Headquarters Daily Report JANUARY 26, 1998 *************************************************************************** REPORT NEGATIVE NO INPUT ATTACHED INPUT RECEIVED RECEIVED HEADQUARTERS û REGION I û REGION II û REGION III û REGION IV û PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - HEADQUARTERS JANUARY 26, 1998 Licensee/Facility: Notification: MR Number: H-98-0019 Kaman Radiation Monitoring Date: 01/26/98 Subject: Kaman Radiation Monitoring Discussion: As a result of an inquiry regarding 10 CFR Part 21 obligations when a vendor is ceasing operation, Amalgamated Services Incorporated (ASI) told the NRC staff that they plan to close down the Kaman Radiation Monitoring operation. They will begin the closing in the next few months and plan to hold a business meeting on January 29 and 30 at Myrtle Beach, SC. ASI stated that they were willing to work with each client on replacement parts, design documentation and qualification packages prior to ceasing operation. Contact: Jerry Carter, NRR/DRPM/PECB (301) 415-1153 Email: tjc@nrc.gov _ HEADQUARTERS MORNING REPORT PAGE 2 JANUARY 26, 1998 Licensee/Facility: Notification: MR Number: H-98-0020 Proposed Generic Communication Date: 01/26/98 Subject: NRC Information Notice Supplement Concerning Additional Test Results for Interam Fire Barrier Material Discussion: The NRC intends to issue an supplement to Information Notice 95-52, "Fire Endurance Test Results for Electrical Raceway Fire Barrier Systems Constructed from 3M Company Interam Fire Barrier Materials." The proposed supplement will inform licensees of recent 3-hour fire endurance test results for certain configurations of 3M Interam fire barrier material. Contact: Jerry Carter, NRR/DPRM/PECB (301) 415-1153 Email: tjc@nrc.gov _ HEADQUARTERS MORNING REPORT PAGE 3 JANUARY 26, 1998 Licensee/Facility: Notification: MR Number: H-98-0021 Generic Date: 01/26/98 Subject: Potential for pump runout while in abnormal configurations Discussion: As reported in event notification 33575, because of backleakage through a safety injection cold leg check valve, a licensee had opened a test isolation valve to allow the backleakage to drain to a storage tank. No limiting condition for operation (LCO) was entered. Prior to opening the test valve, the licensee had performed an analysis to verify the acceptability of this configuration, specifically to ensure that pump runout limits would not be exceeded even with the test valve open. The analysis determined that the limit would not be exceeded. For the analysis, the licensee had used ultrasonic indication to measure the flow in the test valve piping. The use of this equipment requires a value of pipe wall thickness as an input. For the analysis, the licensee had assumed nominal pipe wall thickness. After the valve had been open for a period of time, the licensee became aware of the fact that the pipe wall thickness had been measured during the last refueling outage and was less than nominal. With this additional information, the licensee concluded that pump runout limits may be exceeded with the test valve open. The licensee closed the valve and implemented requirements to station a dedicated operator whenever the valve was to be opened (in accordance with operability guidance in Generic Letter 91-18). Upon review of event notifications for calendar years 1997 and 1998, two related issues (the potential for pump runout while in abnormal configurations) were identified. Event notifications 31732 and 32117 discuss an issue where, were a large-break LOCA to occur when using the safety injection pumps to fill the accumulators, the pumps could potentially exceed runout limits. Event notification 33396 discusses an issue where, were a loss-of-offsite power to occur while both motor driven auxiliary feedwater pumps (AFWPs) had their discharge flow valve cutback controllers aligned to their alternate power source (which is not backed up by emergency power), both AFWPs would exceed runout limits. The generic implications of these issues is that licensees may not be carefully considering the ramifications of abnormal configurations on equipment operability. In all of the cases mentioned above, the configurations would probably have been acceptable had the appropriate technical specification LCOs been entered, which would have limited the amount of time the condition existed and focused additional attention on the condition. Contact: Eric Benner, NRR/DRPM/PECB 301-415-1171 EMail ejb1@nrc.gov _ REGION III MORNING REPORT PAGE 4 JANUARY 26, 1998 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Commonwealth Edison Co. MR Number: 3-98-0005 Dresden 2 3 Date: 01/21/98 Morris,Illinois ANNOUNCEMENT BY LICENSEE Dockets: 50-237,50-249 BWR/GE-3,BWR/GE-3 Subject: MANAGEMENT CHANGES Discussion: On January 21, 1998, Commonwealth Edison Company announced the promotion of Preston Swafford from the position of Dresden Station Outage and Work Control Manager to Dresden Station Manager. Mr. Swafford replaced Michael Heffley who was promoted to Site Vice President when Steve Perry was named Vice President of BWR Operations. Regional Action: Information only Contact: M. RING (630)829-9703 _