U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Operations Center Event Reports For 06/04/96 - 06/05/96 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** 29447 29449 30578 30579 30580 30581 +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ |POWER REACTOR | |EVENT NUMBER: 29447 | +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ |FACILITY: BRAIDWOOD REGION: 3 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 10/12/95 | |UNIT: [1] [2] [ ] STATE: IL |NOTIFICATION TIME: 15:50 [ET]| |RX TYPE: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP |EVENT DATE: 10/12/95 | +------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 14:25[CDT]| |NRC NOTIFIED BY: MIKE DEBOARD |LAST UPDATE DATE: 06/04/96 | |HQ OPS OFFICER: JOHN MacKINNON +-----------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+ NOTIFICATIONS | |EMERGENCY CLASS: NOT APPLICABLE +-----------------------------+ |10 CFR SECTION: |B. J. HOLT RDO | |AOUT 50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B) OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +-----+----------+-------+--------+--------------+--+--------+-----------------+ |UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ | 1 | N N 0 REFUELING | 0 REFUELING | | 2 | N Y 100 POWER OPERATION | 100 POWER OPERATION | | | | | +-----+---------------------------------------------+--------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | UNIT 1 AND 2 MISCELLANEOUS EQUIPMENT ROOM VENTILATION SUPPLY FANS MAY | | BECOME INOPERABLE AS A RESULT OF A FIRE IN ZONES 11.5-0 AND 11.6-0. | | | | THE FOLLOWING IS FROM THE FACSIMILE SENT BY THE LICENSEE. | | | | "ON OCTOBER 6, 1995, A REVIEW OF THE FIRE PROTECTION REPORT (FPR) SAFE | | SHUTDOWN ANALYSIS REVEALED THAT ANALYSIS CONCLUSIONS REGARDING THE | | AVAILABILITY OF UNIT 1 & UNIT 2 MISCELLANEOUS EQUIPMENT ROOM VENTILATION | | SUPPLY FANS 1VE01C AND 2VE01C MAY BE INCORRECT. THE ERROR WAS IDENTIFIED | | AS A RESULT OF ONGOING ANALYSES TO RESOLVE THERMO-LAG FIRE BARRIER ISSUES | | AT BRAIDWOOD AND BYRON STATIONS. AT 1425 CDST ON OCT. 12, 1995, IT WAS | | DETERMINED THAT THE EXISTING CONFIGURATION WAS NOT IN COMPLIANCE WITH | | 10CFR50, APP R. | | | | THE EXISTING [FPR] DISCUSSION INCORRECTLY STATES THAT THE SUPPLY FANS WILL | | BE AVAILABLE AFTER A FIRE IN FIRE ZONES 11.5-0 & 11.6-0 MOTOR CONTROL | | CENTERS (MCCs) 132X4 & 232X4, WHICH POWER FANS 1VE01C AND 2VE01C COULD BE | | UNAVAILABLE AS A RESULT OF A FIRE IN ZONES 11.5-0 & 11.6-0. THESE MCCs ARE | | AFFECTED BECAUSE THEY ARE FED FROM COMMON SOURCE BREAKERS WITH MCCs 132X5 | | AND 232X5. THEREFORE, A FIRE INDUCED FAULT ON MCCs 132X5 & 232X5 OR THEIR | | ASSOCIATED FEED CABLES WILL RENDER THE POWER SOURCE FOR THE SUBJECT FANS, | | MCCs 132X4 & 232X4, UNAVAILABLE. | | | | THE SUPPLY FANS ARE SUPPORT EQUIPMENT FOR THE DIVISION 12 AND 22 125 Vdc | | ESF BUSES AND INSTRUMENT POWER BUSES 112, 114, 212, & 214. | | | | COMPENSATORY ACTIONS IN THE FORM OF HOURLY FIRE WATCHES HAVE BEEN IN PLACE | | IN THESE ZONES SINCE INITIAL PLANT START-UP DUE TO THERMO-LAG DEFICIENCIES | | AND OTHER FIRE PROTECTION REASONS. DESIGN MODIFICATIONS ASSOCIATED WITH | | THERMO-LAG RESOLUTION ARE CURRENTLY IN PROGRESS TO RE-POWER THE AFFECTED | | MCCs FROM NEW SOURCE BREAKERS." END OF TEXT. (SEE BYRON EVENT NUMBER | | 29449 FOR A SIMILAR EVENT.) | | | | THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR WAS INFORMED BY THE LICENSEE. | | | | * * * UPDATE ON 6/4/96 AT 1727 EDT FROM RAUSH TAKEN BY KARSCH * * * | | | | THE FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF A FAX RECEIVED FROM THE LICENSEE: | | | | "AN ONGOING EVALUATION OF THE BYRON AND BRAIDWOOD FIRE PROTECTION REPORT | | (FPR) SAFE SHUTDOWN ANALYSIS HAS IDENTIFIED THAT FPR SECTIONS FOR FIRE | | ZONES 2.1-0, 3.2A-1, 3.2B-1, 11.4-0, 11.4C-0, 11.5-0, AND 11.6-0, DO NOT | | DISCUSS THE LOSS OF BOTH CONTROL ROOM VENTILATION (VC) TRAINS IF A FIRE | | SHOULD OCCUR IN THE FIRE ZONE. THE LOSS OF BOTH TRAINS OF VC COULD OCCUR | | DUE TO VARIOUS COMBINATIONS OF VC SUPPLY OR RETURN FANS OR SYSTEM DAMPERS | | FROM REDUNDANT TRAINS FAILING WHEN THEIR RESPECTIVE CABLES ARE DAMAGED BY | | THE FIRE. WORST CASE CONSEQUENCES OF THE TOTAL LOSS OF VC COULD REQUIRE | | EVACUATION OF THE MAIN CONTROL ROOM WITH A CONTROLLED SHUTDOWN FROM THE | | REMOTE SHUTDOWN PANEL. ALSO, VENTILATION WOULD BE LOST TO THE AUX ELECTRIC | | EQUIPMENT ROOM WHICH COULD FAIL THE INSTRUMENTATION IN THE MCR AND AT THE | | REMOTE SHUTDOWN PANEL. FOR A LOSS OF ALL VC, INSTRUMENTATION AT THE FIRE | | HAZARDS PANEL WOULD BE RELIED UPON TO VERIFY SAFE SHUTDOWN. THE FIRE | | HAZARDS PANELS ARE POWERED FROM DIVISION 12 AND 22 FOR UNIT 1 AND UNIT 2 | | RESPECTIVELY. | | | | "HOWEVER, IT WAS DETERMINED THAT A FIRE IN FIRE ZONE 3.2A-1 WOULD DISABLE | | BOTH TRAINS OF VC AND THE INSTRUMENTATION AT THE UNIT 1 FIRE HAZARDS PANEL | | (DIVISION 12 POWER IS NOT PROTECTED IN THIS ZONE). THEREFORE FOR A FIRE IN | | THIS ZONE, POTENTIALLY NO SAFE SHUTDOWN INSTRUMENTATION MAY BE AVAILABLE TO | | VERIFY HOT SHUTDOWN CONDITIONS. THIS IS NOT IN COMPLIANCE WITH 10CFR50, | | APPENDIX R. PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATIONS HAVE VERIFIED THAT THE REMAINING | | FIRE ZONES LISTED ABOVE WHERE BOTH TRAINS OF VC COULD BE LOST DO HAVE THE | | FIRE HAZARDS PANEL AVAILABLE TO PROVIDE INDICATION TO VERIFY SAFE SHUTDOWN. | | BECAUSE THE VC SYSTEM IS POWERED FROM UNIT 1, THERE IS NO EFFECT ON THE | | UNIT 2 FIRE HAZARDS PANEL. | | | | "COMPENSATORY ACTIONS IN THE FORM OF HOURLY FIRE WATCHES HAVE BEEN IN PLACE | | SINCE 1992 DUE TO THERMO-LAG FIRE BARRIER DEFICIENCIES. HOURLY FIRE | | WATCHES EXISTED IN THIS ZONE PRIOR TO 1992 FOR OTHER REASONS. THE HOURLY | | FIRE WATCHES WILL REMAIN IN PLACE UNTIL THE FIRE BARRIER DISCREPANCIES ARE | | PERMANENTLY RESOLVED." | | | | THE LICENSEE WILL INFORM THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR. R3DO | | (MCCORMICKBARGER) NOTIFIED. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ |POWER REACTOR | |EVENT NUMBER: 29449 | +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ |FACILITY: BYRON REGION: 3 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 10/12/95 | |UNIT: [1] [2] [ ] STATE: IL |NOTIFICATION TIME: 16:10 [ET]| |RX TYPE: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP |EVENT DATE: 10/12/95 | +------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 14:25[CDT]| |NRC NOTIFIED BY: D. FLOWERS |LAST UPDATE DATE: 06/04/96 | |HQ OPS OFFICER: JOHN MacKINNON +-----------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+ NOTIFICATIONS | |EMERGENCY CLASS: NOT APPLICABLE +-----------------------------+ |10 CFR SECTION: |B J HOLT RDO | |AOUT 50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B) OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +-----+----------+-------+--------+--------------+--+--------+-----------------+ |UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ | 1 | N Y 99 POWER OPERATION | 99 POWER OPERATION | | 2 | N Y 100 POWER OPERATION | 100 POWER OPERATION | | | | | +-----+---------------------------------------------+--------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | UNIT 1 AND 2 MISCELLANEOUS EQUIPMENT ROOM VENTILATION SUPPLY FANS MAY | | BECOME INOPERABLE AS A RESULT OF A FIRE IN ZONE 11.6-0. | | | | THE FOLLOWING TEXT IS FROM A FACSIMILE SENT BY THE LICENSEE: | | "ON OCTOBER 9, 1995, BRAIDWOOD STATION NOTIFIED BYRON STATION THAT A REVIEW | | OF THE FIRE PROTECTION REPORT (FPR) SAFE SHUTDOWN ANALYSIS REVEALED THAT | | ANALYSIS CONCLUSIONS REGARDING THE AVAILABILITY OF UNIT 1 AND UNIT 2 | | MISCELLANEOUS EQUIPMENT ROOM VENTILATION SUPPLY FANS 1VE01C AND 2VE01C MAY | | BE INCORRECT. THE ERROR WAS IDENTIFIED AS A RESULT OF ONGOING ANALYSES TO | | RESOLVE THERMO-LAG BARRIER ISSUES AT BRAIDWOOD AND BYRON STATIONS. AT 1425 | | [CDT] ON OCT. 12, 1995, IT WAS DETERMINED THAT THE EXISTING CONFIGURATION | | WAS NOT IN COMPLIANCE WITH 10CFR50, APP R. | | | | THE EXISTING FPR DISCUSSION INCORRECTLY STATES THAT THE SUPPLY FANS WILL BE | | AVAILABLE AFTER A FIRE IN FIRE ZONES 11.6-0. MOTOR CONTROL CENTERS (MCCs) | | 132X4 & 232X4 WHICH POWER FANS 1VE01C AND 2VE01C COULD BE UNAVAILABLE AS A | | RESULT OF A FIRE IN ZONE 11.6-0. THESE MCCs ARE AFFECTED BECAUSE THEY ARE | | FED FROM COMMON SOURCE BREAKERS WITH MCCs 132X5 AND 232X5. THEREFORE, A | | FIRE INDUCED FAULT ON MCCs 132X5 & 232X5 OR THEIR ASSOCIATED FEED CABLES | | WILL RENDER THE POWER SOURCE FOR THE SUPPLY FANS, MCCs 132X4 & 232X4, | | UNAVAILABLE. | | | | THE SUPPLY FANS ARE SUPPORT EQUIPMENT FOR THE DIVISION 12 AND 22 125 Vdc | | ESF BUSES AND INSTRUMENT POWER BUSES 112, 114, 212, & 214. | | | | COMPENSATORY ACTIONS IN THE FORM OF HOURLY FIRE WATCHES HAVE BEEN IN PLACE | | IN THIS ZONE SINCE LATE 1992 DUE TO THERMO-LAG DEFICIENCIES. HOURLY FIRE | | WATCHES EXISTED IN THIS ZONE PRIOR TO 1992 FOR OTHER REASONS. DESIGN | | MODIFICATIONS ARE CURRENTLY BEING PROCESSED TO PERMANENTLY CORRECT THE | | WIRING CONFIGURATION TO ASSURE THE SUBJECT FANS WILL BE AVAILABLE FOLLOWING | | A FIRE IN ZONE 11.6-0." END OF TEXT. (SEE EVENT NUMBER 29447 FROM | | BRAIDWOOD FOR A SIMILAR EVENT.) | | | | THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR WAS INFORMED BY THE LICENSEE. | | | | * * * 10/13/95, UPDATE @ 17:04 EDT BY DAVE FLOWERS TAKEN BY MACKINNON * * * | | | | LICENSEE FOUND ANOTHER FIRE ZONE CONFIGURATION THAT IS NOT IN COMPLIANCE | | WITH 10 CFR PART 50, APP 'R', REQUIREMENTS ON 10/13/95, AT 15:30 CDT. | | | | THE FOLLOWING TEXT IS FROM A FACSIMILE SENT BY THE LICENSEE: | | "THE FIRE PROTECTION REPORT (FPR) SAFE SHUTDOWN ANALYSIS REVEALED THAT | | ANALYSIS CONCLUSIONS REGARDING THE AVAILABILITY OF UNIT 1 DIVISION 11 | | SWITCHGEAR VENT FANS 1VX04C AND DIESEL GENERATOR FUEL OIL TRANSFER PUMP | | 1DO01PC MAY BE INCORRECT. THE ERROR WAS IDENTIFIED AS A RESULT OF A FURTHER | | REVIEW OF DUAL FEED MCCs. | | | | MOTOR CONTROL CENTER (MCC) 131X5 WHICH POWERS FAN 1VX04C AND PUMP 1DO01PC | | COULD BE UNAVAILABLE AS A RESULT OF A FIRE IN ZONE 11.4-0. THIS MCC IS | | AFFECTED BECAUSE IT IS FED FROM A COMMON SOURCE BREAKER WITH MCC 131X3. | | THEREFORE, A FIRE INDUCED FAULT ON MCC 131X3 OR IT'S ASSOCIATED FEED CABLES | | WILL RENDER THE POWER SOURCE FOR THE VENT FAN AND FUEL OIL TRANSFER PUMP, | | UNAVAILABLE. | | | | COMPENSATORY ACTIONS IN THE FORM OF HOURLY FIRE WATCHES HAVE BEEN IN PLACE | | IN THIS ZONE SINCE LATE 1992 DUE TO THERMO-LAG DEFICIENCIES. HOURLY FIRE | | WATCHES EXISTED IN THIS ZONE PRIOR TO 1992 FOR OTHER REASONS. DESIGN | | MODIFICATIONS ARE CURRENTLY BEING PROCESSED TO PERMANENTLY CORRECT THE | | WIRING CONFIGURATION TO ASSURE THE SUBJECT FANS WILL BE AVAILABLE FOLLOWING | | A FIRE IN ZONE 11.4-0." END OF TEXT. | | | | THE R3DO (B. J. HOLT) WAS NOTIFIED BY THE HOO. THE RESIDENT INSPECTOR WAS | | INFORMED BY THE LICENSEE. | | | | * * * UPDATE AT 16:34 ON 10/26/95, BY BRINDLE ENTERED BY HOO JOLLIFFE * * * | | | | AT 14:55 CDT ON 10/26/95, DURING A REVIEW TO IDENTIFY PREVIOUS OCCURRENCES | | OF THE TYPE OF DISCREPANCIES REPORTED IN THIS EVENT, THE LICENSEE | | IDENTIFIED | | 11 ADDITIONAL ELECTRICAL CABLE TRAYS/CONDUITS THAT ARE NOT PROTECTED | | WITH A THERMO-LAG FIRE BARRIER (NRC GENERIC LETTER #92-08 ISSUE) | | WHEN THE BYRON FIRE PROTECTION REPORT SAFE SHUTDOWN ANALYSIS CONCLUDED | | (OR SHOULD HAVE CONCLUDED) THAT THEY SHOULD BE PROTECTED FROM FIRE. THE | | FOLLOWING EQUIPMENT IS POTENTIALLY IMPACTED BY THESE DISCREPANCIES: #1B | | AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMP, #1B CENTRIFUGAL CHARGING PUMP, #1A EMERGENCY | | DIESEL GENERATOR, #2A EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR, #1RH8701A VALVE, AND #1A | | ESSENTIAL SERVICE WATER PUMP. COMPENSATORY ACTIONS IN THE FORM OF HOURLY | | FIRE WATCHES HAVE BEEN IN PLACE IN THESE FIRE ZONES SINCE PRIOR TO 1992 AND | | WILL REMAIN IN PLACE UNTIL THE FIRE BARRIER DISCREPANCIES ARE PERMANENTLY | | RESOLVED PRIOR TO 1997. | | | | THE LICENSEE INFORMED THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR. THE HOO NOTIFIED THE | | R3DO (GARY SHEAR). | | | | * * * UPDATE ON 6/4/96 AT 1707 EDT FROM MARK SMITH TAKEN BY KARSCH * * * | | | | THE FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF A FAX RECEIVED FROM THE LICENSEE: | | | | "AN ONGOING EVALUATION OF THE BYRON FIRE PROTECTION REPORT (FPR) SAFE | | SHUTDOWN ANALYSIS, BEING PERFORMED IN RESPONSE TO IDENTIFIED DISCREPANCIES, | | HAS IDENTIFIED THAT FPR SECTIONS FOR FIRE ZONES 2.1-0, 3.2A-1, 3.2B-1, | | 11.4-0, 11.4C-0, 11.5-0 AND 11.6-0, DO NOT DISCUSS THE LOSS OF BOTH CONTROL | | ROOM VENTILATION (VC) TRAINS IF A FIRE SHOULD OCCUR IN THE FIRE ZONE. THE | | LOSS OF BOTH TRAINS OF VC COULD OCCUR DUE TO VARIOUS COMBINATIONS OF VC | | SUPPLY AND RETURN FANS OR SYSTEM DAMPERS FROM REDUNDANT TRAINS FAILING WHEN | | THEIR RESPECTIVE CABLES ARE DAMAGED BY THE FIRE. WORST CASE CONSEQUENCES | | OF THE TOTAL LOSS OF VC COULD REQUIRE EVACUATION OF THE MAIN CONTROL ROOM | | WITH A CONTROLLED SHUTDOWN FROM THE REMOTE SHUTDOWN PANEL. ALSO, | | VENTILATION WOULD BE LOST TO THE AUX ELECTRIC EQUIPMENT ROOM WHICH COULD | | FAIL THE INSTRUMENTATION IN THE MCR AND AT THE REMOTE SHUTDOWN PANEL. FOR | | A LOSS OF ALL VC, INSTRUMENTATION AT THE FIRE HAZARDS PANEL WOULD BE RELIED | | UPON TO VERIFY SAFE SHUTDOWN. THE FIRE HAZARDS PANELS ARE POWERED FROM | | DIVISION 12 AND 22 FOR UNIT 1 AND UNIT 2 RESPECTIVELY. | | | | "HOWEVER, IT WAS DETERMINED THAT A FIRE IN FIRE ZONE 3.2A-1 WOULD DISABLE | | BOTH TRAINS OF VC AND INTERRUPT POWER TO THE UNIT 1 FIRE HAZARD PANEL | | (DIVISION 12 POWER IS NOT PROTECTED IN THIS ZONE). THEREFORE, FOR A FIRE IN | | THIS ZONE, POTENTIALLY NO SAFE SHUTDOWN INSTRUMENTATION MAY BE AVAILABLE TO | | VERIFY HOT SHUTDOWN CONDITIONS. THIS IS NOT IN COMPLIANCE WITH 10CFR50, | | APPENDIX R. IT HAS BEEN VERIFIED THAT THE REMAINING FIRE ZONES LISTED | | ABOVE WHERE BOTH TRAINS OF VC COULD BE LOST DO HAVE THE FIRE HAZARDS PANEL | | AVAILABLE TO PROVIDE INDICATION TO VERIFY SAFE SHUTDOWN. BECAUSE THE VC | | SYSTEM IS POWERED FROM UNIT 1, THERE IS NO EFFECT ON THE UNIT 2 FIRE | | HAZARDS PANEL. | | | | "COMPENSATORY ACTIONS IN THE FORM OF HOURLY FIRE WATCHES HAVE BEEN IN PLACE | | SINCE LATE 1992 DUE TO THERMO-LAG FIRE BARRIER DEFICIENCIES. HOURLY FIRE | | WATCHES EXISTED IN THIS ZONE PRIOR TO 1992 FOR OTHER REASONS. THE HOURLY | | FIRE WATCHES WILL REMAIN IN PLACE UNTIL THE FIRE BARRIER DISCREPANCIES ARE | | PERMANENTLY RESOLVED." | | | | THE LICENSEE WILL INFORM THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR. R3DO | | (MCCORMICKBARGER) NOTIFIED. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ |POWER REACTOR | |EVENT NUMBER: 30578 | +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ |FACILITY: MILLSTONE REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 06/04/96 | |UNIT: [ ] [ ] [3] STATE: CT |NOTIFICATION TIME: 14:35 [ET]| |RX TYPE: [1] GE-3,[2] CE,[3] W-4-LP |EVENT DATE: 06/04/96 | +------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 14:29[EDT]| |NRC NOTIFIED BY: PAUL MALZAHN |LAST UPDATE DATE: 06/04/96 | |HQ OPS OFFICER: RUDY KARSCH +-----------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+ NOTIFICATIONS | |EMERGENCY CLASS: NOT APPLICABLE +-----------------------------+ |10 CFR SECTION: |JENNY JOHANSEN RDO | |APRE 50.72(b)(2)(vi) OFFSITE NOTIFICATION | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +-----+----------+-------+--------+--------------+--+--------+-----------------+ |UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ | | | | | | | | | 3 | N N 0 COLD SHUTDOWN | 0 COLD SHUTDOWN | +-----+---------------------------------------------+--------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | THE LICENSEE NOTIFIED THE US COAST GUARD, US DOT/NRC, AND THE CONNECTICUT | | DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION THAT THEY RELEASED 584 GALLONS OF | | 12.5% SODIUM HYPOCHLORITE SOLUTION TO LONG ISLAND SOUND. THE RELEASE | | OCCURRED FROM 1630 EDT ON 6/2/96 TO 0030 EDT ON 6/3/96, VIA THE SUCTION TO | | THE SERVICE WATER SYSTEM. THE LICENSEE INFORMED THE NRC RESIDENT | | INSPECTOR. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ |POWER REACTOR | |EVENT NUMBER: 30579 | +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ |FACILITY: WOLF CREEK REGION: 4 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 06/04/96 | |UNIT: [1] [ ] [ ] STATE: KS |NOTIFICATION TIME: 15:58 [ET]| |RX TYPE: [1] W-4-LP |EVENT DATE: 05/17/96 | +------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 00:00[CDT]| |NRC NOTIFIED BY: GREG YOUNG |LAST UPDATE DATE: 06/04/96 | |HQ OPS OFFICER: RUDY KARSCH +-----------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+ NOTIFICATIONS | |EMERGENCY CLASS: NOT APPLICABLE +-----------------------------+ |10 CFR SECTION: | | |CDEF 21.21(b)(2) DEFECTS/NONCOMPLIANCE | | | | | | |VERN HODGE NRR | | | | | | | +-----+----------+-------+--------+--------------+--+--------+-----------------+ |UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ | 1 | N Y 100 POWER OPERATION | 100 POWER OPERATION | | | | | | | | | +-----+---------------------------------------------+--------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | 1" X 3.25" CAP SCREWS MANUFACTURED BY CARDINAL INDUSTRIES, DISTRIBUTED BY | | ENERGY & PROCESS CORPORATION WITH HEAT CODE K7, HEAT NUMBER 8866807, MAY BE | | DEFECTIVE. SIX OUT OF 71 TESTED PIECES FAILED THEIR HARDNESS TEST. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ |POWER REACTOR | |EVENT NUMBER: 30580 | +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ |FACILITY: PEACH BOTTOM REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 06/04/96 | |UNIT: [2] [3] [ ] STATE: PA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 16:37 [ET]| |RX TYPE: [2] GE-4,[3] GE-4 |EVENT DATE: 06/04/96 | +------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 13:32[EDT]| |NRC NOTIFIED BY: BRIAN MERRYMAN |LAST UPDATE DATE: 06/04/96 | |HQ OPS OFFICER: RUDY KARSCH +-----------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+ NOTIFICATIONS | |EMERGENCY CLASS: NOT APPLICABLE +-----------------------------+ |10 CFR SECTION: |JENNY JOHANSEN RDO | |AESF 50.72(b)(2)(ii) ESF ACTUATION | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +-----+----------+-------+--------+--------------+--+--------+-----------------+ |UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ | 2 | N Y 82 POWER OPERATION | 80 POWER OPERATION | | 3 | N Y 100 POWER OPERATION | 97 POWER OPERATION | | | | | +-----+---------------------------------------------+--------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | A FAULT AT AN OFF-SITE SUBSTATION CAUSED GROUP 2 AND GROUP 3 ISOLATIONS AT | | BOTH UNITS. | | | | AN INDICATED FAULT AT THE NOTTINGHAM SUBSTATION CAUSED A LOSS OF "2" START | | UP SOURCE (AN OFF-SITE LINE). THE SUBSEQUENT ELECTRICAL TRANSIENT CAUSED | | THE FOLLOWING ESF ACTUATIONS: UNIT 2 - GROUP 2 (CONTAINMENT ISOLATION | | VALVES) CLOSURE OF THE INBOARD ISOLATION VALVES, GROUP 3 (REACTOR BUILDING | | VENTILATION) CLOSURE OF THE INBOARD ISOLATION VALVES; UNIT 3 - GROUP 2 | | CLOSURE OF THE OUTBOARD ISOLATION VALVES, GROUP 3 CLOSURE OF THE OUTBOARD | | ISOLATION VALVES. IN ADDITION A HALF SCRAM OCCURRED AND THE FEED HEATERS | | ISOLATED. ISOLATION OF THE FEED HEATERS LOWERED REACTOR POWER. | | | | IN RESPONSE TO THE ELECTRICAL TRANSIENT THE "2" 4KV 1E BUS AUTOMATICALLY | | TRANSFERRED FROM THE "2 SUE" TRANSFORMER TO THE "3 SUE" TRANSFORMER. THE | | PLANTS ARE STABLE AND HAVE RETURNED TO 82% AND 100% POWER RESPECTIVELY. NO | | EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATORS STARTED. THE LICENSEE INFORMED THE NRC | | RESIDENT INSPECTOR. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ |POWER REACTOR | |EVENT NUMBER: 30581 | +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ |FACILITY: SEQUOYAH REGION: 2 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 06/05/96 | |UNIT: [ ] [2] [ ] STATE: TN |NOTIFICATION TIME: 03:05 [ET]| |RX TYPE: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP |EVENT DATE: 06/05/96 | +------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 01:37[EDT]| |NRC NOTIFIED BY: LIEB |LAST UPDATE DATE: 06/05/96 | |HQ OPS OFFICER: CHAUNCEY GOULD +-----------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+ NOTIFICATIONS | |EMERGENCY CLASS: NOT APPLICABLE +-----------------------------+ |10 CFR SECTION: |PAUL FREDRICKSON RDO | |ARPS 50.72(b)(2)(ii) RPS ACTUATION | | |AESF 50.72(b)(2)(ii) ESF ACTUATION | | | | | | | | | | | +-----+----------+-------+--------+--------------+--+--------+-----------------+ |UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ | | | | | 2 | M N 0 HOT STANDBY | 0 HOT STANDBY | | | | | +-----+---------------------------------------------+--------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | THE PLANT HAD A MANUAL REACTOR TRIP AND FEEDWATER ISOLATION WHILE IN MODE 3 | | DURING A SURVEILLANCE. | | | | DURING A ROD POSITION INDICATION (RPI) HOT CALIBRATION TEST, THE DELTA ROD | | S/D BANK DROPPED TO THE FULLY INSERTED POSITION FROM FULLY WITHDRAWN | | POSITION DUE TO AN APPARENT EQUIPMENT MALFUNCTION. THE CAUSE OF THIS | | MALFUNCTION IS BEING INVESTIGATED. PLANT PROCEDURES REQUIRED THE LICENSEE | | TO INITIATE A MANUAL REACTOR TRIP AND ENTER INTO THEIR EMERGENCY | | PROCEDURES. ALL RODS WERE FULLY INSERTED. IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING THE REACTOR | | TRIP, A FEEDWATER ISOLATION OCCURRED DUE TO RCS AVERAGE TEMPERATURE BEING | | BELOW 550 DEGREES F. MAIN FEEDWATER, HOWEVER, WAS NOT IN SERVICE AT THIS | | TIME, BUT AUX FEEDWATER WAS IN SERVICE. THE RI WAS INFORMED. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+