U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Operations Center Event Reports For 02/16/96 - 02/20/96 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** 29884 29982 29983 29984 29985 29986 29987 29988 29989 29990 29991 29992 29993 29994 29995 29996 29997 29998 !!!!!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!!! +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ |POWER REACTOR | |EVENT NUMBER: 29884 | +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ |FACILITY: RIVER BEND REGION: 4 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 01/24/96 | |UNIT: [1] [ ] [ ] STATE: LA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 10:42 [ET]| |RX TYPE: [1] GE-6 |EVENT DATE: 01/24/96 | +------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 09:00[CST]| |NRC NOTIFIED BY: CLARENCE BUSH |LAST UPDATE DATE: 02/16/96 | |HQ OPS OFFICER: DICK JOLLIFFE +-----------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+ NOTIFICATIONS | |EMERGENCY CLASS: NOT APPLICABLE +-----------------------------+ |10 CFR SECTION: |CHARLES CAIN RDO | |AIND 50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D) ACCIDENT MITIGATION | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +-----+----------+-------+--------+--------------+--+--------+-----------------+ |UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ | 1 | N N 0 REFUELING | 0 REFUELING | | | | | | | | | +-----+---------------------------------------------+--------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | - CPVLC SYSTEM INOP DUE TO 2 CONTAINMENT ISO VALVES FAILING THEIR LLRT - | | | | THE PLANT IS IN CONDITION 5 IN A REFUELING OUTAGE. | | | | AFTER REVIEWING THE RESULTS OF THE LOCAL LEAK RATE TEST (LLRT) OF PLANT | | SERVICE AIR SYSTEM VALVES #1SAS-MOV-102 & 103 (CONTAINMENT ISOLATION | | VALVES), LICENSEE DETERMINED THAT THE CONTAINMENT PENETRATION VALVE LEAKAGE | | CONTROL (CPVLC) SYSTEM WOULD HAVE FAILED TO PERFORM ITS SAFETY FUNCTION | | HAD IT BEEN CALLED UPON TO FUNCTION FOLLOWING A DESIGN BASIS ACCIDENT. | | THIS DETERMINATION IS BASED ON AN INDETERMINATE SERVICE AIR VALVE LEAK | | RATE WHICH MAY EXCEED THE MAXIMUM FLOW CAPACITY OF THE CPVLC SYSTEM. | | | | THE CPVLC SYSTEM IS DESIGNED TO LIMIT LEAKAGE FROM CONTAINMENT FOLLOWING | | AN ACCIDENT BY PRESSURIZING CERTAIN CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES IN ORDER | | TO SEAL THE VALVES. IN THIS SPECIFIC CASE, THE #102 & #103 VALVES ISOLATE | | THE CONTAINMENT PENETRATION FOR THE SERVICE AIR SUPPLY TO CONTAINMENT. | | | | IN THE AS-FOUND CONDITION, THE #102 & #103 VALVES WOULD NOT HAVE BEEN | | CAPABLE OF PROVIDING AN ADEQUATE ISOLATION BARRIER FOR THE CPVLC SYSTEM. | | THE RESULT WOULD HAVE BEEN THAT BOTH DIVISIONS OF THE CPVLC SYSTEM WOULD | | HAVE REACHED A SYSTEM HIGH FLOW SET POINT DUE TO THE LEAKAGE FROM THE | | #102 & #103 VALVES. THIS IN TURN WOULD HAVE ISOLATED THE ENTIRE CPVLC | | SYSTEM (DIVISION 1 & 2), BY DESIGN. | | | | THE CPVLC SYSTEM IS REQUIRED TO BE IN OPERATION ONLY IN CONDITIONS 1, 2, | | AND 3. LICENSEE WILL RESTORE THE CPVLC SYSTEM TO OPERABLE STATUS PRIOR | | TO ENTERING CONDITION 3. LICENSEE INFORMED THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR. | | | | * * * UPDATE AT 1714 ON 02/16/96 BY JIM BOYLE ENTERED BY HOO JOLLIFFE * * * | | | | BASED ON THE TOTAL AS-FOUND LEAKAGE FOR CPVLC SYSTEM, DIVISION 2 DURING | | REFUELING OUTAGE #6, THE COMBINED LEAKAGE OF CPVLC SYSTEM, DIVISION 1 AND 2 | | WOULD NOT HAVE CAUSED CPVLC SYSTEM, DIVISION 2 TO ISOLATE ON A HIGH FLOW | | SIGNAL. THEREFORE, THE SAFETY FUNCTION OF CPVLC SYSTEM, DIVISION 2 WOULD | | NOT HAVE BEEN LOST FOLLOWING A DESIGN BASIS ACCIDENT. | | | | THUS, LICENSEE DESIRES TO RETRACT THIS EVENT. | | | | LICENSEE INFORMED THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR. | | | | HOO NOTIFIED R4DO CHUCK CAIN. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ |POWER REACTOR | |EVENT NUMBER: 29982 | +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ |FACILITY: TURKEY POINT REGION: 2 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 02/16/96 | |UNIT: [3] [ ] [ ] STATE: FL |NOTIFICATION TIME: 02:46 [ET]| |RX TYPE: [3] W-3-LP,[4] W-3-LP |EVENT DATE: 02/16/96 | +------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 02:00[EST]| |NRC NOTIFIED BY: MIKE KOHL |LAST UPDATE DATE: 02/16/96 | |HQ OPS OFFICER: LEIGH TROCINE +-----------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+ NOTIFICATIONS | |EMERGENCY CLASS: NOT APPLICABLE +-----------------------------+ |10 CFR SECTION: |JOHN POTTER RDO | |AOUT 50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B) OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS | | |NLCO TECH SPEC LCO A/S | | | | | | | | | | | +-----+----------+-------+--------+--------------+--+--------+-----------------+ |UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ | 3 | N Y 60 POWER OPERATION | 60 POWER OPERATION | | | | | | | | | +-----+---------------------------------------------+--------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | LOW INTAKE COOLING WATER SYSTEM FLOW DUE TO AN INFLUX OF AQUATIC GRASS IN | | THE INTAKE STRUCTURE | | | | WHILE BACKWASHING THE '3B' COMPONENT COOLING WATER (CCW)/INTAKE COOLING | | WATER (ICW) BASKET STRAINER AT 0200, UNIT 3 WENT OUTSIDE THE DESIGN BASIS | | WHEN THE MINIMUM ICW FLOW RATE OF 10,250 GPM COULD NOT BE MET. AT THE | | TIME, ICW FLOW WAS 7,000 GPM. AT 0208, THE '3B' CCW/ICW BASKET STRAINER | | WAS RETURNED TO SERVICE, AND TOTAL ICW FLOW WAS 17,000 GPM. (WHEN ONE | | HEADER IS OUT OF SERVICE FOR BACKWASHING, THE UNIT IS IN A 72-HOUR | | TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION.) | | | | THE LICENSEE DETERMINED THAT THE CAUSE OF THE FLOW PROBLEM WAS AQUATIC | | GRASS IN THE INTAKE STRUCTURE AND IS CONTINUING TO CLEAN THE BASKET | | STRAINERS ONE AT A TIME. LICENSEE MANAGEMENT MAY DECIDE TO TAKE UNIT 3 OFF | | LINE DUE TO THE ONGOING PROBLEM OF AQUATIC GRASS IN THE INTAKE STRUCTURE. | | | | THE LICENSEE WILL NOTIFY THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR. | | | | * * * 0321 FEBRUARY 16, 1996, UPDATE FROM KOHL TAKEN BY TROCINE * * * | | | | AFTER BACKWASHING THE '3A' CCW/ICW BASKET STRAINER AND RETURNING IT TO | | SERVICE, ICW SYSTEM FLOW SUBSEQUENTLY DECREASED BELOW THE MINIMUM ICW FLOW | | RATE OF 10,250 GPM AGAIN AT 0300 DUE TO THE AQUATIC GRASS INFLUX. AS A | | RESULT, THE LICENSEE REMOVED THE '3B' CCW/ICW BASKET STRAINER FROM SERVICE | | AT 0300, BACKWASHED IT AGAIN, AND RETURNED IT TO SERVICE AT 0310 TO RESTORE | | ICW SYSTEM FLOW. | | | | IN ADDITION TO BACKWASHING THE CCW/ICW BASKET STRAINERS, THE LICENSEE IS | | RAKING THE INTAKE SCREENS. | | | | THE INFLUX OF AQUATIC GRASS IS ALSO CAUSING PROBLEMS WITH THE CIRCULATING | | WATER PUMPS. THE '3A1' CIRCULATING WATER PUMP IS CURRENTLY OUT OF SERVICE | | DUE TO GRASS IN THE WELL, AND OPERATORS ARE ALTERNATING BETWEEN OPERATION | | OF THE '3A2' AND '3B1' CIRCULATING WATER PUMPS. CURRENTLY, UNIT 4 IS NOT | | AFFECTED. | | | | AS A RESULT OF THE AQUATIC GRASS INFLUX, LICENSEE MANAGEMENT DIRECTED | | OPERATORS TO PLACE THE UNIT 3 IN MODE 3 (HOT STANDBY). A LOAD REDUCTION | | WAS COMMENCED AT 0320. | | | | THE NRC OPERATIONS CENTER NOTIFIED THE R2DO (POTTER). | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ |POWER REACTOR | |EVENT NUMBER: 29983 | +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ |FACILITY: HATCH REGION: 2 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 02/16/96 | |UNIT: [1] [2] [ ] STATE: GA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 09:33 [ET]| |RX TYPE: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4 |EVENT DATE: 02/15/96 | +------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 21:35[EST]| |NRC NOTIFIED BY: R. MUSGROVE |LAST UPDATE DATE: 02/16/96 | |HQ OPS OFFICER: LEIGH TROCINE +-----------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+ NOTIFICATIONS | |EMERGENCY CLASS: NOT APPLICABLE +-----------------------------+ |10 CFR SECTION: |JOHN POTTER RDO | |HFIT 26.73 FITNESS FOR DUTY | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +-----+----------+-------+--------+--------------+--+--------+-----------------+ |UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ | 1 | N Y 88 POWER OPERATION | 88 POWER OPERATION | | 2 | N Y 100 POWER OPERATION | 100 POWER OPERATION | | | | | +-----+---------------------------------------------+--------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | CONFIRMED POSITIVE FOR-CAUSE TEST FOR ALCOHOL | | | | THE FOR-CAUSE FITNESS-FOR-DUTY TEST RESULTS OF A NON-LICENSED LICENSEE | | SUPERVISOR WERE CONFIRMED TO BE POSITIVE FOR ALCOHOL AT 2135 ON FEBRUARY | | 15, 1996. THE INDIVIDUAL'S SITE ACCESS WAS REVOKED, AND THE LICENSEE IS | | PERFORMING A REVIEW OF THE INDIVIDUAL'S PREVIOUS WORK RECORD TO DETERMINE | | ANY POTENTIAL CONSEQUENCES. | | | | THE LICENSEE NOTIFIED THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ |POWER REACTOR | |EVENT NUMBER: 29984 | +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ |FACILITY: BROWNS FERRY REGION: 2 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 02/16/96 | |UNIT: [ ] [2] [3] STATE: AL |NOTIFICATION TIME: 13:06 [ET]| |RX TYPE: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4,[3] GE-4 |EVENT DATE: 02/16/96 | +------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 11:30[CST]| |NRC NOTIFIED BY: MIKE MORROW |LAST UPDATE DATE: 02/16/96 | |HQ OPS OFFICER: DICK JOLLIFFE +-----------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+ NOTIFICATIONS | |EMERGENCY CLASS: NOT APPLICABLE +-----------------------------+ |10 CFR SECTION: |JOHN POTTER RDO | |AOUT 50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B) OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS | | |ACNC 50.72(b)(1)(ii)(C) COND OUTSIDE EOPS | | | | | | | | | | | +-----+----------+-------+--------+--------------+--+--------+-----------------+ |UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ | | | | | 2 | N Y 94 POWER OPERATION | 94 POWER OPERATION | | 3 | N Y 100 POWER OPERATION | 100 POWER OPERATION | +-----+---------------------------------------------+--------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | -CABLE RUNS POSSIBLY AFFECTED BY APPENDIX R FIRE NOT PREVIOUSLY IDENTIFIED- | | | | AT 1130 (CST), LICENSEE DETERMINED THAT FIRE AREAS, IN WHICH SEVERAL CABLE | | RUNS COULD BE AFFECTED BY A 10CFR50, APPENDIX R FIRE EVENT, ARE NOT | | IDENTIFIED IN THE BROWNS FERRY SAFE SHUTDOWN PROGRAM (10CFR50, APPENDIX R) | | FOR UNITS 2 AND 3. | | | | THESE CABLE RUNS SUPPLY POWER TO INSTRUMENTATION REQUIRED FOR THE | | PERFORMANCE OF SAFE SHUTDOWN INSTRUCTION (SSIs) FOR 10CFR50, APPENDIX R | | FIRES IN THE FIRE AFFECTED AREAS. | | | | THE FOLLOWING INSTRUMENTS ARE REQUIRED FOR THE PERFORMANCE OF SSIs | | ASSOCIATED WITH FIRE AFFECTED AREAS: | | - UNIT 2 SUPPRESSION POOL WATER LEVEL INSTRUMENTS (#2-LI-64-159A & | | #2-XR-64-159) AND DRYWELL PRESSURE INSTRUMENT (#2-PI-64-160A) ARE | | DETERMINED TO BE AFFECTED BY CABLE RUNS IN 7 FIRE AREAS NOT PREVIOUSLY | | IDENTIFIED, | | - UNIT 3 SUPPRESSION POOL WATER LEVEL INSTRUMENT (#3-LI-64-159A) AND | | DRYWELL PRESSURE INSTRUMENT (#3-PI-64-161A) ARE DETERMINED TO BE AFFECTED | | BY CABLE RUNS IN 4 FIRE AREAS NOT PREVIOUSLY IDENTIFIED. | | | | THUS, IF AN SSI WERE BEING PERFORMED FOR ONE OF THE IDENTIFIED FIRE AREAS, | | THE CONTROL ROOM OPERATOR MAY FIND THAT INSTRUMENTS ASSUMED TO BE OPERABLE | | ARE RENDERED INOPERABLE BY THE FIRE. | | | | LICENSEE HAS POSTED ROVING FIRE WATCHES IN THE AFFECTED AREAS. | | | | LICENSEE IS REVISING THE AFFECTED SSIs TO USE OTHER AVAILABLE INSTRUMENTS | | THAT INDICATE THE REQUIRED PARAMETERS. THE COMPENSATORY FIRE WATCHES WILL | | REMAIN IN PLACE UNTIL THE AFFECTED SSIs ARE REVISED. | | | | LICENSEE WILL SUBMIT AN LER ON THIS EVENT TO THE NRC WITHIN 30 DAYS. | | | | LICENSEE INFORMED THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ |POWER REACTOR | |EVENT NUMBER: 29985 | +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ |FACILITY: FERMI REGION: 3 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 02/16/96 | |UNIT: [2] [ ] [ ] STATE: MI |NOTIFICATION TIME: 14:33 [ET]| |RX TYPE: [2] GE-4 |EVENT DATE: 02/16/96 | +------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 14:15[EST]| |NRC NOTIFIED BY: SUE REITH |LAST UPDATE DATE: 02/16/96 | |HQ OPS OFFICER: DICK JOLLIFFE +-----------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+ NOTIFICATIONS | |EMERGENCY CLASS: NOT APPLICABLE +-----------------------------+ |10 CFR SECTION: |MARK RING RDO | |AOUT 50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B) OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +-----+----------+-------+--------+--------------+--+--------+-----------------+ |UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ | 2 | N Y 96 POWER OPERATION | 96 POWER OPERATION | | | | | | | | | +-----+---------------------------------------------+--------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | -SOME ECC SYSTEMS UNAVAILABLE DURING A TEST DUE TO UV TRIPS BEING DEFEATED- | | | | DURING PAST PERFORMANCES OF THE MONTHLY UNDERVOLTAGE CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL | | TEST OF #12 EDG AND ITS ASSOCIATED BUSES, THE UNDERVOLTAGE TRIPS FOR THE | | ASSOCIATED CIRCUIT BREAKERS WERE DEFEATED. | | | | ONE OF THE LOADS AFFECTED BY THIS ACTION IS SWING BUS #MCC-72-CF WHICH | | IS DESIGNED TO AUTOMATICALLY SWAP OVER TO ITS ALTERNATE FEED, DIVISION 2 | | BUS #72F. THE SWING BUS, WHICH IS THE ONLY ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT DESIGNED | | TO AUTOMATICALLY SWAP OVER BETWEEN DIVISIONS, PROVIDES POWER TO VALVES | | NEEDED TO ALIGN THE LPCI SYSTEM INJECTION FLOWPATH. WHEN THE UNDERVOLTAGE | | TRIPS ARE DEFEATED, THE NORMAL FEED CIRCUIT BREAKER #72C-3C WOULD NOT | | TRIP ON AN UNDERVOLTAGE SIGNAL, AND THUS THE SWING BUS WOULD NOT | | AUTOMATICALLY SWAP OVER TO ITS ALTERNATE FEED. THIS WOULD HAVE RESULTED IN | | THE DEENERGIZATION OF THE SWING BUS IF OFFSITE POWER HAD BEEN LOST. | | WITH THE SWING BUS DEENERGIZED, THE LPCI SYSTEM INJECTION VALVES COULD | | NOT OPEN, IF NEEDED. | | | | IN ADDITION, DURING PERFORMANCE OF THE TEST, THE 'C' CORE SPRAY PUMP IS | | UNAVAILABLE DUE TO THE OPERATION OF THE UNDERVOLTAGE RELAYS UNDER TEST. | | WITHOUT THE LPCI SYSTEM INJECTION FLOW PATH AVAILABLE, ALL CORE SPRAY | | PUMPS ARE REQUIRED TO BE AVAILABLE TO MEET DESIGN BASIS MINIMUM ECC SYSTEMS | | OPERABILITY REQUIREMENTS. | | | | LICENSEE IS EVALUATING SIMILAR TESTS ON OTHER EDGs. SIMILAR PROBLEMS ARE | | NOT EXPECTED BECAUSE THE #12 EDG IS THE ONLY NORMAL FEED FOR THE SWING BUS. | | LICENSEE IS DETERMINING CORRECTIVE ACTIONS AND PLANS TO SUBMIT AN LER ON | | THIS EVENT TO THE NRC. LICENSEE INFORMED THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ |POWER REACTOR | |EVENT NUMBER: 29986 | +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ |FACILITY: COOK REGION: 3 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 02/16/96 | |UNIT: [1] [2] [ ] STATE: MI |NOTIFICATION TIME: 16:29 [ET]| |RX TYPE: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP |EVENT DATE: 02/16/96 | +------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 15:57[EST]| |NRC NOTIFIED BY: ROGER WEST |LAST UPDATE DATE: 02/16/96 | |HQ OPS OFFICER: DICK JOLLIFFE +-----------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+ NOTIFICATIONS | |EMERGENCY CLASS: NOT APPLICABLE +-----------------------------+ |10 CFR SECTION: |MARK RING RDO | |AOUT 50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B) OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +-----+----------+-------+--------+--------------+--+--------+-----------------+ |UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ | 1 | N Y 100 POWER OPERATION | 100 POWER OPERATION | | 2 | N Y 100 POWER OPERATION | 100 POWER OPERATION | | | | | +-----+---------------------------------------------+--------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | - PRESENT RAD MONITOR LOCATION DOES NOT MEET REQUIREMENTS OF 10CFR70.24 - | | | | A LICENSEE PRELIMINARY CALCULATION INDICATES THAT A RAD MONITOR PRESENTLY | | LOCATED OUTSIDE THE NEW FUEL VAULT DOOR WOULD NOT DETECT A CRITICALITY IN | | THE NEW FUEL ASSEMBLIES AS THEY WERE LOADED INTO THE NEW FUEL VAULT BECAUSE | | OF THE SHIELDING PROVIDED BY THE VAULT CONCRETE WALLS. | | | | THUS, THE EXISTING RADIATION MONITORING CAPABILITIES FOR A CRITICALITY IN | | THE NEW FUEL VAULT DO NOT APPEAR TO MEET THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10CFR70.24, | | CRITICALITY ACCIDENT REQUIREMENTS. | | | | AS AN INITIAL CORRECTIVE ACTION, LICENSEE HAS MOVED A NEW FUEL ASSEMBLY | | TO A POSITION INSIDE THE VAULT THAT IS CLOSEST TO THE VAULT DOOR. BASED | | ON LICENSEE PRELIMINARY CALCULATIONS, THIS NEW FUEL ASSEMBLY LOCATED NEAR | | THE RAD MONITOR WILL ENABLE THE RAD MONITOR TO DETECT A CRITICALITY INSIDE | | THE VAULT BASED ON THE SOURCE TERM GUIDANCE CONTAINED IN 10CFR70.24. | | | | LICENSEE IS IN THE PROCESS OF DETERMINING PERMANENT CORRECTIVE ACTIONS. | | | | LICENSEE INFORMED THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ |POWER REACTOR | |EVENT NUMBER: 29987 | +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ |FACILITY: CRYSTAL RIVER REGION: 2 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 02/16/96 | |UNIT: [3] [ ] [ ] STATE: FL |NOTIFICATION TIME: 17:07 [ET]| |RX TYPE: [3] B&W-L-LP |EVENT DATE: 02/16/96 | +------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 16:30[EST]| |NRC NOTIFIED BY: WALTER NEUMAN |LAST UPDATE DATE: 02/16/96 | |HQ OPS OFFICER: DICK JOLLIFFE +-----------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+ NOTIFICATIONS | |EMERGENCY CLASS: NOT APPLICABLE +-----------------------------+ |10 CFR SECTION: |JOHN POTTER RDO | |ASHU 50.72(b)(1)(i)(A) PLANT S/D REQD BY TS | | |NLCO TECH SPEC LCO A/S | | | | | | | | | | | +-----+----------+-------+--------+--------------+--+--------+-----------------+ |UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ | 3 | N Y 100 POWER OPERATION | 95 POWER OPERATION | | | | | | | | | +-----+---------------------------------------------+--------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | -HPI SYSTEM INJECTION FLOW TS REQUIRED PLANT S/D TO BEGIN REFUELING OUTAGE- | | | | AFTER FURTHER REVIEW OF EVENT #29981, LICENSEE HAS DETERMINED THAT THE | | POST ACCIDENT MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION DOES NOT MEET THE TECH SPEC | | REQUIREMENTS FOR HIGH PRESSURE INJECTION (HPI) SYSTEM FLOW. | | | | TECH SPEC 3.3.17, CONDITION 'C', WHICH REQUIRES 2 OPERABLE FLOW INSTRUMENTS | | (NARROW RANGE AND WIDE RANGE) FOR EACH OF 2 LOOPS FOR EACH OF 4 HPI SYSTEM | | INJECTION LEGS, CANNOT BE MET. | | | | TECH SPEC 3.5.2, CONDITION 'A', WHICH REQUIRES LICENSEE TO RESTORE THE | | 1 OF 2 INOPERABLE ECC SYSTEM TRAINS TO OPERABLE STATUS WITHIN 72 HOURS, | | COULD NOT BE MET. | | | | AT 1630, LICENSEE ENTERED TECH SPEC LCO A/S 3.0.3, WHICH REQUIRES THE | | PLANT TO BE IN AT LEAST MODE 3 (HOT STANDBY) WITHIN 7 HOURS, AND BEGAN | | A CONTROLLED PLANT SHUTDOWN. LICENSEE EXPECTS THE PLANT TO BE IN | | HOT STANDBY MODE BY 23OO, WHEN THEY WILL BEGIN THEIR REFUELING OUTAGE. | | | | LICENSEE WILL DETERMINE CORRECTIVE ACTIONS. | | | | LICENSEE WILL INFORM THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ |POWER REACTOR | |EVENT NUMBER: 29988 | +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ |FACILITY: MILLSTONE REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 02/16/96 | |UNIT: [ ] [2] [ ] STATE: CT |NOTIFICATION TIME: 17:21 [ET]| |RX TYPE: [1] GE-3,[2] CE,[3] W-4-LP |EVENT DATE: 02/16/96 | +------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 17:00[EST]| |NRC NOTIFIED BY: JERRY VAN NOORDENNEN |LAST UPDATE DATE: 02/16/96 | |HQ OPS OFFICER: DICK JOLLIFFE +-----------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+ NOTIFICATIONS | |EMERGENCY CLASS: NOT APPLICABLE +-----------------------------+ |10 CFR SECTION: |FRANK COSTELLO RDO | |AOUT 50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B) OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +-----+----------+-------+--------+--------------+--+--------+-----------------+ |UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ | | | | | 2 | N Y 100 POWER OPERATION | 100 POWER OPERATION | | | | | +-----+---------------------------------------------+--------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | - LONGER WAITING PERIOD TO OBTAIN CONTAINMENT GAS SAMPLE FOLLOWING DBA - | | | | THE MILLSTONE UNIT 2 DESIGN BASIS ACCIDENT (DBA) ANALYSIS REQUIRES THAT | | CONTAINMENT PRESSURE BE LESS THAN 10 PSIG BEFORE A CONTAINMENT GAS SAMPLE | | CAN BE TAKEN FOLLOWING A DESIGN BASIS LOCA (LARGE BREAK LOCA). | | | | THE ORIGINAL DESIGN BASIS ACCIDENT ANALYSIS DETERMINED THAT IT WOULD TAKE | | 3 HOURS FOR THE CONTAINMENT PRESSURE TO DECREASE TO LESS THAN 10 PSIG | | FOLLOWING A DESIGN BASIS LOCA (LARGE BREAK LOCA). | | | | LICENSEE RECENTLY DETERMINED THAT WITH AN INTERMEDIATE BREAK LOCA IT WOULD | | TAKE 21.5 HOURS FOR THE CONTAINMENT PRESSURE TO DECREASE TO LESS THAN | | 10 PSIG BEFORE A CONTAINMENT GAS SAMPLE COULD BE TAKEN USING THE POST | | ACCIDENT SAMPLE SYSTEM. | | | | THIS DETERMINATION HAS NO EFFECT ON PLANT OPERABILITY. | | | | LICENSEE IS DETERMINING CORRECTIVE ACTIONS. | | | | LICENSEE NOTIFIED STATE OFFICIALS AND THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ |POWER REACTOR | |EVENT NUMBER: 29989 | +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ |FACILITY: BRUNSWICK REGION: 2 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 02/17/96 | |UNIT: [ ] [2] [ ] STATE: NC |NOTIFICATION TIME: 05:20 [ET]| |RX TYPE: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4 |EVENT DATE: 02/17/96 | +------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 01:51[EST]| |NRC NOTIFIED BY: JOHN REINSBURROW |LAST UPDATE DATE: 02/17/96 | |HQ OPS OFFICER: RUDY KARSCH +-----------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+ NOTIFICATIONS | |EMERGENCY CLASS: NOT APPLICABLE +-----------------------------+ |10 CFR SECTION: |JOHN POTTER RDO | |AESF 50.72(b)(2)(ii) ESF ACTUATION | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +-----+----------+-------+--------+--------------+--+--------+-----------------+ |UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ | | | | | 2 | N N 0 REFUELING | 0 REFUELING | | | | | +-----+---------------------------------------------+--------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | WITH THE REACTOR DEFUELED, A MAIN STEAM LINE DRAIN VALVE CLOSED | | UNEXPECTEDLY WHILE MODIFICATIONS WERE BEING PERFORMED ON THE MAIN STEAM | | LINE RADIATION MONITORS. | | | | DURING PERFORMANCE OF A MAIN STEAM LINE RADIATION MONITOR ISOLATION | | MODIFICATION, AN UNEXPECTED GROUP 1 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION SIGNAL | | WAS RECEIVED. THIS CAUSED THE OUTBOARD MAIN STEAM LINE DRAIN VALVE | | (2-B21-F019) WHICH WAS OPEN, TO CLOSE. THE MAIN STEAM ISOLATION VALVES AND | | SAMPLE VALVES WHICH ARE PART OF A GROUP 1 ISOLATION WERE EITHER ALREADY | | CLOSED OR TAGGED OUT FOR MAINTENANCE. THE INBOARD DRAIN VALVE (2-B21-F016) | | WAS NOT AFFECTED BY THE GROUP 1 ISOLATION SIGNAL. DIVISION 1 OF THE GROUP | | 1 LOGIC HAD BEEN PREVIOUSLY DEENERGIZED IN SUPPORT OF THE PLANT | | MODIFICATION. THE ISOLATION OCCURRED AFTER A TECHNICIAN LIFTED A WIRE PER | | THE PROCEDURE AND DEENERGIZED ONE CHANNEL OF THE DIVISION 2 GROUP 1 LOGIC. | | THE LICENSEE IS CONDUCTING AN INVESTIGATION TO DETERMINE THE CAUSE OF THIS | | OCCURRENCE. THE LICENSEE INFORMED THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ |POWER REACTOR | |EVENT NUMBER: 29990 | +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ |FACILITY: MILLSTONE REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 02/17/96 | |UNIT: [1] [ ] [ ] STATE: CT |NOTIFICATION TIME: 10:25 [ET]| |RX TYPE: [1] GE-3,[2] CE,[3] W-4-LP |EVENT DATE: 02/17/96 | +------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 10:20[EST]| |NRC NOTIFIED BY: DON CLEARY |LAST UPDATE DATE: 02/17/96 | |HQ OPS OFFICER: RUDY KARSCH +-----------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+ NOTIFICATIONS | |EMERGENCY CLASS: NOT APPLICABLE +-----------------------------+ |10 CFR SECTION: |FRANK COSTELLO RDO | |AIND 50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D) ACCIDENT MITIGATION | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +-----+----------+-------+--------+--------------+--+--------+-----------------+ |UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ | 1 | N N 0 REFUELING | 0 REFUELING | | | | | | | | | +-----+---------------------------------------------+--------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | THE LICENSEE FOUND FUSES INSTALLED IN THE EMERGENCY GAS TURBINE GENERATOR | | START CIRCUITRY AND IN TWO VITAL 480 VOLT LOAD CENTERS THAT MIGHT NOT HAVE | | BLOWN IF REQUIRED. THESE FUSES WERE IDENTIFIED BY A FUSE VERIFICATION | | PROGRAM INITIATED BY THE LICENSEE. THE FUSES IN QUESTION ARE 10 AMP | | CARTRIDGE FUSES. THE LICENSEE INFORMED THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ |POWER REACTOR | |EVENT NUMBER: 29991 | +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ |FACILITY: PERRY REGION: 3 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 02/18/96 | |UNIT: [1] [ ] [ ] STATE: OH |NOTIFICATION TIME: 04:51 [ET]| |RX TYPE: [1] GE-6 |EVENT DATE: 02/18/96 | +------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 02:30[EST]| |NRC NOTIFIED BY: PETE ARTHUR |LAST UPDATE DATE: 02/18/96 | |HQ OPS OFFICER: RUDY KARSCH +-----------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+ NOTIFICATIONS | |EMERGENCY CLASS: NOT APPLICABLE +-----------------------------+ |10 CFR SECTION: |MARK RING RDO | |AESF 50.72(b)(2)(ii) ESF ACTUATION | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +-----+----------+-------+--------+--------------+--+--------+-----------------+ |UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ | 1 | N N 0 REFUELING | 0 REFUELING | | | | | | | | | +-----+---------------------------------------------+--------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | SPURIOUS ACTUATION OF LOW REACTOR VESSEL LEVEL SIGNAL DURING HIGH PRESSURE | | CORE SPRAY (HPCS) SYSTEM TAG OUT. | | | | A LEVEL 2 INITIATION SIGNAL OCCURRED WHILE PULLING FUSES FOR TAG OUT OF THE | | HPCS SYSTEM. WHEN THE FIRST FUSE WAS PULLED, A SECOND FUSE WAS SHORTED OUT | | AND BLEW. THIS COMPLETED THE LEVEL 2 INITIATION LOGIC. THE HPCS PUMP DID | | NOT START BECAUSE REMOVAL OF THE FIRST FUSE DEFEATED PUMP START. THE | | EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR DID NOT START BECAUSE IT HAD BEEN SECURED. THE | | DIVISION 3 EMERGENCY SERVICE WATER PUMP DID START AS EXPECTED. THE | | LICENSEE INFORMED THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ |GENERAL INFORMATION or OTHER | |EVENT NUMBER: 29992 | +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ |LICENSEE: DUKE HOSPTIAL |NOTIFICATION DATE: 02/19/96 | | CITY: DURHAM REGION: 2 |NOTIFICATION TIME: 14:27 [ET]| | COUNTY: DURHAM STATE: NC |EVENT DATE: 02/19/96 | |LICENSE#: AGREEMENT: Y |EVENT TIME: 13:12[EST]| | DOCKET: |LAST UPDATE DATE: 02/19/96 | | +-----------------------------+ | |PERSON ORGANIZATION| | |JOHN POTTER RDO | | | | +------------------------------------------------+ | |NRC NOTIFIED BY: JOHNNY JAMES | | |HQ OPS OFFICER: JOHN MacKINNON | | +------------------------------------------------+ | |EMERGENCY CLASS: NOT APPLICABLE | | |10 CFR SECTION: | | |NINF INFORMATION ONLY | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +------------------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | COMPACTOR TRASH TRUCK OWNED BY DUKE HOSPITAL CAUSED A LAND FILL RADIATION | | MONITOR TO ACTUATE. | | | | THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION WAS GIVEN BY THE DIVISION OF RADIATION FOR THE | | STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA REPRESENTATIVE. | | | | A COMPACTOR TRASH TRUCK OWNED BY DUKE HOSPITAL WHILE ENTERING THE DURHAM | | LAND FILL LOCATED ON CLUB ROAD SET OFF THE LAND FILL RADIATION MONITOR. THE | | COMPACTOR TRASH TRUCK WAS NOT PERMITTED TO ENTER THE LAND FILL. READING AT | | THE FRONT OF THE TRASH TRUCK WAS 15æR/HR. THE COMPACTOR TRASH TRUCK WAS | | SENT BACK TO DUKE HOSPITAL LOCATED IN DURHAM, NC. THE RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL | | WILL BE REMOVED FROM THE TRASH TRUCK BY THE LICENSEE (DUKE HOSPITAL) AND | | PLACED IN STORAGE . THE CALLER FROM THE NORTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF | | RADIATION THOUGHT THAT THE MATERIAL INSIDE THE COMPACTOR TRASH TRUCK WAS | | MOST PROBABLY IODINE-131 OR TECHNETIUM-99m. NOBODY EXCEEDED ANY REGULATORY | | RADIATION LIMITS FROM THE SOURCE LOCATED INSIDE THE COMPACTOR TRASH TRUCK. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ |POWER REACTOR | |EVENT NUMBER: 29993 | +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ |FACILITY: MCGUIRE REGION: 2 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 02/19/96 | |UNIT: [1] [2] [ ] STATE: NC |NOTIFICATION TIME: 14:44 [ET]| |RX TYPE: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP |EVENT DATE: 02/19/96 | +------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 11:30[EST]| |NRC NOTIFIED BY: GARY MILLS |LAST UPDATE DATE: 02/19/96 | |HQ OPS OFFICER: JOHN MacKINNON +-----------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+ NOTIFICATIONS | |EMERGENCY CLASS: NOT APPLICABLE +-----------------------------+ |10 CFR SECTION: |JOHN POTTER RDO | |APRE 50.72(b)(2)(vi) OFFSITE NOTIFICATION | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +-----+----------+-------+--------+--------------+--+--------+-----------------+ |UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ | 1 | N Y 100 POWER OPERATION | 100 POWER OPERATION | | 2 | N Y 100 POWER OPERATION | 100 POWER OPERATION | | | | | +-----+---------------------------------------------+--------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | MOORESVILLE, NORTH CAROLINA ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY OFFICE REPORTED | | THAT SOME OF THE FINAL HOLD UP EFFLUENT POND WAS DUMPED INTO THE CATAWBA | | RIVER. THE POND'S pH EFFLUENT, WHICH DISCHARGES INTO THE CATAWBA RIVER, | | EXCEEDED 9.0. | | | | THE LICENSEE'S PERMIT LIMITS THE pH DUMPED INTO THE CATAWBA RIVER TO ó9.0. | | IF THE FINAL EFFLUENT HOLD UP POND pH EXCEEDS A pH OF 9.0 THERE IS SUPPOSED | | TO BE A DETECTOR THAT DETECTS THE HOLD UP POND DISCHARGE pH, AND IF THE | | DISCHARGE pH GOES ABOVE 9.0 IT SHUTS OFF THE HOLD UP POND DISCHARGE INTO | | THE CATAWBA RIVER. ALSO IF THE HOLD UP POND pH EXCEEDS A CERTAIN LIMIT | | CARBON DIOXIDE IS SUPPOSED TO BE AUTOMATICALLY INJECTED INTO THE POND. THE | | CARBON DIOXIDE REDUCES THE pH OF THE HOLD UP POND. BOTH OF THESE DEVICES | | FAILED TO FUNCTION PROPERLY AND SOME OF THE CONTENTS OF THE FINAL HOLD UP | | POND WAS DUMPED INTO THE CATAWBA RIVER. LICENSEE NOTIFIED THE MOORESVILLE, | | NORTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY OF THIS | | PROBLEM. THE FINAL HOLD UP POND pH WAS CHECKED ON 02/13/96 AND ITS pH WAS | | 10.0. ACID WAS ADDED TO THE HOLD UP POND AND THE POND WAS PLACED IN | | RECIRCULATION TO REDUCE ITS pH. SAMPLING ON 02/16/96 INDICATED THAT THE | | HOLD UP POND'S pH WAS 8.6. THE pH OF OUTFALL FROM THE HOLD UP POND ON | | 02/18/96 WAS CHECKED AND WAS FOUND TO BE 8.0. | | LICENSEE WILL CORRECT THE PROBLEMS WITH THE AUTOMATIC SHUTOFF AND THE | | CARBON DIOXIDE INJECTION DEVICES. | | | | RESIDENT INSPECTOR WAS INFORMED BY THE LICENSEE OF THIS EVENT. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ |POWER REACTOR | |EVENT NUMBER: 29994 | +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ |FACILITY: SAINT LUCIE REGION: 2 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 02/19/96 | |UNIT: [1] [ ] [ ] STATE: FL |NOTIFICATION TIME: 15:18 [ET]| |RX TYPE: [1] CE,[2] CE |EVENT DATE: 02/19/96 | +------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 02:20[EST]| |NRC NOTIFIED BY: KELLY KORTH |LAST UPDATE DATE: 02/19/96 | |HQ OPS OFFICER: JOHN MacKINNON +-----------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+ NOTIFICATIONS | |EMERGENCY CLASS: NOT APPLICABLE +-----------------------------+ |10 CFR SECTION: |JOHN POTTER RDO | |AOUT 50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B) OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +-----+----------+-------+--------+--------------+--+--------+-----------------+ |UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ | 1 | N Y 100 POWER OPERATION | 100 POWER OPERATION | | | | | | | | | +-----+---------------------------------------------+--------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | CONTROL ROOM PRESSURE WAS FOUND TO BE NEGATIVE. | | | | AT APPROXIMATELY 0225 ON 02/19/96, IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT A NEGATIVE | | PRESSURE EXISTED IN THE UNIT 1 CONTROL ROOM. THE INLET PLENUM ACCESS HATCH | | FOR THE ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT ROOM SUPPLY FANS HAD BEEN OPENED FOR | | MAINTENANCE AT APPROXIMATELY 0220. WITH THE INLET PLENUM HATCH OPEN, THE | | OPERATING SUPPLY FAN AS TAKING A SUCTION ON THE HVAC ROOM. CONCURRENTLY, | | THE ACCESS HATCH FOR THE INLET PLENUM OF ONE OF THE CONTROL ROOM AIR | | CONDITIONERS, ALSO LOCATED IN THE HVAC ROOM, WAS OPEN FOR MAINTENANCE. WITH | | BOTH OF THESE ACCESS HATCHES OPEN, THE ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT ROOM FAN WAS | | TAKING A SUCTION ON THE HVAC ROOM, THROUGH THE CONTROL ROOM AIR | | CONDITIONING SUCTION LINE, AND ULTIMATELY ON THE CONTROL ROOM. THIS CREATED | | A NEGATIVE PRESSURE IN THE CONTROL ROOM. AT APPROXIMATELY 0240, BOTH ACCESS | | HATCHES WERE CLOSED AND CONTROL ROOM PRESSURE RETURNED TO NORMAL. | | SUBSEQUENTLY AT 1430, AN ENGINEERING EVALUATION CONCLUDED THAT OPERATION | | WITH THESE ACCESS HATCHES OPENED RESULTED IN OPERATION OUTSIDE OF THE | | PLANT'S DESIGN BASIS. THE CONTROL ROOM EMERGENCY VENTILATION SYSTEM IS | | DESIGNED TO MAINTAIN > 0.125" OF WATER GAUGE PRESSURE IN THE CONTROL ROOM | | FOLLOWING A DESIGN BASIS ACCIDENT. | | | | RESIDENT INSPECTOR WAS INFORMED BY THE LICENSEE OF THIS EVENT. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ |POWER REACTOR | |EVENT NUMBER: 29995 | +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ |FACILITY: OCONEE REGION: 2 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 02/19/96 | |UNIT: [1] [ ] [ ] STATE: SC |NOTIFICATION TIME: 15:47 [ET]| |RX TYPE: [1] B&W-L-LP,[2] B&W-L-LP,[3] B&W-L-LP |EVENT DATE: 02/14/96 | +------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 17:30[EST]| |NRC NOTIFIED BY: NOEL CLARKSON |LAST UPDATE DATE: 02/19/96 | |HQ OPS OFFICER: JOHN MacKINNON +-----------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+ NOTIFICATIONS | |EMERGENCY CLASS: NOT APPLICABLE +-----------------------------+ |10 CFR SECTION: |JOHN POTTER RDO | |AINB 50.72(b)(2)(iii)(B) POT RHR INOP | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +-----+----------+-------+--------+--------------+--+--------+-----------------+ |UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ | 1 | N Y 100 POWER OPERATION | 100 POWER OPERATION | | | | | | | | | +-----+---------------------------------------------+--------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | SPURIOUS OPERATION OF VALVE 1HP-276 (RCP STANDPIPE FILL AND MAKEUP) DURING | | AN APPENDIX "R" FIRE, COULD DECREASE THE BACK PRESSURE DOWNSTREAM OF THE #1 | | REACTOR COOLANT PUMP (RCP) SEAL WHICH COULD RESULT IN REACTOR COOLANT | | SYSTEM (RCS) LEAKAGE RATES GREATER THAN WERE ASSUMED IN PREVIOUS | | CALCULATIONS. | | | | ON 02/05/96, DURING A REVIEW OF APPENDIX "R" CORRESPONDENCE, A POTENTIAL | | PROBLEM WAS DISCOVERED WHERE A SPURIOUS OPENING OF 1HP-276, DUE TO AN | | APPENDIX "R" FIRE, COULD RESULT IN REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM LEAKAGE RATES | | GREATER THAN WERE ASSUMED IN PREVIOUS CALCULATIONS. BASED ON THIS INITIAL | | CONCERN, THE BREAKER FOR 1HP-276 WAS OPENED SO THAT SPURIOUS OPERATION | | DURING A FIRE WOULD BE PRECLUDED. SUBSEQUENT INVESTIGATION REVEALED THAT | | THE SPURIOUS OPERATION OF THE VALVE 1HP-276, DURING AN APPENDIX "R' FIRE, | | COULD DECREASE THE BACK PRESSURE DOWNSTREAM OF THE #1 RCP SEAL. IT WAS | | DETERMINED THAT THE BACK PRESSURE COULD POTENTIALLY DROP LOW ENOUGH SUCH | | THAT TWO-PHASE FLOW COULD OCCUR ACROSS THE #1 RCP SEAL. CONVERSATIONS WITH | | THE RCP VENDOR (WESTINGHOUSE) CONFIRMED THAT THERE IS NO ANALYSIS METHOD | | AVAILABLE TO DETERMINE THE EFFECT THAT TWO-PHASE FLOW, ACROSS THE #1 RCP | | SEAL, WOULD HAVE ON RCP SEAL INTEGRITY. THEREFORE, SEAL DEGRADATION OR | | FAILURE COULD HAVE OCCURRED IF THE 1HP-276 SPURIOUSLY ACTIVATED DURING AN | | APPENDIX "R" SCENARIO. DEGRADATION OR FAILURE OF THIS SEAL COULD CAUSE RCS | | LEAKAGE TO EXCEED THE AVAILABLE CAPACITY OF THE SAFE SHUTDOWN FACILITY | | (SSF) REACTOR COOLANT MAKEUP PUMP (IN AN ACCIDENT THE PUMP WOULD DELIVER | | 26gpm TO THE RCP SEALS FROM THE SPENT FUEL POOL). THE SSF IS INTENDED TO | | PROVIDE THE ABILITY TO MAINTAIN HOT SHUTDOWN CONDITIONS FOLLOWING AN | | APPENDIX "R" FIRE. IF RCS LEAKAGE WERE GREATER THAN AVAILABLE MAKEUP, THE | | POTENTIAL WOULD EXIST FOR RCS NATURAL CIRCULATION TO BE INTERRUPTED, | | THEREBY STOPPING THIS METHOD OF DECAY HEAT REMOVAL DURING AN APPENDIX "R" | | SCENARIO. | | | | UNITS 2 AND 3 ARE UNAFFECTED BY THE ABOVE SCENARIO SINCE THEY HAVE BINGHAM | | REACTOR COOLANT PUMPS. | | | | RESIDENT INSPECTOR WAS INFORMED BY THE LICENSEE OF THIS EVENT. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ |POWER REACTOR | |EVENT NUMBER: 29996 | +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ |FACILITY: GRAND GULF REGION: 4 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 02/19/96 | |UNIT: [1] [ ] [ ] STATE: MS |NOTIFICATION TIME: 16:42 [ET]| |RX TYPE: [1] GE-6 |EVENT DATE: 02/19/96 | +------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 15:00[CST]| |NRC NOTIFIED BY: PAUL BREWER |LAST UPDATE DATE: 02/19/96 | |HQ OPS OFFICER: JOHN MacKINNON +-----------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+ NOTIFICATIONS | |EMERGENCY CLASS: NOT APPLICABLE +-----------------------------+ |10 CFR SECTION: |CHUCK CAIN RDO | |AOUT 50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B) OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +-----+----------+-------+--------+--------------+--+--------+-----------------+ |UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ | 1 | N Y 100 POWER OPERATION | 100 POWER OPERATION | | | | | | | | | +-----+---------------------------------------------+--------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | CONTROL ROOM HVAC COOLING COILS REQUIRED FOR POST LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENTS | | (LOCA) HEAT REMOVAL WERE FOUND INCAPABLE OF REMOVEING THEIR REQUIRED HEAT | | LOAD. | | | | AS PART OF TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION IMPROVEMENT PROGRAM, A SURVEILLANCE TEST | | WAS DEVELOPED TO DETERMINE THE HEAT REMOVAL CAPABILITY OF THE CONTROL ROOM | | HVAC UNITS. PERFORMANCE DATA OBTAINED INDICATES THE CONTROL ROOM HVAC UNITS | | MAY NOT HAVE THE CAPABILITY OF REMOVING THE MAXIMUM DESIGN BASED HEAT LOADS | | WITH A SINGLE UNIT OF 658,300 BTU/HR. ENGINEERING EVALUATED THE DATA AND | | DETERMINED THE POST LOCA HEAT REMOVAL CAPABILITY OF THE "A" CONTROL ROOM | | HVAC UNIT COIL TO BE 356,301 BTU/HR AT THE EVALUATED CONDITION, AND THE | | POST LOCA HEAT REMOVAL CAPABILITY OF THE "B" CONTROL ROOM HVAC UNIT COIL TO | | BE 431,725 BTUs/hr AT THE EVALUATED CONDITION. | | THE REQUIRED POST LOCA HEAT REMOVAL CAPABILITY FOR EACH OF THE COILS IS | | 658,300 BTUs/hr. | | LICENSEE SAID THAT THIS PROBLEM WAS CORRECTED TWO OR THREE WEEKS AGO AND HE | | DID NOT KNOW WHAT WAS DONE TO CORRECT THE PROBLEM. | | | | RESIDENT INSPECTOR WAS INFORMED BY THE LICENSEE OF THIS EVENT. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ |POWER REACTOR | |EVENT NUMBER: 29997 | +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ |FACILITY: WATTS BAR REGION: 2 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 02/19/96 | |UNIT: [1] [ ] [ ] STATE: TN |NOTIFICATION TIME: 17:43 [ET]| |RX TYPE: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP |EVENT DATE: 02/19/96 | +------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 15:03[EST]| |NRC NOTIFIED BY: TOM WALLACE |LAST UPDATE DATE: 02/19/96 | |HQ OPS OFFICER: JOHN MacKINNON +-----------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+ NOTIFICATIONS | |EMERGENCY CLASS: NOT APPLICABLE +-----------------------------+ |10 CFR SECTION: |JOHN POTTER RDO | |ARPS 50.72(b)(2)(ii) RPS ACTUATION | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +-----+----------+-------+--------+--------------+--+--------+-----------------+ |UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ | 1 | M/R Y 15 STARTUP | 0 HOT STANDBY | | | | | | | | | +-----+---------------------------------------------+--------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | REACTOR WAS MANUALLY TRIPPED AFTER THE AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMPS (MOTOR | | DRIVEN PUMPS) WERE MANUALLY INITIATED WHEN THEIR ONLY OPERATING CONDENSATE | | BOOSTER PUMP TRIPPED ON LOW SUCTION PRESSURE. | | | | OPERATORS MANUALLY INITIATED THE MOTOR DRIVEN AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMPS | | THEN SUBSEQUENTIALLY TRIPPED THE REACTOR IN RESPONSE TO SEVERE FEEDWATER | | SWING AND IMMINENT LOSS OF CONDENSATE FLOW AFTER CONDENSATE BOOSTER PUMP | | "A" TRIPPED ON LOW SUCTION PRESSURE. AT THE TIME OF THE INCIDENT, REACTOR | | POWER WAS AT 15% WITH TURBINE LOAD AT 90MWe. ALL RODS FULLY INSERTED INTO | | THE CORE. DUE TO LOW DECAY HEAT LEVELS AT THE BEGINNING OF LIFE, A REACTOR | | COOLANT SYSTEM COOL DOWN OCCURRED RESULTING IN LETDOWN ISOLATION, | | REQUIREMENT TO EMERGENCY BORATE THE REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM AND TO MANUALLY | | SHUT THE MAIN STEAM ISOLATION VALVES. ESSENTIAL RAW COOLING WATER SUPPLY TO | | THE TURBINE DRIVEN AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMP (TDAFW) OPENED UPON PRESSURE | | SWITCH LOGIC BEING MADE UP. THE TDAFW PUMP WAS PROMPTLY SECURED AFTER | | VERIFICATION OF REQUIRED MOTOR DRIVEN FEEDWATER PUMP FLOW. NO PORV ON THE | | PRIMARY OR SECONDARY SIDE OF THE PLANT OPENED DURING THIS EVENT. AT THE | | PRESENT TIME, THE PLANT IS STABLE WITH THE MOTOR DRIVEN AUXILIARY FEEDWATER | | PUMPS FEEDING THE STEAM GENERATORS. ALL OTHER ESF EQUIPMENT IS OPERABLE AND | | IN STANDBY. THE REASON FOR CONDENSATE BOOSTER PUMP "A" TRIPPING ON LOW | | SUCTION PRESSURE IS UNDER INVESTIGATION. BOTH CONDENSATE PUMPS CONTINUED TO | | OPERATE PROPERLY AFTER THE CONDENSATE BOOSTER PUMP TRIPPED ON LOW SUCTION | | PRESSURE. | | | | RESIDENT INSPECTOR WAS INFORMED OF THE EVENT BY THE LICENSEE. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ |POWER REACTOR | |EVENT NUMBER: 29998 | +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ |FACILITY: CRYSTAL RIVER REGION: 2 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 02/19/96 | |UNIT: [3] [ ] [ ] STATE: FL |NOTIFICATION TIME: 21:45 [ET]| |RX TYPE: [3] B&W-L-LP |EVENT DATE: 02/19/96 | +------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 21:00[EST]| |NRC NOTIFIED BY: H LILES |LAST UPDATE DATE: 02/19/96 | |HQ OPS OFFICER: JOHN MacKINNON +-----------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+ NOTIFICATIONS | |EMERGENCY CLASS: NOT APPLICABLE +-----------------------------+ |10 CFR SECTION: |JOHN POTTER RDO | |AUNA 50.72(b)(1)(ii)(A) UNANALYZED COND OP | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +-----+----------+-------+--------+--------------+--+--------+-----------------+ |UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ | 3 | N N 0 HOT SHUTDOWN | 0 HOT SHUTDOWN | | | | | | | | | +-----+---------------------------------------------+--------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | REACTOR BUILDING PURGE INLET CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES FAILED THEIR | | LOCAL LEAK RATE TEST (LLRT). | | | | WHILE ENTERING A REFUELING OUTAGE, A LLRT OF REACTOR BUILDING PURGE INLET | | ISOLATION VALVES (AHV-1C & AHV-1D) WAS PERFORMED AND THE LEAKAGE RATE FOR | | THE VALVES WAS > 0.6La (LIMIT IS 266.4 liters/min). THE LEAKAGE RATE FOR | | THE REACTOR BUILDING PURGE INLET ISOLATION VALVES WAS > 500 liters/min | | (MAXIMUM READING ON LEAKAGE FLOW METER). PER TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION | | 3.6.1.b (OVERALL CONTAINMENT LEAKAGE TESTING) & TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION | | 3.6.3.d (CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVE LEAKAGE LIMITS) LICENSEE HAVE 36 HOURS | | TO BE IN A COLD SHUTDOWN CONDITION SINCE THERE ARE NO ISOLATION VALVES TO | | ISOLATE AHV-1C & AHV-1D. AFTER REACHING COLD SHUTDOWN CONDITION, LICENSEE | | WILL OPEN THE VALVES AND ESTABLISH A CONTAINMENT ATMOSPHERE PURGE TO CLEAN | | THE CONTAINMENT ATMOSPHERE. THE VALVES WILL BE REPAIRED BEFORE EXITING THE | | REFUELING OUTAGE. THE REACTOR BUILDING INLET PURGE ISOLATION VALVES ARE | | PRESSURIZED TO BETWEEN 54.2psig AND 54.7psig (AIR IS INTRODUCED BETWEEN THE | | TWO INLET PURGE ISOLATION VALVES) AND THEN THE LEAKAGE RATE IS MEASURED. | | | | RESIDENT INSPECTOR WAS WILL BE INFORMED BY THE LICENSEE OF THIS EVENT. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+