U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Operations Center Event Reports For 11/21/96 - 11/22/96 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** 30934 31197 31258 31364 31365 31366 31367 31368 !!!!!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!!! +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ |POWER REACTOR | |EVENT NUMBER: 30934 | +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ |FACILITY: WATERFORD REGION: 4 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 08/28/96 | |UNIT: [3] [ ] [ ] STATE: LA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 21:03 [ET]| |RX TYPE: [3] CE |EVENT DATE: 08/22/96 | +------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 01:18[CDT]| |NRC NOTIFIED BY: DAVID LITOFF |LAST UPDATE DATE: 11/21/96 | |HQ OPS OFFICER: JOHN MacKINNON +-----------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+ NOTIFICATIONS | |EMERGENCY CLASS: NOT APPLICABLE +-----------------------------+ |10 CFR SECTION: |DALE POWERS RDO | |NLTR LICENSEE 24 HR REPORT | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +-----+----------+-------+--------+--------------+--+--------+-----------------+ |UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ | 3 | N Y 100 POWER OPERATION | 100 POWER OPERATION | | | | | | | | | +-----+---------------------------------------------+--------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | POTENTIALLY VIOLATING LICENSE CONDITION 2.C, MAXIMUM POWER LEVEL, BY 0.5%. | | | | ON 08/22/96, THE CORE OPERATING LIMITS SUPERVISOR SYSTEM (COLSS) MAIN STEAM | | SECONDARY CALORIMETRIC (MSBSCAL) POWER VALIDITY CHECK ALARM WAS RECEIVED | | AND LOCKED IN FOR SEVERAL MINUTES. THE CAUSE OF THE ALARM WAS A DIFFERENCE | | BETWEEN MSBSCAL AND TWO OTHER POWER INDICATIONS, TURBINE FIRST STAGE | | PRESSURE (BTFSP) AND FEEDWATER SECONDARY CALORIMETRIC (FWBSCAL). PER | | PROCEDURE, MSBSCAL WAS REMOVED FROM SERVICE, AND FWBSCAL WAS RETURNED TO | | SERVICE RESULTING IN A DECREASE IN NET ELECTRICAL GENERATION BY | | APPROXIMATELY 14 MW. PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION INTO THIS CONDITION | | INDICATES THAT MSBSCAL, WHICH IS THE PRIMARY INDICATION USED BY THE | | OPERATORS TO MAINTAIN REACTOR POWER AT 100%, MAY BE INDICATING LESS THAN | | ACTUAL THERMAL POWER BY APPROXIMATELY 0.5%. INDICATIONS ARE THAT THIS | | CONDITION HAS DEVELOPED GRADUALLY OVER TIME AND IS INDICATIVE OF INSTRUMENT | | DRIFT. TREND DATA ON FEEDWATER FLOW AND CONDENSATE FLOW SINCE REFUELING | | OUTAGE #7 (NOV. 1995) INDICATE A GRADUAL BUT SLIGHT INCREASE (APPROXIMATELY | | 0.5%) IN THERMAL POWER WHICH MSBSCAL DID NOT REFLECT. BASED UPON THE | | ABOVE, IT APPEARS THAT WATERFORD UNIT 3 MAY HAVE OPERATED IN EXCESS OF THE | | 100% LICENSED POWER LIMIT BUT NOT IN EXCESS OF THE DESIGN BASIS LIMIT OF | | 102% POWER. THE LICENSEE IS CURRENTLY USING THE MOST CONSERVATIVE | | INDICATION OF REACTOR POWER, FWBSCAL. THIS REPORT WAS MADE PER LICENSE | | CONDITION 2.F. THE LICENSEE IS STILL INVESTIGATING THIS INCIDENT. | | | | THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR WILL BE INFORMED BY THE LICENSEE. | | | | * * * UPDATE 2025 EST ON 11/21/96, FROM OSCAR PIPKINS BY S. SANDIN * * * | | | | THE LICENSEE IS RETRACTING THIS EVENT. THE FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF A FACSIMILE | | SUBMITTED BY THE LICENSEE: | | | | "ON 8/28/96 AT 2013 EASTERN STANDARD TIME, WATERFORD 3 CALLED THE NRC | | OPERATIONS CENTER AND REPORTED A POTENTIAL OPERATION ABOVE LICENSED REACTOR | | POWER (EVENT #30934). IT WAS REPORTED AT THAT TIME THAT ON 8/22/96 THE | | CORE OPERATING LIMITS SUPERVISORY SYSTEM (COLSS) MAIN STEAM SECONDARY | | CALORIMETRIC (MSBSCAL) POWER VALIDITY CHECK ALARM WAS RECEIVED AND LOCKED | | IN FOR SEVERAL MINUTES. THE CAUSE OF THE ALARM WAS A DIFFERENCE BETWEEN | | MSBSCAL AND TWO OTHER POWER INDICATIONS, TURBINE FIRST STAGE PRESSURE | | (BTFSP) AND FEEDWATER SECONDARY CALORIMETRIC (FWBSCAL). MSBSCAL IS THE | | PRIMARY SELECTED INDICATION USED BY OPERATIONS TO MAINTAIN REACTOR POWER AT | | 100%. PER PROCEDURE, MSBSCAL WAS REMOVED FROM SERVICE AND FWBSCAL WAS | | RETURNED TO SERVICE, RESULTING IN A DECREASE IN NET ELECTRICAL GENERATION | | BY APPROXIMATELY 14 MW. SUBSEQUENT INVESTIGATIONS AND ROOT CAUSE ANALYSIS | | HAVE CONCLUDED THAT MSBSCAL WAS PERFORMING ACCURATELY AND THAT THE PLANT | | DID NOT OPERATE ABOVE LICENSED 100% POWER. THE CONCLUDED CAUSE OF THE | | GRADUAL DIVERGENCE OF REACTOR POWER INDICATIONS WAS A COMBINATION OF | | ADDITIONAL FEEDWATER VENTURI FOULING, THE GRADUAL UPWARD DRIFT OF THE | | FEEDWATER FLOW TRANSMITTERS AND THE CALIBRATION OF THE TURBINE FIRST STAGE | | PRESSURE TRANSMITTER. WATERFORD 3 IS CURRENTLY OPERATING IN MODE 1 AT 61% | | POWER DUE TO A FEEDWATER PUMP B OUTAGE. THE PLANT WILL RETURN TO MSBSCAL | | AS THE PRIMARY INDICATION USED BY OPERATORS TO MAINTAIN REACTOR POWER AT | | 100%. THEREFORE, THIS CALL IS TO RETRACT THE EARLIER (8/28/96) 10 CFR 50.72 | | CALL TO THE NRC OPERATIONS CENTER. LER-96-013 IS BEING CANCELED." | | | | THE LICENSEE INFORMED THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR. THE NRC OPERATIONS | | CENTER NOTIFIED THE R4DO (JOHNSON). | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ !!!!!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!!! +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ |POWER REACTOR | |EVENT NUMBER: 31197 | +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ |FACILITY: BIG ROCK POINT REGION: 3 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 10/23/96 | |UNIT: [1] [ ] [ ] STATE: MI |NOTIFICATION TIME: 11:55 [ET]| |RX TYPE: [1] GE-1 |EVENT DATE: 10/23/96 | +------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 11:15[EDT]| |NRC NOTIFIED BY: G. C. WITHROW |LAST UPDATE DATE: 11/21/96 | |HQ OPS OFFICER: JOHN MacKINNON +-----------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+ NOTIFICATIONS | |EMERGENCY CLASS: NOT APPLICABLE +-----------------------------+ |10 CFR SECTION: |BRUCE JORGENSEN RDO | |AOUT 50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B) OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +-----+----------+-------+--------+--------------+--+--------+-----------------+ |UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ | 1 | N Y 95 POWER OPERATION | 95 POWER OPERATION | | | | | | | | | +-----+---------------------------------------------+--------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | A REVISED CONTAINMENT ANALYSIS INDICATES THAT ANALYSIS OF THE FINAL SAFETY | | ANALYSIS REPORT UNDERESTIMATED PLANT RESPONSE TO A LARGE STEAM LINE BREAK. | | | | A REVISED CONTAINMENT ANALYSIS INDICATES THAT THE ANALYSIS OF THE FINAL | | SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT FIGURE 3.4 (PAGE 3.11-8) UNDERESTIMATED PLANT | | RESPONSE TO LARGE STEAM LINE BREAKS. BIG ROCK POINT WAS NOT MADE AWARE OF | | THE DISCREPANCY DISCOVERED BY NUS/PALISADES IN 1990 AND CORRECTED FOR | | PALISADES AT THAT TIME. DURING CONVERSION OF CONTEMPT CODE (CONTAINMENT | | ANALYSIS COMPUTER CODE) FROM A MAINFRAME TO A PERSONAL COMPUTER VERSION, AN | | ERROR WAS DISCOVERED WHICH INVOLVED SPRAY SUPERHEAT EFFICIENCY. THIS MAY | | RESULT IN A ~ 65øF UNDERESTIMATION OF THE ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT | | QUALIFICATION PROFILE CURVE. INITIAL THERMAL RESPONSE REVIEW INDICATES THAT | | ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT QUALIFICATION COMPONENT HAVING LOWER THAN A 325øF | | QUALIFICATION WILL NOT EXPERIENCE A TEMPERATURE RISE DURING POSTULATED | | ACCIDENTS THAT WILL EXCEED THEIR QUALIFICATION. THUS SOME COMPONENTS ARE | | CONSIDERED NONCONFORMING BUT OPERABLE UNTIL FINALIZATION OF ANALYSIS CAN BE | | COMPLETE. THE PLANT WILL BE SHUTDOWN WITHIN THE NEXT 24 HOURS AND WILL | | REMAIN SHUTDOWN UNTIL A REVISED ANALYSIS IS COMPLETED. | | | | THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR WAS INFORMED BY THE LICENSEE BY THE LICENSEE. | | | | * * * UPDATE 1300 EST 11/21/96, FROM MICHAEL BOURASSA BY S. SANDIN * * * | | | | THE LICENSEE IS RETRACTING THIS EVENT BASED ON THE FOLLOWING: | | | | "THE PURPOSE OF THIS COMMUNICATION IS TO RETRACT A ONE-HOUR NONEMERGENCY | | REPORT THAT WAS MADE ON OCTOBER 23, 1996 AT 1115. A LICENSEE EVENT REPORT | | WILL NOT BE SUBMITTED." | | | | "THE 10CFR50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B) REPORT WAS CLASSIFIED AS A CONDITION OUTSIDE | | THE DESIGN BASIS." | | | | "ON OCTOBER 23, 1996, 0730, PROBLEMS WERE CONFIRMED IN A STATION COMPUTER | | CODE. THE CODE, NUS CONTEMPT-LT/28 NO-VENT MODEL, WAS USED TO DETERMINE | | PEAK CONTAINMENT TEMPERATURE RESPONSE TO POSTULATED LOSS OF COOLING | | ACCIDENTS (LOCAs) AND MAIN STEAM LINE BREAKS (MSLBs). AN ANALYSIS OF THE | | .63ý STEAM LINE BREAK WITHOUT CONTAINMENT VENTILATION OPERATING REVEALED | | INCONSISTENT RESULTS COMPARED TO THE LOSS OF COOLING ACCIDENT/MAIN STEAM | | LINE BREAK (LOCA/MSLB) TEMPERATURE PROFILE, FIGURE 3-4 IN THE UFHSR. THESE | | INCONSISTENCIES LED MANAGEMENT TO CONCLUDE THAT AN ORDERLY SHUTDOWN OF THE | | REACTOR WAS NECESSARY WHILE THESE INCONSISTENCIES WERE INVESTIGATED." | | | | "THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WAS NOTIFIED OF THE DISCOVERY AT 1115, | | AND THE PLANT COMMENCED A NORMAL AND ORDERLY SHUTDOWN AT 1135. COLD | | SHUTDOWN WAS REACHED AT 1123 ON OCTOBER 24, 1996." | | | | "AN INCORRECT MODIFICATION WAS MADE TO THE COMPUTER CODE IN 1983 AND THE | | CODE WAS SUBSEQUENTLY USED TO PERFORM ANALYSES FOR BIG ROCK POINT. IN | | SEPTEMBER 1990, THE VENDOR IDENTIFIED AND CORRECTED THE ERROR, BUT THE | | DISCREPANCY WAS NOT EFFECTIVELY COMMUNICATED TO THE BIG ROCK POINT STAFF. | | THE PROGRAM HAS NOT BEEN USED UNTIL RECENTLY WHEN A DISCREPANCY IN THE PEAK | | CONTAINMENT TEMPERATURE RESPONSE WAS NOTED. THE BIG ROCK POINT STAFF | | RE-EVALUATED THE CONTAINMENT RESPONSE TO THE HYPOTHETICAL DESIGN BASE | | ACCIDENTS AND CONCLUDED THAT THE CONTAINMENT RESPONSE WAS UNCHANGED. THE | | DESIGN BASES IS NOT ALTERED. LONG TERM CORRECTIVE ACTIONS WILL ADDRESS THE | | COMMUNICATION DEFICIENCY AND INCORPORATE ADDITIONAL MARGIN TO THE LOCA/MSLB | | TEMPERATURE PROFILE (FIGURE 3-4)." | | | | "THE PLANT WAS RETURNED TO SERVICE NOVEMBER 3, 1996." | | | | THE LICENSEE INFORMED THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR. THE NRC OPERATIONS | | CENTER NOTIFIED THE R3DO (SHEAR). | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ !!!!!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!!! +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ |POWER REACTOR | |EVENT NUMBER: 31258 | +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ |FACILITY: HADDAM NECK REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 10/31/96 | |UNIT: [1] [ ] [ ] STATE: CT |NOTIFICATION TIME: 12:35 [ET]| |RX TYPE: [1] W-4-LP |EVENT DATE: 10/31/96 | +------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 12:31[EST]| |NRC NOTIFIED BY: MONTALVO AND SILBERQUIT |LAST UPDATE DATE: 11/21/96 | |HQ OPS OFFICER: LEIGH TROCINE +-----------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+ NOTIFICATIONS | |EMERGENCY CLASS: NOT APPLICABLE +-----------------------------+ |10 CFR SECTION: |MOHAMED SHANBAKY RDO | |AIND 50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D) ACCIDENT MITIGATION | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +-----+----------+-------+--------+--------------+--+--------+-----------------+ |UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ | 1 | N N 0 COLD SHUTDOWN | 0 COLD SHUTDOWN | | | | | | | | | +-----+---------------------------------------------+--------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | POTENTIAL FOR THE LOSS OF THE '2A' EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR (EDG) DURING | | A HYPOTHETICAL EVENT INVOLVING A LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER (LOOP) COINCIDENT | | WITH A DESIGN BASIS LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT (LOCA) AND THE FAILURE OF THE | | '2B' EDG | | | | THE LICENSEE HAS BEEN IN THE PROCESS OF REVISING THE EDG ACCIDENT LOADING | | ANALYSIS AND HAS REVISED THE COMPUTER SIMULATION OF THE EDG RESPONSE TO | | LOADING OF THE EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM LOADS. DURING THIS PROCESS, | | THE LICENSEE DISCOVERED A CONDITION THAT COULD RESULT IN THE LOSS OF THE | | '2A' EDG DURING A HYPOTHETICAL EVENT INVOLVING A LOOP COINCIDENT WITH A | | DESIGN BASIS LARGE BREAK LOCA AND THE FAILURE OF THE '2B' EDG. AT THIS | | FACILITY, THE '2A' EDG SUPPLIES POWER TO SAFETY INJECTION TRAIN 'B', AND | | THE '2B' EDG SUPPLIES POWER TO SAFETY INJECTION TRAIN 'A'. | | | | THE LICENSEE'S MODEL OF AN EVENT INVOLVING A LOOP/LOCA WITH A FAILURE OF | | THE '2B' EDG HAS DETERMINED THAT THE INITIAL LOADING SEQUENCE FOR THE '2A' | | EDG WOULD BE SUCCESSFUL. ONE OF THE SUBSEQUENT STEPS THAT WAS MODELED | | INVOLVED THE SWITCHING OF HIGH PRESSURE SAFETY INJECTION (HPSI) OVER TO | | SUMP RECIRCULATION PER THE EMERGENCY OPERATING PROCEDURES. DURING THIS | | PROCESS, THE 'B' HPSI PUMP WOULD BE RESTARTED FOLLOWING HPSI SYSTEM | | RE-ALIGNMENT TO THE CONTAINMENT SUMP. WHEN THIS OCCURS, THE MODEL HAS | | SHOWN THAT IT TAKES APPROXIMATELY 13.5 TO 14 SECONDS FOR THE PUMP TO | | RESTART. ALTHOUGH THE COMPUTER ANALYSIS SHOWS THAT THE PUMP WOULD | | SUCCESSFULLY START AFTER 14 SECONDS, THE AUTHORS OF THE ANALYSIS ARE NOT | | CONFIDENT THAT THE ANALYSIS IS NOW REPLICATING THAT THE EQUIPMENT WILL | | FUNCTION BECAUSE OF THE EXCESSIVE AMOUNT OF TIME FOR THE HPSI PUMP TO | | RESTART. THE AUTHORS ARE NOT CONFIDENT THAT THE '2A' EDG WOULD SUCCEED IN | | STARTING THE 'B' HPSI PUMP AND BELIEVE THAT THIS WOULD CAUSE THE '2A' EDG | | TO FAIL. BECAUSE THE LICENSEE CANNOT CONCLUDE SUCCESSFUL PERFORMANCE, IT | | IS CONSIDERING THE '2A' EDG TO BE INOPERABLE. THE UNIT IS NOT CURRENTLY IN | | ANY TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION AS A RESULT | | OF THIS ISSUE BECAUSE OF THE CURRENT MODE OF OPERATION. | | | | THE LICENSEE NOTIFIED THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR AND PLANS TO NOTIFY THE | | STATE. | | | | **RETRACTION FROM BOWER/SILBERQUIT @ 1144 ON 11/19/96, TAKEN BY MACKINNON** | | | | BASED UPON FURTHER EVALUATION OF PRE-EXISTING LOADS ON THE EDG FOR THE | | SERVICE WATER PUMPS AND THE CONTAINMENT AIR RECIRCULATION FANS, IT HAS BEEN | | DETERMINED THAT WITHIN APPROXIMATELY 5 SECONDS AFTER A MANUAL ACTUATION OF | | THE HPSI FOR SUMP RECIRCULATION, HPSI WILL BE FULLY FUNCTIONAL. THEREFORE, | | BASED UPON HPSI BEING FULLY FUNCTIONAL WITHIN APPROXIMATELY 5 SECONDS OF | | BEING MANUALLY STARTED, THIS EVENT REPORT IS BEING RETRACTED. | | | | THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR HAS BEEN NOTIFIED OF THIS EVENT. THE R1DO | | (BARKLEY) WAS NOTIFIED BY THE NRC OPERATIONS CENTER. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ |OTHER NUCLEAR MATERIAL | |EVENT NUMBER: 31364 | +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ |LICENSEE: S. C. JOHNSON & SON, INC. |NOTIFICATION DATE: 11/21/96 | | CITY: MT. PLEASANT REGION: 3 |NOTIFICATION TIME: 10:12 [ET]| | COUNTY: RACINE STATE: WI |EVENT DATE: 11/20/96 | |LICENSE#: 48-06453-01 AGREEMENT: N |EVENT TIME: 09:00[CST]| | DOCKET: |LAST UPDATE DATE: 11/21/96 | | +-----------------------------+ | |PERSON ORGANIZATION| | |GARY SHEAR RDO | | | | +------------------------------------------------+ | |NRC NOTIFIED BY: THOMAS STOCKDALE | | |HQ OPS OFFICER: LEIGH TROCINE | | +------------------------------------------------+ | |EMERGENCY CLASS: NOT APPLICABLE | | |10 CFR SECTION: | | |BAB2 20.2201(a)(1)(ii) LOST/STOLEN LNM>10X | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +------------------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | S. C. JOHNSON & SON, INC. LOCATED IN MT. PLEASANT, WISCONSIN DISCOVERED | | THAT A 300-MILLICURIE AMERICIUM-241 SEALED SOURCE WAS MISSING. | | | | LATE IN AUGUST OF 1996, A FILLTECH CASE SCANNER USED FOR DETECTING THE | | FULLNESS OF AEROSOL CANS WAS REMOVED FROM AN ASSEMBLY LINE AND WAS SET | | ASIDE. THE SCANNER UNIT HAD A LARGE FRAME WITH A RECEIVER AND TELEVISION | | MONITOR. IT ALSO HAD A LABELLED BOX (THE SIZE OF A SHOE BOX) WITH A | | SHUTTER WHICH CONTAINED A 300-MILLICURIE, 4-INCH BY 4-INCH BY 4-INCH, | | SEALED, AMERICIUM-241 SOURCE. THE SCANNER UNIT WITH THE SOURCE WAS LATER | | MISTAKEN FOR SCRAP AND TAKEN TO A RECYCLING COMPANY AROUND OCTOBER 1, 1996. | | THE RECYCLING COMPANY RECOGNIZED THE LABELS ON THE BOX CONTAINING THE | | SOURCE AND REFUSED TO ACCEPT THE SCANNER. THE BOX CONTAINING THE SOURCE | | WAS THEN REMOVED, AND THE REST OF THE SCANNER UNIT (THE FRAME, RECEIVER, | | AND TELEVISION MONITOR) WAS TAKEN TO A SECOND RECYCLING COMPANY WHICH | | ACCEPTED IT. PORTIONS OF THIS UNIT HAVE SINCE BEEN RECOVERED BY THE | | LICENSEE. | | | | THE LICENSEE BECAME AWARE OF THE MISSING SOURCE ON NOVEMBER 13, 1996, AND | | INITIATED AN INVESTIGATION AND SEARCH OF ITS FACILITIES. THE LICENSEE HAS | | CONCLUDED THAT THE SOURCE WAS LOST ON NOVEMBER 20, 1996, AND HAS THEORIZED | | THAT DURING THE FIRST WEEK IN OCTOBER 1996, THE BOX CONTAINING THE SOURCE | | WAS POTENTIALLY PLACED IN A DUMPSTER AND TAKEN TO A LARGE REGIONAL LAND | | FILL IN FRANKLIN, WISCONSIN. THE LAND FILL HAS BEEN CONTACTED, AND IT DOES | | NOT HAVE RADIATION MONITORS. THE LAND FILL HAS DETERMINED THAT THE BOX | | CONTAINING THE SOURCE MAY BE LOCATED IN A 10 TO 40 ACRE AREA. IT HAS BEEN | | ESTIMATED THAT THE BOX CONTAINING THE SOURCE MAY BE 10 TO 15 FEET DEEP, AND | | IT MAY BE COVERED BY 10 TO 20 FEET OF GARBAGE. THE SCANNER UNIT VENDOR | | (INDUSTRIAL DYNAMICS) INDICATED THAT IF THE BOX CONTAINING THE SOURCE WAS | | PLACED NEXT TO AN INDIVIDUAL FOR 10 MINUTES WITH THE SHUTTER OPEN, THEN THE | | INDIVIDUAL WOULD RECEIVED A DOSE APPROXIMATELY EQUIVALENT TO THAT OF A | | CHEST X-RAY. | | | | ON NOVEMBER 20, 1996, THE LICENSEE NOTIFIED THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION | | AGENCY (NATIONAL RESPONSE CENTER) AND THE NRC REGION 3 (SLAWINSKI AND | | WEIDEMAN). NRC REGION 3 DISPATCHED TWO INSPECTORS (SLAWINSKI AND GATTONE) | | TO THE SITE ON NOVEMBER 21, 1996. (REFER TO THE HOO LOG FOR THE LICENSEE'S | | STREET ADDRESS AND TELEPHONE NUMBER.) | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ |POWER REACTOR | |EVENT NUMBER: 31365 | +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ |FACILITY: RIVER BEND REGION: 4 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 11/21/96 | |UNIT: [1] [ ] [ ] STATE: LA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 11:59 [ET]| |RX TYPE: [1] GE-6 |EVENT DATE: 11/21/96 | +------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 08:00[CST]| |NRC NOTIFIED BY: VERNON CARLSON |LAST UPDATE DATE: 11/21/96 | |HQ OPS OFFICER: STEVE SANDIN +-----------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+ NOTIFICATIONS | |EMERGENCY CLASS: NOT APPLICABLE +-----------------------------+ |10 CFR SECTION: |WILLIAM JOHNSON RDO | |AIND 50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D) ACCIDENT MITIGATION | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +-----+----------+-------+--------+--------------+--+--------+-----------------+ |UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ | 1 | N Y 100 POWER OPERATION | 100 POWER OPERATION | | | | | | | | | +-----+---------------------------------------------+--------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | GE NUCLEAR ENERGY NOTIFIED THE LICENSEE OF AN ERROR IN A COMPUTER CODE USED | | TO CALCULATE THE PEAK CLAD TEMPERATURE. | | | | "ON NOVEMBER 21, 1996 GE INFORMED RIVER BEND STATION (RBS) OF AN INPUT | | ERROR IN THE GEGAP CODE. THE GEGAP CODE IS USED TO CALCULATE FUEL PELLET | | TO FUEL CLADDING HEAT TRANSFER THAT IS INPUT TO SAFE/REFLOOD CODE THAT | | CALCULATES THE PEAK CLAD TEMPERATURE (PCT) FOR RBS TO DETERMINE CONFORMANCE | | WITH EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM (ECCS) PERFORMANCE CRITERIA IN | | 10CFR50.46. GE HAS DETERMINED THAT THIS INPUT ERROR WILL INCREASE THE PCT | | BY APPROXIMATELY 15øF. THE CURRENT LICENSING BASIS PCT FOR RBS IS 2189øF. | | THEREFORE THIS INPUT ERROR WOULD LIKELY CAUSE THE PCT FOR RBS TO BE OVER | | 2200øF WHICH IS THE ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA IN 10CFR50.46. THE IMMEDIATE | | ACTION TAKEN WAS VERIFICATION THAT CURRENT MAPRAT VALUE IS BELOW 0.97. THIS | | CONDITION IS BEING REPORTED AS A CONDITION THAT ALONE COULD HAVE PREVENTED | | THE MAPLHGR SAFETY FUNCTION OF MAINTAINING THE FUEL PCT BELOW 2200øF. | | THEREFORE, THIS CONDITION IS REPORTABLE UNDER 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(2)(iii)(D)." | | | | "THIS ERROR APPLIES TO PLANTS THAT CURRENTLY USE SAFE/REFLOOD ECCS | | METHODOLOGY AND HAVE GE11 FUEL. THE ERROR AFFECTS THE CALCULATION OF FUEL | | PELLET DENSIFICATION AS A FUNCTION OF EXPOSURE. FUEL PELLET DENSIFICATION | | AFFECTS THE HEAT TRANSFER BETWEEN THE FUEL AND THE CLADDING. HEAT TRANSFER | | BETWEEN THE FUEL AND CLADDING IS AN IMPORTANT PARAMETER IN CALCULATING PCT. | | THIS AFFECT ON PCT CAN BE OFFSET BY ADMINISTRATIVELY CONTROLLING MAPLHGR | | LIMITS. THIS IS ACCOMPLISHED BY APPLYING A PENALTY ON MAPRAT. GE HAS | | STATED THAT A 1% PENALTY IN MAPRAT WILL CAUSE THE CALCULATED PCT TO REDUCE | | BY ABOUT 15øF AND RECOMMENDS THAT RBS APPLY A 3% ADMINISTRATIVE PENALTY. | | THIS WILL ENSURE AMPLE MARGIN (~45øF) TO THE 2200øF LIMIT TO ACCOUNT FOR | | THE 15øF INCREASE." | | | | "GE DID NOT GIVE DETAILS OF THE NATURE OF THE ERROR OR ITS POTENTIAL CAUSE. | | THE IMMEDIATE ACTION TAKEN WAS VERIFICATION WITH REACTOR ENGINEERING THAT | | CURRENT MAPRAT VALUE IS BELOW 0.97, CURRENTLY LESS THAN 0.90." | | | | "RBS INTENDS TO ADMINISTRATIVELY CONTROL MAPRAT TO 0.97 (3% PENALTY | | RESULTING IN ABOUT 45øF) TO PROTECT PCT UNTIL FURTHER LONG TERM ACTIONS ARE | | TAKEN." | | | | THE LICENSEE WILL INFORM THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ |FUEL CYCLE FACILITY | |EVENT NUMBER: 31366 | +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ |FACILITY: SIEMENS POWER CORPORATION |NOTIFICATION DATE: 11/21/96 | | RXTYPE: URANIUM FUEL FABRICATION |NOTIFICATION TIME: 15:40 [ET]| |COMMENTS: LEU CONVERSION (UF6 to UO2) |EVENT DATE: 11/21/96 | | FABRICATION & SCRAP RECOVERY |EVENT TIME: 00:00[PST]| | COMMERICAL LWR FUEL |LAST UPDATE DATE: 11/21/96 | | CITY: RICHLAND REGION: 4 +-----------------------------+ | COUNTY: BENTON STATE: WA |PERSON ORGANIZATION| |LICENSE#: SNM-1227 AGREEMENT: Y | | | DOCKET: 07001257 | | +------------------------------------------------+VERN HODGE NRR | |NRC NOTIFIED BY: LOREN J. MAAS |KEVIN RAMSEY NMSS | |HQ OPS OFFICER: STEVE SANDIN | | +------------------------------------------------+ | |EMERGENCY CLASS: NOT APPLICABLE | | |10 CFR SECTION: | | |CCCC 21.21 UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +------------------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | 10 CFR PART 21 NOTIFICATION OF DEFECT IN 1986 EXEM PWR LBLOCA MODEL | | | | "THIS FACSIMILE IS TO INFORM THE NRC OF A REPORTABLE DEFECT PER 10 CFR PART | | 21." | | | | "IN A TELEPHONE CONVERSATION ON OCTOBER 10, 1996, SIEMENS POWER CORPORATION | | (SPC) AND ITS CURRENT PWR UTILITY CUSTOMERS WERE INFORMED THAT THE NRC HAD | | REJECTED SPC's PROPOSED 1991 CHANGES MADE TO THE FCTF REFLOOD HEAT TRANSFER | | CORRELATIONS IN THE TOODEE2 CODE IN THE APPROVED 1986 EXEM PWR LARGE BREAK | | LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT (LBLOCA) EVALUATION MODEL. THESE CHANGES WERE | | SUBMITTED TO ELIMINATE A NON-PHYSICAL TREND IN HEAT TRANSFER COEFFICIENTS | | AS A FUNCTION OF REFLOOD RATE IN THE 1986 EXEM PWR LBLOCA EVALUATION MODEL. | | THE NRC ALSO CONCLUDED, BASED ON THE INFORMATION AVAILABLE TO THE STAFF, | | THE NON-PHYSICAL TREND IN THE 1986 EXEM PWR LBLOCA EVALUATION MODEL WAS | | CONSIDERED TO BE AN UNACCEPTABLE ERROR. THESE NRC DETERMINATIONS WERE | | DOCUMENTED IN A LETTER FROM R.C. JONES (USNRC) TO H.D. CURET (SPC) DATED | | OCTOBER 11, 1996. AS A RESULT OF THESE DETERMINATIONS, SPC PERFORMED A 10 | | CFR 21 EVALUATION IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE SPC PROCEDURES. THIS LETTER | | DOCUMENTS THE RESULTS OF THIS PART 21 EVALUATION." | | | | "THE SPC PART 21 EVALUATION CONCLUDED THE ERROR IN THE FCTF HEAT TRANSFER | | CORRELATIONS IN THE 1986 EXEM PWR EVALUATION MODEL TO BE A SUBSTANTIAL | | SAFETY DEFECT. THE BASIS FOR THIS CONCLUSION RESTS ON THE FACT THAT | | CERTAIN PLANTS ANALYZED WITH THE INTERIM CORRECTIONS TO THE FCTF HEAT | | TRANSFER CORRELATIONS EXCEEDED 10 CFR 50.46 LIMITS." | | | | "THE AFFECTED PWR UTILITIES WERE INFORMED OF THE TELEPHONE CONVERSATION, A | | MEETING CONDUCTED BY THE NRC HELD ON WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 16, 1996 IN | | ROCKVILLE, MD REGARDING THE IMPACT OF THE DEFECT ON CALCULATED 10 CFR 50.46 | | CRITERIA, AND DIRECT COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN THE UTILITIES AND SPC. ACTIONS | | TAKEN AND TO BE TAKEN TO ADDRESS THE ISSUE ARE TO BE PROVIDED IN A WRITTEN | | REPORT TO THE NRC IN COMPLIANCE TO 10 CFR 21.21 (d)(3)(ii)." | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ |POWER REACTOR | |EVENT NUMBER: 31367 | +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ |FACILITY: OCONEE REGION: 2 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 11/21/96 | |UNIT: [ ] [ ] [3] STATE: SC |NOTIFICATION TIME: 16:05 [ET]| |RX TYPE: [1] B&W-L-LP,[2] B&W-L-LP,[3] B&W-L-LP |EVENT DATE: 11/21/96 | +------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 15:30[EST]| |NRC NOTIFIED BY: TERRY KING |LAST UPDATE DATE: 11/21/96 | |HQ OPS OFFICER: STEVE SANDIN +-----------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+ NOTIFICATIONS | |EMERGENCY CLASS: NOT APPLICABLE +-----------------------------+ |10 CFR SECTION: |MARK LESSER RDO | |DDDD 73.71 UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH |AL CHAFFEE, NRR EO | | |YARDUMIAN, NMSS IAT | | |RICH BARRETT, IRD AEOD | | |ED MCALPINE, REG. 2 IAT | | | | +-----+----------+-------+--------+--------------+--+--------+-----------------+ |UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ | | | | | | | | | 3 | N N 0 REFUELING | 0 REFUELING | +-----+---------------------------------------------+--------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | THE LICENSEE SUSPECTS TAMPERING OF A MAIN STEAM LINE VALVE. IMMEDIATE | | COMPENSATORY MEASURES WERE TAKEN UPON DISCOVERY. OUTSIDE LAW ENFORCEMENT | | AGENCIES HAVE NOT BEEN NOTIFIED. THE LICENSEE INFORMED THE NRC RESIDENT | | INSPECTOR AND AN NRC REGION II SAFEGUARDS INSPECTOR (BILL STANSBERRY) WHO | | IS CURRENTLY ONSITE. (REFER TO THE HOO LOG FOR DETAILS.) | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ |POWER REACTOR | |EVENT NUMBER: 31368 | +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ |FACILITY: CLINTON REGION: 3 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 11/21/96 | |UNIT: [1] [ ] [ ] STATE: IL |NOTIFICATION TIME: 18:05 [ET]| |RX TYPE: [1] GE-6 |EVENT DATE: 11/21/96 | +------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 16:00[CST]| |NRC NOTIFIED BY: GREG HALVERSON |LAST UPDATE DATE: 11/21/96 | |HQ OPS OFFICER: STEVE SANDIN +-----------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+ NOTIFICATIONS | |EMERGENCY CLASS: NOT APPLICABLE +-----------------------------+ |10 CFR SECTION: |BRUCE JORGENSEN RDO | |ADAS 50.72(b)(2)(i) DEG/UNANALYZED COND | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +-----+----------+-------+--------+--------------+--+--------+-----------------+ |UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ | 1 | N N 0 REFUELING | 0 REFUELING | | | | | | | | | +-----+---------------------------------------------+--------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | THE LICENSEE DISCOVERED THAT A SEISMIC GUIDE ASSOCIATED WITH A SAFETY | | RELIEF VALVE (SRV) DID NOT HAVE PROPER SEISMIC RESTRAINT. | | | | "AT 1130 CST ON 11/21/96, A CONDITION REPORT (1-96-11-328) WAS INITIATED | | DESCRIBING THE FOLLOWING CONDITION: | | | | A MAIN STEAM LINE SEISMIC GUIDE LOCATED IN THE DRYWELL AND THE 795 | | ELEVATION, 117ø AZIMUTH IS MISSING 2 COTTER PINS (ONE ON EACH SIDE)." | | | | "THIS CONDITION WAS REPORTED TO THE SHIFT SUPERVISOR (SS) AT 1330 CST. | | FOLLOWING A PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION, THE SS DETERMINED THAT THIS | | CONDITION IS REPORTABLE UNDER 10 CFR 50.72.b.2.i." | | | | THIS CONDITION WAS IDENTIFIED BY AN ENGINEER DURING A SYSTEM WALKDOWN. | | | | THE LICENSEE INFORMED THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+