U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Operations Center Event Reports For 04/27/95 - 04/28/95 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** 28601 28678 28731 28732 28733 28734 28735 !!!!!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!!! +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ |POWER REACTOR | |EVENT NUMBER: 28601 | +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ |FACILITY: VERMONT YANKEE REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 03/28/95 | |UNIT: [1] [ ] [ ] STATE: VT |NOTIFICATION TIME: 12:22 [ET]| |RX TYPE: [1] GE-4 |EVENT DATE: 03/25/95 | +------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 11:00[EST]| |NRC NOTIFIED BY: BRYAN CROKE |LAST UPDATE DATE: 04/27/95 | |HQ OPS OFFICER: JOSEPH SEBROSKY +-----------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+ NOTIFICATIONS | |EMERGENCY CLASS: NOT APPLICABLE +-----------------------------+ |10 CFR SECTION: |JAMES LINVILLE RDO | |AIND 50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D) ACCIDENT MITIGATION | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +-----+----------+-------+--------+--------------+--+--------+-----------------+ |UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ | 1 | N N 0 REFUELING | 0 REFUELING | | | | | | | | | +-----+---------------------------------------------+--------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | SILTING WAS FOUND IN A SECTION OF SERVICE WATER PIPING LEADING TO THE MAIN | | CONDENSER. THE EXTENT OF THE SILTING WAS SUCH THAT IT WOULD PREVENT THIS | | PORTION OF THE SYSTEM FROM PERFORMING ITS SAFETY FUNCTION. | | | | THE MAKEUP TO THE CONDENSER HOTWELL SERVES A SAFETY RELATED FUNCTION THAT | | IS DESCRIBED IN THE FSAR. THERE ARE 2 NORMALLY CLOSED VALVES BETWEEN THE | | SERVICE WATER SYSTEM AND THE CONDENSER HOTWELL. THERE IS ALSO A NORMALLY | | OPEN VALVE IN BETWEEN THESE VALVES THAT SERVES AS A LEAK OFF. | | | | AN INSPECTION OF THIS SECTION OF PIPING WAS DONE AS A FOLLOWUP TO A SELF | | ASSESSMENT THAT WAS PERFORMED IN 1993 ON THE SERVICE WATER SYSTEM. IT WAS | | THE JUDGMENT OF THE SYSTEMS ENGINEER THAT THERE WAS SUFFICIENT BLOCKAGE | | FROM THE SILTING TO PREVENT THIS SYSTEM FROM PERFORMING ITS SAFETY | | FUNCTION. THE LAST TIME THIS PORTION OF PIPING WAS INSPECTED WAS IN 1990. | | DURING THAT INSPECTION SOME MINOR SILTING WAS FOUND. | | | | THE SAFETY FUNCTION IS DESCRIBED IN SECTION 10.6.4.3 OF THE FSAR. THE FSAR | | STATES THAT THE PURPOSE OF THIS PORTION OF THE SYSTEM IS TO PROVIDE AN | | INEXHAUSTIBLE SOURCE OF WATER DIRECTLY TO THE MAIN CONDENSER HOTWELL FOR | | INJECTION TO THE REACTOR SYSTEM VIA THE FEEDWATER SYSTEM. | | | | THE EVENT WAS NOT RECOGNIZED TO BE REPORTABLE UNTIL TODAY WHEN IT WAS | | BROUGHT TO THE ATTENTION OF THE OPERATIONS MANAGER. THE LICENSEE WILL | | INFORM THE RESIDENT INSPECTOR AND STATE OFFICIALS. | | | | * * * UPDATE AT 1013 ON 04/27/95 BY CROKE ENTERED BY HOO JOLLIFFE * * * | | | | LICENSEE DESIRES TO RETRACT THIS EVENT SINCE THE STANDBY COOLANT SUPPLY | | SYSTEM FUNCTION TO FILL THE MAIN CONDENSER IS NON-NUCLEAR SAFETY AND | | IS OUTSIDE THE BOUNDS OF THE LICENSEE EVENT REPORT RULE. | | | | LICENSEE INFORMED THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR. | | | | HOO NOTIFIED R1DO JACK DURR. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ !!!!!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!!! +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ |POWER REACTOR | |EVENT NUMBER: 28678 | +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ |FACILITY: FT CALHOUN REGION: 4 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 04/13/95 | |UNIT: [1] [ ] [ ] STATE: NE |NOTIFICATION TIME: 15:30 [ET]| |RX TYPE: [1] CE |EVENT DATE: 04/13/95 | +------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 13:55[CDT]| |NRC NOTIFIED BY: CONNER |LAST UPDATE DATE: 04/27/95 | |HQ OPS OFFICER: GREG SCARFO +-----------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+ NOTIFICATIONS | |EMERGENCY CLASS: NOT APPLICABLE +-----------------------------+ |10 CFR SECTION: |COLLINS RDO | |ADAS 50.72(b)(2)(i) DEG/UNANALYZED COND | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +-----+----------+-------+--------+--------------+--+--------+-----------------+ |UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ | 1 | N N 0 STARTUP | 0 STARTUP | | | | | | | | | +-----+---------------------------------------------+--------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | AN OIL LINE WHICH SUPPLIED HYDRAULIC FLUID TO REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) | | SNUBBERS WAS FOUND TO BE SUSCEPTIBLE TO DAMAGE DURING A SEISMIC EVENT. | | | | THE FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF A FACSIMILE SUBMITTED BY THE LICENSEE: | | "DURING THE 1995 REFUELING OUTAGE, IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT THERE WERE | | SEISMIC SUPPORTS MISSING ON THE TUBING THAT RUNS BETWEEN THE OIL RESERVOIRS | | AND THE SEISMIC SNUBBERS ON RC-3B AND RC-3D REACTOR COOLANT PUMP MOTORS. | | ANALYSIS SHOWS THAT THE REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) PIPING MEETS STRESS | | ALLOWABLES WITHOUT THE SNUBBERS. HOWEVER, THE SNUBBERS ARE INSTALLED TO | | PROTECT RCS CONNECTED PIPING SUCH AS CHEMICAL VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM AND | | SAFETY INJECTION PIPING. THE RCS CONNECTED PIPING WOULD BE OVER STRESSED | | BY THE INCREASED DISPLACEMENT OF THE RCS DURING AN EARTHQUAKE IF THE | | SNUBBERS WERE NOT OPERABLE. THE LOSS OF OIL FROM THE SNUBBERS IF THE | | TUBING WERE TO FAIL DURING A SEISMIC EVENT WOULD PREVENT THE SNUBBERS FROM | | LOCKING UP DURING THE SEISMIC EVENT AND THUS NOT PERFORM THEIR DESIGN | | FUNCTION. SUPPORTS HAVE BEEN PLACED ON THE TUBING SUCH THAT INTERIM SEISMIC | | OPERABILITY CRITERION IS MET AND THE SNUBBERS ARE OPERABLE. THE EVENT WAS | | DISCOVERED AND REPAIRED WHILE THE PLANT WAS IN MODE 4." END OF TEXT. | | | | AN ENGINEERING ANALYSIS DETERMINED THAT AN OIL LINE FROM A REMOTE RESERVOIR | | TO THE SNUBBERS SUPPORTING THE RCS AND SUPPORT-SYSTEM PIPING (LIKE THE CVCS | | PIPING) MAY BE SUSCEPTIBLE TO DAMAGE DURING A SEISMIC EVENT. WHILE THE RCS | | PIPING WOULD NOT EXCEED ALLOWABLE STRESS LEVELS, THE SUPPORT-SYSTEM PIPING | | WOULD EXCEED THOSE STRESS LEVELS. THIS CONDITION RESULTED FROM MISSING OIL | | LINE SUPPORTS. ADDITIONAL SUPPORTS HAVE BEEN PLACED ON THE OIL LINES TO | | ALLEVIATE THIS CONDITION. THE LICENSEE INFORMED THE NRC RESIDENT | | INSPECTOR. | | | | **** AT 14:01 (EDT) ON APRIL 27, 1995, THE LICENSEE (JIM TILLS) RETRACTED | | THIS EVENT. THIS RETRACTION WAS RECEIVED BY LEIGH TROCINE. **** | | | | SUBSEQUENT LICENSEE EVALUATION CONCLUDED THAT THIS EVENT WAS NOT REPORTABLE | | PURSUANT TO 10 CFR 50.72 OR 10 CFR 50.73. ALTHOUGH A PORTION OF THE | | HYDRAULIC TUBING WAS NOT PROPERLY SUPPORTED, THERE WERE TUBING CLAMPS | | APPROXIMATELY 30 INCHES ABOVE EACH SNUBBER. THE LICENSEE CONCLUDED THAT | | THE TUBING FROM THE SNUBBER TO THESE EXISTING CLAMPS WOULD BE EXPECTED TO | | REMAIN INTACT DURING A SEISMIC EVENT. EVEN IF THE TUBING WERE TO FAIL IN | | THE VICINITY OF THE MISSING SUPPORTS, THE INTACT TUBING WOULD PREVENT THE | | LOSS OF FLUID FROM THE SNUBBERS AND ALLOW THEM TO PERFORM THEIR SAFETY | | FUNCTION. AS A RESULT, THE LICENSEE CONCLUDED THAT THE SNUBBERS WERE | | OPERABLE AS FOUND, AND THE EVENT NOTIFICATION WAS RETRACTED. | | | | THE RESIDENT INSPECTORS WILL BE NOTIFIED BY THE LICENSEE. R4DO (SPITZBERG) | | NOTIFIED. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ |POWER REACTOR | |EVENT NUMBER: 28731 | +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ |FACILITY: CATAWBA REGION: 2 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 04/27/95 | |UNIT: [ ] [2] [ ] STATE: SC |NOTIFICATION TIME: 15:00 [ET]| |RX TYPE: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP |EVENT DATE: 04/27/95 | +------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 11:56[EDT]| |NRC NOTIFIED BY: GARY CLEMENTS |LAST UPDATE DATE: 04/27/95 | |HQ OPS OFFICER: LEIGH TROCINE +-----------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+ NOTIFICATIONS | |EMERGENCY CLASS: NOT APPLICABLE +-----------------------------+ |10 CFR SECTION: |PAUL FREDRICKSON RDO | |ARPS 50.72(b)(2)(ii) RPS ACTUATION | | |AESF 50.72(b)(2)(ii) ESF ACTUATION | | | | | | | | | | | +-----+----------+-------+--------+--------------+--+--------+-----------------+ |UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ | | | | | 2 | A/R Y 100 POWER OPERATION | 0 HOT STANDBY | | | | | +-----+---------------------------------------------+--------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | AUTOMATIC REACTOR TRIP ON LOW-LOW STEAM GENERATOR WATER LEVEL DURING THE | | PERFORMANCE OF REACTOR TRIP BREAKER TESTING. | | | | Rx AUXILIARY TRIP BREAKER "A" RECEIVED AN OPEN SIGNAL DURING THE | | PERFORMANCE OF Rx TRIP BREAKER TESTING. THE LICENSEE BELIEVES THAT THE | | DIGITAL FEEDWATER CONTROL SYSTEM SAW A Rx TRIP SIGNAL WHICH CAUSED THE MAIN | | FEEDWATER PUMPS TO GO INTO RECIRCULATION AT MINIMUM SPEED. AN OPERATOR | | ATTEMPTED TO MANUALLY RAISE THE SPEED OF THE MAIN FEEDWATER PUMPS, BUT THE | | UNIT TRIPPED ON A STEAM GENERATOR "B" LOW-LOW LEVEL SIGNAL. ALL RODS FULLY | | INSERTED. THE LOWEST WATER LEVELS RECEIVED WERE 28%, 22%, 27%, AND 24% | | WIDE RANGE FOR THE "A," "B," "C," AND "D" STEAM GENERATORS, RESPECTIVELY. | | (THE LOW-LOW LEVEL STEAM GENERATOR TRIP SETPOINT IS 37% NARROW RANGE, AND | | 58% WIDE RANGE LEVEL IS EQUAL TO 0% NARROW RANGE.) THE ESF ACTUATIONS | | RECEIVED WERE THE AUTOMATIC START OF AUXILIARY FEEDWATER, A TURBINE TRIP ON | | A REACTOR TRIP, MAIN FEEDWATER ISOLATION, AND LOW-LOW T(ave) P-12. | | | | DURING Rx TRIP RECOVERY, LOW-LOW PRESSURIZER WATER LEVEL (17%) WAS RECEIVED | | AND THIS CAUSED A LOSS OF CVCS LETDOWN. THE LICENSEE STATED THAT THIS WAS | | AN EXPECTED RESPONSE FOR THIS PARTICULAR TYPE OF TRIP. LETDOWN WAS | | RETURNED TO SERVICE WITHOUT PROBLEMS WHEN PRESSURIZER LEVEL WAS RECOVERED. | | POST-TRIP CONDITIONS ARE NORMAL, AND THE LICENSEE'S EVALUATION OF THE CAUSE | | OF THE TRIP IS CURRENTLY IN PROGRESS. THE LICENSEE'S PRELIMINARY | | EVALUATION INDICATES A POSSIBLE PROBLEM WITH AN AUXILIARY RELAY ASSOCIATED | | WITH THE Rx TRIP BYPASS BREAKERS. | | | | THE RESIDENT INSPECTOR WAS NOTIFIED BY THE LICENSEE. | | | | NOTE: SEE EVENT #28734 FOR A RELATED EVENT. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ |POWER REACTOR | |EVENT NUMBER: 28732 | +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ |FACILITY: SUSQUEHANNA REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 04/27/95 | |UNIT: [1] [2] [ ] STATE: PA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 16:24 [ET]| |RX TYPE: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4 |EVENT DATE: 04/27/95 | +------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 13:13[EDT]| |NRC NOTIFIED BY: DON E. ROLAND |LAST UPDATE DATE: 04/27/95 | |HQ OPS OFFICER: LEIGH TROCINE +-----------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+ NOTIFICATIONS | |EMERGENCY CLASS: NOT APPLICABLE +-----------------------------+ |10 CFR SECTION: |JACK DURR RDO | |AESF 50.72(b)(2)(ii) ESF ACTUATION | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +-----+----------+-------+--------+--------------+--+--------+-----------------+ |UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ | 1 | N N 0 COLD SHUTDOWN | 0 COLD SHUTDOWN | | 2 | N Y 100 POWER OPERATION | 100 POWER OPERATION | | | | | +-----+---------------------------------------------+--------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | UNPLANNED NON-VALID ACTUATION OF THE "B" EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR ON LOSS | | OF DC WHEN A TEST LIGHT WAS BEING INSTALLED IN A LOCAL PANEL. | | | | THE LICENSEE SENT A FACSIMILE WITH THE FOLLOWING EVENT DESCRIPTION: | | | | "AN UNPLANNED NON-VALID ESF ACTUATION OF AN EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR WAS | | RECEIVED WHEN A TEST LIGHT WAS BEING INSTALLED IN A LOCAL PANEL IN SUPPORT | | OF UPCOMING TESTING. | | | | SYSTEMS ENGINEERING AND ELECTRICAL MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL HAD INSTALLED A | | NEON TEST LIGHT IN A DIESEL GENERATOR LOGIC CIRCUIT HOWEVER ONE OF THE | | LEADS WAS TOO SHORT TO ALLOW PLACING THE LIGHT DOWN. THE LIGHT WAS | | DISCONNECTED AND A LONGER LEAD INSTALLED. WHILE RE-INSTALLING THE NEON | | TEST LIGHT, ONE LEAD HAD ALREADY BEEN INSTALLED AND THE OTHER WAS ABOUT TO | | BE INSTALLED WHEN THE "B" EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR AUTOMATICALLY STARTED. | | THE LIGHT WAS IMMEDIATELY REMOVED AND THE CONTROL ROOM NOTIFIED. | | | | PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION INDICATES THAT A DC POWER SUPPLY BREAKER MAY HAVE | | BEEN ACCIDENTALLY BUMPED AND OPENED DURING THE INSTALLATION OF THE TEST | | LIGHT THE SECOND TIME." | | | | THE DC BREAKER THAT WAS INADVERTENTLY OPENED WAS LOCATED AT ABOUT KNEE | | LEVEL INSIDE THE LOCAL PANEL. THE SYSTEM FUNCTIONED AS REQUIRED. | | | | THE RESIDENT INSPECTOR WAS NOTIFIED BY THE LICENSEE. NO OTHER OFF SITE | | NOTIFICATIONS HAVE BEEN MADE. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ |POWER REACTOR | |EVENT NUMBER: 28733 | +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ |FACILITY: MILLSTONE REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 04/28/95 | |UNIT: [ ] [2] [ ] STATE: CT |NOTIFICATION TIME: 01:20 [ET]| |RX TYPE: [1] GE-3,[2] CE,[3] W-4-LP |EVENT DATE: 04/28/95 | +------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 00:55[EDT]| |NRC NOTIFIED BY: DUBAY |LAST UPDATE DATE: 04/28/95 | |HQ OPS OFFICER: DICK JOLLIFFE +-----------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+ NOTIFICATIONS | |EMERGENCY CLASS: NOT APPLICABLE +-----------------------------+ |10 CFR SECTION: |JACK DURR RDO | |AINB 50.72(b)(2)(iii)(B) POT RHR INOP | | |AIND 50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D) ACCIDENT MITIGATION | | | | | | | | | | | +-----+----------+-------+--------+--------------+--+--------+-----------------+ |UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ | | | | | 2 | N N 0 REFUELING | 0 REFUELING | | | | | +-----+---------------------------------------------+--------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | -CHEMICAL ADDITION LINES CONNECTED TO RBCCW SYSTEM NOT SEISMICALLY MOUNTED- | | | | DURING A ROUTINE VISUAL PLANT INSPECTION WITH UNIT 2 IN A REFUELING OUTAGE, | | LICENSEE DISCOVERED THAT THE 3/4 INCH DIAMETER CHEMICAL ADDITION SYSTEM | | LINES ARE NOT SEISMICALLY MOUNTED. THESE LINES ARE CONNECTED TO BOTH | | TRAINS OF THE UNIT 2 REACTOR BUILDING CLOSED COOLING WATER (RBCCW) SYSTEM | | WHICH IS SEISMICALLY MOUNTED. THE ISOLATION VALVES BETWEEN BOTH TRAINS | | OF THESE TWO SYSTEMS ARE NORMALLY OPEN DURING ALL PLANT OPERATING MODES | | BECAUSE THESE MANUALLY OPERATED VALVES ARE INSTALLED IN A REMOTE LOCATION | | AND ARE NOT EASILY ACCESSIBLE TO PLANT OPERATORS. A SEISMIC EVENT COULD | | CAUSE A RUPTURE OF THE NON-SEISMICALLY MOUNTED CHEMICAL ADDITION LINES AND | | PROVIDE A LEAK PATH FROM THE RBCCW SYSTEM BACK THROUGH THE OPEN SYSTEM | | ISOLATION VALVES. | | | | LICENSEE CLOSED BOTH ISOLATION VALVES BETWEEN THESE TWO SYSTEMS. | | | | THIS CONDITION HAS EXISTED WHEN UNIT 2 WAS IN POWER OPERATIONS. | | | | LICENSEE IS DETERMINING CORRECTIVE ACTIONS WHICH INCLUDE SEISMICALLY | | MOUNTING THE CHEMICAL ADDITION SYSTEM, ATTACHING REACH RODS TO THESE | | MANUALLY OPERATED SYSTEM ISOLATION VALVES, REDESIGNATING THESE MANUALLY | | OPERATED SYSTEM ISOLATION VALVES AS NORMALLY CLOSED DURING ALL PLANT | | OPERATING MODES, AND REVISING APPROPRIATE DRAWINGS, PROCEDURES, DOCUMENTS, | | AND TRAINING MATERIALS. | | | | THIS EVENT HAS NO EFFECT ON UNITS 1 AND 3. | | | | LICENSEE NOTIFIED STATE AND LOCAL OFFICIALS AND THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ |POWER REACTOR | |EVENT NUMBER: 28734 | +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ |FACILITY: CATAWBA REGION: 2 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 04/28/95 | |UNIT: [ ] [2] [ ] STATE: SC |NOTIFICATION TIME: 02:49 [ET]| |RX TYPE: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP |EVENT DATE: 04/27/95 | +------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 23:44[EDT]| |NRC NOTIFIED BY: R. W. SMITH |LAST UPDATE DATE: 04/28/95 | |HQ OPS OFFICER: DICK JOLLIFFE +-----------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+ NOTIFICATIONS | |EMERGENCY CLASS: NOT APPLICABLE +-----------------------------+ |10 CFR SECTION: |PAUL FREDRICKSON RDO | |ARPS 50.72(b)(2)(ii) RPS ACTUATION | | |AESF 50.72(b)(2)(ii) ESF ACTUATION | | | | | | | | | | | +-----+----------+-------+--------+--------------+--+--------+-----------------+ |UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ | | | | | 2 | A N 0 HOT STANDBY | 0 HOT STANDBY | | | | | +-----+---------------------------------------------+--------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | - MAIN FEEDWATER SYSTEM ISOLATION WITH UNIT 2 IN MODE 3 (HOT STANDBY) - | | | | WITH UNIT 2 IN MODE 3 (HOT STANDBY), TECHNICIANS WERE TROUBLESHOOTING THE | | PROBLEM THAT CAUSED THE REACTOR TRIP OF 04/27/95 (EVENT #28731). | | | | THE 'A' REACTOR TRIP BREAKER WAS OPEN AND ITS ASSOCIATED REACTOR TRIP | | BREAKER INDICATING SWITCH WAS INDICATING "OPEN". | | | | TECHNICIANS REMOVED THE 'A' REACTOR TRIP BREAKER FROM ITS CUBICAL WHICH | | CAUSED THE ASSOCIATED REACTOR TRIP BREAKER POSITION INDICATION SWITCH TO | | CHANGE INDICATING STATE FROM "OPEN" TO "NEUTRAL". | | | | DURING TROUBLESHOOTING ACTIVITIES, TECHNICIANS EXERCISED THE SWITCH TO THE | | "OPEN" POSITION WHICH CAUSED A REACTOR TRIP SIGNAL AND A TRAIN 'A' MAIN | | FEEDWATER SYSTEM ISOLATION SIGNAL. | | | | THE MAIN FEEDWATER SYSTEM ISOLATED DUE TO THIS SIGNAL ALONG WITH A LOW Tave | | INDICATION SIGNAL. | | | | LICENSEE RESET ALL SYSTEMS TO NORMAL WITHIN 10 MINUTES. | | | | THE WATER LEVEL IN ONLY ONE STEAM GENERATOR DROPPED AS MUCH AS 5% NARROW | | RANGE WITHIN THIS 10 MINUTE PERIOD. | | | | LICENSEE IS CONTINUING TO DETERMINE THE CAUSE OF THE REACTOR TRIP. | | | | LICENSEE INFORMED THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ |POWER REACTOR | |EVENT NUMBER: 28735 | +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ |FACILITY: INDIAN POINT REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 04/28/95 | |UNIT: [ ] [3] [ ] STATE: NY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 05:59 [ET]| |RX TYPE: [2] W-4-LP,[3] W-4-LP |EVENT DATE: 04/28/95 | +------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 04:40[EDT]| |NRC NOTIFIED BY: DAVE MOHRE |LAST UPDATE DATE: 04/28/95 | |HQ OPS OFFICER: DICK JOLLIFFE +-----------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+ NOTIFICATIONS | |EMERGENCY CLASS: NOT APPLICABLE +-----------------------------+ |10 CFR SECTION: |JACK DURR RDO | |ADAS 50.72(b)(2)(i) DEG/UNANALYZED COND | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +-----+----------+-------+--------+--------------+--+--------+-----------------+ |UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ | | | | | 3 | N N 0 HOT SHUTDOWN | 0 HOT SHUTDOWN | | | | | +-----+---------------------------------------------+--------------------------+ EVENT TEXT *** NO TEXT FOR THIS EVENT ***