U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Operations Center Event Reports For 05/11/95 - 05/12/95 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** 28715 28788 28789 28790 28791 28792 28793 28794 !!!!!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!!! +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ |POWER REACTOR | |EVENT NUMBER: 28715 | +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ |FACILITY: INDIAN POINT REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 04/22/95 | |UNIT: [2] [ ] [ ] STATE: NY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 18:16 [ET]| |RX TYPE: [2] W-4-LP,[3] W-4-LP |EVENT DATE: 04/22/95 | +------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 18:15[EDT]| |NRC NOTIFIED BY: DEIRDRE MURPHY |LAST UPDATE DATE: 05/11/95 | |HQ OPS OFFICER: JOSEPH SEBROSKY +-----------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+ NOTIFICATIONS | |EMERGENCY CLASS: NOT APPLICABLE +-----------------------------+ |10 CFR SECTION: |WILLIAM RULAND RDO | |AESF 50.72(b)(2)(ii) ESF ACTUATION | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +-----+----------+-------+--------+--------------+--+--------+-----------------+ |UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ | 2 | N N 0 COLD SHUTDOWN | 0 COLD SHUTDOWN | | | | | | | | | +-----+---------------------------------------------+--------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | A HYDROGEN RECOMBINER FAILED A SURVEILLANCE TEST. | | | | DURING THE PERFORMANCE OF QUARTERLY SURVEILLANCE ON THE '22' HYDROGEN | | RECOMBINER, THREE VALVES FAILED TO OPERATE PROPERLY. TWO VALVES FAILED TO | | CLOSE, AND ONE VALVE FAILED TO OPEN. THE VALVES THAT FAILED TO CLOSE ARE | | THE BLEED VALVES FROM THE RECOMBINER, AND THE VALVE THAT FAILED TO OPEN IS | | THE BLOCK VALVE IN THE MAIN COMBUSTION LINE. WITH THE RECOMBINER IN | | STANDBY THESE VALVES ARE NORMALLY IN A POSITION TO PREVENT A BUILDUP OF | | HYDROGEN IN THE UNIT. THE VALVES ARE REQUIRED TO REPOSITION ONCE THE UNIT | | IS STARTED. | | | | THE TEST HAS BEEN SUCCESSFULLY PERFORMED ON THE OTHER HYDROGEN RECOMBINER. | | THE LICENSEE IS NOT CURRENTLY IN A TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION ACTION STATEMENT | | BECAUSE OF THE PROBLEM. THE LICENSEE IS PREVENTED FROM ENTERING THE | | STARTUP MODE UNTIL THE PROBLEM WITH THE RECOMBINER IS SOLVED. | | | | THE LICENSEE WILL INFORM THE RESIDENT INSPECTOR. | | | | * * * UPDATE ON 5/11/95 AT 1724 EDT, FROM GOETCHIUS TAKEN BY KARSCH * * * | | THE LICENSEE IS RETRACTING THIS EVENT FOR THE FOLLOWING REASONS: THE | | POTENTIAL FAILURE OF THE VALVES TO OPERATE WAS ADDRESSED IN THE TEST | | PROCEDURE; THE FAILED VALVES CAN BE OPERATED MANUALLY AND THE RECOMBINER | | WOULD NOT BE INOPERABLE. [THE SYSTEM IS MANUALLY INITIATED]; THE REDUNDANT | | TRAIN WAS TESTED AND FOUND FULLY AVAILABLE. THE LICENSEE WILL INFORM THE | | NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR. R1DO (KELLY) NOTIFIED. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ |POWER REACTOR | |EVENT NUMBER: 28788 | +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ |FACILITY: FT CALHOUN REGION: 4 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 05/11/95 | |UNIT: [1] [ ] [ ] STATE: NE |NOTIFICATION TIME: 13:25 [ET]| |RX TYPE: [1] CE |EVENT DATE: 05/11/95 | +------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 11:05[CDT]| |NRC NOTIFIED BY: TIMOTHY R. NELLENBACH |LAST UPDATE DATE: 05/11/95 | |HQ OPS OFFICER: LEIGH TROCINE +-----------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+ NOTIFICATIONS | |EMERGENCY CLASS: NOT APPLICABLE +-----------------------------+ |10 CFR SECTION: |IAN BARNES RDO | |ARPS 50.72(b)(2)(ii) RPS ACTUATION | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +-----+----------+-------+--------+--------------+--+--------+-----------------+ |UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ | 1 | M/R Y 100 POWER OPERATION | 0 HOT STANDBY | | | | | | | | | +-----+---------------------------------------------+--------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | MANUAL REACTOR TRIP DUE TO INTERNAL REACTOR COOLANT PUMP LEAKAGE THROUGH | | THE LUBE OIL COOLER | | | | THE PLANT COMPUTER INDICATED AN INCREASING LEVEL IN THE REACTOR COOLANT | | PUMP BEARING OIL RESERVOIR. THE LICENSEE PERFORMED A CONTAINMENT ENTRY AND | | CONFIRMED OVERFLOW OF THE RESERVOIR. THE LICENSEE SUSPECTED THAT THE CAUSE | | WAS LEAKAGE OF COMPONENT COOLING WATER THROUGH THE BEARING OIL COOLER. THE | | LICENSEE DID NOT HAVE AN ACCURATE ESTIMATION OF THE LEAKAGE INTO THE COOLER | | AT THE TIME OF THE NOTIFICATION. TO MINIMIZE POTENTIAL DAMAGE TO THE 3D | | REACTOR COOLANT PUMP MOTOR, THE LICENSEE MANUALLY TRIPPED THE REACTOR AND | | SECURED AND DE-ENERGIZED THE 3D REACTOR COOLANT PUMP. | | | | ALL RODS FULLY INSERTED, AND ALL SYSTEMS FUNCTIONED AS REQUIRED. NO SAFETY | | SYSTEM ACTUATIONS WERE REQUIRED. THE LICENSEE PLANS TO KEEP THE UNIT IN | | MODE 3 UNTIL REPAIRS ARE COMPLETE. THE ESTIMATED TIME TO REPAIR THE LEAK | | IS TWO DAYS. | | | | THE RESIDENT INSPECTORS WERE NOTIFIED BY THE LICENSEE, AND THE LICENSEE | | PLANS TO MAKE A PRESS RELEASE. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ |FUEL CYCLE FACILITY | |EVENT NUMBER: 28789 | +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ |FACILITY: BABCOCK & WILCOX CO. |NOTIFICATION DATE: 05/11/95 | | RXTYPE: URANIUM FUEL FABRICATION |NOTIFICATION TIME: 14:00 [ET]| |COMMENTS: HEU FABRICATION & SCRAP RECOVERY |EVENT DATE: 05/11/95 | | NAVAL REACTOR FUEL |EVENT TIME: 10:00[EDT]| | |LAST UPDATE DATE: 05/11/95 | | CITY: LYNCHBURG REGION: 2 +-----------------------------+ | COUNTY: CAMPBELL STATE: VA |PERSON ORGANIZATION| |LICENSE#: SNM-42 AGREEMENT: N |JOHN POTTER RDO | | DOCKET: 07000027 |BILL BRACH EO | +------------------------------------------------+ | |NRC NOTIFIED BY: A. F. OLSEN | | |HQ OPS OFFICER: LEIGH TROCINE | | +------------------------------------------------+ | |EMERGENCY CLASS: NOT APPLICABLE | | |10 CFR SECTION: | | |NBNL RESPONSE-BULLETIN | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +------------------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | NRC BULLETIN 91-01 4-HOUR CRITICALITY CONTROL NOTIFICATION MADE BECAUSE | | CHANGES WERE MADE WITHOUT PROPER DOCUMENTATION OF ANALYSIS. | | | | THE LICENSEE SENT IN THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION BY FACSIMILE: | | | | "AT 10:00 A.M. MAY 11, 1995 IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT A CHANGE FROM 28" TO 12" | | WAS MADE IN THE SPACING REQUIREMENTS BETWEEN A DISSOLVER TRAY AND A FILTER | | BOWL LOCATED IN THE LOW LEVEL DISSOLVER HOOD IN URANIUM RECOVERY. THE | | SEPARATION DISTANCE WAS ORIGINALLY ANALYZED TO BE 28". THIS DIMENSION WAS | | CHANGED PRIOR TO USING THE SYSTEM. A QUALIFIED NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY | | ENGINEER EVALUATED A 12" SEPARATION AND APPROVED THE CHANGE. THE | | EVALUATION OF THE 12" CHANGE IS BELIEVED TO HAVE BEEN DEFICIENT IN THAT | | DOCUMENTATION TO SUPPORT THE CHANGE IS NOT INCLUDED WITH THE EVALUATION. A | | REVIEW BY THE [NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY] STAFF, INCLUDING A CONVERSATION | | WITH THE ORIGINAL [NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY] [ANALYST], RECONFIRMS | | [BABCOCK & WILCOX NAVAL NUCLEAR FUEL DIVISION'S] VIEW THAT THERE IS NOT A | | PHYSICS SAFETY CONCERN. THE DEFICIENCY IS THAT THE ORIGINAL REVIEW OF THIS | | CHANGE WAS NOT DOCUMENTED. ADDITIONAL CALCULATIONS ARE BEING PERFORMED TO | | PERMIT DOCUMENTATION OF THE SAFETY JUSTIFICATION. | | | | THE LOW LEVEL DISSOLVER WAS SHUT DOWN AT 10:45 A.M. ON 5/11/95. A ROOT | | CAUSE INVESTIGATION TEAM HAS BEEN ASSIGNED TO REVIEW THE SITUATION AND | | RECOMMEND CORRECTIVE ACTION." | | | | THE RESIDENT INSPECTOR WAS NOTIFIED BY THE LICENSEE. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ |POWER REACTOR | |EVENT NUMBER: 28790 | +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ |FACILITY: BRUNSWICK REGION: 2 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 05/11/95 | |UNIT: [1] [ ] [ ] STATE: NC |NOTIFICATION TIME: 14:25 [ET]| |RX TYPE: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4 |EVENT DATE: 05/11/95 | +------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 10:56[EDT]| |NRC NOTIFIED BY: GLEN LONG |LAST UPDATE DATE: 05/11/95 | |HQ OPS OFFICER: LEIGH TROCINE +-----------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+ NOTIFICATIONS | |EMERGENCY CLASS: NOT APPLICABLE +-----------------------------+ |10 CFR SECTION: |JOHN POTTER RDO | |AESF 50.72(b)(2)(ii) ESF ACTUATION | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +-----+----------+-------+--------+--------------+--+--------+-----------------+ |UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ | 1 | N N 0 COLD SHUTDOWN | 0 COLD SHUTDOWN | | | | | | | | | +-----+---------------------------------------------+--------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | PRIMARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION SYSTEM ACTUATION WHILE IN MODE 4 DUE TO THE | | LOSS OF A REACTOR PROTECTION BUS. | | | | DIESEL GENERATOR NO. 1 LOAD TESTING WAS IN PROGRESS AT THE TIME OF THE | | EVENT. THIS 18-MONTH SURVEILLANCE OPENS THE NORMAL POWER SUPPLY TO | | EMERGENCY BUS NO. 1 AND ALLOWS DIESEL GENERATOR NO. 1 TO AUTOMATICALLY | | START AND LOAD. FOLLOWING THE AUTOMATIC START AND LOAD, EMERGENCY BUS NO. | | 1 WAS BEING TIED BACK TO ITS NORMAL POWER SUPPLY. WHEN DIESEL GENERATOR | | NO. 1 CONTROL SWITCH WAS PLACED FROM AUTOMATIC TO CONTROL ROOM MANUAL, | | ELECTRIC PROTECTION ASSEMBLY BREAKER NOS. 1 AND 2 OPENED AND DE-ENERGIZED | | REACTOR PROTECTION BUS 'A'. THIS RESULTED IN HALF GROUP 1, 2, AND 3 | | ISOLATIONS. GROUP 6 VALVES WERE ALREADY CLOSED, AND GROUP 8 VALVE E11-F009 | | BREAKER WAS OPEN IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE MAINTENANCE SURVEILLANCE TEST SO IT | | DID NOT CLOSE. PRIMARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVE MOVEMENT INCLUDED ONE | | DIVISION 1 REACTOR COOLANT SAMPLE LINE VALVE, DIVISION 1 INBOARD DRYWELL | | FLOOR AND EQUIPMENT DRAIN SUMP VALVES, AND DIVISION 1 INBOARD REACTOR WATER | | CLEANUP SYSTEM ISOLATION VALVES. ELECTRICAL PROTECTION ASSEMBLY BREAKERS | | ARE DESIGNED TO OPEN AT 57.6 Hz TO 57.8 Hz. THERE IS A POTENTIAL THAT WHEN | | THE CONTROL SWITCH WAS PLACED FROM AUTOMATIC TO CONTROL ROOM MANUAL | | (ISOCHRONOUS TO DROOP MODE) FREQUENCY DROPPED TO THE ELECTRICAL PROTECTION | | ASSEMBLY BREAKER SETPOINT. | | | | ALL SYSTEMS RESPONDED CORRECTLY FOR THIS LOSS OF A REACTOR PROTECTION | | SYSTEM BUS. THE LICENSEE RESTORED THE EQUIPMENT/COMPONENTS TO THE | | APPROPRIATE POSITIONS, AND THE LICENSEE'S INVESTIGATION IS CONTINUING. THE | | ROOT CAUSE WILL BE DETERMINED BY THE CONDITION REPORT. | | | | THE RESIDENT INSPECTOR WAS NOTIFIED BY THE LICENSEE. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ |POWER REACTOR | |EVENT NUMBER: 28791 | +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ |FACILITY: KEWAUNEE REGION: 3 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 05/11/95 | |UNIT: [1] [ ] [ ] STATE: WI |NOTIFICATION TIME: 15:41 [ET]| |RX TYPE: [1] W-2-LP |EVENT DATE: 05/11/95 | +------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 09:00[CDT]| |NRC NOTIFIED BY: RICK PULEC |LAST UPDATE DATE: 05/11/95 | |HQ OPS OFFICER: RUDY KARSCH +-----------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+ NOTIFICATIONS | |EMERGENCY CLASS: NOT APPLICABLE +-----------------------------+ |10 CFR SECTION: |JAMES LYNCH RDO | |BPE2 20.403(b)(1) PERS EXPOS > 5REM WB | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +-----+----------+-------+--------+--------------+--+--------+-----------------+ |UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ | 1 | N N 0 REFUELING | 0 REFUELING | | | | | | | | | +-----+---------------------------------------------+--------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | LICENSEE 24 HOUR REPORT DUE TO AN OCCUPATIONAL EXPOSURE EXCEEDING THE | | LIMITS OF 10CFR20.1201(2)(ii). | | | | ON 5/10/95 AT APPROXIMATELY 0035 CDT, A PLANT MECHANIC FOUND A HOT PARTICLE | | OF PRIMARILY Co60 ON HIS NECK. HE HAD BEEN COMPLETING REPLACEMENT OF STEAM | | GENERATOR MANWAYS. PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT OF THE SHALLOW DOSE EQUIVALENT | | IS ESTIMATED AT 65 REM. THIS IS GREATER THAN THE 50 REM REPORTING | | THRESHOLD IN 20.1201(2)(ii). THE HOT PARTICLE WAS REMOVED UPON DISCOVERY. | | THE LICENSEE'S INITIAL METHOD FOR ESTIMATING THE DOSE MAY BE OVERLY | | CONSERVATIVE DUE TO THE COUNTING GEOMETRY AND THE DISPERSION OF THE SOURCE | | IN THE SOLVENT. THEREFORE, THE LICENSEE MAY RETRACT THIS EVENT IF A MORE | | PRECISE RECOMPUTATION DETERMINES THAT THE 50 REM THRESHOLD WAS NOT | | EXCEEDED. THE MECHANIC HAS BEEN REASSIGNED TO NON-RADIOLOGICAL WORK. THE | | LICENSEE INFORMED THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ |POWER REACTOR | |EVENT NUMBER: 28792 | +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ |FACILITY: FT CALHOUN REGION: 4 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 05/11/95 | |UNIT: [1] [ ] [ ] STATE: NE |NOTIFICATION TIME: 17:06 [ET]| |RX TYPE: [1] CE |EVENT DATE: 05/11/95 | +------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 13:12[CDT]| |NRC NOTIFIED BY: JOHN A. DRAKOTA |LAST UPDATE DATE: 05/11/95 | |HQ OPS OFFICER: LEIGH TROCINE +-----------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+ NOTIFICATIONS | |EMERGENCY CLASS: NOT APPLICABLE +-----------------------------+ |10 CFR SECTION: |IAN BARNES RDO | |APRE 50.72(b)(2)(vi) OFFSITE NOTIFICATION | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +-----+----------+-------+--------+--------------+--+--------+-----------------+ |UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ | 1 | N N 0 HOT STANDBY | 0 HOT STANDBY | | | | | | | | | +-----+---------------------------------------------+--------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | OFFSITE NOTIFICATION THAT OIL AND GREASE RELEASE LIMITS FOR AN EAST LAGOON | | RELEASE WERE EXCEEDED. | | | | AT 1:12 P.M. ON MAY 11, 1995, A REPRESENTATIVE OF THE LICENSEE'S | | ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS DEPARTMENT NOTIFIED THE STATE OF NEBRASKA DEPARTMENT | | OF ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY THAT OIL AND GREASE RELEASE LIMITS FOR THE EAST | | LAGOON WERE EXCEEDED ON MAY 3, 1995. THE ANALYSIS OF THE SAMPLE FROM THE | | LAGOON WAS RECEIVED AT 4:00 P.M. ON MAY 10, 1995, AND THE NATIONAL | | POLLUTANT DISCHARGE ELIMINATION SYSTEM ALLOWS THE LICENSEE FIVE DAYS TO | | REPORT THIS TYPE OF EVENT. | | | | AT 4:30 P.M. ON MAY 10, 1995, THE EAST LAGOON WAS SAMPLED AND VERIFIED TO | | BE WITHIN SPECIFICATIONS ON ALL PARAMETERS INCLUDING OIL. THE LAGOON AREA | | WAS ALSO VISUALLY INSPECTED TO DETECT SIGNS OF OIL FILM, AND NO TRACES OF | | OIL WERE FOUND ON THE LAGOON'S WATER SURFACE OR ON THE ROCKS ON THE BANKS | | OF THE LAGOON. | | | | THE LICENSEE'S RELEASE PERMIT ALLOWS ANALYSIS OF THE LAGOON SAMPLES TO BE | | COMPLETED AFTER THE RELEASE. THE LICENSEE PLANS TO HAVE CHEMISTRY VERIFY | | THAT ALL PARAMETERS ARE WITHIN LIMITS BEFORE A RELEASE PERMIT WILL BE | | ISSUED. | | | | THE RESIDENT INSPECTOR WAS NOTIFIED BY THE LICENSEE. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ |POWER REACTOR | |EVENT NUMBER: 28793 | +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ |FACILITY: VOGTLE REGION: 2 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 05/11/95 | |UNIT: [1] [2] [ ] STATE: GA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 18:43 [ET]| |RX TYPE: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP |EVENT DATE: 05/11/95 | +------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 18:08[EDT]| |NRC NOTIFIED BY: BOB BROWN |LAST UPDATE DATE: 05/12/95 | |HQ OPS OFFICER: RUDY KARSCH +-----------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+ NOTIFICATIONS | |EMERGENCY CLASS: NOT APPLICABLE +-----------------------------+ |10 CFR SECTION: |JOHN POTTER RDO | |AOUT 50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B) OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +-----+----------+-------+--------+--------------+--+--------+-----------------+ |UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ | 1 | N Y 100 POWER OPERATION | 100 POWER OPERATION | | 2 | N N 0 | 0 | | | | | +-----+---------------------------------------------+--------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | FOUR ELECTRICAL PENETRATIONS BETWEEN THE CONTROL BUILDINGS AND THE | | EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR (EDG) TUNNELS ARE IMPROPERLY SEALED. | | | | THE FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF A FAX FROM THE LICENSEE: | | "DURING THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE DCP FOR THE DIESEL GENERATOR GOVERNOR | | REPLACEMENT, A DISCREPANCY WAS IDENTIFIED WITH RESPECT TO TORNADO PRESSURE | | BARRIERS BETWEEN THE UNIT 1 AND UNIT 2 CONTROL BUILDINGS LEVEL B AND THE | | DIESEL GENERATOR ELECTRICAL TUNNELS. THIS DISCREPANCY WAS REFERRED TO | | ENGINEERING FOR A DESIGN REVIEW, AND ON 5-11-95 AT 1808 EDT, THE VEGP SITE | | WAS NOTIFIED OF THIS CONDITION. SPECIFICALLY, PENETRATIONS V12111Z11322-B, | | V12107Z11331-B, V22111Z1003-B, AND V22111Z1236-B LACK THE NECESSARY | | PENETRATION SEAL TO WITHSTAND A 3 PSI DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE. THE ELECTRICAL | | TUNNELS COMMUNICATE WITH THE OUTSIDE ATMOSPHERE VIA HVAC VENTS WHICH ARE | | NECESSARY TO COOL THE TUNNEL. THEREFORE, IN THE ABSENCE OF THESE SEALS, A | | TORNADO COULD DEPRESSURIZE THE ELECTRICAL TUNNELS WHICH WOULD ULTIMATELY | | DEPRESSURIZE LEVEL B OF THE CONTROL BUILDING. PER DESIGN CRITERIA 1007, | | SAFETY RELATED EQUIPMENT LOCATED IN AREAS OF THE PLANT NOT DESIGNED TO BE | | ISOLATED FROM THE PRESSURE EFFECTS ASSOCIATED WITH TORNADOS (e.g., DIESEL | | GENERATOR BUILDING AND AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMP HOUSE) SHOULD BE DESIGNED | | FOR OR PROTECTED FROM TORNADO DEPRESSURIZATION. THE MAXIMUM | | DEPRESSURIZATION EXPECTED FOR THE VEGP IS 3 PSI AT A RATE OF 2 PSI/S AND A | | DURATION OF APPROXIMATELY 40 SECONDS. DESIGN CRITERIA 1007 INDICATES THAT | | LEVEL B OF THE CONTROL BUILDING IS TO REMAIN AT ATMOSPHERIC PRESSURE DURING | | ABNORMAL CONDITIONS INCLUDING A TORNADO. THEREFORE, THE ABSENCE OF SEALS | | FOR THE ABOVE PENETRATIONS CONSTITUTES A CONDITION THAT IS OUTSIDE THE | | DESIGN BASIS OF THE PLANT. [THE LICENSEE] IS IN THE PROCESS OF PREPARING A | | JUSTIFICATION FOR CONTINUED OPERATION (JCO), AND MAKING PREPARATIONS FOR | | THE INSTALLATION OF THE SEALS." | | | | THE LICENSEE INFORMED THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR. | | | | ***UPDATE 5/12/95 @ 04:56 FROM HOPKINS TAKEN BY SEBROSKY *** | | THE LICENSEE HAS PERFORMED AN OPERABILITY DETERMINATION DUE TO THE PROBLEM | | WITH THE SEALS. THE LICENSEE MAINTAINS THAT THE POTENTIALLY AFFECTED | | EQUIPMENT CONTINUES TO MEET ALL TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION REQUIREMENTS | | INCLUDING SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS. THEREFORE THE LICENSEE IS NOT | | CURRENTLY IN AN LCO BECAUSE OF THE PROBLEM. HOWEVER, THE LICENSEE WILL | | IMPLEMENT COMPENSATORY MEASURES THAT WILL REDUCE THE POTENTIAL EFFECTS OF A | | TORNADO DEPRESSURIZATION OF THE CONTROL BUILDING. THESE MEASURES CONSIST OF | | A STANDING ORDER TO OPEN EQUIPMENT AND ROOM DOORS IN THE EVENT OF A TORNADO | | WARNING DURING THE PERIOD PRIOR TO INSTALLATION OF THE NEW PENETRATION | | SEALS. | | | | THE PURPOSE OF OPENING THE DOORS IS TO PROVIDE A FLOW PATH BETWEEN THE UNIT | | 1 AND 2 DIESEL GENERATOR ELECTRICAL TUNNEL VENTS. THIS WILL PROVIDE A | | SOURCE OF APPROXIMATELY ATMOSPHERIC AIR TO LEVEL 'B' IN THE CONTROL | | BUILDING. THE PRESSURE INSIDE OF THE CONTROL BUILDING WILL BE REDUCED TO A | | VALUE APPROXIMATELY ONE HALF OF THE PRESSURE RESULTING FROM A TORNADO. THIS | | PRESSURE WILL HAVE NO ADVERSE IMPACT ON EQUIPMENT IMPORTANT TO SAFETY. | | | | THE LICENSEE WILL INFORM THE RESIDENT INSPECTOR. HOO NOTIFIED R2DO(). | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ |POWER REACTOR | |EVENT NUMBER: 28794 | +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ |FACILITY: SURRY REGION: 2 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 05/12/95 | |UNIT: [ ] [2] [ ] STATE: VA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 02:04 [ET]| |RX TYPE: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP |EVENT DATE: 05/11/95 | +------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 22:31[EDT]| |NRC NOTIFIED BY: ALAN BAILOWAS |LAST UPDATE DATE: 05/12/95 | |HQ OPS OFFICER: JOSEPH SEBROSKY +-----------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+ NOTIFICATIONS | |EMERGENCY CLASS: NOT APPLICABLE +-----------------------------+ |10 CFR SECTION: |JOHN POTTER RDO | |AESF 50.72(b)(2)(ii) ESF ACTUATION | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +-----+----------+-------+--------+--------------+--+--------+-----------------+ |UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ | | | | | 2 | M/R Y 100 POWER OPERATION | 0 HOT SHUTDOWN | | | | | +-----+---------------------------------------------+--------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | MANUAL REACTOR TRIP DUE TO 4 CONTROL RODS DROPPING INTO THE CORE DURING ROD | | CONTROL TROUBLE SHOOTING. | | | | PRIOR TO THE MANUAL REACTOR TRIP, TROUBLE SHOOTING OF A ROD CONTROL SYSTEM | | URGENT FAILURE WAS IN PROGRESS. FOUR CONTROL BANK 'B' RODS HAD BEEN PLACED | | ON THE ROD CONTROL DC HOLD CABINET TO ALLOW REPLACEMENT OF CIRCUIT CARDS IN | | THE ROD CONTROL POWER CABINET. WHILE TRANSFERRING THE AFFECTED CONTROL | | RODS BACK TO THE ROD CONTROL POWER CABINET, THE FOUR AFFECTED CONTROL RODS | | DROPPED INTO THE CORE. OPERATORS THEN MANUALLY TRIPPED THE PLANT IN | | ACCORDANCE WITH THE ROD CONTROL SYSTEM MALFUNCTION ABNORMAL PROCEDURE WHICH | | REQUIRES A MANUAL REACTOR TRIP WHEN MORE THAN 1 ROD DROPS INTO THE CORE. | | | | THE POST TRIP RESPONSE WAS NORMAL. ALL RODS INSERTED. THE ROD BOTTOM | | LIGHT FOR ROD M-10 WAS SLOW TO ILLUMINATE FOLLOWING THE TRIP. THIS HAS | | OCCURRED IN THE PAST AND WAS EXPECTED. NO PRIMARY RELIEFS OR POWER | | OPERATED RELIEF VALVES ACTUATED DURING THE EVENT. NO SECONDARY RELIEFS | | LIFTED, HOWEVER, THE 'C' MAIN STEAM POWER OPERATED RELIEF VALVE ACTUATED | | BRIEFLY DURING THE START OF THE TRANSIENT. ALL ELECTRICAL BUSSES | | TRANSFERRED AS EXPECTED. AUXILIARY FEEDWATER (AFW) AUTOMATICALLY INITIATED | | ON LOW LOW STEAM GENERATOR WATER LEVEL FOLLOWING THE TRIP. CURRENTLY STEAM | | GENERATOR WATER LEVELS ARE BEING MAINTAINED BY THE MAIN FEEDWATER SYSTEM | | AND AFW HAS BEEN SECURED. THE MAIN CONDENSER IS AVAILABLE AS A HEAT SINK. | | | | THE LICENSEE HAS INFORMED THE RESIDENT INSPECTOR. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+