U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Operations Center Event Reports For 06/29/94 - 06/30/94 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** 27462 27463 27464 27465 27466 +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ |POWER REACTOR | |EVENT NUMBER: 27462 | +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ |FACILITY: SALEM REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 06/29/94 | |UNIT: [ ] [2] [ ] STATE: NJ |NOTIFICATION TIME: 05:33 [ET]| |RX TYPE: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP |EVENT DATE: 06/29/94 | +------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 04:39[EDT]| |NRC NOTIFIED BY: SERWAN |LAST UPDATE DATE: 06/29/94 | |HQ OPS OFFICER: GREG SCARFO +-----------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+ NOTIFICATIONS | |EMERGENCY CLASS: NOT APPLICABLE +-----------------------------+ |10 CFR SECTION: |LAWRENCE DOERFLEIN RDO | |ARPS 50.72(b)(2)(ii) RPS ACTUATION | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +-----+----------+-------+--------+--------------+--+--------+-----------------+ |UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ | | | | | 2 | A/R Y 14 STARTUP | 0 HOT STANDBY | | | | | +-----+---------------------------------------------+--------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | A REACTOR TRIP OCCURRED ON LOW STEAM GENERATOR (SG) LEVEL DURING A STARTUP | | FEEDWATER TRANSIENT. | | | | WITH THE UNIT AT APPROXIMATELY 14% POWER, SG "22" RECEIVED A FEEDWATER | | ISOLATION SIGNAL ON HIGH-HIGH SG WATER LEVEL (ABOUT 60%). A TURBINE TRIP | | WOULD HAVE OCCURRED IF THE TURBINE WAS ONLINE. THIS RESULTED IN THE | | CLOSURE OF ALL FEEDWATER REGULATING VALVES, FEEDWATER BYPASS VALVES, AND | | FEEDWATER ISOLATION VALVES, AS WELL AS A TRIP OF THE ONLY OPERATING SG FEED | | PUMP. OPERATORS INSERTED RODS IN AN ATTEMPT TO REDUCE POWER TO A POINT | | WHERE THE AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM (AFW) COULD SUPPORT LEVEL IN THE SGs | | (AFW WAS OPERATING BUT NOT SUPPLYING THE SGs). POWER WAS REDUCED FROM 14% | | TO APPROXIMATELY 7% WHEN WATER LEVEL IN SG "23" DROPPED TO THE LOW-LOW | | REACTOR TRIP SETPOINT OF 17%. A REACTOR TRIP SIGNAL WAS ISSUED AND ALL | | RODS FULLY INSERTED. WHEN THE STEAM DUMP SYSTEM ACTUATED, REACTOR COOLANT | | SYSTEM (RCS) TEMPERATURE DECREASED FROM 547 DEGREES F (NOT) TO 540 DEGREES | | F. AT 540 DEGREES F, OPERATORS CLOSED THE MAIN STEAM ISOLATION VALVES | | (MSIVs) PER THEIR EMERGENCY OPERATING PROCEDURES (EOPs) AND RCS TEMPERATURE | | RECOVERED. NO ECCS ACTUATIONS OR OTHER ESF ACTUATIONS OCCURRED. NO PORVs | | OR SAFETY VALVES LIFTED. ALL OTHER PLANT PARAMETERS REMAINED WITHIN THEIR | | EXPECTED BANDS. | | | | CURRENTLY, THE UNIT IS STABLE IN HOT STANDBY (MODE 3). AFW IS FEEDING THE | | SGs. THE ATMOSPHERIC DUMP VALVES ARE BEING UTILIZED TO DISSIPATE DECAY | | HEAT. OFFSITE POWER SUPPLIED ALL LOADS THROUGHOUT THE EVENT. ALL ECCS | | EQUIPMENT AND EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATORS ARE OPERABLE. | | | | THE CAUSE OF THE FEEDWATER TRANSIENT IS DUE TO THE CHANGING STATE OF THE | | SGFP "21" RECIRCULATING VALVE. WITH THE FEEDWATER REGULATING VALVES IN | | AUTOMATIC, SG LEVEL SWINGS OCCURRED WHICH CAUSED SGFP "21" RECIRCULATING | | VALVE WENT CLOSED AT ONE POINT. THIS RESULTED IS ADDITIONAL FLOW THROUGH | | THE OPEN FEEDWATER REGULATING VALVES AND ENHANCED LEVEL IN ALL THE SGs. SG | | "23" HAD THE HIGHEST LEVEL PRIOR TO THE ADDITIONAL FLOW CONDITION AND | | REACHED ITS HIGH-HIGH LEVEL SETPOINT BEFORE OPERATORS COULD RESPOND. | | | | THE LICENSEE INFORMED THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR. LOWER ALLOWAYS CREEK | | TOWNSHIP WAS NOTIFIED. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ |POWER REACTOR | |EVENT NUMBER: 27463 | +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ |FACILITY: HATCH REGION: 2 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 06/29/94 | |UNIT: [1] [2] [ ] STATE: GA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 13:26 [ET]| |RX TYPE: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4 |EVENT DATE: 06/29/94 | +------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 12:18[CDT]| |NRC NOTIFIED BY: STEVE BRUNSON |LAST UPDATE DATE: 06/29/94 | |HQ OPS OFFICER: WILLIAM HUFFMAN +-----------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+ NOTIFICATIONS | |EMERGENCY CLASS: NOT APPLICABLE +-----------------------------+ |10 CFR SECTION: |JOHN POTTER RDO | |AIND 50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D) ACCIDENT MITIGATION | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +-----+----------+-------+--------+--------------+--+--------+-----------------+ |UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ | 1 | N Y 100 POWER OPERATION | 100 POWER OPERATION | | 2 | N Y 100 POWER OPERATION | 100 POWER OPERATION | | | | | +-----+---------------------------------------------+--------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | INADEQUATE CONTROL ROOM VENTILATION CARBON EFFICIENCY REQUIREMENTS. | | | | THE LICENSEE HAS DETERMINED THAT THE MAIN CONTROL ROOM ENVIRONMENTAL | | CONTROL SYSTEM (MCREC) CARBON EFFICIENCY REQUIREMENTS ARE INADEQUATE. THE | | EFFICIENCY VALUES SPECIFIED IN THE UNIT 1 TECH SPECS AND COMMON PLANT | | PROCEDURE 42-SU-Z41-002-0S REQUIRE A CARBON IODINE ABSORPTION EFFICIENCY OF | | GREATER THAN 90%. IF CARBON EFFICIENCY WERE ACTUALLY THIS LOW, 10CFR50, | | APPENDIX A, GENERAL DESIGN CRITERIA 19 LIMITS, COULD BE EXCEEDED IN AN | | ACCIDENT. | | | | THE CARBON CURRENTLY INSTALLED IN THE MCREC FILTER TRAINS HAS AN EFFICIENCY | | GREATER THAN 99% AND IS MORE THAN ADEQUATE TO ENSURE THAT THE GDC 19 LIMITS | | ARE NOT EXCEEDED. A REVIEW OF CARBON EFFICIENCY RESULTS FOR THE PAST FIVE | | YEARS SHOWED THAT THE MCREC WAS NEVER RENDERED INCAPABLE OF PERFORMING ITS | | INTENDED FUNCTION DURING THE TIME PERIOD DUE TO INADEQUATE CARBON | | EFFICIENCY. | | | | THE CARBON EFFICIENCY TESTING PROCEDURE WILL BE REVISED IMMEDIATELY TO | | REFLECT HIGHER REQUIREMENTS. THE TECH SPEC WILL BE CHANGED AS PART OF | | GENERAL REVISION UNDER THE LICENSEE'S IMPROVED TECH SPEC PROGRAM SOMETIME | | NEXT YEAR. | | | | THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR HAS BEEN INFORMED. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ |POWER REACTOR | |EVENT NUMBER: 27464 | +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ |FACILITY: DIABLO CANYON REGION: 4 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 06/29/94 | |UNIT: [1] [2] [ ] STATE: CA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 15:36 [ET]| |RX TYPE: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP |EVENT DATE: 06/29/94 | +------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 11:30[PDT]| |NRC NOTIFIED BY: BRAD HINDS |LAST UPDATE DATE: 06/29/94 | |HQ OPS OFFICER: WILLIAM HUFFMAN +-----------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+ NOTIFICATIONS | |EMERGENCY CLASS: NOT APPLICABLE +-----------------------------+ |10 CFR SECTION: |CHARLES CAIN RDO | |AINB 50.72(b)(2)(iii)(B) POT RHR INOP | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +-----+----------+-------+--------+--------------+--+--------+-----------------+ |UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ | 1 | N Y 100 POWER OPERATION | 100 POWER OPERATION | | 2 | N Y 100 POWER OPERATION | 100 POWER OPERATION | | | | | +-----+---------------------------------------------+--------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | POTENTIAL RHR DESIGN DEFICIENCY DURING LOW TEMPERATURE OVER PRESSURE (LTOP) | | EVENTS. | | | | THE FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF A FACSIMILE REPORTING THIS EVENT: | | | | "A DESIGN REVIEW CALCULATION HAS DETERMINED THAT FOR A RESIDUAL HEAT | | REMOVAL SYSTEM OPERATION WITH FLOW LESS THAN 3000 GPM IN MODES 4 AND 5, RHR | | PIPING AND HEAT EXCHANGER PRESSURES COULD EXCEED DESIGN BASIS PRESSURE | | DURING A LOW TEMPERATURE OVER PRESSURE (LTOP) TRANSIENT. THIS IS DUE TO A | | FAILURE TO RECOGNIZE RHR SYSTEM OPERATIONAL PRESSURE LIMITATIONS FOR LTOP | | TRANSIENTS WHEN OPERATING AT LOW FLOW (LESS THAN 3000 GPM) CONDITIONS. FOR | | RHR FLOW > 3000 GPM, PRESENT ANALYSIS BOUNDS BOTH NORMAL AND TRANSIENT | | CONDITIONS." END OF TEXT. | | | | THE LICENSEE'S ANALYSIS INDICATES THAT WITH RHR FLOW THROTTLED, SYSTEM | | COMPONENTS DOWNSTREAM OF THE THROTTLE VALVE MAY NOT BE PROTECTED BY THE RHR | | SYSTEM OVERPRESSURE RELIEF PROTECTION DURING A DESIGN BASIS LTOP TRANSIENT. | | APPARENTLY THE DELTA PRESSURE ACROSS THE THROTTLED VALVE COULD RESULT IN | | SOME POSSIBLE OVERPRESSURE SCENARIOS. | | | | CORRECTIVE ACTIONS ARE STILL BEING EVALUATED BUT INCLUDE POSSIBLE RHR | | PROCEDURE LIMITATIONS AND/OR A LICENSE AMENDMENT REQUEST. | | | | THE LICENSEE WAS DID NOT KNOW IF THIS CONDITION MIGHT BE APPLICABLE TO | | OTHER WESTINGHOUSE RHR SYSTEMS. | | | | THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR HAS BEEN INFORMED. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ |FUEL CYCLE FACILITY | |EVENT NUMBER: 27465 | +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ |FACILITY: BABCOCK & WILCOX CO. |NOTIFICATION DATE: 06/29/94 | | RXTYPE: URANIUM FUEL FABRICATION |NOTIFICATION TIME: 16:13 [ET]| |COMMENTS: HEU FABRICATION & SCRAP RECOVERY |EVENT DATE: 06/29/94 | | NAVAL REACTOR FUEL |EVENT TIME: 06:30[EDT]| | |LAST UPDATE DATE: 06/29/94 | | CITY: LYNCHBURG REGION: 2 +-----------------------------+ | COUNTY: CAMPBELL STATE: VA |PERSON ORGANIZATION| |LICENSE#: SNM-42 AGREEMENT: N |JOHN POTTER RDO | | DOCKET: 07000027 |JOE HOLONICH EO | +------------------------------------------------+MARK ELLIOT RI | |NRC NOTIFIED BY: ARNIE OLSEN |DOUG COLLINS RGII | |HQ OPS OFFICER: WILLIAM HUFFMAN |JOE YARDUMIAN NMSS | +------------------------------------------------+ | |EMERGENCY CLASS: NOT APPLICABLE | | |10 CFR SECTION: | | |NBNL RESPONSE-BULLETIN | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +------------------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | CRITICALITY CONTROL VIOLATION REPORT PER NRC BULLETIN 91-01. | | | | THE FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF A FACSIMILE FROM THE LICENSEE REPORTING THIS | | EVENT: "SCRAP MATERIAL FROM THE NNFD FUEL MANUFACTURING PROCESS IS SENT TO | | URANIUM RECOVERY FOR PROCESSING TO RECOVER THE VALUABLE URANIUM. SCRAP IS | | MEASURED PRIOR TO ENTRY INTO THE RECOVERY PROCESS USING NON-DESTRUCTIVE | | ASSAY (NDA) METHODS. THE MATERIAL IN QUESTION WAS MEASURED AND HAD A VALUE | | OF 121 GRAMS. THE MATERIAL WAS PLACED IN THE DISSOLVER SOLUTION AND | | DISSOLVED. MATERIAL THAT WAS DISSOLVED INTO LIQUID WAS MEASURED TO CONTAIN | | 291 GRAMS U-235. THAT PORTION OF THE MATERIAL THAT DID NOT DISSOLVE WAS | | MEASURED TO CONTAIN 358 GRAMS U-235. THE SUM OF THESE VALUES EXCEEDED THE | | UNIT LIMIT OF 350 GRAMS FOR THE DISSOLVER. | | | | AT THIS TIME IT IS NOT CLEAR WHAT CAUSED THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN THE TWO | | MEASUREMENTS. IT IS ASSUMED THAT THE MATERIAL CONTAINING THE URANIUM WAS | | LOCATED AT THE BOTTOM OF THE TRANSFER BOTTLE AND CAUSED NON-CONSERVATIVE | | RESULTS. THE MEASUREMENT AFTER THE DISSOLUTION DID NOT HAVE THIS CONDITION | | TO OVERCOME. THE SOLID MATERIAL FROM THE DISSOLUTION PROCESS IS CURRENTLY | | UNDERGOING MORE EXTENSIVE MEASUREMENT. | | | | THIS REPORT WILL BE UPDATED IF MEASURED VALUES SUBSTANTIALLY DIFFERENT FROM | | THOSE PREVIOUSLY MEASURED RESULT. | | | | THE MATERIAL HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM THE DISSOLUTION PROCESS AND THE | | INVESTIGATION IS IN PROGRESS." END OF TEXT. | | | | ESSENTIALLY, THE LICENSEE IS REPORTING THAT FOR THE BATCH OF MATERIAL IN | | QUESTION, THEY HAD A PREVIOUSLY ASSAYED U-235 CONTENT OF 121 GRAMS. AFTER | | THE FIRST STAGE OF THE RECOVERY DISSOLUTION PROCESS, THE CONTENT OF THE | | LIQUID AND SOLID U-235 EFFLUENTS FROM THE PROCESS WERE ASSAYED AT 649 | | GRAMS. THIS REPRESENTS A LOSS OF CRITICALITY CONTROL IN THAT THE TOTAL MASS | | OF U-235 IN THE DISSOLVER WAS WELL ABOVE THE LIMIT OF 350 GRAMS. THERE WAS | | ALSO A LOSS OF MASS CONTROL DUE TO INACCURATE ASSAY OF THE INPUT MATERIAL | | INTO THE PROCESS. | | | | THE MATERIAL BATCH WAS ASSAYED IN 1990 WITH A CERTIFIED CONTENT OF 121 | | GRAMS OF U-235. THE LICENSEE NOW BELIEVES THAT THE ASSAYED VALUE OF THE | | INPUT MATERIAL WAS IN ERROR AND WAS PROBABLY CLOSER TO THE 649 GRAM VALUE | | MEASURED AT THE OUTPUT OF THE FIRST STAGE OF THE DISSOLVING PROCESS (IF NOT | | GREATER). THE CAUSE OF THE MEASUREMENT DISCREPANCY IS STILL UNDER | | INVESTIGATION BUT IS MOST LIKELY DUE TO THE MATERIAL FORM OF THE SCRAP | | URANIUM. USUALLY, THE SCRAP IS IN AN ALLOY FORM WHICH IS PUT THROUGH A | | CHOPPER AND CUT INTO SMALL CHUNKS. IN THIS BATCH, THE SCRAP CONSISTED OF A | | LARGE AMOUNT OF "SAND LIKE" SCRAP WHICH IS NOT NORMAL. THE ASSAY | | METHODOLOGY INVOLVES INTRODUCING THE SCRAP MATERIAL INTO A FIXED GEOMETRY | | CONTAINER WHICH HAS CALIBRATED DETECTORS THAT WILL PROVIDE THE URANIUM | | CONTENT BASED ON THE ACTIVITY READING FROM THE CONTAINER. THE METHODOLOGY | | ASSUMES THAT THE FORM OF THE SCRAP WILL BE IN A PHYSICAL FORM THAT HAS BEEN | | PREVIOUSLY TESTED AND HAS ESTABLISHED ATTENUATION FACTORS BASED ON THE | | GEOMETRY AND MATERIAL CONTENT OF THE SCRAP. IN THIS CASE, THE SAND LIKE | | MATERIAL HAD NOT BEEN SPECIFICALLY STUDIED FOR ASSAY ACCURACY BY THE | | LICENSEE AND THE ASSUMED ATTENUATION FACTOR APPARENTLY GIVE | | NON-CONSERVATIVE RESULTS. | | | | THE LICENSEE HAS STOPPED PROCESSING MATERIAL OF THE SAND LIKE FORM BUT HAS | | NOT STOPPED THE RECOVERY PROCESS OF OTHER MATERIALS. THEY DO NOT BELIEVE | | THERE IS A INSTRUMENTATION PROBLEM AND HAVE VERIFIED THE CALIBRATION OF ALL | | MEASURING DEVICES INVOLVED. | | | | THE LICENSEE NOTED THAT THERE WAS STILL SOME CRITICALITY MARGIN IN THE | | PROCESS IN THAT AN ACTUAL CRITICAL GEOMETRY COULD NOT RESULT WITH LESS THAN | | 700 GRAMS OF U-235. | | | | THIS EVENT IS BEING REPORTED AS A 24 HOUR REPORT PER NRC BULLETIN 91-01 | | UNDER DEGRADED CRITICALITY CONTROL. ACCORDING TO THE LICENSEE'S PREPARED | | WORKSHEET, ALL CRITICALITY BARRIERS WERE LOST DURING THIS EVENT. | | | | THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR HAS BEEN NOTIFIED. | | | | HOO NOTE: A RELATED EVENT AT THIS FACILITY IS REPORTED IN EVENT #27386. | | | | AN NRC CONFERENCE CONCERNING THIS EVENT TOOK PLACE FROM APPROXIMATELY 1800 | | TO 2030 EDT INVOLVING THE FOLLOWING PARTICIPANT: REGION II (COLLINS) AND | | R2DO (POTTER); RESIDENT INSPECTOR (ELLIOT); AND HEADQUARTERS EO (HOLINICH); | | ALSO INCLUDED WERE CRITICALITY ANALYST (WILSON & WITHEE); AND SAFETY | | ASSESSMENT TEAM MEMBERS (YARDUMIUM AND ROTH). THE RESIDENT INSPECTOR PLANS | | TO REPORT BACK TO THE SITE THIS EVENING AND REQUEST THAT THE LICENSEE | | IMPOSE SPECIFIC RESTRICTIONS ON THE TYPE AND QUANTITY OF ANY FURTHER | | MATERIAL PROCESSED IN THE RECOVERY LINES. A CONFIRMATORY ACTION LETTER IS | | ALSO ANTICIPATED PRIOR TO RELEASE OF UNRESTRICTED RECOVERY OPERATIONS. | | RG II(STOHR); NMSS (BURNETT); AND AEOD (JORDAN) WERE BRIEFED ON THE | | SITUATION. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ |POWER REACTOR | |EVENT NUMBER: 27466 | +----------------------------------+ +-----------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+-----------------------------+ |FACILITY: QUAD CITIES REGION: 3 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 06/29/94 | |UNIT: [ ] [2] [ ] STATE: IL |NOTIFICATION TIME: 20:35 [ET]| |RX TYPE: [1] GE-3,[2] GE-3 |EVENT DATE: 06/29/94 | +------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 19:11[CDT]| |NRC NOTIFIED BY: TIM SCHORES |LAST UPDATE DATE: 06/29/94 | |HQ OPS OFFICER: WILLIAM HUFFMAN +-----------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+ NOTIFICATIONS | |EMERGENCY CLASS: UNUSUAL EVENT +-----------------------------+ |10 CFR SECTION: |RONALD GARDNER RDO | |AAEC 50.72(a)(1)(i) EMERGENCY DECLARED |BRIAN SHERON EO | | |DAN SULLIVAN FEMA | | | | | | | | | | +-----+----------+-------+--------+--------------+--+--------+-----------------+ |UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ | | | | | 2 | N N 0 COLD SHUTDOWN | 0 COLD SHUTDOWN | | | | | +-----+---------------------------------------------+--------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | UNUSUAL EVENT DECLARED DUE TO "PLANNED" LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER. | | | | DURING RECENT OPERATION, GAS BUBBLES WERE OBSERVED IN THE UNIT 2 RESERVE | | AUXILIARY TRANSFORMER (RAT 22) INDICATIVE OF SOME KIND OF ELECTRICAL | | PROBLEM DEVELOPING. EARLIER TODAY, THE LICENSEE SHUTDOWN TO INVESTIGATE THE | | SITUATION AND MAKE ANY NECESSARY REPAIRS TO THE RAT. | | | | WITH THE UNIT IN COLD SHUTDOWN, THE DECISION WAS MADE TO GO AHEAD AND | | DE-ENERGIZE THE RAT TO PREVENT ANY POSSIBILITY OF DAMAGE TO THE | | TRANSFORMER'S WINDINGS. AS PART OF A PROCEDURALLY APPROVED AND CONTROLLED | | EVOLUTION, ELECTRICAL POWER TO THE UNIT 2 EMERGENCY BUSES WAS CROSS-TIED TO | | UNIT 1. NON-CLASS 1E, UNIT 2, BUSES WERE BACKFED THROUGH THE UNIT 2 | | EMERGENCY BUSES (EXCEPT BUSES 21 AND 22 WHICH CAN NOT BE BACKFED; THESE | | BUSES ARE ONLY USED TO POWER THE REACTOR FEED PUMPS AND RECIRC PUMPS AND | | ARE NOT REQUIRED IN COLD SHUTDOWN). ALL NECESSARY POWER TO THE UNIT 2 WAS | | PROVIDED VIA THE UNIT 1 CROSS-TIES. THE RAT WAS THEN DE-ENERGIZED, WHICH, | | IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE LICENSEE'S EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL PROCEDURES, PLACES | | THEM INTO AN UNUSUAL EVENT CLASSIFICATION DUE TO LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER FOR | | > FIFTEEN MINUTES. | | | | BOTH UNIT 1 AND UNIT 2 POWER IS CURRENTLY BEING SUPPLIED VIA THE UNIT 1 | | OFFSITE POWER SUPPLY, RESERVE AUXILIARY TRANSFORMER 12. UNIT 1 IS ALSO IN A | | COLD SHUTDOWN CONDITION. THE EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATORS ARE OPERABLE AND | | CAPABLE OF SUPPLYING BACKUP POWER IF REQUIRED. IN ADDITION, THE LICENSEE IS | | REMOVING THE DISCONNECT LINKS FROM THE MAIN TRANSFORMER TO THE UNIT 2 | | GENERATOR WHICH WILL PERMIT POWER TO BE BACKFED THROUGH THE MAIN | | TRANSFORMER. THE LICENSEE WILL REMAIN IN AN UNUSUAL EVENT UNTIL THE MAIN | | TRANSFORMER BACKFEED IS ESTABLISHED. THE DISCONNECT LINK REMOVAL PROCESS | | COULD TAKE AS LONG AS TWO DAYS ACCORDING TO LICENSEE ESTIMATES. | | | | AN ANALYSIS OF THE CURRENT ELECTRICAL CONFIGURATION AND UNIT DEMANDS WAS | | FOUND TO BE ACCEPTABLE UNDER THE PRESENT PLANT CONDITIONS. THE NRC WAS | | INFORMED OF THE LICENSEE'S INTENTIONS PRIOR TO THIS ACTION. | | | | THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR IS AWARE OF THIS SITUATION. STATE AUTHORITIES | | HAVE ALSO BEEN INFORMED | | | | *** UPDATE FROM SCHORES TO HUFFMAN AT 2140 EDT ON 6/29/94 *** | | THE LICENSEE PLANS TO NOT PROVIDE ANY FURTHER UPDATES ON THIS EVENT UNTIL | | THE UE IS TERMINATED. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+