U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Operations Center Event Reports For 12/15/94 - 12/16/94 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** 28061 28128 28149 28150 28151 !!!!!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!!! +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ |POWER REACTOR | |EVENT NUMBER: 28061 | +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ |FACILITY: LIMERICK REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 11/23/94 | |UNIT: [1] [ ] [ ] STATE: PA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 02:53 [ET]| |RX TYPE: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4 |EVENT DATE: 11/23/94 | +------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 01:55[EST]| |NRC NOTIFIED BY: GREGORY SASSON |LAST UPDATE DATE: 12/15/94 | |HQ OPS OFFICER: DOUG WEAVER +-----------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+ NOTIFICATIONS | |EMERGENCY CLASS: NOT APPLICABLE +-----------------------------+ |10 CFR SECTION: |WILLIAM RULAND RDO | |AIND 50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D) ACCIDENT MITIGATION | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +-----+----------+-------+--------+--------------+--+--------+-----------------+ |UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ | 1 | N Y 100 POWER OPERATION | 100 POWER OPERATION | | | | | | | | | +-----+---------------------------------------------+--------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | HIGH PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION (HPCI) SYSTEM DECLARED INOPERABLE | | | | "AT 0155 EST ON 11/23/94 THE UNIT 1 HPCI SYSTEM WAS DECLARED INOPERABLE. | | THE SYSTEM WAS DECLARED INOPERABLE AS A RESULT OF FAILURE TO MEET SEISMIC | | SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS ON THE STEAM SUPPLY LINE. A STATION EMPLOYEE REPORTED | | THE FAILURE OF A VERTICAL TRAPEZE STRUT ON THE HPCI STEAM SUPPLY LINE AT | | 1600 ON 11/22/94. STATION ENGINEERING IMMEDIATELY CONDUCTED A REVIEW OF | | THE HPCI SYSTEM DESIGN REQUIREMENTS AND DETERMINED THAT THE STEAM LINE NO | | LONGER WAS SEISMICALLY QUALIFIED. THIS DETERMINATION WAS MADE AT 0155 EST | | ON 11/23/94. THE TIME OF INOPERABILITY WILL BE CONSIDERED AS 1600 ON | | 11/22/94 FOR LCO TRACKING PURPOSES. THE HPCI SYSTEM IS CURRENTLY | | CONSIDERED INOPERABLE BUT AVAILABLE." | | | | ALL OTHER ECCS SYSTEMS ARE CURRENTLY OPERABLE. | | | | THE LICENSEE WILL INFORM THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR. | | | | ** UPDATE DATE\TIME:12/15/94 @ 1704 *FROM LICENSEE:NEFF BY:McGINTY** | | THE LICENSEE RETRACTED THIS EVENT AFTER A DETAILED ENGINEERING ANALYSIS | | CONCLUDED THAT THE PIPE, SUPPORTS, AND ANCHORS REMAINED WITHIN THE | | APPROPRIATE CODE AND DESIGN LIMITS UNDER ALL DESIGN CONDITIONS, EVEN WITH | | THE SUPPORT MISSING. AS A RESULT, THE HPCI SYSTEM WAS NOT INOPERABLE AT | | ANY TIME DUE TO THIS PROBLEM. THE BROKEN SEISMIC SUPPORT WAS REPAIRED A | | FEW DAYS AFTER THE EVENT WAS REPORTED. THE LICENSEE INFORMED THE RESIDENT | | INSPECTOR. HOO NOTIFIED THE R1DO (NICHOLSON). | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ !!!!!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!!! +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ |POWER REACTOR | |EVENT NUMBER: 28128 | +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ |FACILITY: PEACH BOTTOM REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 12/09/94 | |UNIT: [2] [3] [ ] STATE: PA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 15:51 [ET]| |RX TYPE: [2] GE-4,[3] GE-4 |EVENT DATE: 12/09/94 | +------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 14:45[EST]| |NRC NOTIFIED BY: JOHN BOUCK |LAST UPDATE DATE: 12/15/94 | |HQ OPS OFFICER: DICK JOLLIFFE +-----------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+ NOTIFICATIONS | |EMERGENCY CLASS: NOT APPLICABLE +-----------------------------+ |10 CFR SECTION: |PETER ESELGROTH RDO | |AINA 50.72(b)(2)(iii)(A) POT UNABLE TO SAFE SD | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +-----+----------+-------+--------+--------------+--+--------+-----------------+ |UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ | 2 | N Y 100 POWER OPERATION | 100 POWER OPERATION | | 3 | N Y 100 POWER OPERATION | 100 POWER OPERATION | | | | | +-----+---------------------------------------------+--------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | - OFFGAS FLOW BYPASSED THE MAIN STACK FOR 3.5 HOURS DUE TO AN OPEN DOOR - | | | | FROM ABOUT 1000 TO 1330 ON 11/29/94, THE OFFGAS FLOW BYPASSED THE MAIN | | STACK WHEN THE DOOR BETWEEN THE STACK PLENUM AND THE STACK EQUIPMENT | | ROOM WAS OPEN WHILE THE STACK EQUIPMENT ROOM OUTSIDE DOOR WAS ALSO OPEN. | | THESE DOORS WERE OPEN TO FACILITATE THE ERECTION OF SCAFFOLDING IN THE | | MAIN STACK. | | | | DURING THIS PERIOD, APPROXIMATELY 99% OF THE OFFGAS FLOW EXITED THE STACK | | THROUGH THE EQUIPMENT ROOM AT THE BASE OF THE STACK. THIS RESULTED IN | | AN UNANTICIPATED POTENTIAL HIGHER OFFSITE DOSE RATE HAD A DESIGN BASIS | | ACCIDENT (LOCA) OCCURRED [21.3 REM (THYROID) & 1.55 REM (WHOLE BODY)]. | | UFSAR LIMITS ARE 14.8 REM (THYROID) & 0.655 REM (WHOLE BODY). | | | | THIS CONSTITUTES A LOSS OF SAFETY FUNCTION OF THE MAIN STACK DUE TO THE | | ELEVATED RELEASE RATES. THE POTENTIAL RISE IN DOSE RATES WERE WELL BELOW | | 10CFR100 LIMITS [300 REM (THYROID) & 25 REM (WHOLE BODY)]. | | | | LICENSEE WILL INFORM THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR. | | | | ** UPDATE DATE\TIME:12/15/94 @ 1320 EST *FROM LICENSEE: FOSS BY:McGINTY** | | THE LICENSEE IS RETRACTING THIS EVENT BASED ON THE INVESTIGATION RESULTS. | | THE DOORS WERE NOT BOTH OPEN FOR A PERIOD OF 3.5 HOURS, BUT THEY WERE BOTH | | OPEN ON 5 DIFFERENT OCCASIONS FOR ABOUT 15 SECONDS EACH. ENGINEERING | | CALCULATIONS SHOWED THAT BOTH OF THE DOORS BEING OPEN FOR THE SHORT TIME | | PERIODS WAS WELL BELOW ANY "UFSAR COMMITMENT LEVELS FOR OFF-GAS", THUS THE | | SAFETY FUNCTION OF THE MAIN STACK WAS NOT LOST. THE LICENSEE INFORMED THE | | RESIDENT INSPECTOR. HOO NOTIFIED THE R1DO (NICHOLSON). | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ |POWER REACTOR | |EVENT NUMBER: 28149 | +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ |FACILITY: NORTH ANNA REGION: 2 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 12/15/94 | |UNIT: [1] [2] [ ] STATE: VA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 11:10 [ET]| |RX TYPE: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP |EVENT DATE: 12/15/94 | +------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 10:45[EST]| |NRC NOTIFIED BY: KEMP |LAST UPDATE DATE: 12/15/94 | |HQ OPS OFFICER: CHAUNCEY GOULD +-----------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+ NOTIFICATIONS | |EMERGENCY CLASS: NOT APPLICABLE +-----------------------------+ |10 CFR SECTION: |WILLIAM RANKIN RDO | |AOUT 50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B) OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +-----+----------+-------+--------+--------------+--+--------+-----------------+ |UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ | 1 | N Y 100 POWER OPERATION | 100 POWER OPERATION | | 2 | N Y 100 POWER OPERATION | 100 POWER OPERATION | | | | | +-----+---------------------------------------------+--------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | THE LICENSEE REPORTED THAT 13 MANHOLE COVERS DO NOT PROVIDE THE LEVEL OF | | MISSILE PROTECTION AS REQUIRED BY THE LICENSEES UFSAR. | | | | THIS WAS DISCOVERED WHEN DESIGN ENGINEERING PERFORMED A WALKDOWN OF ALL | | MISSILE-PROTECTED MANHOLE COVERS AND CONCLUDED THAT 13 MANHOLE COVERS DID | | NOT PROVIDE THE LEVEL OF MISSILE PROTECTION AS REQUIRED BY THEIR UFSAR | | SECTION 3.5.4. THE INADEQUATE MISSILE PROTECTION WAS REVIEWED AND | | DETERMINED TO BE REPORTABLE PER 10CFR50.72 (b)(1)(ii)(B) BECAUSE IT RESULTS | | IN THE NUCLEAR PLANT BEING IN A CONDITION THAT IS OUTSIDE ITS DESIGN BASIS. | | | | THE MOST PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THIS CONDITION WAS THAT THE PROCUREMENT | | INSTRUCTIONS ON DESIGN DRAWINGS AND SPECIFICATION NAS-104 WERE INADEQUATE | | TO ENSURE THE PROPER MANHOLE COVERS WERE PURCHASED. | | | | COMPENSATORY MEASURES HAVE BEEN INITIATED TO RESTORE THE MISSILE PROTECTION | | TO THE 13 MANHOLES. THREE INCHES OF CARBON STEEL WILL BE PLACED OVER THE | | AFFECTED MANHOLES UNTIL MISSILE-PROTECTED REPLACEMENT MANHOLE COVERS ARE | | AVAILABLE. | | | | THE RESIDENT INSPECTOR HAS BEEN NOTIFIED. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ |POWER REACTOR | |EVENT NUMBER: 28150 | +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ |FACILITY: BRUNSWICK REGION: 2 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 12/15/94 | |UNIT: [1] [ ] [ ] STATE: NC |NOTIFICATION TIME: 13:55 [ET]| |RX TYPE: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4 |EVENT DATE: 12/15/94 | +------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 10:15[EST]| |NRC NOTIFIED BY: REINSBURROW |LAST UPDATE DATE: 12/15/94 | |HQ OPS OFFICER: TIM McGINTY +-----------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+ NOTIFICATIONS | |EMERGENCY CLASS: NOT APPLICABLE +-----------------------------+ |10 CFR SECTION: |WILLIAM RANKIN RDO | |AESF 50.72(b)(2)(ii) ESF ACTUATION | | |AIND 50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D) ACCIDENT MITIGATION | | | | | | | | | | | +-----+----------+-------+--------+--------------+--+--------+-----------------+ |UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ | 1 | N Y 100 POWER OPERATION | 100 POWER OPERATION | | | | | | | | | +-----+---------------------------------------------+--------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | A HIGH PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION (HPCI) SYSTEM INITIATION OCCURRED DUE TO | | A SPURIOUS ACTUATION SIGNAL. NO COOLANT WAS INJECTED. | | | | WHILE UNIT 1 WAS OPERATING AT 100% POWER, AN INITIATION OF THE HIGH | | PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION (HPCI) SYSTEM OCCURRED AT 1015 EST ON 12/15/94. | | THE OPERATOR OBSERVED THE HPCI START AND SECURED THE SYSTEM (ABOUT 70 | | SECONDS AFTER INITIATION) BASED ON IT NOT BEING A VALID INITIATION SIGNAL. | | THE INITIATION SIGNALS ARE LOW REACTOR WATER LEVEL AT 112 INCHES OR HIGH | | DRYWELL PRESSURE AT 2.0 psig. REACTOR WATER LEVEL AND DRYWELL PRESSURE | | WERE NORMAL. | | | | A SURVEILLANCE (1MST-RHR21M) OF DRYWELL PRESSURE INITIATION INSTRUMENTATION | | WAS IN PROGRESS ON THE "B" TRIP SYSTEM. HALF OF THE INITIATION LOGIC CAME | | FROM THE SURVEILLANCE IN PROGRESS, HOWEVER, THE SOURCE OF THE OTHER HALF OF | | THE SIGNAL THAT PROVIDED THE MOMENTARY INITIATION REMAINS UNKNOWN AND IS | | BEING INVESTIGATED. THE SURVEILLANCE CONTAINS STEPS TO VERIFY THAT THE | | RELAYS FROM ONE DIVISION ARE RESET PRIOR TO COMMENCING WORK ON THE OTHER | | DIVISION. DOCUMENTATION INDICATES THAT THIS WAS PERFORMED. | | | | AFTER THE SYSTEM WAS SECURED, HPCI WAS DECLARED INOPERABLE BASED UPON | | LOCKING OUT THE HPCI AUXILIARY OIL PUMP TO PREVENT HPCI OPERATION WHILE THE | | EVENT WAS INVESTIGATED. THIS PLACED THE PLANT IN A 14-DAY LIMITING | | CONDITION OF OPERATION PER T/S 3.5.1. NO OTHER SYSTEMS WERE AFFECTED BY THE | | INADVERTENT INITIATION SIGNAL. THE HPCI SYSTEM WAS AVAILABLE FOR MANUAL | | INITIATION IF REQUIRED. | | | | THE STATUS OF RELAYS IN THE INITIATION LOGIC WAS VERIFIED AND FOUND TO BE | | IN THEIR EXPECTED POSITIONS BASED ON THE SPURIOUS INITIATION. THE HPCI | | SYSTEM FUNCTIONED AS REQUIRED ON THE INITIATION SIGNAL. THE AUTOMATIC | | DEPRESSURIZATION SYSTEM, CORE SPRAY SYSTEMS, LOW PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION | | AND REACTOR COOLANT ISOLATION SYSTEMS ARE OPERABLE. | | | | THE HPCI INJECTION VALVE DID NOT OPEN DUE TO THE SPURIOUS NATURE OF THE | | INITIATION SIGNAL (DID NOT SEAL IN). THEREFORE, NO COOLANT WAS INJECTED | | INTO THE REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM. FOLLOWING THE INITIAL INVESTIGATION, THE | | HPCI AUXILIARY OIL PUMP WAS RETURNED TO AUTOMATIC AND DECLARED OPERABLE. | | THE LICENSEE INFORMED THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ |POWER REACTOR | |EVENT NUMBER: 28151 | +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ |FACILITY: HADDAM NECK REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 12/15/94 | |UNIT: [1] [ ] [ ] STATE: CT |NOTIFICATION TIME: 15:20 [ET]| |RX TYPE: [1] W-4-LP |EVENT DATE: 12/15/94 | +------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 15:10[EST]| |NRC NOTIFIED BY: WILLIS |LAST UPDATE DATE: 12/15/94 | |HQ OPS OFFICER: TIM McGINTY +-----------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+ NOTIFICATIONS | |EMERGENCY CLASS: NOT APPLICABLE +-----------------------------+ |10 CFR SECTION: |LARRY NICHOLSON RDO | |AIND 50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D) ACCIDENT MITIGATION | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +-----+----------+-------+--------+--------------+--+--------+-----------------+ |UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ | 1 | N Y 100 POWER OPERATION | 100 POWER OPERATION | | | | | | | | | +-----+---------------------------------------------+--------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | TWO SERVICE WATER VALVES MAY NOT CLOSE AS DESIGNED DURING A SAFETY | | INJECTION IF THEIR INDICATING LIGHTS BURNED OUT AND CREATED A SHORT. | | | | IN RESPONSE TO INFORMATION NOTICE 94-68 (REGARDING INDICATING LIGHTS | | SHORTING OUT CAUSING BREAKER MALFUNCTIONS), AN ENGINEERING EVALUATION WAS | | PERFORMED THAT IDENTIFIED POTENTIAL PROBLEMS WITH TWO VALVES. TWO SERVICE | | WATER MOV's (SW-MOV-1 & SW-MOV-2), WHICH NORMALLY SUPPLY SERVICE WATER TO | | SECONDARY EQUIPMENT (NON-SAFETY RELATED), ARE DESIGNED TO CLOSE IN THE | | EVENT OF A SAFETY INJECTION SIGNAL. THE LICENSEE DETERMINED THAT SHOULD | | THE INDICATING LIGHTS FOR THESE VALVES BURN OUT, THE FILAMENTS COULD BECOME | | CROSSED, CREATING A SHORT AND POSSIBLY BLOWING THE CONTROL POWER FUSES FOR | | THE VALVES. | | | | THE IMMEDIATE CORRECTIVE ACTION IS TO REMOVE THE INDICATING LIGHT BULBS FOR | | THESE PARTICULAR VALVES. THESE ARE THE ONLY BULBS WHICH THE EVALUATION | | IDENTIFIED AS HAVING AN EFFECT ON A SAFETY RELATED SYSTEM. THE LICENSEE | | INFORMED THE RESIDENT INSPECTOR. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+