U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Operations Center Event Reports For 02/01/95 - 02/02/95 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** 28315 28316 28317 28318 28319 28320 28321 28322 +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ |POWER REACTOR | |EVENT NUMBER: 28315 | +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ |FACILITY: SOUTH TEXAS REGION: 4 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 02/01/95 | |UNIT: [ ] [2] [ ] STATE: TX |NOTIFICATION TIME: 09:53 [ET]| |RX TYPE: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP |EVENT DATE: 01/31/95 | +------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 09:43[CST]| |NRC NOTIFIED BY: JACK GRANT |LAST UPDATE DATE: 02/01/95 | |HQ OPS OFFICER: JOHN MacKINNON +-----------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+ NOTIFICATIONS | |EMERGENCY CLASS: NOT APPLICABLE +-----------------------------+ |10 CFR SECTION: |JOHNSON RDO | |NLTR LICENSEE 24 HR REPORT | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +-----+----------+-------+--------+--------------+--+--------+-----------------+ |UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ | | | | | 2 | N Y 100 POWER OPERATION | 100 POWER OPERATION | | | | | +-----+---------------------------------------------+--------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | INCORRECT CALIBRATION CORRECTION FACTOR FOR STATIC SHIFT APPLIED TO | | PRESSURIZER LEVEL TRANSMITTER (LT0467) CAUSED REACTOR TRIP SETPOINT ON HIGH | | PRESSURIZER LEVEL TO BECOME NONCONSERVATIVE. | | | | ENGINEERING DETERMINED THAT AN INCORRECT CALIBRATION CORRECTION FACTOR FOR | | STATIC SHIFT HAD BEEN APPLIED TO PRESSURIZER LEVEL TRANSMITTER LT0467 | | (PRESSURIZER HAS FOUR CHANNELS FOR PRESSURIZER LEVEL AND EACH CHANNEL HAS A | | PRESSURIZER LEVEL TRANSMITTER ASSOCIATED WITH IT). ON 01/31/95 AT 0943CST, | | LICENSEE DECLARED LT0467 INOPERABLE AND ENTERED TECH SPEC 3.3.1.12 ACTION | | STEP 6 (PLACE LT0467 IN THE TRIP POSITION WITHIN 6 HOURS). LT0467 WAS | | PLACED IN ITS TRIPPED POSITION AT 1046CST ON 01/31/95. IT APPEARS THAT | | LT0467 WAS INCORRECTLY CALIBRATED DURING THEIR 3rd REFUELING OUTAGE (MAY | | 1994). LICENSEE SAID THE PRESSURIZER LEVEL TRANSMITTER WAS CHANGED OUT | | (LT0467) DURING THEIR LAST REFUELING OUTAGE. WHEN THE NEW PRESSURIZER | | LEVEL TRANSMITTER (LT0467) WAS INSTALLED, THE STATIC SHIFT CORRECTION | | FACTOR FOR THE REMOVED PRESSURIZER LEVEL TRANSMITTER (LT0467) WAS USED FOR | | CALIBRATION. REACTOR TRIP ON HIGH PRESSURIZER LEVEL FOR LT0467 WOULD OCCUR | | AT A PRESSURIZER LEVEL OF 0.9% GREATER THAN PRESSURIZER UPPER LEVEL LIMIT | | OF 93.6% (LIMIT IS 92% TO 93.6%). 2 OUT OF 4 HIGH PRESSURIZER LEVELS IS | | REQUIRED FOR A REACTOR TRIP. LICENSEE RECALIBRATED LT0467 AND DECLARED | | LT0467 OPERABLE AT 0228CST 02/01/95. | | | | RESIDENT INSPECTOR WILL BE INFORMED BY THE LICENSEE. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ |POWER REACTOR | |EVENT NUMBER: 28316 | +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ |FACILITY: COOPER REGION: 4 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 02/01/95 | |UNIT: [1] [ ] [ ] STATE: NE |NOTIFICATION TIME: 11:09 [ET]| |RX TYPE: [1] GE-4 |EVENT DATE: 02/01/95 | +------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 08:29[CST]| |NRC NOTIFIED BY: D HETZEL |LAST UPDATE DATE: 02/01/95 | |HQ OPS OFFICER: JOHN MacKINNON +-----------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+ NOTIFICATIONS | |EMERGENCY CLASS: NOT APPLICABLE +-----------------------------+ |10 CFR SECTION: |JOHNSON RDO | |AESF 50.72(b)(2)(ii) ESF ACTUATION | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +-----+----------+-------+--------+--------------+--+--------+-----------------+ |UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ | 1 | N N 0 COLD SHUTDOWN | 0 COLD SHUTDOWN | | | | | | | | | +-----+---------------------------------------------+--------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | DEFECTIVE SURVEILLANCE TEST PROCEDURE RESULTED IN A PERTURBATION OF REACTOR | | VESSEL WATER LEVEL REFERENCE LEG WHICH RESULTED IN SEVERAL GROUP | | ISOLATIONS. | | | | DURING PERFORMANCE OF SURVEILLANCE TEST PROCEDURE 6.3.10.2, INSTRUMENT LINE | | EXCESS FLOW CHECK VALVE TEST, THE FOLLOWING ACTUATIONS AND GROUP ISOLATIONS | | OCCURRED DUE TO AN INVALID LOW REACTOR VESSEL WATER LEVEL SIGNAL: GROUP 2 | | CONTAINMENT VENT VALVES, TIP VALVES, AND RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL SHUTDOWN | | COOLING MODE (RHR WAS NOT IN SERVICE); GROUP 3 REACTOR WATER CLEANUP; GROUP | | 6 REACTOR BUILDING VENTILATION; AND BOTH TRAINS OF STANDBY GAS TREATMENT | | AUTOSTARTED. ALL ACTUATIONS AND ISOLATIONS OCCURRED AS REQUIRED. | | | | A REACTOR VESSEL HYDROSTATIC TEST WAS IN PROGRESS AT THE TIME OF THE EVENT, | | WITH REACTOR PRESSURE AT APPROXIMATELY 1025psig. DUE TO THE ISOLATION OF | | REACTOR WATER CLEANUP (NORMAL PATH FOR OVERPRESSURE PROTECTION DURING | | REACTOR VESSEL HYDROSTATIC TEST), REACTOR PRESSURE INCREASED TO | | APPROXIMATELY 1060psig BEFORE PRESSURE CONTROL WAS RESTORED BY THE | | ALTERNATE PRESSURE CONTROL SYSTEM (USED DURING REACTOR HYDROSTATIC TEST), | | WHICH IS THE USE OF THE STEAM LINE DRAINS TO REDUCE REACTOR VESSEL | | PRESSURE. REACTOR VESSEL PRESSURE LIMIT WAS NOT REACHED AND NO SAFETY | | RELIEF VALVES (SRVs) OPENED (REACTOR VESSEL PRESSURE DID NOT REACH SRV | | SETPOINT). ALL ISOLATIONS AND ACTUATIONS WERE RESET BY APPROXIMATELY 0841 | | CST. | | | | LICENSEE SAID THAT THE SURVEILLANCE TEST PROCEDURE WAS INCORRECTLY WRITTEN. | | SURVEILLANCE TEST PROCEDURE HAD THE TEST EQUIPMENT CONNECTED TO THE | | INCORRECT REACTOR VESSEL WATER LEVEL INSTRUMENT DRAIN VALVE. WHEN THE VALVE | | WAS OPENED IT CAUSED A PERTURBATION OF THE REACTOR VESSEL WATER LEVEL | | REFERENCE LEG (THIS REFERENCE LEG MEASURES DIVISION "A" & "B" REACTOR | | VESSEL WATER LEVELS). DRAINING THIS LINE CAUSED TWO LOW REACTOR VESSEL | | WATER LEVEL SIGNALS WHICH CAUSED THE ABOVE MENTIONED GROUP ISOLATIONS. | | LICENSEE IS PERFORMING A REVALIDATION OF THEIR SURVEILLANCE TEST PROCEDURE | | VALVE LINEUP. LICENSEE SAID THAT THE DRAIN VALVE WHICH CAUSED THE EVENT IS | | NOT SHOWN ON CONTROL ROOM PRINTS SO CONTROL ROOM DID NOT KNOW WHICH | | REFERENCE LEG DRAIN VALVE WAS BEING OPENED. | | | | RESIDENT INSPECTOR WAS INFORMED BY THE LICENSEE. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ |POWER REACTOR | |EVENT NUMBER: 28317 | +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ |FACILITY: HADDAM NECK REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 02/01/95 | |UNIT: [1] [ ] [ ] STATE: CT |NOTIFICATION TIME: 12:57 [ET]| |RX TYPE: [1] W-4-LP |EVENT DATE: 02/01/95 | +------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 11:22[EST]| |NRC NOTIFIED BY: DANIELSON |LAST UPDATE DATE: 02/01/95 | |HQ OPS OFFICER: CHAUNCEY GOULD +-----------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+ NOTIFICATIONS | |EMERGENCY CLASS: NOT APPLICABLE +-----------------------------+ |10 CFR SECTION: |JENNY JOHANSEN RDO | |AIND 50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D) ACCIDENT MITIGATION | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +-----+----------+-------+--------+--------------+--+--------+-----------------+ |UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ | 1 | N N 0 COLD SHUTDOWN | 0 COLD SHUTDOWN | | | | | | | | | +-----+---------------------------------------------+--------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | THE LICENSEE DETERMINED THAT THREE OF THEIR CONTAINMENT AIR RECIRC FANS | | WERE INOPERABLE. | | | | THIS WAS DISCOVERED DURING THE PERFORMANCE OF FLOW RATE TESTING OF THE | | CONTAINMENT AIR RECIRC FANS. THEY DETERMINED THAT FAN #'s 2, 3 & 4 FAILED | | TO MEET THE REQUIRED AMOUNT OF AIR FLOW. THE CAUSE OF THE PROBLEM IS | | UNKNOWN AND IS BEING INVESTIGATED. THE RI AND THE STATE WERE INFORMED. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ |POWER REACTOR | |EVENT NUMBER: 28318 | +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ |FACILITY: DIABLO CANYON REGION: 4 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 02/01/95 | |UNIT: [1] [2] [ ] STATE: CA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 13:55 [ET]| |RX TYPE: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP |EVENT DATE: 02/01/95 | +------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 10:25[PST]| |NRC NOTIFIED BY: SKAGGS |LAST UPDATE DATE: 02/01/95 | |HQ OPS OFFICER: CHAUNCEY GOULD +-----------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+ NOTIFICATIONS | |EMERGENCY CLASS: NOT APPLICABLE +-----------------------------+ |10 CFR SECTION: |DWIGHT CHAMBERLAIN RDO | |AOUT 50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B) OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS | | |NLCO TECH SPEC LCO A/S | | | | | | | | | | | +-----+----------+-------+--------+--------------+--+--------+-----------------+ |UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ | 1 | N Y 100 POWER OPERATION | 100 POWER OPERATION | | 2 | N Y 100 POWER OPERATION | 100 POWER OPERATION | | | | | +-----+---------------------------------------------+--------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | THE LICENSEE HAS DECLARED BOTH TRAINS OF THEIR SOLID STATE PROTECTION | | SYSTEM (SSPS) INOPERABLE AND ENTERED LCO ACTION STATEMENT 18 OF TS 3.3.2 | | AND TS 3.0.3. | | | | ON 2/1/95 LICENSEE DESIGN ENGINEERING CONFIRMED A CONDITION THAT COULD | | RESULT IN THE FAILURE OF ONE TRAIN OF THEIR SSPS DURING A MAIN STEAM LINE | | BREAK (MSLB) IN THE TURBINE BUILDING. | | | | IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE HIGH ENERGY LINE BREAK PROGRAM AT DIABLO CANYON, A | | DOUBLE ENDED GUILLOTINE BREAK OF A MAIN STEAM LINE IS POSTULATED TO OCCUR | | AT THE TURBINE STOP VALVE ON THE 140' ELEVATION. OF THE TURBINE BUILDING. | | WHEN THE STEAM LINE BREAKS, IT IS FREE TO ROTATE APPROXIMATELY 10 DEGREES. | | THE TEN DEGREE ROTATION OF THE STEAM LINE WOULD RESULT IN THE STEAM JET | | FROM THE FAULTED STEAM LINE STRIKING AN ELECTRICAL TERMINAL BOX. | | | | THE ELECTRICAL TERMINAL BOX CONTAINS TWO CHANNELS FOR TURBINE STOP VALVE | | POSITION INDICATION. THESE CHANNELS ARE CLASS II CHANNELS THAT PROVIDE | | INPUT TO THE SSPS. THE CLASS II INPUT CHANNELS INTO THE SSPS ARE NOT FUSED. | | | | WHEN THE STEAM JET IMPINGES ON THE ELECTRICAL TERMINAL PANEL, A FORCE OF | | APPROXIMATELY 22,500 POUNDS WOULD BE APPLIED NORMAL TO THE SURFACE OF THE | | PANEL. THE FORCE WOULD DESTROY THE PANEL AND COULD CAUSE SHORTS IN THE | | CLASS II INPUTS TO THE SSPS. HOWEVER, SINCE THE CLASS II CIRCUITS ARE NOT | | ISOLATED FROM THE SSPS VIA FUSES, THE SHORT WOULD CAUSE THE FUSES FOR THE | | ASSOCIATED CLASS I CHANNELS TO FAIL. THE FAILURE OF THE FUSES FOR THE CLASS | | I CHANNELS WOULD RESULT IN THE FAILURE OF THE POWER SUPPLIES FOR THE LOGIC | | CIRCUITRY OF ONE TRAIN OF THE SSPS, RENDERING THE TRAIN INOPERABLE. IF A | | SINGLE FAILURE OF THE INSTRUMENT INVERTER SUPPLYING POWER TO SLAVE RELAYS | | OF THE OTHER SSPS TRAIN IS CONSIDERED, BOTH TRAINS OF SSPS WOULD BE | | RENDERED INOPERABLE. NO AUTOMATIC ACTUATIONS WOULD BE AVAILABLE TO MITIGATE | | THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE STEAM LINE BREAK. | | | | ALTHOUGH A SINGLE MAIN STEAM LINE BREAK COULD RENDER ONLY ONE SSPS CHANNEL | | INOPERABLE, EITHER CHANNEL COULD BE RENDERED INOPERABLE DEPENDENT UPON | | WHICH STEAM LINE BREAKS. | | | | THE POSSIBLE CORRECTIVE ACTION IS TO INSTALL FUSES. | | | | THE RI WAS INFORMED. | | | | HOO NOTE: SEE EVENT #28321 | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ |POWER REACTOR | |EVENT NUMBER: 28319 | +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ |FACILITY: VERMONT YANKEE REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 02/01/95 | |UNIT: [1] [ ] [ ] STATE: VT |NOTIFICATION TIME: 14:40 [ET]| |RX TYPE: [1] GE-4 |EVENT DATE: 02/01/95 | +------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 14:35[EST]| |NRC NOTIFIED BY: MCKENNEY |LAST UPDATE DATE: 02/01/95 | |HQ OPS OFFICER: CHAUNCEY GOULD +-----------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+ NOTIFICATIONS | |EMERGENCY CLASS: NOT APPLICABLE +-----------------------------+ |10 CFR SECTION: |JENNY JOHANSEN RDO | |AOUT 50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B) OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +-----+----------+-------+--------+--------------+--+--------+-----------------+ |UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ | 1 | N Y 100 POWER OPERATION | 100 POWER OPERATION | | | | | | | | | +-----+---------------------------------------------+--------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | THE LICENSEE DETERMINED THAT THEY HAD A CONDITION THAT RESULTED IN AIR FLOW | | EXITING THE CAST ROOM DOOR. | | | | AS THE RESULT OF A REVIEW OF A POTENTIAL REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE (OCCURRED ON | | 1/18/95), THE LICENSEE DETERMINED ON 2/1/95 THAT THEY HAD A PROBLEM WITH | | AIR ESCAPING THROUGH THE CASK ROOM DOOR WHEN IT WAS OPENEDON 1/18/95. THEIR | | FSAR STATES THAT NO AIR IS TO BE DISCHARGED FROM THE RAD WASTE BUILDING | | EXCEPT THROUGH THE STACK. THE IMMEDIATE CORRECTIVE ACTION TAKEN WILL BE TO | | NOT OPEN THE DOOR UNTIL THEY HAVE MADE A FURTHER EVALUATION OF THE | | SITUATION. THE RI AND STATE WILL BE INFORMED. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ |POWER REACTOR | |EVENT NUMBER: 28320 | +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ |FACILITY: NINE MILE POINT REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 02/01/95 | |UNIT: [ ] [2] [ ] STATE: NY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 17:43 [ET]| |RX TYPE: [1] GE-2,[2] GE-5 |EVENT DATE: 02/01/95 | +------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 15:00[EST]| |NRC NOTIFIED BY: BURTCH |LAST UPDATE DATE: 02/01/95 | |HQ OPS OFFICER: CHAUNCEY GOULD +-----------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+ NOTIFICATIONS | |EMERGENCY CLASS: NOT APPLICABLE +-----------------------------+ |10 CFR SECTION: |JENNY JOHANSEN RDO | |APRE 50.72(b)(2)(vi) OFFSITE NOTIFICATION | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +-----+----------+-------+--------+--------------+--+--------+-----------------+ |UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ | | | | | 2 | N N 0 COLD SHUTDOWN | 0 COLD SHUTDOWN | | | | | +-----+---------------------------------------------+--------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | THE LICENSEE RELEASED INFORMATION TO THE MEDIA REGARDING THE BENTONITE CLAY | | SPILL WHICH OCCURRED AT NINE MILE POINT 2 IN AUGUST OF 1993. | | | | THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION WAS RELEASED TO THE MEDIA AFTER A VERBAL INQUIRY | | WAS MADE. | | | | "NIAGARA MOHAWK IS AWARE OF THE STATE AND FEDERAL INVESTIGATION OF AN | | AUGUST 1993 SPILL AND DISCHARGE AT NINE MILE POINT OF BENTONITE CLAY, A | | BENIGN MATERIAL OFTEN USED IN WATER TO BIND CERTAIN CHEMICALS. THE COMPANY | | IS COOPERATING WITH STATE AND FEDERAL OFFICIALS WHILE CONDUCTING ITS OWN | | INTERNAL INVESTIGATION OF THE INCIDENT." | | | | THE RI HAS BEEN INFORMED. STATE AND LOCAL AGENCIES WILL BE NOTIFIED. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ |POWER REACTOR | |EVENT NUMBER: 28321 | +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ |FACILITY: SALEM REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 02/01/95 | |UNIT: [1] [2] [ ] STATE: NJ |NOTIFICATION TIME: 23:09 [ET]| |RX TYPE: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP |EVENT DATE: 02/01/95 | +------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 22:35[EST]| |NRC NOTIFIED BY: SAUER |LAST UPDATE DATE: 02/01/95 | |HQ OPS OFFICER: CHAUNCEY GOULD +-----------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+ NOTIFICATIONS | |EMERGENCY CLASS: NOT APPLICABLE +-----------------------------+ |10 CFR SECTION: |JENNY JOHANSEN RDO | |ADEG 50.72(b)(1)(ii) DEGRAD COND DURING OP | | |NLCO TECH SPEC LCO A/S | | | | | | | | | | | +-----+----------+-------+--------+--------------+--+--------+-----------------+ |UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ | 1 | N Y 100 POWER OPERATION | 100 POWER OPERATION | | 2 | N N 0 STARTUP | 0 STARTUP | | | | | +-----+---------------------------------------------+--------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | THE LICENSEE HAS DECLARED THE SOLID STATE PROTECTION SYSTEM(SSPS) | | INOPERABLE AND ENTERED TS 3.0.3 LCO TO START REACTOR SHUTDOWN WITHIN 1 HR. | | | | THE LICENSEE DISCOVERED THAT THE POWER FEED TO THE FIELD CIRCUITS IS | | DESIGNED SUCH THAT THE POWER FEED IS ROUTED TO THE FIELD CONTACT. IF A | | DESIGN BASIS ACCIDENT CONDITION OR NATURAL PHENOMENA WERE TO AFFECT THESE | | CABLES SUCH THAT A SHORT WOULD RESULT, THEN THE POWER SUPPLY TO THE INPUT | | RELAY BAYS, SSPS LOGIC AND MASTER RELAYS WOULD BE LOST. THIS IS DUE TO THE | | INTERNAL POWER DISTRIBUTION ARRANGEMENT WITHIN THE SSPS CABINETS. FUSES | | WHICH ARE SUPPLIED DO NOT PROVIDE PROTECTION FOR THE POWER SUPPLIES, DUE TO | | THE WAY THE WIRING IS ARRANGED. FOR SSPS TRAIN A, THE POWER SUPPLIES ARE | | POWERED FROM CHANNELS I AND IV. FOR TRAIN B, THE POWER SUPPLIES ARE POWERED | | FROM CHANNELS II AND III. A STEAM LINE BREAK OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT OR A | | SEISMIC EVENT WHICH CAUSES A STEAM LINE BREAK OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT WOULD | | CAUSE EITHER A PARTIAL LOSS OR A TOTAL LOSS OF SOLID STATE LOGIC | | CAPABILITY, AND REQUIRE PROTECTIVE ACTION TO TERMINATE THE EVENT. THE SSPS, | | AS PART OF THE REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM, IS DESIGNED TO MEET THE | | REQUIREMENTS OF IEEE-279 AND THE GENERAL DESIGN CRITERIA. ALTHOUGH THE | | FAILURES MAY BE TOLERABLE ON SOME OTHER BASIS, THE LOSS OF THE PROTECTION | | FUNCTION OR REQUIRED REDUNDANCY IS OUTSIDE THE DESIGN BASIS OF THE | | PROTECTION SYSTEM. | | | | THE RI WILL BE INFORMED. | | | | ***UPDATE AT 23:50 BY SAUER TO MACKINNON*** THE PLANT STARTED SHUTDOWN AT | | 23:30 AND HAVE 6 HRS TO BE IN MODE 3. THEY ARE REDUCING POWER BY 15%/HR. | | ALL SAFETY EQUIPMENT IS OPERABLE. THE RI WAS INFORMED. | | | | | | HOO NOTE: SEE EVENT #28318 | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ |POWER REACTOR | |EVENT NUMBER: 28322 | +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ |FACILITY: TURKEY POINT REGION: 2 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 02/02/95 | |UNIT: [3] [4] [ ] STATE: FL |NOTIFICATION TIME: 01:59 [ET]| |RX TYPE: [3] W-3-LP,[4] W-3-LP |EVENT DATE: 02/02/95 | +------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 01:00[EST]| |NRC NOTIFIED BY: TERRY JONES |LAST UPDATE DATE: 02/02/95 | |HQ OPS OFFICER: JOHN MacKINNON +-----------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+ NOTIFICATIONS | |EMERGENCY CLASS: NOT APPLICABLE +-----------------------------+ |10 CFR SECTION: |JEROME BLAKE RDO | |AOUT 50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B) OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +-----+----------+-------+--------+--------------+--+--------+-----------------+ |UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ | 3 | N Y 100 POWER OPERATION | 100 POWER OPERATION | | 4 | N Y 100 POWER OPERATION | 100 POWER OPERATION | | | | | +-----+---------------------------------------------+--------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | UNIT 3 MAY HAVE BEEN BEYOND ITS DESIGN BASIS FOR 27 MINUTES DURING WHICH | | TIME PERIOD BOTH UNIT 3 EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATORS (EDGs) WERE INOPERABLE. | | | | AT 2045ET 02/01/95, UNIT 3 EDG "3A" WAS DECLARED INOPERABLE DUE TO A SMALL | | COOLING WATER LEAK ON ITS SENSING LINE. THIS PLACED THEM INTO A 72 HOUR | | TECH SPEC ACTION STATEMENT PER TECH SPEC 3.8.1. DURING RAPID START TEST OF | | EDG "3B" AT 2153ET, EDG "3B" FAILED TO START (AIR START SYSTEM SEEMED TO | | OPERATE PROPERLY BUT THE DIESEL DID NOT START) AND IT WAS DECLARED | | INOPERABLE. AT 2153ET, UNIT 3 ENTERED A 2 HOUR TECH SPEC 3.8.1 ACTION | | STATEMENT BECAUSE BOTH OF THEIR EDGs WERE INOPERABLE. UNIT 4 ENTERED A 72 | | HOUR TECH SPEC 3.8.1 ACTION STATEMENT BECAUSE UNIT 4 TECH SPECs REQUIRES | | ONE OPERABLE EDG FROM UNIT 3 (BOTH OF UNIT 4's EDG ARE FULLY OPERABLE). | | UNIT 3 EDG "3A" WAS DECLARED OPERABLE AT 2220ET, AT WHICH TIME UNIT 3 WENT | | FROM AT 2 HOUR TECH SPEC ACTION STATEMENT TO A 72 HOUR ACTION STATEMENT PER | | TECH SPEC 3.8.1 (UNIT 4 EXITED TECH SPEC 3.8.1 ACTION STATEMENT WHEN EDG | | "3A" WAS DECLARED OPERABLE). | | | | PRELIMINARY ENGINEERING REVIEW DURING THE TIME PERIOD WHEN BOTH UNIT 3 EDGs | | WERE DECLARED INOPERABLE (27 MINUTES) FOUND THAT THEY MAY HAVE BEEN BEYOND | | THE DESIGN BASIS OF THE PLANT WHEN BOTH EDGs WERE INOPERABLE. ENGINEERING | | POSTULATED A LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER (LOOP) CONCURRENT WITH A LARGE BREAK | | LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT (LOCA) WHEN BOTH UNIT 3 EDGs WERE INOPERABLE. WITH | | A LOOP, LARGE BREAK LOCA, AND BOTH OF UNIT 3 EDGs INOPERABLE, ADEQUATE CORE | | COOLING MAY HAVE NOT HAVE BEEN POSSIBLE. UNIT 3 & 4 HIGH HEAD SAFETY | | INJECTION PUMPS (TOTAL OF 4 PUMPS) WILL PROVIDE COLD LEG INJECTION TO | | EITHER UNIT. WITH BOTH UNIT 3 EDGs INOPERABLE UNIT 4's HIGH HEAD SAFETY | | INJECTION PUMPS WOULD HAVE SUPPLIED COLD LEG INJECTION TO UNIT 3 BUT IF THE | | LOCA BREAK WAS TOO LARGE, UNIT 3 WOULD HAVE NEEDED EXTRA FLOW FROM ONE ITS | | RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL PUMPs (WHICH WOULD BE INOPERABLE DUE TO LOOP AND BOTH | | UNIT 3 EDGs INOPERABLE). | | | | RESIDENT INSPECTOR WILL BE INFORMED BY THE LICENSEE. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+