Headquarters Daily Report DECEMBER 02, 1998 *************************************************************************** REPORT NEGATIVE NO INPUT ATTACHED INPUT RECEIVED RECEIVED HEADQUARTERS û REGION I û REGION II û REGION III û REGION IV û PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - HEADQUARTERS DEC. 02, 1998 MR Number: H-98-0159 NRR DAILY REPORT ITEM GENERIC COMMUNICATIONS Subject: IN 98-42 ISSUED 12/01/98 NRC INFORMATION NOTICE 98-42: Implementation of 10 CFR 50.55a(g) Inservice Inspection Requirements, dated December 1, 1998 The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission is issuing this information notice to alert addressees to certain aspects of requesting relief from American Society of Mechanical Engineers Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code (ASME Code) examinations that received less than "essentially 100 percent" coverage. Technical contact: Thomas McLellan, NRR 301-415-2716 E-mail: tkm@nrc.gov _ HEADQUARTERS MORNING REPORT PAGE 2 DECEMBER 2, 1998 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Part 21 Database MR Number: H-98-0160 Magnetrol Date: 12/02/98 Subject: Part 21 - Level control switch develops inadequate magnetic force Discussion: VENDOR: Magnetrol PT21 FILE NO: 98-68-0 DATE OF DOCUMENT: 10/27/98 ACCESSION NUMBER: SOURCE DOCUMENT: EN 34963 REVIEWER: PECB, T. Koshy NEW ISSUE. The Dresden 2 licensee reports that high pressure coolant injection (HPCI) system control switches, manufactured by Magnetrol and dedicated for safety-grade operation by the licensee, failed in a surveillance test. The combination of insufficient magnet strength and excessive travel in the float mechanism did not consistently actuate the float microswitch. The licensee replaced and tested Magnetrol modified-design switches in both Unit 2 and Unit 3 HPCI gland seal leak off hotwell pump level circuitry. _ HEADQUARTERS MORNING REPORT PAGE 3 DECEMBER 2, 1998 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Part 21 Database MR Number: H-98-0161 Coltec Industries Date: 12/02/98 Subject: Part 21 - Incorrect material used in FM-Alco 251 engine wrist pin assemblies Discussion: VENDOR: Coltec Industries PT21 FILE NO: 98-70-0 DATE OF DOCUMENT: 11/13/98 ACCESSION NUMBER: SOURCE DOCUMENT: EN 35030 REVIEWER: PECB, T. Koshy NEW ISSUE: The vendor reports use of incorrect material in wrist pin assemblies for FM-Alco 251 engines. The wrist pin assembly consists of a sleeve in the bore of the wrist pin. The sleeve is held in place by friction against the rolled ends of the sleeve. The incorrect material may decrease the magnitude of the friction fit. The vendor learned of this problem after many thousands of hours of commercial operation. The vendor has taken corrective actions to prevent recurrence of this problem. The only affected nuclear power plant is Palisades. No wrist pin assembly failures have been reported. _ REGION IV MORNING REPORT PAGE 4 DECEMBER 2, 1998 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Pacific Gas & Electric Co. MR Number: 4-98-0063 Diablo Canyon 1 2 Date: 12/02/98 Avila Beach,California SENIOR RESIDENT INSPECTOR Dockets: 50-275,50-323 PWR/W-4-LP,PWR/W-4-LP Subject: MANUAL REACTOR TRIP FOLLOWING KELP BUILDUP (SEE EVENT 35097) Discussion: On December 1, 1998, sea kelp from a coastal storm impeded flow into the circulating water system, impacting the operations of Diablo Canyon Units 1 and 2. At 3:47 a.m., operators tripped the Unit 2 reactor from 100 percent after kelp buildup caused both circulating water screens to sieze. All rods fully inserted, and the post-trip response was normal except for an auto-start on EDG 2-2 caused by a momentary low voltage while transferring startup power. The diesel was secured shortly thereafter, ensuring proper engine response. About 30 minutes after the trip, main steam safety relief Valve RV7 lifted when main steam pressure approached 1045.7 psig. The normal setpoint for Valve RV7 is 1065 psig (+3/-2%). Valve RV7 did not fully reseat for several hours. At 9 a.m., after reducing pressure to 950 psig, RV7 reseated. The licensee later gagged the valve and intends to perform a setpoint test on it. At 3:20 p.m., flooding occurred in the intake structure. While recovering from the Unit 2 trip, operators cross-tied the nonsafety-related Unit 1 screen wash system with the nonsafety-related Unit 2 service cooling water to assist in cooling Unit 2 secondary plant components. Subsequently, a portion of the cross-tie piping broke at a flexible coupling and put 3-4 feet of water in the intake structure before the screen wash was secured. The flooding affected the intake structure sump pumps and lighting, but did not affect the circulating water pumps or the safety-related auxiliary saltwater pumps. During the event, Unit 1 power was reduced to 50 percent after exceeding the maximum differential pressure allowed on one circulating-water screen. Regional Action: Routine followup by resident inspectors. Contact: J. F. Melfi (817)860-8269 D. L. Proulx (805)595-2354 _