U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Operations Center Event Reports For 11/07/96 - 11/08/96 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** 29449 31251 31287 31288 31289 31290 31291 31292 31293 31294 31295 +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ |POWER REACTOR | |EVENT NUMBER: 29449 | +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ |FACILITY: BYRON REGION: 3 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 10/12/95 | |UNIT: [1] [2] [ ] STATE: IL |NOTIFICATION TIME: 16:10 [ET]| |RX TYPE: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP |EVENT DATE: 10/12/95 | +------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 14:25[CDT]| |NRC NOTIFIED BY: D. FLOWERS |LAST UPDATE DATE: 11/07/96 | |HQ OPS OFFICER: JOHN MacKINNON +-----------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+ NOTIFICATIONS | |EMERGENCY CLASS: NOT APPLICABLE +-----------------------------+ |10 CFR SECTION: |B J HOLT RDO | |AOUT 50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B) OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +-----+----------+-------+--------+--------------+--+--------+-----------------+ |UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ | 1 | N Y 99 POWER OPERATION | 99 POWER OPERATION | | 2 | N Y 100 POWER OPERATION | 100 POWER OPERATION | | | | | +-----+---------------------------------------------+--------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | UNIT 1 AND 2 MISCELLANEOUS EQUIPMENT ROOM VENTILATION SUPPLY FANS MAY | | BECOME INOPERABLE AS A RESULT OF A FIRE IN ZONE 11.6-0. | | | | THE FOLLOWING TEXT IS FROM A FACSIMILE SENT BY THE LICENSEE: | | "ON OCTOBER 9, 1995, BRAIDWOOD STATION NOTIFIED BYRON STATION THAT A REVIEW | | OF THE FIRE PROTECTION REPORT (FPR) SAFE SHUTDOWN ANALYSIS REVEALED THAT | | ANALYSIS CONCLUSIONS REGARDING THE AVAILABILITY OF UNIT 1 AND UNIT 2 | | MISCELLANEOUS EQUIPMENT ROOM VENTILATION SUPPLY FANS 1VE01C AND 2VE01C MAY | | BE INCORRECT. THE ERROR WAS IDENTIFIED AS A RESULT OF ONGOING ANALYSES TO | | RESOLVE THERMO-LAG BARRIER ISSUES AT BRAIDWOOD AND BYRON STATIONS. AT 1425 | | [CDT] ON OCT. 12, 1995, IT WAS DETERMINED THAT THE EXISTING CONFIGURATION | | WAS NOT IN COMPLIANCE WITH 10CFR50, APP R. | | | | THE EXISTING FPR DISCUSSION INCORRECTLY STATES THAT THE SUPPLY FANS WILL BE | | AVAILABLE AFTER A FIRE IN FIRE ZONES 11.6-0. MOTOR CONTROL CENTERS (MCCs) | | 132X4 & 232X4 WHICH POWER FANS 1VE01C AND 2VE01C COULD BE UNAVAILABLE AS A | | RESULT OF A FIRE IN ZONE 11.6-0. THESE MCCs ARE AFFECTED BECAUSE THEY ARE | | FED FROM COMMON SOURCE BREAKERS WITH MCCs 132X5 AND 232X5. THEREFORE, A | | FIRE INDUCED FAULT ON MCCs 132X5 & 232X5 OR THEIR ASSOCIATED FEED CABLES | | WILL RENDER THE POWER SOURCE FOR THE SUPPLY FANS, MCCs 132X4 & 232X4, | | UNAVAILABLE. | | | | THE SUPPLY FANS ARE SUPPORT EQUIPMENT FOR THE DIVISION 12 AND 22 125 Vdc | | ESF BUSES AND INSTRUMENT POWER BUSES 112, 114, 212, & 214. | | | | COMPENSATORY ACTIONS IN THE FORM OF HOURLY FIRE WATCHES HAVE BEEN IN PLACE | | IN THIS ZONE SINCE LATE 1992 DUE TO THERMO-LAG DEFICIENCIES. HOURLY FIRE | | WATCHES EXISTED IN THIS ZONE PRIOR TO 1992 FOR OTHER REASONS. DESIGN | | MODIFICATIONS ARE CURRENTLY BEING PROCESSED TO PERMANENTLY CORRECT THE | | WIRING CONFIGURATION TO ASSURE THE SUBJECT FANS WILL BE AVAILABLE FOLLOWING | | A FIRE IN ZONE 11.6-0." END OF TEXT. (SEE EVENT NUMBER 29447 FROM | | BRAIDWOOD FOR A SIMILAR EVENT.) | | | | THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR WAS INFORMED BY THE LICENSEE. | | | | * * * 10/13/95, UPDATE @ 17:04 EDT BY DAVE FLOWERS TAKEN BY MACKINNON * * * | | | | LICENSEE FOUND ANOTHER FIRE ZONE CONFIGURATION THAT IS NOT IN COMPLIANCE | | WITH 10 CFR PART 50, APP 'R', REQUIREMENTS ON 10/13/95, AT 15:30 CDT. | | | | THE FOLLOWING TEXT IS FROM A FACSIMILE SENT BY THE LICENSEE: | | "THE FIRE PROTECTION REPORT (FPR) SAFE SHUTDOWN ANALYSIS REVEALED THAT | | ANALYSIS CONCLUSIONS REGARDING THE AVAILABILITY OF UNIT 1 DIVISION 11 | | SWITCHGEAR VENT FANS 1VX04C AND DIESEL GENERATOR FUEL OIL TRANSFER PUMP | | 1DO01PC MAY BE INCORRECT. THE ERROR WAS IDENTIFIED AS A RESULT OF A FURTHER | | REVIEW OF DUAL FEED MCCs. | | | | MOTOR CONTROL CENTER (MCC) 131X5 WHICH POWERS FAN 1VX04C AND PUMP 1DO01PC | | COULD BE UNAVAILABLE AS A RESULT OF A FIRE IN ZONE 11.4-0. THIS MCC IS | | AFFECTED BECAUSE IT IS FED FROM A COMMON SOURCE BREAKER WITH MCC 131X3. | | THEREFORE, A FIRE INDUCED FAULT ON MCC 131X3 OR IT'S ASSOCIATED FEED CABLES | | WILL RENDER THE POWER SOURCE FOR THE VENT FAN AND FUEL OIL TRANSFER PUMP, | | UNAVAILABLE. | | | | COMPENSATORY ACTIONS IN THE FORM OF HOURLY FIRE WATCHES HAVE BEEN IN PLACE | | IN THIS ZONE SINCE LATE 1992 DUE TO THERMO-LAG DEFICIENCIES. HOURLY FIRE | | WATCHES EXISTED IN THIS ZONE PRIOR TO 1992 FOR OTHER REASONS. DESIGN | | MODIFICATIONS ARE CURRENTLY BEING PROCESSED TO PERMANENTLY CORRECT THE | | WIRING CONFIGURATION TO ASSURE THE SUBJECT FANS WILL BE AVAILABLE FOLLOWING | | A FIRE IN ZONE 11.4-0." END OF TEXT. | | | | THE R3DO (B. J. HOLT) WAS NOTIFIED BY THE HOO. THE RESIDENT INSPECTOR WAS | | INFORMED BY THE LICENSEE. | | | | * * * UPDATE AT 16:34 ON 10/26/95, BY BRINDLE ENTERED BY HOO JOLLIFFE * * * | | | | AT 14:55 CDT ON 10/26/95, DURING A REVIEW TO IDENTIFY PREVIOUS OCCURRENCES | | OF THE TYPE OF DISCREPANCIES REPORTED IN THIS EVENT, THE LICENSEE | | IDENTIFIED | | 11 ADDITIONAL ELECTRICAL CABLE TRAYS/CONDUITS THAT ARE NOT PROTECTED | | WITH A THERMO-LAG FIRE BARRIER (NRC GENERIC LETTER #92-08 ISSUE) | | WHEN THE BYRON FIRE PROTECTION REPORT SAFE SHUTDOWN ANALYSIS CONCLUDED | | (OR SHOULD HAVE CONCLUDED) THAT THEY SHOULD BE PROTECTED FROM FIRE. THE | | FOLLOWING EQUIPMENT IS POTENTIALLY IMPACTED BY THESE DISCREPANCIES: #1B | | AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMP, #1B CENTRIFUGAL CHARGING PUMP, #1A EMERGENCY | | DIESEL GENERATOR, #2A EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR, #1RH8701A VALVE, AND #1A | | ESSENTIAL SERVICE WATER PUMP. COMPENSATORY ACTIONS IN THE FORM OF HOURLY | | FIRE WATCHES HAVE BEEN IN PLACE IN THESE FIRE ZONES SINCE PRIOR TO 1992 AND | | WILL REMAIN IN PLACE UNTIL THE FIRE BARRIER DISCREPANCIES ARE PERMANENTLY | | RESOLVED PRIOR TO 1997. | | | | THE LICENSEE INFORMED THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR. THE HOO NOTIFIED THE | | R3DO (GARY SHEAR). | | | | * * * UPDATE ON 6/4/96 AT 1707 EDT FROM MARK SMITH TAKEN BY KARSCH * * * | | | | THE FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF A FAX RECEIVED FROM THE LICENSEE: | | | | "AN ONGOING EVALUATION OF THE BYRON FIRE PROTECTION REPORT (FPR) SAFE | | SHUTDOWN ANALYSIS, BEING PERFORMED IN RESPONSE TO IDENTIFIED DISCREPANCIES, | | HAS IDENTIFIED THAT FPR SECTIONS FOR FIRE ZONES 2.1-0, 3.2A-1, 3.2B-1, | | 11.4-0, 11.4C-0, 11.5-0 AND 11.6-0, DO NOT DISCUSS THE LOSS OF BOTH CONTROL | | ROOM VENTILATION (VC) TRAINS IF A FIRE SHOULD OCCUR IN THE FIRE ZONE. THE | | LOSS OF BOTH TRAINS OF VC COULD OCCUR DUE TO VARIOUS COMBINATIONS OF VC | | SUPPLY AND RETURN FANS OR SYSTEM DAMPERS FROM REDUNDANT TRAINS FAILING WHEN | | THEIR RESPECTIVE CABLES ARE DAMAGED BY THE FIRE. WORST CASE CONSEQUENCES | | OF THE TOTAL LOSS OF VC COULD REQUIRE EVACUATION OF THE MAIN CONTROL ROOM | | WITH A CONTROLLED SHUTDOWN FROM THE REMOTE SHUTDOWN PANEL. ALSO, | | VENTILATION WOULD BE LOST TO THE AUX ELECTRIC EQUIPMENT ROOM WHICH COULD | | FAIL THE INSTRUMENTATION IN THE MCR AND AT THE REMOTE SHUTDOWN PANEL. FOR | | A LOSS OF ALL VC, INSTRUMENTATION AT THE FIRE HAZARDS PANEL WOULD BE RELIED | | UPON TO VERIFY SAFE SHUTDOWN. THE FIRE HAZARDS PANELS ARE POWERED FROM | | DIVISION 12 AND 22 FOR UNIT 1 AND UNIT 2 RESPECTIVELY. | | | | "HOWEVER, IT WAS DETERMINED THAT A FIRE IN FIRE ZONE 3.2A-1 WOULD DISABLE | | BOTH TRAINS OF VC AND INTERRUPT POWER TO THE UNIT 1 FIRE HAZARD PANEL | | (DIVISION 12 POWER IS NOT PROTECTED IN THIS ZONE). THEREFORE, FOR A FIRE IN | | THIS ZONE, POTENTIALLY NO SAFE SHUTDOWN INSTRUMENTATION MAY BE AVAILABLE TO | | VERIFY HOT SHUTDOWN CONDITIONS. THIS IS NOT IN COMPLIANCE WITH 10CFR50, | | APPENDIX R. IT HAS BEEN VERIFIED THAT THE REMAINING FIRE ZONES LISTED | | ABOVE WHERE BOTH TRAINS OF VC COULD BE LOST DO HAVE THE FIRE HAZARDS PANEL | | AVAILABLE TO PROVIDE INDICATION TO VERIFY SAFE SHUTDOWN. BECAUSE THE VC | | SYSTEM IS POWERED FROM UNIT 1, THERE IS NO EFFECT ON THE UNIT 2 FIRE | | HAZARDS PANEL. | | | | "COMPENSATORY ACTIONS IN THE FORM OF HOURLY FIRE WATCHES HAVE BEEN IN PLACE | | SINCE LATE 1992 DUE TO THERMO-LAG FIRE BARRIER DEFICIENCIES. HOURLY FIRE | | WATCHES EXISTED IN THIS ZONE PRIOR TO 1992 FOR OTHER REASONS. THE HOURLY | | FIRE WATCHES WILL REMAIN IN PLACE UNTIL THE FIRE BARRIER DISCREPANCIES ARE | | PERMANENTLY RESOLVED." | | | | THE LICENSEE WILL INFORM THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR. R3DO | | (MCCORMICKBARGER) NOTIFIED. | | | | * * * UPDATE ON 11/7/96 AT 1212 EST FROM FRUIN TAKEN BY KARSCH * * * | | | | THE FOLLOWING UPDATE WAS RECEIVED FROM THE LICENSEE: | | "DURING THE ONGOING BYRON FIRE PROTECTION IMPROVEMENT REVIEW, IT WAS | | CONFIRMED THAT THE EXISTING SAFE SHUTDOWN ANALYSIS (SSA) OF THE FIRE | | PROTECTION REPORT (FPR) DOES NOT EVALUATE THE POTENTIAL FOR A SINGLE FIRE | | TO RESULT IN THE LOSS OF BOTH 4Kv ESF BUSES AND BOTH DIESEL GENERATORS IN | | BYRON FIRE ZONES 3.2A-1&2. THIS UNANALYZED CONDITION IS NOT IN COMPLIANCE | | WITH 10CFR50, APPENDIX R. | | | | "IN FIRE ZONE 3.2A-2, DIVISION 21 SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT IS RELIED UPON | | FOR SAFE SHUTDOWN SINCE DIVISION 22 CABLES ARE ROUTED THROUGH THIS ZONE. IN | | THIS ZONE BUS 241 NORMAL AND RESERVE DC CONTROL POWER SUPPLY CABLES ARE | | ROUTED IN SEPARATE CONDUITS. A FIRE IN THIS ZONE COULD DAMAGE THESE CABLES | | AND INTERRUPT ALL CONTROL POWER TO BUS 241. FPR SECTION 2.4.2.6 DISCUSSES | | THIS LOSS IN TERMS OF LOSING THE ABILITY TO CLOSE THE BREAKERS REMOTELY. | | THE SSA TAKES CREDIT FOR OPERATORS TO MANUALLY CLOSE THE BREAKERS AS | | NEEDED. THE SSA DOES NOT ADDRESS THAT LOSS OF DC CONTROL POWER PREVENTS | | BUS 241 BREAKERS FROM OPENING TO ISOLATE CABLE FAULTS. THE POWER CABLE | | FROM BUS 241 CUBICLE #5 TO THE SX TOWER UNIT SUBSTATION IS ALSO ROUTED IN | | CONDUIT THROUGH ZONE 3.2A-2. THE POWER CABLE AND THE NORMAL DC CONTROL | | POWER SUPPLY CABLE ARE SEPARATED BY APPROXIMATELY 5 FEET. THEREFORE, A | | SINGLE FIRE COULD CAUSE A 3 PHASE OR PHASE-TO-PHASE FAULT ON THE CABLE FROM | | BUS 241 CUBICLE #5. IF THE SEQUENCE OF CABLE FAILURES SHOULD OCCUR IN A | | SPECIFIC ORDER SUCH THAT THE CONTROL/POWER CABLE FAILS BEFORE THE SERVICE | | POWER CABLE FAILS, THE FAULT CURRENT WOULD NOT BE INTERRUPTED AND DAMAGE | | COULD OCCUR TO THE ESF BUS AND D/G 2A BECAUSE THEIR RESPECTIVE BREAKERS | | WOULD NOT HAVE CONTROL POWER. SAFE SHUTDOWN CANNOT BE ASSURED IF EITHER | | D/G 2A OR BUS 241 IS UNAVAILABLE. | | | | "THIS CONCERN ALSO APPLIES TO UNIT 1 FIRE ZONE 3.2A-1 FOR THE CORRESPONDING | | CABLE AND EQUIPMENT. | | | | "SITE ENGINEERING HAS INITIATED REVISIONS TO APPROPRIATE ANNUNCIATOR | | RESPONSE PROCEDURES FOR FIRE DETECTION PANELS 1PM09J AND 2PM09J THAT WILL | | SPECIFY ALL 4 Kv ESF EQUIPMENT POTENTIALLY AFFECTED BY A FIRE IN THE ZONE | | AND WHAT EQUIPMENT SHOULD BE SHUTDOWN TO PREVENT UNEXPECTED DAMAGE TO THE | | ESF BUSES. | | | | "COMPENSATORY ACTIONS IN THE FORM OF HOURLY FIRE WATCHES, ADMINISTRATIVE | | CONTROL OF TRANSIENT AND COMBUSTIBLES AND HOT WORK IN FIRE ZONES 3.2A-1&2 | | HAVE BEEN ESTABLISHED UNTIL PERMANENT CORRECTIVE ACTIONS ARE TAKEN." | | | | THE LICENSEE WILL INFORM THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR. R3DO (JORDAN) | | NOTIFIED. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+