U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Operations Center Event Reports For 09/03/96 - 09/04/96 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** 30950 30951 30952 30953 30954 +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ |POWER REACTOR | |EVENT NUMBER: 30950 | +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ |FACILITY: BYRON REGION: 3 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 09/03/96 | |UNIT: [1] [2] [ ] STATE: IL |NOTIFICATION TIME: 12:40 [ET]| |RX TYPE: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP |EVENT DATE: 09/03/96 | +------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 11:14[CDT]| |NRC NOTIFIED BY: SCOTT FRUIN |LAST UPDATE DATE: 09/03/96 | |HQ OPS OFFICER: LEIGH TROCINE +-----------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+ NOTIFICATIONS | |EMERGENCY CLASS: NOT APPLICABLE +-----------------------------+ |10 CFR SECTION: |ROGER LANKSBURY RDO | |AOUT 50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B) OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +-----+----------+-------+--------+--------------+--+--------+-----------------+ |UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ | 1 | N Y 97 POWER OPERATION | 97 POWER OPERATION | | 2 | N N 0 REFUELING | 0 REFUELING | | | | | +-----+---------------------------------------------+--------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | DISCOVERY OF SPENT FUEL RACK BORAFLEX MATERIAL GAPING GREATER THAN THE | | MAXIMUM ASSUMED GAP | | | | RESULTS OF THE EVALUATION OF SPENT FUEL RACK NEUTRON ATTENUATION TEST DATA | | RECEIVED ON SEPTEMBER 3, 1996, SHOWED BORAFLEX MATERIAL GAPING OF GREATER | | THAN ONE FOOT IN A CELL. THE MAXIMUM GAP ASSUMED IN THE CURRENT CRITICAL | | ANALYSIS IS FOUR INCHES. SINCE THE OBSERVED GAP EXCEEDS THE MAXIMUM | | ASSUMED GAP, THE FUEL RACK IS OUTSIDE OF ITS DESIGN BASIS. CURRENTLY, NO | | FUEL IS STORED IN THIS LOCATION OR IN ANY ADJACENT LOCATION. COMPENSATORY | | MEASURES ARE ALSO IN PLACE TO ENSURE THAT A SUFFICIENT BORON CONCENTRATION | | IS MAINTAINED IN THE POOL TO ACCOUNT FOR DEGRADATION OF THE BORAFLEX | | MATERIAL. | | | | THE LICENSEE NOTIFIED THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ |POWER REACTOR | |EVENT NUMBER: 30951 | +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ |FACILITY: OCONEE REGION: 2 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 09/03/96 | |UNIT: [1] [ ] [3] STATE: SC |NOTIFICATION TIME: 12:41 [ET]| |RX TYPE: [1] B&W-L-LP,[2] B&W-L-LP,[3] B&W-L-LP |EVENT DATE: 09/03/96 | +------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 12:10[EDT]| |NRC NOTIFIED BY: DAVID NIX |LAST UPDATE DATE: 09/03/96 | |HQ OPS OFFICER: LEIGH TROCINE +-----------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+ NOTIFICATIONS | |EMERGENCY CLASS: NOT APPLICABLE +-----------------------------+ |10 CFR SECTION: |CHARLES CASTO RDO | |AIND 50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D) ACCIDENT MITIGATION | | |NLCO TECH SPEC LCO A/S | | | | | | | | | | | +-----+----------+-------+--------+--------------+--+--------+-----------------+ |UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ | 1 | N Y 100 POWER OPERATION | 100 POWER OPERATION | | | | | | 3 | N Y 100 POWER OPERATION | 100 POWER OPERATION | +-----+---------------------------------------------+--------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | MISSED VENT VALVE TESTING RESULTED IN INOPERABILITY OF THE UNIT 1 AND 3 | | BORATED WATER STORAGE TANKS (BWST). | | | | DURING A REVIEW OF THE OCONEE INSERVICE TESTING PROGRAM ON AUGUST 26, 1996, | | IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT THE REQUIRED TESTING FREQUENCY HAD BEEN EXCEEDED FOR | | VALVES 1LP-61 AND 3LP-61, VENT VALVES FOR THE UNIT 1 AND 3 BWSTs. AT THAT | | TIME, THESE VALVES WERE DECLARED INOPERABLE, AND AN EVALUATION OF SYSTEM | | IMPACT WAS UNDERTAKEN. | | | | THE VENT VALVES FOR THE BWSTs ARE REQUIRED TO BE CAPABLE OF OPENING AND | | ADMITTING SUFFICIENT AIR TO MAINTAIN THE PRESSURE IN THE BWSTs ABOVE THE | | DESIGN VACUUM WHEN LIQUID IS REMOVED FROM THE TANKS. THE BWSTs PROVIDE A | | SOURCE OF BORATED WATER FOR THE EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS DURING | | CERTAIN DESIGN BASIS ACCIDENTS. | | | | AT 1210 ON SEPTEMBER 3, 1996, FURTHER ENGINEERING REVIEW REVEALED THAT THE | | INOPERABILITY OF VALVES 1LP-61 AND 3LP-61 RENDERED THE UNIT 1 AND 3 BWSTs | | INOPERABLE. TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.2.2 REQUIRES THE LICENSEE TO RESTORE | | OPERABILITY OF THE BWSTs WITHIN ONE HOUR OR PLACE THE UNITS IN A HOT | | SHUTDOWN CONDITION WITHIN SIX HOURS. | | | | CURRENTLY, EFFORTS ARE IN PROGRESS TO REMOVE VALVES 1LP-61 AND 3LP-61 FROM | | THE BWST VENT PIPING TO RESTORE OPERABILITY OF THE BWST. THE LICENSEE | | PLANS TO PROVIDE ADDITIONAL DETAILS IN A LICENSEE EVENT REPORT. | | | | THE LICENSEE NOTIFIED THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ |POWER REACTOR | |EVENT NUMBER: 30952 | +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ |FACILITY: SALEM REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 09/03/96 | |UNIT: [1] [2] [ ] STATE: NJ |NOTIFICATION TIME: 17:12 [ET]| |RX TYPE: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP |EVENT DATE: 09/03/96 | +------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 14:45[EDT]| |NRC NOTIFIED BY: JOHN KONOVALCHICK |LAST UPDATE DATE: 09/03/96 | |HQ OPS OFFICER: LEIGH TROCINE +-----------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+ NOTIFICATIONS | |EMERGENCY CLASS: NOT APPLICABLE +-----------------------------+ |10 CFR SECTION: |DAVID SILK RDO | |AIND 50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D) ACCIDENT MITIGATION | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +-----+----------+-------+--------+--------------+--+--------+-----------------+ |UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ | 1 | N N 0 REFUELING | 0 REFUELING | | 2 | N N 0 REFUELING | 0 REFUELING | | | | | +-----+---------------------------------------------+--------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | FAILURE TO LIST SEVERAL MANUAL TURBINE DRAIN VALVES IN THE EMERGENCY | | OPERATING PROCEDURE FOR COPING ACTIONS FOLLOWING A HYPOTHETICAL STEAM | | GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE FAILURE OF THE MAIN STEAM | | ISOLATION VALVE ASSOCIATED WITH THE RUPTURED STEAM GENERATOR | | | | DURING A DISCUSSION OF A RECENT DESIGN CHANGE ON THE NEW STEAM TRAPS, THE | | LICENSED OPERATORS IN TRAINING DISCOVERED A PROBLEM WITH AN EMERGENCY | | OPERATING PROCEDURE. THE SPECIFIC PROBLEM INVOLVED A SCENARIO WHERE A | | HYPOTHETICAL STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE OCCURS IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE | | FAILURE OF THE MAIN STEAM ISOLATION VALVE ASSOCIATED WITH THE RUPTURED | | STEAM GENERATOR. THE EMERGENCY OPERATING PROCEDURE COPING ACTIONS REQUIRE | | CLOSURE OF THE OTHER MAIN STEAM ISOLATION VALVES AND CLOSURE OF SEVERAL | | MANUAL ISOLATION VALVES TO CONTROL THE SPREAD OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL AND | | TO PREVENT AN UNCONTROLLED COOLDOWN OF THE REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM. SEVERAL | | MANUAL TURBINE DRAIN VALVES WERE FOUND TO BE MISSING FROM THE EMERGENCY | | OPERATING PROCEDURE AND COULD HAVE CAUSED THE RUPTURED STEAM GENERATOR'S | | CONTENTS TO FLOW TO THE MAIN CONDENSER AND SUBSEQUENTLY TO THE PLANT VENT | | STACK. THERE WERE OTHER EMERGENCY PROCEDURES IN PLACE TO DEAL WITH THE | | CONTINUED DEPRESSURIZATION OF THE RUPTURED STEAM GENERATOR. | | | | CURRENTLY, BOTH SALEM UNITS ARE DEFUELED, AND THE EMERGENCY OPERATING | | PROCEDURES ARE NOT REQUIRED TO BE UTILIZED TO MITIGATE DESIGN BASIS | | ACCIDENTS. THE LICENSEE BELIEVES THAT THERE IS NO SIGNIFICANT IMPACT ON | | THE HEALTH AND SAFETY OF THE PUBLIC DUE TO THIS PROBLEM. | | | | THE LICENSEE NOTIFIED THE LOWER ALLOWAYS CREEK TOWNSHIP AND PLANS TO NOTIFY | | THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ |POWER REACTOR | |EVENT NUMBER: 30953 | +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ |FACILITY: MILLSTONE REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 09/03/96 | |UNIT: [ ] [ ] [3] STATE: CT |NOTIFICATION TIME: 17:29 [ET]| |RX TYPE: [1] GE-3,[2] CE,[3] W-4-LP |EVENT DATE: 09/03/96 | +------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 17:04[EDT]| |NRC NOTIFIED BY: DAVID McDANIEL |LAST UPDATE DATE: 09/03/96 | |HQ OPS OFFICER: LEIGH TROCINE +-----------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+ NOTIFICATIONS | |EMERGENCY CLASS: NOT APPLICABLE +-----------------------------+ |10 CFR SECTION: |DAVID SILK RDO | |AOUT 50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B) OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +-----+----------+-------+--------+--------------+--+--------+-----------------+ |UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ | | | | | | | | | 3 | N N 0 COLD SHUTDOWN | 0 COLD SHUTDOWN | +-----+---------------------------------------------+--------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | DISCOVERY THAT TWO COMPONENT COOLING WATER (CCW) SYSTEM RELIEF VALVES FOR | | THE RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL (RHR) HEAT EXCHANGERS WERE 19 PSI HIGHER THAN THE | | SYSTEM DESIGN PRESSURE REQUIREMENTS | | | | THE LICENSEE DETERMINED THAT THERE WERE SOME RELIEF VALVES THAT WERE NOT IN | | AGREEMENT WITH THE DESIGN PRESSURE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE CCW SYSTEM. TWO OF | | THE IDENTIFIED DISCREPANCIES WERE OF CONCERN. SPECIFICALLY, TWO RELIEF | | VALVES THAT PROVIDE THERMAL PROTECTION TO THE RHR HEAT EXCHANGERS WERE | | FOUND TO BE SET 19 PSI HIGHER THAN THE DESIGN PRESSURE OF THE PIPING. | | NORMAL CODE ALLOWANCES WOULD PERMIT UP TO 165 PSI (10% ABOVE THE SYSTEM | | DESIGN PRESSURE OF 150 PSI), BUT THE RELIEF SETPOINT FOR THESE TWO VALVES | | WAS FOUND TO BE 169 PSI. ALTHOUGH THE RELIEF VALVE SETPOINTS WERE FOUND TO | | BE SET ABOVE THE SYSTEM DESIGN PRESSURE, THE LICENSEE BELIEVES THAT THE | | SETPOINTS ARE WELL BELOW THE ULTIMATE FAILURE PRESSURE OF THE PIPING. | | | | UNIT 3 IS CURRENTLY IN COLD SHUTDOWN, AND THE RHR AND CCW SYSTEMS ARE | | CURRENTLY IN USE. THE LICENSEE'S ENGINEERING EVALUATION HAS DETERMINED | | THAT THE CCW SYSTEM CONTINUES TO REMAIN OPERABLE AND CAPABLE OF COOLING. | | THE LICENSEE ALSO CONSIDERS THE RHR SYSTEM TO BE OPERABLE AT THIS TIME. | | THEREFORE, THE UNIT IS NOT IN ANY TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION LIMITING | | CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION AS A RESULT OF THIS ISSUE. | | | | THE LICENSEE NOTIFIED THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR AND THE APPLICABLE STATE | | AND LOCAL AUTHORITIES. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ |POWER REACTOR | |EVENT NUMBER: 30954 | +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ |FACILITY: HARRIS REGION: 2 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 09/04/96 | |UNIT: [1] [ ] [ ] STATE: NC |NOTIFICATION TIME: 02:10 [ET]| |RX TYPE: [1] W-3-LP |EVENT DATE: 09/03/96 | +------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 23:42[EDT]| |NRC NOTIFIED BY: ERIC McCARTNEY |LAST UPDATE DATE: 09/04/96 | |HQ OPS OFFICER: DICK JOLLIFFE +-----------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+ NOTIFICATIONS | |EMERGENCY CLASS: NOT APPLICABLE +-----------------------------+ |10 CFR SECTION: |CHARLES CASTO RDO | |ARPS 50.72(b)(2)(ii) RPS ACTUATION | | |AESF 50.72(b)(2)(ii) ESF ACTUATION | | | | | | | | | | | +-----+----------+-------+--------+--------------+--+--------+-----------------+ |UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ | 1 | A/R Y 100 POWER OPERATION | 0 HOT STANDBY | | | | | | | | | +-----+---------------------------------------------+--------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | - MANUAL Rx TRIP FROM 100% POWER DUE TO LOSS OF NORMAL SERVICE WATER SYSTEM | | | | THE PLANT WAS OPERATING AT 100% POWER WHEN FLOW AND PRESSURE FOR THE NORMAL | | SERVICE WATER SYSTEM WAS LOST FOR UNKNOWN REASONS. CONTROL ROOM OPERATORS | | MANUALLY STARTED THE STANDBY NORMAL SERVICE WATER PUMP BUT IT TRIPPED AFTER | | 2 TO 3 MINUTES FOR UNKNOWN REASONS. THIS RESULTED IN A LOSS OF COOLING | | WATER TO THE MAIN FEEDWATER AND CONDENSATE PUMPS. | | | | AT 2342 ON 09/03/96, CONTROL ROOM OPERATORS MANUALLY TRIPPED THE REACTOR | | FROM 100% POWER. ALL CONTROL RODS INSERTED COMPLETELY. THE AUXILIARY | | FEEDWATER SYSTEM AUTO STARTED ON LOW LOW STEAM GENERATOR WATER LEVEL | | SETPOINT DUE TO SHRINK FROM THE REACTOR TRIP. STEAM IS BEING DUMPED | | TO THE ATMOSPHERE VIA THE STEAM GENERATOR POWER OPERATED RELIEF VALVES. | | THE PLANT IS STABLE IN MODE 3 (HOT STANDBY). | | | | THE LICENSEE IS INVESTIGATING THE CAUSE OF THE LOSS OF THE NORMAL SERVICE | | WATER SYSTEM. | | | | THE LICENSEE INFORMED THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+