U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Operations Center Event Reports For 08/24/95 - 08/25/95 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** 29233 29234 29235 29236 +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ |IRRETRIEVABLE WELL LOGGING SOURCE | |EVENT NUMBER: 29233 | +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ |LICENSEE: SPERRY-SUN DRILLING SERVICES |NOTIFICATION DATE: 08/24/95 | | CITY: HOUSTON REGION: 4 |NOTIFICATION TIME: 08:02 [ET]| | COUNTY: STATE: TX |EVENT DATE: 08/24/95 | |LICENSE#: 42-26844-01 AGREEMENT: Y |EVENT TIME: 06:00[CDT]| | DOCKET: |LAST UPDATE DATE: 08/24/95 | | +-----------------------------+ | |PERSON ORGANIZATION| | |ART HOWELL RDO | | | | +------------------------------------------------+ | |NRC NOTIFIED BY: RICHARD ARSENAULT | | |HQ OPS OFFICER: LEIGH TROCINE | | +------------------------------------------------+ | |EMERGENCY CLASS: NOT APPLICABLE | | |10 CFR SECTION: | | |EIRR 39.77(c) WELL LOGGING SOURCE | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +------------------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | SPERRY-SUN DRILLING SERVICES WELL LOGGING SOURCE EVENT | | | | NAME OF WELL OWNER: MOBIL OIL COMPANY | | | | LOCATION OF WELL: SHIP SHOAL BLOCK NUMBER 72 IN THE GULF OF MEXICO | | | | WELL IDENTIFICATION: OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF 0060, WELL NUMBER 26 | | | | ISOTOPE: ONE CESIUM-137 SOURCE AND ONE AMERICIUM-241/BERYLLIUM SOURCE | | | | QUANTITY: 2 CURIES AND 3 CURIES, RESPECTIVELY | | | | REQUEST FOR IMMEDIATE NRC APPROVAL TO BEGIN ABANDONMENT: YES | | | | DATE AND TIME OF OCCURRENCE: THE DRILL STRING GOT STUCK AT 21:30 (CDT) ON | | AUGUST 22, 1995, AND THE DECISION FOR ABANDONMENT WAS MADE AT APPROXIMATELY | | 06:00 (CDT) ON AUGUST 24, 1995. | | | | ADDITIONAL NOTIFICATIONS: THE LICENSEE HAS NOTIFIED THE MINERALS | | MANAGEMENT SERVICE AND PLANS TO FILE A 30-DAY WRITTEN REPORT WITH MINERALS | | MANAGEMENT SERVICE. THE LICENSEE ALSO PLANS TO SENT COPIES OF THIS REPORT | | TO THE STATES OF TEXAS AND LOUISIANA AS A COURTESY. | | | | REFER TO THE HOO LOG FOR LICENSEE TELEPHONE NUMBER. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ |POWER REACTOR | |EVENT NUMBER: 29234 | +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ |FACILITY: FT CALHOUN REGION: 4 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 08/24/95 | |UNIT: [1] [ ] [ ] STATE: NE |NOTIFICATION TIME: 13:42 [ET]| |RX TYPE: [1] CE |EVENT DATE: 08/24/95 | +------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 11:13[CDT]| |NRC NOTIFIED BY: CARLSON |LAST UPDATE DATE: 08/24/95 | |HQ OPS OFFICER: BOB STRANSKY +-----------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+ NOTIFICATIONS | |EMERGENCY CLASS: NOT APPLICABLE +-----------------------------+ |10 CFR SECTION: |ART HOWELL RDO | |ARPS 50.72(b)(2)(ii) RPS ACTUATION | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +-----+----------+-------+--------+--------------+--+--------+-----------------+ |UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ | 1 | M/R Y 100 POWER OPERATION | 0 HOT STANDBY | | | | | | | | | +-----+---------------------------------------------+--------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | MANUAL REACTOR TRIP DUE TO PERSONNEL ERROR DURING TESTING. | | | | AT 11:13 (CDT), THE PLANT WAS INADVERTENTLY TRIPPED FROM 100% POWER. ALL | | CONTROL RODS INSERTED FOLLOWING THE TRIP. THE LICENSEE BELIEVES THAT THE | | TRIP WAS CAUSED BY THE OPERATION OF AN INCORRECT SWITCH DURING THE | | PERFORMANCE OF DIVERSE SCRAM SYSTEM PREVENTIVE MAINTENANCE TEST | | IC-PM-DSS-1001. THE LICENSEE STATED THAT THIS TEST WAS PERFORMED FROM | | INSIDE THE CONTROL ROOM AND THAT FOLLOWING THE TEST, AN INCORRECT SWITCH | | ALIGNMENT WAS OBSERVED BY CONTROL ROOM OPERATORS. | | | | FOLLOWING THE TRIP, THE "D1" EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR AUTOMATICALLY | | STARTED AND ACCELERATED TO FULL SPEED. THE LICENSEE STATED THAT THIS | | EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR SHOULD HAVE STARTED BUT ONLY ACCELERATED TO IDLE | | SPEED. ALL OTHER PLANT EQUIPMENT FUNCTIONED AS EXPECTED. | | | | THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR HAS BEEN INFORMED. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ |POWER REACTOR | |EVENT NUMBER: 29235 | +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ |FACILITY: HARRIS REGION: 2 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 08/24/95 | |UNIT: [1] [ ] [ ] STATE: NC |NOTIFICATION TIME: 15:25 [ET]| |RX TYPE: [1] W-3-LP |EVENT DATE: 08/24/95 | +------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 15:08[EDT]| |NRC NOTIFIED BY: ABRAHAM |LAST UPDATE DATE: 08/24/95 | |HQ OPS OFFICER: BOB STRANSKY +-----------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+ NOTIFICATIONS | |EMERGENCY CLASS: NOT APPLICABLE +-----------------------------+ |10 CFR SECTION: |EDWARD MCALPINE RDO | |AOUT 50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B) OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +-----+----------+-------+--------+--------------+--+--------+-----------------+ |UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ | 1 | N Y 76 POWER OPERATION | 76 POWER OPERATION | | | | | | | | | +-----+---------------------------------------------+--------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | PORTION OF ECCS RECIRCULATION PIPING OUTSIDE BOUNDARY OF REACTOR AUXILIARY | | BUILDING EMERGENCY EXHAUST SYSTEM. | | | | THE FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF A FACSIMILE SUBMITTED BY THE LICENSEE: | | | | "FSAR SECTION 6.5.1.1.2 DESCRIBES THE DESIGN BASIS FOR THE REACTOR | | AUXILIARY BUILDING (RAB) EMERGENCY EXHAUST SYSTEM AND IMPLIES THAT THIS | | SYSTEM ENVELOPS THE ENTIRE ECCS RECIRCULATION PIPING LOCATED OUTSIDE | | CONTAINMENT. FSAR SECTION 15.6.5.4.2 PROVIDES THIS SAME ASSUMPTION AND | | CONTAINS THE DOSE ANALYSIS RESULTING FROM ECCS LEAKAGE THAT IS POSTULATED | | TO OCCUR OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT DURING A DESIGN BASIS LOCA. THE HARRIS SER | | SECTIONS 6.5.1 AND 15.6.5.2 PROVIDE SIMILAR UNDERSTANDING OF THIS | | CONFIGURATION. | | | | THE MAJOR COMPONENTS OF THE ECCS SYSTEM OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT (ECCS PUMPS, | | HEAT EXCHANGERS, AND PIPING) ARE LOCATED WITHIN THE RAB EMERGENCY EXHAUST | | SYSTEM BOUNDARY. IT HAS BEEN DETERMINED THAT A PORTION OF OUR ECCS | | RECIRCULATION PIPING (INCLUDING VALVES) IS ACTUALLY OUTSIDE THE PHYSICAL | | BOUNDARY OF THE RAB EMERGENCY EXHAUST SYSTEM. AS A RESULT, THERE COULD | | POTENTIALLY BE MORE 'UNFILTERED' LEAKAGE THAN ORIGINALLY ANALYZED. WHEN | | USING THE ASSUMPTIONS PRESENTED IN FSAR SECTION 15.6.5.4.2 AND TAKING INTO | | CONSIDERATION THAT SOME OF THE ASSUMED NORMAL OPERATIONAL LEAKAGE COULD | | OCCUR OUTSIDE THE "FILTERED" AREA DURING AN ACCIDENT, THE EXPECTED OFFSITE | | DOSES ARE STILL WITHIN 10 CFR 100 LIMITS. THE PIPING IN QUESTION IS | | ENVELOPED BY THE RAB NORMAL VENTILATION SYSTEM BOUNDARY. IN POST ACCIDENT | | CONDITIONS, THIS NORMAL VENTILATION SYSTEM, WHICH CONTAINS CHARCOAL | | FILTERS, IS AUTOMATICALLY SHUTDOWN AND ISOLATED TO SUPPORT THE OPERATION OF | | THE EMERGENCY EXHAUST SYSTEM. THE ENTIRE RAB IS EXPECTED TO REMAIN | | ISOLATED (EXCEPT FOR PERSONNEL PASSAGE) FROM THE ENVIRONMENT MINIMIZING A | | POTENTIAL RELEASE FROM ANY SYSTEM LEAKS. | | | | THE FOLLOWING ACTIONS HAVE BEEN TAKEN: | | 1) AN ADMINISTRATIVE LEAKAGE LIMIT OF 1 GALLON PER HOUR HAS BEEN | | ESTABLISHED FOR THIS PORTION OF THE ECCS SYSTEM. BASED ON OUR REVIEW OF | | THE EXISTING ANALYSIS (ADJUSTING FOR THE KNOWN PIPING CONFIGURATION) THIS | | ADMINISTRATIVE LIMIT PROVIDES ASSURANCE THAT OFFSITE DOSES WOULD REMAIN | | WITHIN 10 CFR 100 LIMITS. | | 2) OPERATORS ARE INSPECTING THE AFFECTED PIPING AREAS FOR LEAKAGE EACH | | SHIFT (TWO SHIFTS PER DAY). | | 3) OPERATORS WILL USE RADIATION MONITOR TRENDS AS AN ADDITIONAL MEANS OF | | EARLY LEAK DETECTION. | | 4) COMPENSATORY ACTIONS ARE IN PLACE TO MAINTAIN CONTROL OF THE RAB | | BOUNDARY SUCH THAT IS WOULD BE INTACT DURING AN ACCIDENT. | | 5) AN INVESTIGATION IS CONTINUING TO RESOLVE THIS ANALYSIS ISSUE." | | | | THE NRC RESIDENT HAS BEEN INFORMED BY THE LICENSEE. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ |POWER REACTOR | |EVENT NUMBER: 29236 | +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ |FACILITY: SUSQUEHANNA REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 08/25/95 | |UNIT: [ ] [2] [ ] STATE: PA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 04:05 [ET]| |RX TYPE: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4 |EVENT DATE: 08/25/95 | +------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 01:41[EDT]| |NRC NOTIFIED BY: DONALD E. ROLAND |LAST UPDATE DATE: 08/25/95 | |HQ OPS OFFICER: LEIGH TROCINE +-----------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+ NOTIFICATIONS | |EMERGENCY CLASS: NOT APPLICABLE +-----------------------------+ |10 CFR SECTION: |RICHARD CONTE RDO | |AESF 50.72(b)(2)(ii) ESF ACTUATION | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +-----+----------+-------+--------+--------------+--+--------+-----------------+ |UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ | | | | | 2 | N Y 100 POWER OPERATION | 100 POWER OPERATION | | | | | +-----+---------------------------------------------+--------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | FAILURE OF THE INBOARD MAIN STEAM LINE DRAIN VALVE TO CLOSE AND OF THE ZONE | | III WALL AND HIGH EXHAUST RADIATION MONITORS TO TRIP DOWNSCALE AS EXPECTED | | DURING A HALF SCRAM AS PART OF A PRE-PLANNED EVOLUTION. | | | | THE REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM (RPS) WAS MOMENTARILY DE-ENERGIZED DURING THE | | PERFORMANCE OF A SWAP OF THE RPS POWER SUPPLIES IN PREPARATION FOR | | MAINTENANCE ON ONE OF THE OFFSITE POWER SUPPLY TRANSFORMERS. THIS WAS DUE | | TO THE DESIGN OF THE RPS POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM. IT UTILIZED A BREAK BEFORE | | MAKE CONFIGURATION. THIS CAUSED A HALF SCRAM SIGNAL AND NUMEROUS | | ISOLATIONS AND WAS PART OF AN EXPECTED EVOLUTION. HOWEVER, FOLLOWING THE | | SWAP, THE INBOARD MAIN STEAM LINE DRAIN VALVE DID NOT GO CLOSED AS | | EXPECTED. (IN THE PAST, THE CAUSE OF THIS HAD BEEN EVALUATED AS A RELAY | | RACE.) IN ADDITION, THE ZONE III WALL (REFUEL FLOOR EXHAUST VENTILATION | | SYSTEM) AND HIGH EXHAUST RADIATION MONITORS DID NOT TRIP DOWNSCALE AS | | EXPECTED. | | | | THE LICENSEE SUSPECTED THAT THESE EMERGENCY SAFEGUARD FEATURE FUNCTIONS DID | | NOT OCCUR DUE TO THE SHORT PERIOD OF TIME THAT THE LOGIC WAS ACTUALLY | | DE-ENERGIZED DURING THE SWAP. THE LICENSEE REPORTED THAT THERE HAVE BEEN | | SIMILAR SITUATIONS IN THE PAST. THE LICENSEE'S INVESTIGATION IS CURRENTLY | | ONGOING. | | | | THE LICENSEE WILL NOTIFY THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+