Headquarters Daily Report JULY 31, 1997 *************************************************************************** REPORT NEGATIVE NO INPUT ATTACHED INPUT RECEIVED RECEIVED HEADQUARTERS û REGION I û REGION II û REGION III û REGION IV û PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - REGION II JULY 31, 1997 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Florida Power & Light Co. MR Number: 2-97-0059 Turkey Point 3 Date: 07/31/97 Miami,Florida Dockets: 50-250 PWR/W-3-LP Subject: TURKEY POINT UNIT 3 TRIP Discussion: Turkey Point Unit 3 tripped on July 30, 1997, when the B MSIV failed closed with the unit at 100 percent power resulting in low steam generator level. The cause of the trip has been determined to be a failed relay in the MSIV control circuit. The failed relay had an open coil. The relay is a Westinghouse BFD22S relay which is normally energized when the MSIV is open. The relay has been replaced and further review of the relay failure is being performed. All similar relays on MSIV circuits have been replaced on Unit 3. Shortly after the trip, the "A" AFW pump turbine tripped on overspeed. The cause of this overspeed trip is being investigated. The plant is currently in Mode 2 and went critical at 4:26 p.m. July 31, 1997. Both units are in a 30 day LCO due to the inoperable AFW pump. Technical Specifications allow startup in this LCO condition. Regional Action: The resident inspector responded to the control room and observed post trip actions and is verifying technical specification requirements. The resident observed startup activities. Contact: S. RUDISAIL (404)562-4512 _ REGION III MORNING REPORT PAGE 2 JULY 31, 1997 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Northern States Power Co. MR Number: 3-97-0087 Monticello 1 Date: 07/30/97 Monticello,Minnesota VIA RESIDENT INSPECTOR OBSERVATION Dockets: 50-263 BWR/GE-3 Subject: UNIT STARTUP FROM 82-DAY FORCED OUTAGE Discussion: On July 30, 1997, the licensee initiated a unit startup from a forced outage which began on May 9, 1997. At about 8:00 p.m. (CST) the unit was made critical and is anticipated to be at 100 percent power by August 1. During the 82-day forced outage, the licensee replaced the emergency core cooling system torus suction strainers due to net positive suction head concerns. Other work completed included: maintenance and modification to the #11 emergency diesel generator, replacement of the shutdown cooling relief valves, maintenance on the main transformer, replacement of all of the scram solenoid pilot valve head assemblies (Part 21 issue), performance of special testing on the #12 core spray pump, and repair of a hydrogen leak on the turbine generator. Regional Action: The resident inspectors observed numerous outage-related and startup activities. Regional inspectors assisted with the ECCS suction strainer installation inspection. The resident inspectors also verified that the actions as specified in the Safety Evaluation Report dated July 25, 1997, were accomplished prior to startup. Contact: J. MCCORMICK-BARGER (630)829-9872 _