Headquarters Daily Report JULY 29, 1997 *************************************************************************** REPORT NEGATIVE NO INPUT ATTACHED INPUT RECEIVED RECEIVED HEADQUARTERS û REGION I û REGION II û REGION III û REGION IV û PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - HEADQUARTERS JULY 29, 1997 MR Number: H-97-0092 NRR DAILY REPORT ITEM GENERIC COMMUNICATIONS Information Notice 97-56, "POSSESSION LIMITS FOR SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL AT THE ENVIROCARE OF UTAH LOW-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTE DISPOSAL FACILITY," was issued on July 28, 1997. This notice was issued to all licensees authorized to possess special nuclear material (SNM) to alert them to recent violations of Envirocare's possession limit for SNM. Recipients should consider actions to assure that they do not ship recipients more radioactive material than they are authorized to possess. Contacts: Harry Felsher, NMSS Tim Harris, NMSS 301-415-5521 301-415-6613 E-mail: hdf@nrc.gov E-mail: teh@nrc.gov _ REGION I MORNING REPORT PAGE 2 JULY 29, 1997 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Duquesne Light Co. MR Number: 1-97-0044 Beaver Valley 1 Date: 07/29/97 Shippingport,Pennsylvania RESIDENT INSPECTOR Dockets: 50-334 PWR/W-3-LP Subject: BEAVER VALLEY UNIT 1 SHUTDOWN AND RESTART Discussion: On June 27, 1997, while evaluating maintenance rule scope applicability, Duquesne Light Company (DLC) engineers determined that two Unit 1 reactor protection system (RPS) trip functions did not meet design requirements and were inoperable. The low-low steam generator RPS trip function was inoperable because the installed system did not satisfy IEEE-279-1971 postulated failure scenarios. The steam flow/feedwater flow mismatch coincident with low SG level RPS trip was inoperable because six feedwater transmitters (two per steam generator) did not meet UFSAR commitments to IEEE-279 (e.g. seismic installation). A third, but unrelated, issue subsequently arose when engineers determined that the feedwater regulating valve (FRV) bypass valves were not constructed to QA Category I requirements and therefore would not assure feedwater isolation upon a feedwater rupture inside containment accident. The licensee entered Technical Specification (TS) action statement 3.0.3 at 7:15 pm on June 27, 1997, due to the plant being outside its design basis. Operators began a controlled plant shutdown at 8:13 pm as required by TS, and achieved hot standby at 1:28 am on June 28, 1997. A SG median selector switch was installed by the licensee to address the low-low steam generator RPS trip function compliance with the IEEE-279 requirements. The steam flow/feedwater flow RPS trip was determined not to be a primary RPS trip credited in the safety analysis and no modifications were made to the feedwater transmitter seismic installations. UFSAR changes will be submitted to clarify the plant trips that are used in the safety analysis and to ensure that any other trip functions would not interfere with these credited trip functions. The licensee performed a safety evaluation as required by 10 CFR 50.59 and determined that the FRV bypass valves meet the original design criteria. In connection with ongoing reviews, some seismic supports were identified within containment that were inadequate on various systems including the excess letdown system piping. The licensee repaired or replaced pipe hangers as necessary to support plant restart. The licensee also identified instances of electrical relays and pressure switches in systems such as the CO2 fire protection system, emergency diesel generator room ventilation, and the containment supplemental leak collection system that did not meet seismic requirements. The licensee has resolved these issues for plant restart either through the posting of fire watches or replacement of the electrical device with an appropriate seismic grade component. The licensee expects to restart the unit on July 30, 1997 and synchronize REGION I MORNING REPORT PAGE 3 JULY 29, 1997 MR Number: 1-97-0044 (cont.) with the transmission and distribution grid by July 31, 1997. Regional Action: Routine inspection followup Contact: Pete Eselgroth (610)337-5234 David Kern (412)643-2000 _ REGION II MORNING REPORT PAGE 3 JULY 29, 1997 Licensee/Facility: Notification: MR Number: 2-97-0057 Northern Virginia Isotopes Date: 07/29/97 Winchester,Virginia Dockets: 03032974 License No: 45-25221-01MD Subject: REPORTED HIGH FILM BADGE READING Discussion: On July 28, 1997, the NRC Office of Research notified Region II of a reported high occcupational dose in the 1996, annual individual monitoring report to the NRC. The licensee (a radiopharmacy) submitted a dose record indicating over 445 Rem total effective dose equivalent for one employee. Region II followed up with the licensee's Radiation Safety Officer (RSO). The licensee's RSO prepared an analysis of the high film badge reading. The licensees' information indicated that the badge reading was not indicative of the dose to the worker. This is based on: (1) the badge was exposed to radiation with energies greater than the energy of the radioisotope used (technetium 99m); (2) the dose to the worker's finger ring was negligible for the period; (3) film badges monitoring the area where the person worked showed 50 to 60 millirem (mrem) per month; (4) and other workers performing the same activities had whole body doses of 50 to 60 mrem per month. The licensee indicated that the individual with the high film badge readings has had no symptoms of exposure to high doses. Regional Action: Region II will inspect the facility on July 29, 1997, to review the circumstances surrounding this film badge reading. Contact: Thomas R. Decker (404)562-4721 _ REGION II MORNING REPORT PAGE 4 JULY 29, 1997 Licensee/Facility: Notification: MR Number: 2-97-0058 Babcock & Wilcox Co. Date: 07/29/97 Lynchburg,Virginia Dockets: 07000027 License No: SNM-42 URANIUM FUEL FABRICATION Subject: Criticality Safety Limits Exceeded on Transfer Cart Reportable Event Number: 32690 Discussion: On July 28, 1997, Babcock & Wilcox Naval Nuclear Fuel Division reported that a cart used to transport high enriched uranium within the facility had been found containing more uranium than authorized by the nuclear criticality safety analysis. The cart was designed to contain four discrete storage locations with each storage location authorized to contain 350 grams of Uranium-235 (U-235). The actual quantity of material in the four storage locations on the cart ranged from less than 350 to approximately 907 grams of U-235 with three of the four locations containing greater than the authorized quantity. The incident occurred following repackaging of the uranium into 13 one-gallon cans from eight 5-gallon cans. Upon discovery, the licensee unloaded the transfer cart, transferred material into containers each with less than 350 grams U-235, and suspended this type of transfer operation pending an investigation. The licensee's nuclear controls relied on 1) internal container moderation as a function of mass, 2) geometry (spacing both internal and external to the cart), and 3) neutron reflection as safety barriers. During the incident, the moderation as a function of mass barrier was lost. The licensee's preliminary calculations following the incident showed that the effective multiplication factor of the as found condition was about 0.87. (The safety limit is 0.95) The licensee has chartered a three person team to investigate the incident and anticipates being finished on July 30, 1997. Regional Action: The NRC Senior Resident Inspector is on site reviewing the licensee's actions and will be augmented by regional and headquarters inspectors next week. Contact: E. J. McAlpine (404)562-4711 _ REGION III MORNING REPORT PAGE 5 JULY 29, 1997 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Non-Licensee MR Number: 3-97-0085 General Motors Date: 07/24/97 Kettering,Ohio TELECON WITH REP. OF GENERAL MOTORS License No: NON-LICENSEE Subject: RADIATION ALARM ON INCOMING SCRAP METAL SHIPMENT Discussion: On July 24, 1997, Region III was notified that a shipment of waste caused a radiation monitoring system to alarm at a Ohio scrapyard. General Motors (GM) staff identified a shoe box of sand in a dumpster at a GM plant in Dayton, Ohio. The sand was from unknown origin. The shoe box was placed into the normal trash. On July 18, 1997, a scrapyard (i.e., Midwest Iron and Metal) called the GM plant and reported that waste had tripped their radiation monitors. The scrapyard identified that the radiation was from the sand in the shoe box. The box of sand was returned to the GM plant and placed in a secured area. Regional Action: Region III notified the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the Ohio Department of Health (ODH) on July 24, 1997. On July 25, 1997, and (ODH) inspector went to the GM plant and identified that the shoe box of sand was within a 5 gallon drum. The ODH inspector measured a maximum of 36,000 counts/minute (cpm) at the surface of the sand with a sodium iodide detector (background was 2,500 cpm). The ODH inspector collected a sample for radiological analysis at the ODH lab. The 5 gallon drum was placed within a 55 gallon drum overpack and put into a secured area at the GM plant. On July 28, 1997, ODH notified the Region that the laboratory analysis indicated 126 picocuries/gram (pCi/g) of radium-226 and 9.7 pCi/g of thorium-232. The concentration of thorium-232 was approximately .009% by weight. Region III will refer this to EPA Region V for followup action. Contact: ROBERT GATTONE (630)829-9823 JOHN MADERA (630)829-9834 _