Headquarters Daily Report DECEMBER 04, 1998 *************************************************************************** REPORT NEGATIVE NO INPUT ATTACHED INPUT RECEIVED RECEIVED HEADQUARTERS û REGION I û REGION II û REGION III û REGION IV û PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - HEADQUARTERS DEC. 04, 1998 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Part 21 Database MR Number: H-98-0163 Abb-Ce Date: 12/04/98 Subject: Part 21 - Incorrectly described computer code input option Discussion: VENDOR: ABB-CE PT21 FILE NO: 98-69-0 DATE OF DOCUMENT: 11/02/98 ACCESSION NUMBER: SOURCE DOCUMENT: EN 34985 REVIEWER: PECB, E. Goodwin NEW ISSUE: The vendor reports a defect in an input option for the boiling water reactor fast transient analysis code BISON-SLAVE. The defect could lead to establishing nonconservative minimum critical power ratio operating limits in certain boiling water reactor plant technical specifications. The input option was incorrectly described in the code user's manual and not in the program coding itself. The incorrect description may lead an analyst to use an incorrect option when modeling radial power distribution. The vendor evaluated this problem for the affected plants, Susquehanna 1 and WNP-2, and concluded that current technical specifications provide adequate protection. _ HEADQUARTERS MORNING REPORT PAGE 2 DECEMBER 4, 1998 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Part 21 Database MR Number: H-98-0164 Westinghouse/Nuclear Logistics Date: 12/04/98 Subject: Part 2 - Failure of potentially safety-related breaker to close Discussion: VENDOR: Westinghouse/Nuclear Logistics PT21 FILE NO: 98-71-0 DATE OF DOCUMENT: 11/25/98 ACCESSION NUMBER: SOURCE DOCUMENT: EN 35082 REVIEWER: PECB, D. Skeen NEW ISSUE. The Clinton licensee reports that a Westinghouse Model 50DHP350 circuit breaker refurbished by Nuclear Logistics failed to operate during functional testing before installation in the drywell water chiller system. Though this application of the breaker is not safety-related, the breaker could be installed in a safety-related capacity. The trip latch appeared to be out of adjustment and one ratchet lever assembly was an incorrect size. This condition rendered the breaker inoperable in the closing function. The licensee shipped the breaker to another breaker services supplier for refurbishment. An NRC inspector from Region III, Division of Reactor Safety (DRS), is following up with the licensee to get details of the breaker failure mechanism and its history, working with NRC inspectors from headquarters, vendor inspection section of the Quality Assurance and Maintenance Branch (HQMB), who are following up with both NLI and Westinghouse. For more information, contact Kamal Naidu of HQMB at 301-415-2980. _ HEADQUARTERS MORNING REPORT PAGE 3 DECEMBER 4, 1998 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Part 21 Database MR Number: H-98-0165 Dubose/Sandvik Date: 12/04/98 Subject: Part 21 - Shipment of safety-related pipe failed minimum wall thickness criterion Discussion: VENDOR: DuBose/Sandvik PT21 FILE NO: 98-72-0 DATE OF DOCUMENT: 11/30/98 ACCESSION NUMBER: SOURCE DOCUMENT: EN 35093 REVIEWER: PECB, V. Hodge NEWISSUE: The vendor reports that part of a shipment of 1 inch stainless steel SA 312 Type 304 Schedule 40 pipe delivered to the Nine Mile Point 2 licensee for safety-related use did not meet the minimum wall thickness acceptance criterion. At the time of discovery, 80 feet of the 600 feet of defective pipe had been installed but not rendered operational. The licensee returned the balance of the pipe to the vendor. All the pipe in question was supplied by the manufacturer, Sandvik, from heat number 440506. _