Headquarters Daily Report JANUARY 30, 1998 *************************************************************************** REPORT NEGATIVE NO INPUT ATTACHED INPUT RECEIVED RECEIVED HEADQUARTERS û REGION I û REGION II û REGION III û REGION IV û PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - HEADQUARTERS JANUARY 30, 1998 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Part 21 Database MR Number: H-98-0022 Abb-Ce Date: 01/30/98 Subject: Part 21 - Error in reactor coolant flow computer code Discussion: VENDOR: ABB-CE PT21 FILE NO: 98-08-0 DATE OF DOCUMENT: 01/06/98 ACCESSION NUMBER: 9801130266 SOURCE DOCUMENT: LETTER REVIEWER: PECB, E. Goodwin NEW ISSUE. The vendor reports an error in its computer code for calculating reactor coolant system flow from calorimetric measurements. In several instances, the code overestimated the hot leg temperature correction and calculated coolant flow to be substantially larger than expected. Plants affected include St. Lucie 1 and 2, Waterford 3, San Onofre 2 and 3, and Palisades. _ HEADQUARTERS MORNING REPORT PAGE 2 JANUARY 30, 1998 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Part 21 Database MR Number: H-98-0023 Part 21 (Vendor: N/A) Date: 01/30/98 Subject: Part 21 - Design of flow-restricting orifice may cause gas generation in safety injection pump suction Discussion: VENDOR: PT21 FILE NO: 98-09-0 DATE OF DOCUMENT: 01/07/98 ACCESSION NUMBER: 9801130101 SOURCE DOCUMENT: LETTER REVIEWER: PECB, J. Tappert NEW ISSUE. The Beaver Valley 1 licensee reports finding a cracked shaft in a charging pump, which also serves as the high head safety injection pump, after a failed surveillance test (LER 50-334/97-39). The licensee attributes part of the cause to the design (14 stages) of the flow-restricting orifice in the minimum flow line for the pump. Non-condensable gas stripped from solution by the orifice may have accumulated in the pump suction piping and produced abnormal impact loading on the pump during pump starts. The licensee identified an orifice design (22 stages) that significantly reduces cavitation and virtually eliminates the evolution of gas at all anticipated operating conditions. y _ HEADQUARTERS MORNING REPORT PAGE 3 JANUARY 30, 1998 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Part 21 Database MR Number: H-98-0024 Buffalo Forge Date: 01/30/98 Subject: Part 21 - Missing motor shaft key for shutdown cooling pump room fan Discussion: VENDOR: Buffalo Forge PT21 FILE NO: 98-11-0 DATE OF DOCUMENT: 01/20/98 ACCESSION NUMBER: SOURCE DOCUMENT: EN 33563 REVIEWER: PECB, C. Petrone NEW ISSUE. The Clinton licensee reports a missing motor shaft key for the cooling fan in the shutdown cooling pump room. _ REGION II MORNING REPORT PAGE 4 JANUARY 30, 1998 Licensee/Facility: Notification: MR Number: 2-98-0008 General Electric Nuclear Energy Date: 01/30/98 Wilmington,North Carolina Dockets: 07001113 License No: SNM-1097 Subject: FAILURE OF AN ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROL ON MODERATION Discussion: On January 29, 1998, at 10:05 (EST), the licensee notified the NRC in accordance with NRC Bulletin 91-01 after it was determined that an administrative control on moderation had been degraded due to an improper addition of a material additive to a production UO2 blend in the dry conversion process (DCP) facility. On January 28 at approximately 12:00 p.m. (EST), the situation was identified during the evaluation of routine quality sample results following completion of a UO2 blend. The licensee determined that no unsafe condition existed. The as-found resulting total equivalent water moderation in the blended material was 1.1 wt percent which was less than the established limit of 1.9 wt percent equivalent water moderation. The normal total equivalent water moderation in the blended material is typically 0.9 wt percent. Other blends performed just before and after the abnormal blend were found to have no abnormal results. The administrative controls on the segregation of the two types of additive material (ie., color-coded bags) failed. One of the additives, with a higher moderation content than the intended additive, was in a bag of incorrect color and was added to the blend. Although the computer system does not make a distinction between the two types of additives, the computer controls that limit the total additive per blend to 1.3 wt percent equivalent water moderation remained intact. Controls were re-established within four hours. The DCP blending activities were re-started on January 29, 1998, after implementation of corrective actions. Regional Action: The Region will review the event and corrective actions during the next inspection. Contact: W. B. Gloersen (404)562-4713 _