT OF SERVICE TIMES FOR THE FP SYSTEMS BEING WORKED. THE | | PUMPS ARE TAKEN TO PULL-TO-LOCK TO PREVENT INADVERTENT PUMP AUTO STARTS | | WHILE THE FP SYSTEMS ARE BEING REFILLED FOLLOWING MAINTENANCE AND TO | | SUPPORT FLOW VERIFICATION TESTING." | | | | THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR HAS BEEN INFORMED BY THE LICENSEE. (SEE RELATED | | EVENT #30173). | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ |POWER REACTOR | |EVENT NUMBER: 30178 | +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ |FACILITY: COMANCHE PEAK REGION: 4 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 03/26/96 | |UNIT: [1] [2] [ ] STATE: TX |NOTIFICATION TIME: 18:33 [ET]| |RX TYPE: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP |EVENT DATE: 03/26/96 | +------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 16:15[CST]| |NRC NOTIFIED BY: HALL |LAST UPDATE DATE: 03/26/96 | |HQ OPS OFFICER: BOB STRANSKY +-----------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+ NOTIFICATIONS | |EMERGENCY CLASS: NOT APPLICABLE +-----------------------------+ |10 CFR SECTION: |MURRAY RDO | |AINC 50.72(b)(2)(iii)(C) POT UNCNTRL RAD REL | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +-----+----------+-------+--------+--------------+--+--------+-----------------+ |UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ | 1 | N Y 100 POWER OPERATION | 100 POWER OPERATION | | 2 | N N 0 REFUELING | 0 REFUELING | | | | | +-----+---------------------------------------------+--------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | NON-ENVIRONMENTALLY QUALIFIED COMPONENTS IN CONTAINMENT PERSONNEL AIRLOCKS | | COULD FAIL UNDER HARSH ENVIRONMENT CONDITIONS. | | | | THE FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF A FACSIMILE SUBMITTED BY THE LICENSEE: | | | | "A CONDITION EXISTS THAT WHEN THE PERSONNEL AIRLOCKS ARE IN USE AND EXPOSED | | TO A POST-ACCIDENT HARSH ENVIRONMENT, THERE IS A POTENTIAL FOR | | NON-QUALIFIED COMPONENTS TO FAIL AND CAUSE THE AIRLOCK EQUALIZATION VALVES | | TO OPEN, PROVIDING A PATH TO THE ENVIRONMENT. NORMALLY, THE HYDRAULIC | | SYSTEM TO THE AIRLOCK IS KEPT ISOLATED AND THIS CONDITION CAN NOT OCCUR ON | | UNIT 1. ON UNIT 2, THE INNER DOOR OR EQUALIZATION VALVE MUST BE OPEN TO | | INTRODUCE THE HARSH ENVIRONMENT TO THE INTERIOR OF THE AIRLOCK FOR THIS | | EVENT TO OCCUR. COMPENSATORY MEASURES HAVE BEEN TAKEN FOR UNIT 1 TO PREVENT | | THE OPENING OF THE HYDRAULIC VALVES. UNIT 2 WILL CORRECT THE CONDITION | | PRIOR TO ENTERING MODE 4. | | | | THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR HAS BEEN INFORMED BY THE LICENSEE. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ |POWER REACTOR | |EVENT NUMBER: 30179 | +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ |FACILITY: FERMI REGION: 3 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 03/27/96 | |UNIT: [2] [ ] [ ] STATE: MI |NOTIFICATION TIME: 02:16 [ET]| |RX TYPE: [2] GE-4 |EVENT DATE: 03/27/96 | +------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 01:35[EST]| |NRC NOTIFIED BY: PETERSON |LAST UPDATE DATE: 03/27/96 | |HQ OPS OFFICER: CHAUNCEY GOULD +-----------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+ NOTIFICATIONS | |EMERGENCY CLASS: UNUSUAL EVENT +-----------------------------+ |10 CFR SECTION: |ROGER LANKSBURY RDO | |AAEC 50.72(a)(1)(i) EMERGENCY DECLARED |LEE SPESSARD EO | |ASHU 50.72(b)(1)(i)(A) PLANT S/D REQD BY TS |BAGWELL FEMA | |AUNA 50.72(b)(1)(ii)(A) UNANALYZED COND OP | | | | | | | | +-----+----------+-------+--------+--------------+--+--------+-----------------+ |UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ | 2 | N Y 81 POWER OPERATION | 81 POWER OPERATION | | | | | | | | | +-----+---------------------------------------------+--------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | THE LICENSEE IS SHUTTING THE PLANT DOWN DUE TO BOTH TRAINS OF THE EMERGENCY | | EQUIPMENT COOLING WATER (EECW) SYSTEM BEING INOPERABLE. | | | | A NOT-PREVIOUSLY CONSIDERED CONDITION WAS DISCOVERED, DURING A SERVICE | | WATER OPERATIONAL PERFORMANCE INSPECTION, WHICH COULD POTENTIALLY RENDER | | BOTH TRAINS OF THE EECW SYSTEM INOPERABLE. THE EECW SYSTEM HAS ONE MAKEUP | | TANK FOR EACH TRAIN TO PROVIDE MAKEUP WATER TO ACCOUNT FOR SYSTEM LEAKAGE. | | NITROGEN IS USED TO PRESSURIZE THE TANKS TO MAINTAIN SUFFICIENT SYSTEM | | PRESSURE FOR PROPER OPERATION. THE DEMINERALIZED WATER SYSTEM (WHICH | | PROVIDES MAKEUP WATER) AND THE NITROGEN SUPPLY SYSTEM ARE NOT SAFETY | | RELATED. | | | | IN THE EVENT OF AN ACCIDENT OR SEISMIC EVENT, NO CREDIT IS TAKEN FOR | | OPERATION OF THE DEMINERALIZED WATER OR NITROGEN SUPPLY SYSTEMS. THE EECW | | MAKEUP TANK IS ISOLATED FROM THESE SYSTEMS, BUT NITROGEN LEAKAGE FROM THE | | TANK THROUGH THE NITROGEN SUPPLY LINE, DEMINERALIZED WATER SUPPLY LINE, OR | | MAKEUP TANK RELIEF VALVES IS EXPECTED TO CAUSE MAKEUP TANK NITROGEN | | PRESSURE TO DECAY IN A SHORT AMOUNT OF TIME. WITH THE MAKEUP TANK | | DEPRESSURIZED, PRESSURE IN THE EECW TRAIN WILL FALL TO A LEVEL THAT PUMP | | CAVITATION AND/OR AIR BINDING COULD OCCUR. THIS CONDITION COULD EFFECT BOTH | | TRAINS OF EECW. THE UFSAR FAILURE MODES AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS FOR THE EECW | | SYSTEM DESCRIBES A FAILURE OF A SINGLE ISOLATION VALVE ON THE MAKEUP TANK | | OUTLET LINE THAT WOULD BOUND THIS FAILURE, BUT IT TAKES CREDIT FOR THE | | AVAILABILITY OF THE REMAINING TRAIN. IN THIS CASE, THE LOSS OF BOTH MAKEUP | | TANKS HAS NOT BEEN PREVIOUSLY ANALYZED. WITH BOTH TRAINS OF EECW BEING | | DECLARED INOPERABLE, THE PLANT ENTERED TS 3.0.3 @ 01:35 AND PREPARED FOR | | SHUTDOWN. THE UNUSUAL EVENT WAS DECLARED AT 02:12 WITH THE COMMENCEMENT OF | | SHUTDOWN. THE RI WILL BE INFORMED ALONG WITH STATE, LOCAL & OTHER AGENCIES. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+