U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Operations Center Event Reports For 07/14/94 - 07/15/94 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** 27530 27531 27532 27533 27534 27535 27536 +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ |POWER REACTOR | |EVENT NUMBER: 27530 | +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ |FACILITY: DRESDEN REGION: 3 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 07/14/94 | |UNIT: [ ] [ ] [3] STATE: IL |NOTIFICATION TIME: 08:39 [ET]| |RX TYPE: [1] GE-1,[2] GE-3,[3] GE-3 |EVENT DATE: 07/14/94 | +------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 04:46[CDT]| |NRC NOTIFIED BY: ATA |LAST UPDATE DATE: 07/14/94 | |HQ OPS OFFICER: JOSEPH SEBROSKY +-----------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+ NOTIFICATIONS | |EMERGENCY CLASS: NOT APPLICABLE +-----------------------------+ |10 CFR SECTION: |CYNTHIA PEDERSON RDO | |AESF 50.72(b)(2)(ii) ESF ACTUATION | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +-----+----------+-------+--------+--------------+--+--------+-----------------+ |UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ | | | | | | | | | 3 | N N 0 COLD SHUTDOWN | 0 COLD SHUTDOWN | +-----+---------------------------------------------+--------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | -ACTUATION OF TORUS VACUUM RELIEF VALVES DUE TO POOR WORK CONTROL PRACTICES | | | | AT 04:46 7/14/94 OPERATORS RECEIVED TORUS RELIEF VALVES NOT CLOSED ALARMS. | | THE OPERATORS NOTICED THAT VALVES #3-1601-20A & #3-1601-20B WERE CYCLING AS | | INDICATED BY VALVE POSITION, AND ALSO NOTICED THAT THE TORUS PRESSURE WAS | | CHANGING. UPON INVESTIGATION IT WAS DETERMINED THAT THE MECHANICAL | | MAINTENANCE DEPARTMENT INSTALLED THE TORUS HATCHES/COVERS IN PREPARATION | | FOR AN INTEGRATED LEAK RATE TEST. WITH THE DRYWELL AND TORUS PURGE FAN ON | | AND SUCTION LINED UP TO THE TORUS IT CAUSED THE TORUS PRESSURE TO GO | | NEGATIVE RELATIVE TO THE REACTOR BUILDING. THE VACUUM RELIEF VALVES OPENED | | AS EXPECTED AND KEPT TORUS PRESSURE FROM EXCEEDING ITS TECH SPEC VALUE OF - | | 0.5 PSIG. THE LOWEST TORUS PRESSURE SEEN WAS - 0.45 PSIG. | | | | THE DRYWELL AND TORUS PURGE SUCTION FROM THE TORUS HAS BEEN SECURED. | | THE DRYWELL AND TORUS PURGE FAN WAS ORIGINALLY RUNNING TO PROVIDE | | VENTILATION TO THE AREA. | | | | THE LICENSEE WILL INFORM THE RESIDENT INSPECTOR. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ |GENERAL INFORMATION or OTHER | |EVENT NUMBER: 27531 | +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ |LICENSEE: CONSTRUCTION ENGINEERING CONSULTANT |NOTIFICATION DATE: 07/14/94 | | CITY: PITTSBURGH REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION TIME: 09:06 [ET]| | COUNTY: ALLEGHENY STATE: PA |EVENT DATE: 07/14/94 | |LICENSE#: 37-18456-02 AGREEMENT: N |EVENT TIME: 08:55[EDT]| | DOCKET: |LAST UPDATE DATE: 07/14/94 | | +-----------------------------+ | |PERSON ORGANIZATION| | |MOHAMED SHANBAKY RDO | | |JOHN GLENN EO | +------------------------------------------------+KEN BROCKMAN AEOD | |NRC NOTIFIED BY: RAY MCFEATERS |FRANK INGRAM PAO | |HQ OPS OFFICER: JOSEPH SEBROSKY | | +------------------------------------------------+ | |EMERGENCY CLASS: NOT APPLICABLE | | |10 CFR SECTION: | | |NINF INFORMATION ONLY | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +------------------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | THE RADIATION SAFETY OFFICER FOR CONSTRUCTION ENGINEERING CONSULTANTS, INC | | OF PITTSBURGH, PA WAS NOTIFIED AT 08:55 EDT ON 7/14/94 OF A CONSTRUCTION | | ACCIDENT INVOLVING A NUCLEAR SOIL DENSITY GAUGE. | | | | THE CONSTRUCTION SITE IS LOCATED AT A SEARS HOME LIFE CENTER ON McKNIGHT | | ROAD IN THE NORTH HILLS AREA OF PITTSBURGH. THE NUCLEAR SOIL DENSITY GAUGE | | AND ITS OPERATOR WERE RUN OVER BY AN EARTH MOVING PAN AT THE SITE. | | | | THE OPERATOR IS IN SERIOUS CONDITION AND EMERGENCY CREWS ARE AT THE SITE | | ATTENDING TO THE INDIVIDUAL. THERE ARE NO REPORTS AT THIS TIME OF THE | | CONDITION OF THE DENSITY GAUGE AND ITS ASSOCIATED SOURCES. | | | | THE RADIATION SAFETY OFFICER SAID THAT PEOPLE AT THE SITE HAVE ISOLATED THE | | AREA AS BEST THEY CAN, HOWEVER, THE AREA HAS NOT BEEN TOTALLY ISOLATED | | BECAUSE OF THE NEED TO ATTEND TO THE OPERATOR. THERE IS A RADIATION SURVEY | | METER AT THE SITE BUT THE RADIATION SAFETY OFFICER DOES NOT KNOW IF ANYONE | | AT THE SITE KNOWS HOW TO USE IT. | | | | THE RADIATION SAFETY OFFICER IS RESPONDING TO THE SITE. THE DENSITY GAUGE | | INVOLVED IS A TROXLER NUCLEAR SOIL DENSITY GAUGE MODEL #34-11B. THE GAUGE | | CONTAINS A 8.0 MILLICURIES CESIUM-137 SEALED SOURCE AND A 40 MILLICURIES | | AMERICIUM-241 SEALED NEUTRON SOURCE. | | NOTE: PRELIMINARY NOTIFICATION #PN1-9441 HAS BEEN ISSUED ON THIS EVENT. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ |POWER REACTOR | |EVENT NUMBER: 27532 | +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ |FACILITY: SALEM REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 07/14/94 | |UNIT: [1] [ ] [ ] STATE: NJ |NOTIFICATION TIME: 15:56 [ET]| |RX TYPE: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP |EVENT DATE: 07/14/94 | +------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 00:00[EDT]| |NRC NOTIFIED BY: F. X. THOMSON |LAST UPDATE DATE: 07/14/94 | |HQ OPS OFFICER: THOMAS ANDREWS +-----------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+ NOTIFICATIONS | |EMERGENCY CLASS: NOT APPLICABLE +-----------------------------+ |10 CFR SECTION: | | |CCCC 21.21 UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +-----+----------+-------+--------+--------------+--+--------+-----------------+ |UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ | 1 | N Y 100 POWER OPERATION | 100 POWER OPERATION | | | | | | | | | +-----+---------------------------------------------+--------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | - - - PORV PLUG AND STEM MATERIAL DEFECTS AT SALEM UNIT 1 - - - | | | | THE FOLLOWING IS A SUMMARY OF THE RESULTS OF PSE&G'S EVALUATION IN | | ACCORDANCE WITH 10CFR21 CONCERNING A DEFICIENCY DUE TO THE CRACKING | | IDENTIFIED IN THE VALVE STEM AND PLUG CONNECTION PINNING COLLAR AREA ON | | UNIT 1 PORVS 1PR1 & 1PR2. THE CAUSE OF THIS CRACKING HAS BEEN ATTRIBUTED | | TO EITHER INTERGRANULAR STRESS CORROSION CRACKING (IGSCC) OR HYDROGEN | | ASSISTED CRACKING. THE CRACKING IN THE PINNING COLLAR AREA COULD CONTINUE | | TO PROPAGATE EVENTUALLY RESULTING IN THE PLUG SEPARATING FROM THE STEM | | RENDERING THE PORVS INOPERABLE. THE UNIT 2 PORVS CURRENTLY ARE PROVIDED | | WITH INTERNALS MANUFACTURED FROM 17-4 PH MATERIAL, AND THEREFORE UNIT 2 IS | | NOT WITHIN THE SCOPE OF THIS 10CFR21 EVALUATION. | | | | THE REACTOR TRIP AND INADVERTENT SI INITIATION THAT OCCURRED ON APRIL 7, | | 1994 AT SALEM UNIT 1 RESULTED IN THE TWO (2) PRESSURIZER POWER OPERATED | | RELIEF VALVES (PORV) TO CYCLE MULTIPLE TIMES DURING THE EVENT. SUBSEQUENT | | INSPECTION OF THE VALVE INTERNALS (PLUG, STEM, AND CAGE) REVEALED CRACKS IN | | THE PINNING COLLARS OF EACH OF THE TWO PLUGS, AND SIGNIFICANT UNEXPECTED | | WEAR AND GALLING ON THE 1PR2 STEM AND PLUG. FOLLOWING IDENTIFICATION OF | | THE CRACKING, THE 10CFR21 EVALUATION PROCESS WAS INITIATED ON MAY 9, 1994. | | INSPECTION OF SPARE VALVE INTERNALS LOCATED IN THE WAREHOUSE ALSO REVEALED | | CRACKS IN THE PINNING COLLAR. THE THREE SETS OF VALVE INTERNALS WERE | | EXAMINED BY WESTINGHOUSE TO DETERMINE THE CAUSE OF THE CRACKING. THE | | SUBSEQUENT INVESTIGATION AND EXAMINATIONS REVEALED THAT THE CRACKS | | ORIGINATED AND GREW PRIMARILY AS A RESULT OF EITHER INTERGRANULAR STRESS | | CORROSION CRACKING OR HYDROGEN ASSISTED CRACKING. IT IS NOTED THAT A | | FOURTH SET OF INTERNALS THAT HAD BEEN INSTALLED IN THE PLANT FOR 1 WEEK | | ALSO REVEALED CRACKING. | | | | THE CAUSE OF THE STRESS CORROSION CRACKING WAS ATTRIBUTED TO THE FOLLOWING | | FACTORS. THE PLUG WAS MANUFACTURED FROM TYPE 420 STAINLESS STEEL AND | | SUBJECTED TO A 975 [DEGREE] F TEMPERING HEAT TREATMENT. THIS CAUSED THE | | MATERIAL TO BECOME SENSITIZED REDUCING ITS CORROSION RESISTANCE, AND CAUSED | | THE MATERIAL TO BECOME LESS DUCTILE REDUCING ITS FRACTURE TOUGHNESS. A | | TAPERED FIT BETWEEN THE STEM AND THE PLUG CAUSED HOOP STRESSES TO BE | | EXERTED ON THE PLUG AT THE PINNING COLLAR. THE COMBINATION OF THE MATERIAL | | CONDITION AND THE HOOP STRESSES WERE SUCH THAT STRESS CORROSION CRACKING | | OCCURRED IN A RELATIVELY SHORT PERIOD OF TIME, ESPECIALLY FOR THE SPARE | | VALVE INTERNALS WHICH HAD NOT SEEN ACTUAL SERVICE BUT ONLY LEAK TESTING AND | | ENVIRONMENTAL HUMIDITY WHILE IN STORAGE. THE INVESTIGATION WAS UNABLE TO | | DETERMINE IF THE CRACKING WOULD HAVE ARRESTED ITSELF AFTER SOME PERIOD OF | | OPERATION OR CONTINUED TO PROPAGATE. | | | | THE PORVS AT SALEM ARE 2" AIR OPERATED-SPRING RETURN VALVES SUPPLIED BY THE | | COPES VULCAN, INC. THE VALVES HAVE A WORKING PRESSURE RATING OF 2485 PSIG | | AT 680 [DEGREES] F PER ANSI B16.5 FOR 1500 LB. RATING. THE NORMAL | | OPERATING PRESSURE FOR THE PORVS IS 2235 PSIG AT 650 [DEGREES] F. THE | | PORVS ARE SET TO OPEN AT A PRESSURE OF 2335 PSIG AND CLOSE AT 2315 PSIG. | | THE VALVE INTERNALS ARE COMPRISED OF THE PLUG, STEM AND CAGE. THE CAGE IS | | A HOLLOW CYLINDER SURROUNDING THE PLUG, AND IS PROVIDED WITH A NUMBER OF | | FLOW PORTS WHICH EVENLY DISTRIBUTE FLOW THROUGH THE VALVE. THE PLUG/STEM | | ASSEMBLY MOVES WITHIN THE CAGE CYLINDER IN RESPONSE TO OPEN OR CLOSE | | CONTROL SIGNALS TO THE ACTUATOR EITHER OPENING OR THE CAGE FLOW PORTS. THE | | PLUG IS JOINED AND SECURED TO THE STEM THROUGH A CONICAL THREADED | | CONJUNCTION. AT THE TOP OF THE PLUG IS AN INTEGRAL PINNING COLLAR. | | FOLLOWING ASSEMBLY OF THE PLUG/ STEM A PINNING HOLE IS DRILLED THROUGH THE | | PLUG COLLAR AND STEM AND A ROLL PIN IS INSERTED. IN MOST CASES, THE | | PINNING HOLE IS DRILLED PRIOR TO HEAT TREATMENT. IT IS AT THE PINNING | | COLLAR LOCATION WHERE STRESS CORROSION CRACKING OCCURRED. SINCE BOTH OF | | THE PORV PLUGS INSTALLED AT UNIT 1 (AS WELL AS THE THIRD AND FOURTH PLUG | | ASSEMBLIES UTILIZED AS SPARES) WERE CONSTRUCTED USING THE SS 420 MATERIAL, | | A COMMON MODE TYPE FAILURE DUE TO THE PLUG CRACKS IDENTIFIED MAY HAVE | | AFFECTED BOTH PORVS. IT IS BELIEVED THAT SHOULD THE CRACKS HAVE CONTINUED | | TO PROPAGATE THROUGH THE PLUG, BOTH PORVS COULD HAVE BEEN RENDERED | | INOPERABLE IN EITHER THE OPEN OR CLOSED POSITION. | | | | DURING DESIGN BASIS TRANSIENTS, THE PORVS ARE UTILIZED TO PREVENT | | CHALLENGES TO THE PRESSURIZER SAFETY VALVES AND PROVIDE RCS OVERPRESSURE | | PROTECTION. THE PORV(S) ARE ASSUMED TO BE AVAILABLE OR MADE AVAILABLE IN | | THE EVENT OF (A) THE INADVERTENT SAFETY INJECTION (SI) AT POWER TRANSIENT | | AND (B) THE LOW TEMPERATURE OVERPRESSURE PROTECTION (LTOP) TRANSIENT DURING | | SHUTDOWN. WITH THE EXCEPTION OF THESE TWO TRANSIENTS, THE PRESSURIZER | | SAFETY VALVES WOULD BE AVAILABLE TO PROVIDE RCS OVERPRESSURE PROTECTION | | SHOULD THE PORVS FAIL. SHOULD THE PORVS OPEN AND FAIL TO CLOSE, THE FAILED | | PORVS WOULD BE MANUALLY ISOLATED BY THE PORV BLOCK VALVES TO PREVENT A LOSS | | OF REACTOR COOLANT. | | | | THE INADVERTENT SI AT POWER TRANSIENT [(A) ABOVE] CREDITS THE AVAILABILITY | | OF THE PORVS SHOULD THE PRESSURIZER BECOME WATER SOLID TO PROVIDE RCS | | OVERPRESSURE PROTECTION. SINCE THE PRESSURIZER SAFETY VALVES ARE NOT | | DESIGNED TO RELIEVE WATER UNDER SATURATED CONDITIONS, AND COULD POTENTIALLY | | FAIL IN THE OPEN POSITION IF THE PORVS ARE UNAVAILABLE DURING THIS | | TRANSIENT, THE TRANSIENT COULD DEGRADE FROM A CONDITION 2 EVENT TO A | | CONDITION 3 EVENT. HOWEVER, EVEN IN THE EVENT OF A PRESSURIZER SAFETY | | FAILING IN THE OPEN POSITION, THE CONSEQUENCES OF THIS ACCIDENT WOULD STILL | | BE BOUNDED BY THE SMALL BREAK LOCAL ANALYSIS RESULTS. SHOULD THE PORVS | | FAIL IN THE OPEN POSITION, PORV BLOCK VALVES CAN BE CLOSED TO ISOLATE THE | | RCS AND PREVENT COOLANT LOSS. | | | | DURING (B) ABOVE, THE PORVS LIFT SETTING IS ADJUSTED TO A SETPOINT EQUAL TO | | OR LESS THAN 375 PSIG WHEN THE RCS COLD LEG TEMPERATURES ARE LESS THAN 312 | | [DEGREES] F DURING MODE 4 AND MODE 5 TO PROVIDE LOW TEMPERATURE | | OVERPRESSURE PROTECTION. THE SETPOINT FOR THE PORVS HAS BEEN DEVELOPED | | SUCH THAT IN THE EVENT OF A MASS INPUT TRANSIENT (I.E., THE START OF A SI | | PUMP) OR A HEAT INPUT TRANSIENT (I.E., THE START OF AN IDLE RCP) WITH THE | | RCS WATER SOLID, THE PRESSURE-TEMPERATURE (P-T) LIMITS CALCULATED IN | | ACCORDANCE WITH 10CFR50, APPENDIX G AND CONTAINED IN TECHNICAL | | SPECIFICATION 3.4.9.1 WOULD NOT BE EXCEEDED. A MINIMUM OF ON PORV SHOULD | | BE AVAILABLE TO MITIGATE THESE TYPES OF OVERPRESSURE TRANSIENTS AND | | MAINTAIN RCS PRESSURE WITHIN P-T LIMITS. THEREFORE, THE FAILURE OF THE | | PORVS TO OPEN DUE TO THE STRESS CORROSION CRACKING IDENTIFIED COULD RESULT | | IN EXCEEDING THE P-T LIMITS. IT IS BASED ON THIS FUNCTION OF THE PORVS | | THAT PSE&G HAS CONCLUDED THAT THIS DEFICIENCY COULD RESULT IN A SUBSTANTIAL | | SAFETY HAZARD, AND IS THEREFORE REPORTABLE IN ACCORDANCE WITH 10CFR21. | | | | PRIOR TO RESTART FOLLOWING THE APRIL 7 EVENT, THE UNIT 1 PORV INTERNALS | | (PLUG AND STEM) WERE REPLACED WITH INTERNALS MANUFACTURED FROM SS 316 | | MATERIAL WITH THE PLUG STELLITED. THE REPLACEMENT CAGES WERE MANUFACTURED | | FROM 17-4 PH STAINLESS STEEL. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ |POWER REACTOR | |EVENT NUMBER: 27533 | +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ |FACILITY: ZION REGION: 3 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 07/14/94 | |UNIT: [1] [ ] [ ] STATE: IL |NOTIFICATION TIME: 17:10 [ET]| |RX TYPE: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP |EVENT DATE: 07/14/94 | +------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 15:50[CDT]| |NRC NOTIFIED BY: CURT BASNER |LAST UPDATE DATE: 07/14/94 | |HQ OPS OFFICER: THOMAS ANDREWS +-----------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+ NOTIFICATIONS | |EMERGENCY CLASS: NOT APPLICABLE +-----------------------------+ |10 CFR SECTION: |JIM MCCORMICKBARGER RDO | |ADAS 50.72(b)(2)(i) DEG/UNANALYZED COND | | |AINA 50.72(b)(2)(iii)(A) POT UNABLE TO SAFE SD | | | | | | | | | | | +-----+----------+-------+--------+--------------+--+--------+-----------------+ |UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ | 1 | N N 0 HOT STANDBY | 0 HOT STANDBY | | | | | | | | | +-----+---------------------------------------------+--------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | DURING MODIFICATION REVIEW, IT WAS DETERMINED THAT A NON-FIRE PROTECTED | | CONDUIT FAILURE COULD HAVE RESULTED IN A FAILURE OF THE "0" DIESEL | | GENERATOR IN THE EVENT OF A FIRE IN FIRE PROTECTION ZONE 18.6A-1. | | THE "0" DIESEL GENERATOR FEEDS THE "1B" CENTRIFUGAL CHARGING PUMP. | | ALSO INSIDE THIS ZONE IS AN UNPROTECTED CABLE THAT FEEDS THE "1A" | | CENTRIFUGAL CHARGING PUMP. THUS, A FIRE IN THIS ZONE COULD HAVE | | RENDERED BOTH OF THE HIGH HEAD PUMPS INOPERABLE. | | | | THIS CONDITION IS IDENTIFIED AS AN APPENDIX R CONCERN. THIS CONDITION | | EXISTED FROM 1987 TO 1992. IN 1992, AS A RESULT OF CONCERNS RELATED TO | | TSI THERMOLAGGING, A CONTINUOUS FIRE WATCH WAS POSTED IN THIS ZONE. | | | | THE LICENSEE STATED THAT THE REASON THAT THIS CONDITION ONLY AFFECTS UNIT 1 | | IS THAT THE APPENDIX R ANALYSIS ASSUMES THAT A FIRE IN THIS ZONE RENDERS | | ALL EQUIPMENT EXCEPT THE "1B" CENTRIFUGAL CHARGING PUMP INOPERABLE. | | | | THE LICENSEE INFORMED THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ |POWER REACTOR | |EVENT NUMBER: 27534 | +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ |FACILITY: FERMI REGION: 3 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 07/14/94 | |UNIT: [2] [ ] [ ] STATE: MI |NOTIFICATION TIME: 17:59 [ET]| |RX TYPE: [2] GE-4 |EVENT DATE: 07/14/94 | +------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 16:50[EDT]| |NRC NOTIFIED BY: PAUL KIEL |LAST UPDATE DATE: 07/14/94 | |HQ OPS OFFICER: THOMAS ANDREWS +-----------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+ NOTIFICATIONS | |EMERGENCY CLASS: NOT APPLICABLE +-----------------------------+ |10 CFR SECTION: |JIM MCCORMICKBARGER RDO | |AIND 50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D) ACCIDENT MITIGATION | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +-----+----------+-------+--------+--------------+--+--------+-----------------+ |UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ | 2 | N N 0 REFUELING | 0 REFUELING | | | | | | | | | +-----+---------------------------------------------+--------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS REQUIRES THAT THE SAFETY VALVE FUNCTION OF | | AT LEAST 11 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM RELIEF VALVES BE OPERABLE WITHIN | | THE SPECIFIED CODE SAFETY VALVE FUNCTION LIFT SETTING OF + OR - 1%. | | THE SAFETY RELIEF VALVES ARE TARGET ROCK TWO STAGE VALVES. DURING | | SAFETY RELIEF VALVE TESTING AT A VENDOR LAB, ONLY 8 OUT OF 15 VALVES | | WERE OPERABLE. THESE VALVES WERE LAST TESTED IN OCTOBER, 1992. | | | | A POTENTIAL CONDITION EXISTED THAT COULD HAVE PREVENTED THE PROPER SAFETY | | FUNCTION OF THE SAFETY RELIEF VALVES. THE LICENSEE WILL EVALUATE THE DATA | | ON THE SAFETY RELIEF VALVES TESTED TO DETERMINE THE POTENTIAL IMPACT ON | | PAST PLANT OPERATIONS. | | | | THE LICENSEE WILL INFORM THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ |POWER REACTOR | |EVENT NUMBER: 27535 | +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ |FACILITY: HATCH REGION: 2 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 07/14/94 | |UNIT: [1] [ ] [ ] STATE: GA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 22:13 [ET]| |RX TYPE: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4 |EVENT DATE: 07/14/94 | +------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 21:11[CDT]| |NRC NOTIFIED BY: RONNIE MUSGROVE |LAST UPDATE DATE: 07/14/94 | |HQ OPS OFFICER: THOMAS ANDREWS +-----------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+ NOTIFICATIONS | |EMERGENCY CLASS: NOT APPLICABLE +-----------------------------+ |10 CFR SECTION: |JACK CRLENJAK RDO | |AESF 50.72(b)(2)(ii) ESF ACTUATION | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +-----+----------+-------+--------+--------------+--+--------+-----------------+ |UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ | 1 | N Y 100 POWER OPERATION | 100 POWER OPERATION | | | | | | | | | +-----+---------------------------------------------+--------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | THE OUTPUT BREAKER FOR THE "B" REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM POWER SUPPLY | | TRIPPED CAUSING A REACTOR WATER CLEANUP PRIMARY ISOLATION ACTUATION. | | ALL SYSTEMS FUNCTIONED AS REQUIRED AND HAVE BEEN RETURNED TO THE NORMAL | | SERVICE LINEUP WITH THE EXCEPTION OF THE OUTPUT BREAKER FOR THE POWER | | SUPPLY. THE "B" REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM IS BEING POWERED FROM ITS | | ALTERNATE POWER SUPPLY. THE CAUSE OF THE OUTPUT BREAKER TRIP IS NOT | | KNOWN AT THIS TIME, BUT IS BEING INVESTIGATED. | | | | THE LICENSEE INFORMED THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ |POWER REACTOR | |EVENT NUMBER: 27536 | +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ |FACILITY: SALEM REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 07/14/94 | |UNIT: [1] [ ] [ ] STATE: NJ |NOTIFICATION TIME: 22:56 [ET]| |RX TYPE: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP |EVENT DATE: 07/14/94 | +------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 21:32[EDT]| |NRC NOTIFIED BY: MICHAEL GWIRTZ |LAST UPDATE DATE: 07/14/94 | |HQ OPS OFFICER: THOMAS ANDREWS +-----------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+ NOTIFICATIONS | |EMERGENCY CLASS: NOT APPLICABLE +-----------------------------+ |10 CFR SECTION: |MOHAMED SHANBAKY RDO | |ARPS 50.72(b)(2)(ii) RPS ACTUATION | | |ANLI 50.72(b)(1)(iii) LIGHTNING | | | | | | | | | | | +-----+----------+-------+--------+--------------+--+--------+-----------------+ |UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ | 1 | M/R Y 100 POWER OPERATION | 0 HOT STANDBY | | | | | | | | | +-----+---------------------------------------------+--------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | THE REACTOR WAS MANUALLY TRIPPED DUE TO LOSS OF ALL SIX CIRC WATER PUMPS | | DUE TO THE LOSS OF THE 4 KV CIRCULATING WATER SWITCHGEAR BUS. THE MANUAL | | TRIP WAS INITIATED BECAUSE OF IMMINENT LOSS OF CONDENSER VACUUM. THE CAUSE | | OF THE SWITCHGEAR BUS TRIP IS NOT KNOWN BUT THERE WAS A SEVERE THUNDER | | STORM IN PROGRESS AT THE TIME. | | | | ALL CONTROL RODS FULLY INSERTED INTO THE CORE. REACTOR COOLANT PUMPS | | REMAINED RUNNING THROUGHOUT THE EVENT PROVIDING FORCED CIRCULATION THROUGH | | THE CORE. THERE WERE NO ABNORMAL PRESSURE OR LEVEL TRANSIENTS ON THE | | PRIMARY SIDE OF THE PLANT. THERE WERE NO PORV OR SAFETY VALVE ACTUATIONS. | | AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMPS AUTOMATICALLY STARTED ON LO-LO STEAM GENERATOR | | LEVEL, AS EXPECTED. THE MAIN STEAM ISOLATION VALVES WERE MANUALLY CLOSED | | TO LIMIT THE RCS COOLDOWN. THE LOWEST RCS TEMPERATURE REACHED WAS | | 542 DEGREES F. | | | | THE REACTOR IS BEING COOLED VIA THE STEAM GENERATORS. THE STEAM GENERATORS | | ARE BEING SUPPLIED WITH WATER FROM THE AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMPS AND THE | | STEAM IS BEING VENTED TO THE ATMOSPHERE VIA THE ATMOSPHERIC DUMP VALVES. | | THERE IS NO INDICATION OF STEAM GENERATOR TUBE LEAKAGE. | | | | UNIT 2 WAS NOT AFFECTED BY THIS EVENT. THE UNIT 1 EMERGENCY DIESEL | | GENERATORS ARE OPERABLE AND THE GRID IS STABLE. THE STORM HAS SUBSIDED. | | THE LICENSEE HAS PEOPLE IN THE SWITCHYARD LOOKING FOR SIGNS OF A LIGHTNING | | STRIKE. | | | | THE LICENSEE NOTIFIED THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR AND LOWER ALLOWAYS CREEK | | TOWNSHIP OFFICIALS. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+