U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Operations Center Event Reports For 01/05/95 - 01/06/95 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** 28207 28208 28209 28210 28211 28212 28213 28214 28215 +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ |POWER REACTOR | |EVENT NUMBER: 28207 | +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ |FACILITY: VERMONT YANKEE REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 01/03/95 | |UNIT: [1] [ ] [ ] STATE: VT |NOTIFICATION TIME: 10:55 [ET]| |RX TYPE: [1] GE-4 |EVENT DATE: 01/03/95 | +------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 10:43[EST]| |NRC NOTIFIED BY: CROKE |LAST UPDATE DATE: 01/05/95 | |HQ OPS OFFICER: CHAUNCEY GOULD +-----------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+ NOTIFICATIONS | |EMERGENCY CLASS: NOT APPLICABLE +-----------------------------+ |10 CFR SECTION: |WILLIAM LAZARUS RDO | |AARC 50.72(b)(1)(v) OTHER ASMT/COMM INOP | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +-----+----------+-------+--------+--------------+--+--------+-----------------+ |UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ | 1 | N Y 100 POWER OPERATION | 100 POWER OPERATION | | | | | | | | | +-----+---------------------------------------------+--------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | THE LICENSEE REPORTED THAT THEY HAVE A PROBLEM WITH THEIR DIRECT NUCLEAR | | ALERT SYSTEM. | | | | THEY DETERMINED THIS WHILE TESTING THEIR DIRECT COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM TO | | THE STATES OF VERMONT, MASSACHUSETTS AND NEW HAMPSHIRE. WHEN THEY REQUESTED | | THE STATES TO CALL BACK NO RING BACK WAS RECEIVED. THEY SUSPECT THE RINGER | | ON THE PHONE, SINCE THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE WAS ON THE PHONE WHEN THE | | LICENSEE PICKED IT UP EVEN THOUGH IT DID NOT RING WHEN THE CALL BACK WAS | | MADE. THE TELEPHONE COMPANY IS AWARE OF THE PROBLEM. THE RESIDENT INSPECTOR | | AND STATE WILL BE INFORMED. | | | | ** UPDATE DATE\TIME: 1/5/95 @ 1008 EST ***FROM LICENSEE:CROKE BY:McGINTY ** | | THE DIRECT COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM HAS BEEN REPAIRED AND RETURNED TO SERVICE. | | TECHNICIANS FOUND A SHORT IN THE RINGER. THE LICENSEE WILL INFORM THE | | RESIDENT INSPECTOR. HOO NOTIFIED R1DO (WHITE). | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ |POWER REACTOR | |EVENT NUMBER: 28208 | +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ |FACILITY: DIABLO CANYON REGION: 4 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 01/04/95 | |UNIT: [1] [2] [ ] STATE: CA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 16:40 [ET]| |RX TYPE: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP |EVENT DATE: 01/04/95 | +------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 13:30[PST]| |NRC NOTIFIED BY: GARY ANDERSON |LAST UPDATE DATE: 01/05/95 | |HQ OPS OFFICER: STEVE SANDIN +-----------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+ NOTIFICATIONS | |EMERGENCY CLASS: NOT APPLICABLE +-----------------------------+ |10 CFR SECTION: |GARY SANBORN RDO | |AESS 50.72(b)(1)(v) EMERGENCY SIREN INOP | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +-----+----------+-------+--------+--------------+--+--------+-----------------+ |UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ | 1 | N Y 100 POWER OPERATION | 100 POWER OPERATION | | 2 | N Y 100 POWER OPERATION | 100 POWER OPERATION | | | | | +-----+---------------------------------------------+--------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | LOSS OF EMERGENCY SIREN CAPABILITY DUE TO LOCAL POWER OUTAGES CAUSED BY | | ADVERSE WEATHER CONDITIONS. | | | | DUE TO LOCAL OUTAGES, MORE THAN ONE-HALF (>75) OF THE EARLY WARNING SIRENS | | HAVE BEEN OUT OF SERVICE FOR MORE THAN ONE HOUR. THE LICENSEE (AN EMERGENCY | | PLANNER) IS MONITORING THE SITUATION FROM THE EOF. THE LICENSEE WILL INFORM | | THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR. | | | | ** UPDATE DATE\TIME:1/5/95 @ 0318 EST ***FROM LICENSEE:DYE BY:McGINTY** | | AT 2024 PST, ONLY 35 OF 131 EARLY WARNING SIRENS REMAINED INOPERABLE DUE TO | | THE POWER OUTAGES. THE REMAINING SIRENS THAT ARE OUT AFFECT ONLY ABOUT 800 | | PEOPLE (THE REMAINING SIRENS WOULD AFFECT ABOUT 100,000 PEOPLE). THE | | LICENSEE WILL INFORM THE RESIDENT INSPECTOR. HOO NOTIFIED R4DO (SANBORN). | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ |POWER REACTOR | |EVENT NUMBER: 28209 | +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ |FACILITY: SEQUOYAH REGION: 2 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 01/05/95 | |UNIT: [ ] [2] [ ] STATE: TN |NOTIFICATION TIME: 01:59 [ET]| |RX TYPE: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP |EVENT DATE: 01/05/95 | +------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 00:15[EST]| |NRC NOTIFIED BY: HARRIS |LAST UPDATE DATE: 01/05/95 | |HQ OPS OFFICER: TIM McGINTY +-----------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+ NOTIFICATIONS | |EMERGENCY CLASS: NOT APPLICABLE +-----------------------------+ |10 CFR SECTION: |PIERCE SKINNER RDO | |ARPS 50.72(b)(2)(ii) RPS ACTUATION | | |AESF 50.72(b)(2)(ii) ESF ACTUATION | | | | | | | | | | | +-----+----------+-------+--------+--------------+--+--------+-----------------+ |UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ | | | | | 2 | A/R Y 100 POWER OPERATION | 0 HOT STANDBY | | | | | +-----+---------------------------------------------+--------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | TURBINE TRIP/REACTOR TRIP DUE TO MAIN BANK TRANSFORMER "B" PHASE | | DIFFERENTIAL RELAY OPERATION. | | | | AT 0015 EST ON 1/5/95, UNIT 2 EXPERIENCED A TURBINE TRIP/REACTOR TRIP DUE | | TO MAIN BANK TRANSFORMER "B" PHASE DIFFERENTIAL RELAY OPERATION. THE | | TURBINE FIRST OUT ANNUNCIATOR WAS "ELECTRICAL TROUBLE TURBINE TRIP", AND | | THE REACTOR TRIP FIRST OUT WAS THE "TURBINE TRIP REACTOR TRIP". NO | | ABNORMALITIES WERE NOTED DURING THE PLANT TRANSIENT AND ALL SAFETY SYSTEMS | | PERFORMED AS DESIGNED. THE PLANT IS CURRENTLY STABLE AT 547F AND 2235 | | PSIG. | | | | STEAM IS BEING REMOVED VIA THE MAIN STEAM DUMPS TO THE MAIN CONDENSER, AND | | THE GENERATORS ARE BEING FED BY AUXILIARY FEEDWATER (AFW AUTO-STARTED AS | | EXPECTED ON THE FEEDWATER ISOLATION WHEN Tavg DROPPED BELOW 550F). ALL | | ECCS's AND EDG's ARE OPERABLE. NO PRIMARY OR SECONDARY RELIEF VALVES | | LIFTED IN RESPONSE TO THE TRANSIENT, AND THERE WERE NO PROBLEMS WITH BUS | | TRANSFERS. ALL RODS FULLY INSERTED INTO THE CORE. | | | | THE LICENSEE WILL BE INVESTIGATING THE CAUSE OF THE PLANT TRIP, WITH A | | RESTART PENDING THE RESULTS OF THE INVESTIGATION. THE LICENSEE INFORMED | | THE RESIDENT INSPECTOR. | | | | HOO NOTE: DURING THE MORNING PLANT STATUS CALL, THE LICENSEE INDICATED | | THAT A LOOSE LIGHT SOCKET ON THE TURBINE BENCHBOARD PANEL MAY HAVE BEEN THE | | CAUSE AND THAT THE PLANT MAY BE STARTED UP LATER TODAY. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ |POWER REACTOR | |EVENT NUMBER: 28210 | +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ |FACILITY: PALO VERDE REGION: 4 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 01/05/95 | |UNIT: [1] [2] [3] STATE: AZ |NOTIFICATION TIME: 15:19 [ET]| |RX TYPE: [1] CE,[2] CE,[3] CE |EVENT DATE: 01/05/95 | +------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 10:00[MST]| |NRC NOTIFIED BY: ROBERSON |LAST UPDATE DATE: 01/05/95 | |HQ OPS OFFICER: BOB STRANSKY +-----------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+ NOTIFICATIONS | |EMERGENCY CLASS: NOT APPLICABLE +-----------------------------+ |10 CFR SECTION: |SANBORN RDO | |AINA 50.72(b)(2)(iii)(A) POT UNABLE TO SAFE SD | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +-----+----------+-------+--------+--------------+--+--------+-----------------+ |UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ | 1 | N Y 100 POWER OPERATION | 100 POWER OPERATION | | 2 | N Y 100 POWER OPERATION | 100 POWER OPERATION | | 3 | N Y 100 POWER OPERATION | 100 POWER OPERATION | +-----+---------------------------------------------+--------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | LICENSEE DISCOVERED POTENTIAL FOR 'DOUBLE-SEQUENCING" OF SAFETY-RELATED | | EQUIPMENT FOLLOWING A LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT, WHICH COULD DELAY INJECTION | | OF WATER INTO THE RCS. | | | | THE FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF A FACSIMILE SUBMITTED BY THE LICENSEE: | | | | "AT APPROXIMATELY 1000 MST, NRA [NUCLEAR REGULATORY ASSURANCE] PERSONNEL | | COMPLETED A REPORTABILITY EVALUATION CONCERNING AN ADDITIONAL UNDERVOLTAGE | | SCENARIO RELATED TO THE ONE REPORTED UNDER VOLUNTARY LER 528/93-011, | | POTENTIAL SAFETY-RELATED EQUIPMENT PROBLEMS DUE TO DEGRADED GRID VOLTAGE. | | THE UNDERVOLTAGE SCENARIO REPORTED BY THIS ENS CALL COULD RESULT IN THE | | POSSIBLE "DOUBLE SEQUENCING" OF SAFETY-RELATED EQUIPMENT. THAT IS, | | FOLLOWING A LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT (LOCA) AND A SUCCESSFUL FAST BUS | | TRANSFER (FBT), THE FOLLOWING SEQUENCE OF EVENTS COULD POTENTIALLY OCCUR: | | o START SEQUENCING SAFETY-RELATED EQUIPMENT ONTO THE PREFERRED | | OFFSITE POWER, | | o LOAD SHED DUE TO THE CLASS 1E 4.16 kV UNDERVOLTAGE RELAYS DROPPING | | OUT DURING SEQUENCING ONTO OFFSITE POWER AND FAILING TO RESET | | DURING THE TIME DELAY PERIOD (LESS THAN 90 PERCENT FOR | | APPROXIMATELY 35 SECONDS), | | o ISOLATE THE CLASS 1E 4.16 kV BUS FROM THE OFFSITE SOURCE, | | o CLOSE THE EDG BREAKER, AND | | o RESEQUENCE THE EQUIPMENT ONTO THE EDG. | | THE SCENARIO FOR "DOUBLE SEQUENCING" REQUIRES TWO CONDITIONS TO BE IN | | EFFECT CONCURRENTLY. THE FIRST CONDITION IS THAT THE SWITCHYARD VOLTAGE | | MUST BE BELOW 99.5% (ALLOWABLE IS 98 TO 102%). THE SECOND CONDITION IS | | THAT THE UNIT IS CHALLENGED WITH A FAST BUS TRANSFER AND AN ACTUATION OF | | THE LOAD SEQUENCER RESULTING FROM A LOCA. IN THIS SCENARIO, THE | | UNDERVOLTAGE RELAYS WOULD DROP OUT DURING LOAD SEQUENCING, AND THERE EXISTS | | THE POSSIBILITY THAT THEY WOULD NOT RESET. THE SCENARIO WILL NOT OCCUR AS | | LONG AS THE SWITCHYARD VOLTAGE REMAINS BETWEEN 100 & 102%, AS CURRENTLY | | ADMINISTRATIVELY MAINTAINED. | | | | NRA HAS DETERMINED THAT MULTIPLE REPORTING REQUIREMENTS APPLY. APPLICABLE | | TO 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iii), TWO SEPARATE CONDITIONS OCCUR DURING THIS | | SCENARIO THAT ALONE COULD HAVE PREVENTED THE FULFILLMENT OF THE SAFETY | | FUNCTION OF SSC (SAFE SHUTDOWN COMPONENTS). | | | | 1. CURRENT UFSAR (6.3.3.2.1.1) LANGUAGE WITH RESPECT TO LOCA ANALYSES | | STATES THAT THE ACTUAL TIME DELAY FOR SIAS (SPECIFICALLY, HPSI) FLOW WILL | | NOT EXCEED 29 SECONDS FOLLOWING A SIAS. ALL SAFETY INJECTION PUMPS MUST | | AWAIT EDG STARTUP AND LOAD SEQUENCING ONTO PREFERRED POWER BEFORE THEY CAN | | START. THE 29 SECOND TIME FRAME STARTS WITH THE SIAS AND ENDS WHEN SI FLOW | | IS DELIVERED TO THE RCS. THE DOUBLE SEQUENCING SCENARIO WOULD CAUSE AN | | INTERRUPT IN THE HPSI FLOW WHEN THE LOAD SHED OCCURRED DUE TO THE | | UNDERVOLTAGE RELAYS DROPPING OUT, RESULTING IN A TIME GREATER THAN 29 | | SECONDS. IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT, PER UFSAR, NO CREDIT IS TAKEN FOR PUMP | | FLOW UNTIL THE SITs (SAFETY INJECTION TANKS) ARE EMPTY, RESULTING IN A | | MINIMUM EFFECTIVE DELAY OF OVER 55 SECONDS FROM THE TIME THE SIAS OCCURS | | UNTIL PUMP FLOW IS DELIVERED TO THE RCS. | | | | 2. CONTRARY TO THE CONCLUSION STATED IN THE PVNGS SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT | | (NUREG-0857), PVNGS IS CURRENTLY UNABLE TO MEET GDC-17 AS INTERPRETED BY | | NUREG-75/087 AND NUREG-0800 AT LOWER SWITCHYARD VOLTAGES. GDC-17 STATES, | | IN PART, THAT "PROVISIONS SHALL BE INCLUDED TO MINIMIZE THE PROBABILITY OF | | LOSING ELECTRIC POWER FROM ANY OF THE REMAINING SUPPLIES AS A RESULT OF, OR | | COINCIDENT WITH, THE LOSS OF POWER GENERATED BY THE NUCLEAR POWER UNIT, THE | | LOSS OF POWER FROM THE TRANSMISSION NETWORK, OR THE LOSS OF POWER FROM THE | | ONSITE ELECTRIC POWER SUPPLIES." DURING THE DOUBLE-SEQUENCING SCENARIO, | | WHEN SWITCHYARD VOLTAGE IS BETWEEN 98 AND 99.5%, IT IS POSTULATED THAT THE | | CLASS 1E 4.16 kV UNDERVOLTAGE RELAYS ACTUATE AND CAUSE LOADING OF THE EDG | | BECAUSE OF SUBSTANDARD VOLTAGES IN THE ONSITE SYSTEM DUE TO LOSS OF THE | | MAIN TURBINE (LOSS OF POWER GENERATION OF THE UNIT) WHICH RESULTS IN A FBT, | | NOT DUE TO A SUSTAINED DEGRADED GRID VOLTAGE. THIS CONFIGURATION CAUSED | | THE ABANDONMENT OF PREFERRED POWER TO THE STANDBY POWER SOURCE (EDG) EVEN | | WITH ACCEPTABLE VOLTAGES ON THE GRID. | | | | IN ADDITION TO THESE TWO EVENTS, THE 30 DAY LER WILL DISCUSS A CONDITION, | | REPORTABLE UNDER 10CFR 50.73(a)(a)(ii), THAT RESULTED IN THE PLANT BEING IN | | A CONDITION THAT WAS OUTSIDE THE DESIGN BASIS OF THE PLANT. PVNGS UFSAR | | DOES NOT EXPLICITLY INCORPORATE POSTULATED ESF TIME DELAYS ASSOCIATED WITH | | THE FULL INITIATION OF A REQUIRED ESF SYSTEM WHICH MAY OCCUR DURING A | | "DOUBLE SEQUENCING" SCENARIO. THE UFSAR ACCIDENT ANALYSIS BOUNDS A LOP | | CONCURRENT WITH A LOCA. HOWEVER, THE ANALYSIS DOES NOT BOUND A CONDITION | | IN WHICH A LOCA CAUSES A LOP TO THE CLASS 1E 4.16 kV BUS. IN OTHER WORDS, | | FOLLOWING A LOCA, A FBT OCCURS WHICH CAUSES A VOLTAGE DROP THAT COULD | | RESULT IN PREFERRED POWER BEING ISOLATED FROM CLASS 1E 4.16 kV BUSES. | | | | NO IMMEDIATE OPERABILITY CONCERNS EXIST SINCE THE SWITCHYARD VOLTAGES | | REMAIN BETWEEN 100 & 102%, AS CURRENTLY ADMINISTRATIVELY MAINTAINED." | | END OF TEXT. THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR HAS BEEN INFORMED BY THE LICENSEE. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ |POWER REACTOR | |EVENT NUMBER: 28211 | +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ |FACILITY: LIMERICK REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 01/05/95 | |UNIT: [1] [ ] [ ] STATE: PA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 21:05 [ET]| |RX TYPE: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4 |EVENT DATE: 01/05/95 | +------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 17:55[EST]| |NRC NOTIFIED BY: FORST |LAST UPDATE DATE: 01/05/95 | |HQ OPS OFFICER: BOB STRANSKY +-----------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+ NOTIFICATIONS | |EMERGENCY CLASS: NOT APPLICABLE +-----------------------------+ |10 CFR SECTION: |WHITE RDO | |AESF 50.72(b)(2)(ii) ESF ACTUATION | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +-----+----------+-------+--------+--------------+--+--------+-----------------+ |UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ | 1 | N Y 100 POWER OPERATION | 100 POWER OPERATION | | | | | | | | | +-----+---------------------------------------------+--------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM INVERTER OUTPUT BREAKER TRIPPED, CAUSING VARIOUS | | CONTAINMENT ISOLATIONS. | | | | THE FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF A FACSIMILE SUBMITTED BY THE LICENSEE: | | | | "ON JANUARY 5, 1995, THE 1A REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM (RPS) INVERTER OUTPUT | | BREAKER TRIPPED ON AN OVERVOLTAGE CONDITION. THIS CAUSED A LOSS OF POWER | | TO 1AY160 (1A RPS UNINTERRUPTIBLE POWER SUPPLY). THIS LOSS OF POWER | | RESULTED IN ESF AND RPS ACTUATIONS. [HOO NOTE: THE LICENSEE ERRONEOUSLY | | CLASSIFIED THIS EVENT AS AN RPS ACTUATION, ALTHOUGH ONLY A HALF SCRAM | | SIGNAL WAS GENERATED AND NO ROD MOTION OCCURRED OR SHOULD HAVE OCCURRED.] | | DRYWELL CHILLED WATER, REACTOR ENCLOSURE COOLING WATER AND INSTRUMENT GAS | | ISOLATIONS WERE BYPASSED IN 5 MINUTES. THIS PLACED THE PLANT IN LCO | | 3.6.3.A FOR INOPERABLE PRIMARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES. THE CAUSE OF | | THE PROBLEM WAS DETERMINED TO BE INTERNAL TO THE INVERTER AND THE INVERTER | | WAS BYPASSED AND POWER RESTORED TO THE RPS BUS IN 50 MINUTES, AT WHICH TIME | | THE 1A HALF SCRAM WAS RESET. ALL ISOLATIONS WERE UNBYPASSED AND RESET | | WITHIN 2 HOURS AND 40 MINUTES OF THE EVENT." END OF TEXT | | | | THE LICENSEE WILL NOTIFY THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR OF THIS EVENT. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ |POWER REACTOR | |EVENT NUMBER: 28212 | +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ |FACILITY: CLINTON REGION: 3 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 01/06/95 | |UNIT: [1] [ ] [ ] STATE: IL |NOTIFICATION TIME: 01:37 [ET]| |RX TYPE: [1] GE-6 |EVENT DATE: 01/05/95 | +------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 22:33[CST]| |NRC NOTIFIED BY: SHORT |LAST UPDATE DATE: 01/06/95 | |HQ OPS OFFICER: TIM McGINTY +-----------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+ NOTIFICATIONS | |EMERGENCY CLASS: NOT APPLICABLE +-----------------------------+ |10 CFR SECTION: |MARTIN FARBER RDO | |ARPS 50.72(b)(2)(ii) RPS ACTUATION | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +-----+----------+-------+--------+--------------+--+--------+-----------------+ |UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ | 1 | M/R Y 79 POWER OPERATION | 0 HOT SHUTDOWN | | | | | | | | | +-----+---------------------------------------------+--------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | MANUAL REACTOR SCRAM FROM 79% POWER DUE TO FEEDWATER HEATER PROBLEMS. | | | | THE REACTOR WAS MANUALLY SCRAMMED FROM 79% POWER DUE TO FEEDWATER HEATER | | PROBLEMS. ALL RODS FULLY INSERTED ON THE SCRAM. THERE WERE NO ABNORMAL | | LEVEL OR PRESSURE TRANSIENTS FOLLOWING THE SCRAM. | | | | PREVIOUSLY IDENTIFIED TUBE LEAKS ON THE "5B" FEEDWATER (FW) HEATER WORSENED | | TO THE POINT THAT IT WAS NECESSARY TO REMOVE THE HEATER STRING (2B THROUGH | | 5B) FROM SERVICE. POWER WAS REDUCED TO 70% AND EXTRACTION STEAM WAS | | ISOLATED TO THE HEATER STRING. WHILE SLOWLY OPENING THE HEATER STRING | | BYPASS VALVE, OSCILLATIONS BEGAN TO OCCUR IN THE "6A" FW HEATER AS WELL AS | | THE "A" SIDE REHEATER DRAIN TANK. DUE TO ALREADY HAVING ONE FW HEATER | | STRING OUT OF SERVICE AND PROBLEMS DEVELOPING ON THE OTHER, THE SHIFT | | SUPERVISOR MADE THE DECISION TO SCRAM THE REACTOR (BASED ON DECREASING | | FEEDWATER TEMPERATURES). | | | | THE ONLY OTHER PROBLEM IDENTIFIED AT THIS POINT IS THAT THE MAIN GENERATOR | | FAILED TO TRIP AS DESIGNED ON REVERSE POWER. OPERATORS MANUALLY | | TRANSFERRED ALL ELECTRICAL BUSES FROM IN-HOUSE POWER TO OFF-SITE POWER AND | | THEN TRIPPED THE GENERATOR BY OPENING THE MAIN OUTPUT BREAKERS. | | | | A REPAIR/INSPECTION PLAN IS UNDERWAY FOR THE "5B" HEATER, AND THE ASPECTS | | OF THE EVENT ON THE "6A" FEEDWATER HEATER AND THE REVERSE POWER TRIP WILL | | ALSO BE INVESTIGATED. ALL ECCS's AND EDG's ARE OPERATIONAL, AND NO SRV's | | OPERATED IN RESPONSE TO THE TRANSIENT. THE UNIT IS STABLE IN HOT SHUTDOWN, | | AND WILL BE MAINTAINED IN MODE 3 ALTHOUGH A RESTART DATE IS PENDING THE | | RESULTS OF THE INVESTIGATION. THE LICENSEE INFORMED THE RESIDENT | | INSPECTOR. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ |POWER REACTOR | |EVENT NUMBER: 28213 | +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ |FACILITY: ZION REGION: 3 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 01/06/95 | |UNIT: [ ] [2] [ ] STATE: IL |NOTIFICATION TIME: 05:39 [ET]| |RX TYPE: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP |EVENT DATE: 01/06/95 | +------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 00:48[CST]| |NRC NOTIFIED BY: WULF |LAST UPDATE DATE: 01/06/95 | |HQ OPS OFFICER: TIM McGINTY +-----------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+ NOTIFICATIONS | |EMERGENCY CLASS: NOT APPLICABLE +-----------------------------+ |10 CFR SECTION: |MARTIN FARBER RDO | |AINA 50.72(b)(2)(iii)(A) POT UNABLE TO SAFE SD | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +-----+----------+-------+--------+--------------+--+--------+-----------------+ |UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ | | | | | 2 | M/R Y 2 STARTUP | 0 HOT STANDBY | | | | | +-----+---------------------------------------------+--------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | TWO RODS FAILED TO INDICATE FULLY INSERTED AFTER THE MANUAL SCRAM TO ENTER | | THE REFUELING OUTAGE. | | | | UNIT 2 WAS SHUTTING DOWN FOR THE UPCOMING REFUELING OUTAGE. TWO CONTROL | | RODS FAILED TO FULLY INSERT ON THE PLANNED MANUAL REACTOR TRIP FROM 2%. | | RODS "K-14" ON CONTROL BANK "B" AND "M-12" ON CONTROL BANK "D" DID NOT | | INDICATE FULLY INSERTED (VIA THE LVDT INDICATING LIGHT). A PREVIOUS WORK | | REQUEST HAD BEEN ISSUED ON ROD "K-14" ON 12/27/94, DUE TO NO RPI's LIT WITH | | THE ROD AT 214 STEPS. | | | | ROD "M-12" LATER DID PROVIDE AN INDICATION OF BEING FULLY INSERTED (AT | | ABOUT 0147 CST) WITHOUT ANY MANUAL ACTION. WHEN THE TWO RODS DID NOT | | INDICATE FULLY INSERTED IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE TRIP, AN EMERGENCY BORATION | | OF 100 ppm WAS INITIATED AS REQUIRED BY ABNORMAL OPERATING PROCEDURE. | | | | TECH SPEC 3.2 SPECIFIES AN EMERGENCY BORATION OF 100 ppm PER ROD GREATER | | THAN ONE NOT FULLY INSERTED. THE EMERGENCY BORATION WAS TERMINATED WHEN | | THE "M-12" ROD LATER INDICATED FULLY INSERTED. THE LICENSEE WILL BE | | INVESTIGATING THE ROD POSITION INDICATION PROBLEMS, AND HAS INFORMED THE | | RESIDENT INSPECTOR. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ |POWER REACTOR | |EVENT NUMBER: 28214 | +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ |FACILITY: ZION REGION: 3 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 01/06/95 | |UNIT: [ ] [2] [ ] STATE: IL |NOTIFICATION TIME: 05:39 [ET]| |RX TYPE: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP |EVENT DATE: 01/06/95 | +------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 01:16[CST]| |NRC NOTIFIED BY: WULF |LAST UPDATE DATE: 01/06/95 | |HQ OPS OFFICER: TIM McGINTY +-----------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+ NOTIFICATIONS | |EMERGENCY CLASS: NOT APPLICABLE +-----------------------------+ |10 CFR SECTION: |MARTIN FARBER RDO | |AINA 50.72(b)(2)(iii)(A) POT UNABLE TO SAFE SD | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +-----+----------+-------+--------+--------------+--+--------+-----------------+ |UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ | | | | | 2 | N N 0 HOT STANDBY | 0 HOT STANDBY | | | | | +-----+---------------------------------------------+--------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | BOTH SOURCE RANGE NI's LOST DETECTOR VOLTAGE ABOUT A HALF-HOUR AFTER | | TRIPPING TO ENTER A REFUELING OUTAGE. | | | | AT O116 CST, ABOUT A HALF-HOUR AFTER THE SCRAM TO ENTER THE UPCOMING | | REFUELING OUTAGE, BOTH UNIT 2 SOURCE RANGE NUCLEAR INSTRUMENTS EXPERIENCED | | A LOSS OF DETECTOR VOLTAGE. THE CAUSE IS UNKNOWN AND BEING INVESTIGATED. | | THIS RESULTS IN THE INABILITY TO MONITOR THE REACTOR IN A SHUTDOWN | | CONDITION, AND IT CANNOT BE VERIFIED THAT THE REACTOR SHUTDOWN IS BEING | | MAINTAINED UNTIL THE FLUX REACHES THE INTERMEDIATE RANGE INSTRUMENTS. | | | | THE LICENSEE IS INITIATING WORK TO GET A SOURCE RANGE OPERABLE. TECH SPEC | | 3.1 ALLOWS 24 HOURS TO GET A SOURCE RANGE OPERABLE WHILE IN HOT SHUTDOWN, | | AND THEN AN ADDITIONAL 24 HOURS TO GET TO COLD SHUTDOWN. THE SOURCE RANGE | | DETECTORS WERE WORKING FINE FOR ABOUT 1/2 HOUR AFTER THE TRIP, AT WHICH | | TIME THE LOSS OF DETECTOR VOLTAGE ANNUNCIATOR WAS RECEIVED. THE LICENSEE | | IS INVESTIGATING THE POSSIBLE SOURCE AS THE PROTECTIVE LOGIC WHICH | | AUTOMATICALLY DE-ENERGIZES SOURCE RANGE NI's BASED ON INTERMEDIATE RANGE | | NI's (A SOURCE RANGE DETECTOR PROTECTIVE FUNCTION FOR START-UPS). | | | | THE LICENSEE INFORMED THE RESIDENT INSPECTOR. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ |POWER REACTOR | |EVENT NUMBER: 28215 | +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ |FACILITY: INDIAN POINT REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 01/06/95 | |UNIT: [2] [ ] [ ] STATE: NY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 05:49 [ET]| |RX TYPE: [2] W-4-LP,[3] W-4-LP |EVENT DATE: 01/06/95 | +------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 02:15[EST]| |NRC NOTIFIED BY: CORMAX |LAST UPDATE DATE: 01/06/95 | |HQ OPS OFFICER: TIM McGINTY +-----------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+ NOTIFICATIONS | |EMERGENCY CLASS: NOT APPLICABLE +-----------------------------+ |10 CFR SECTION: |JOHN WHITE RDO | |APRE 50.72(b)(2)(vi) OFFSITE NOTIFICATION | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +-----+----------+-------+--------+--------------+--+--------+-----------------+ |UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ | 2 | N Y 89 POWER OPERATION | 89 POWER OPERATION | | | | | | | | | +-----+---------------------------------------------+--------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | 100 GALLON FUEL OIL SPILL IN THE TURBINE BUILDING. | | | | AN OIL SPILL INSIDE THE MAIN TURBINE BUILDING OCCURRED AT 0215 EST. | | APPROXIMATELY 100 GALLONS OF NO.2 FUEL OIL WAS SPILLED. THE SPILL WAS | | CONTAINED, DID NOT REACH ANY DRAINS OR SEWERS AND DID NOT REACH THE LAND OR | | WATER. THE LICENSEE NOTIFIED THE STATE DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL | | CONSERVATION. THE CLEANUP WAS COMPLETED AT 0500 EST. | | | | THE OIL IS USED TO SUPPLY THE HOUSE SERVICE BOILERS (HEATING UNITS). A | | PRESSURE GAGE ON THE DISCHARGE SIDE OF THE SUPPLY PUMPS BLEW OUT, CAUSING | | THE SPILL. THE LICENSEE NOTIFIED THE RESIDENT INSPECTOR. | | | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+