Headquarters Daily Report NOVEMBER 26, 1997 *************************************************************************** REPORT NEGATIVE NO INPUT ATTACHED INPUT RECEIVED RECEIVED HEADQUARTERS û REGION I û REGION II û REGION III û REGION IV û PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - HEADQUARTERS NOV. 26, 1997 MR Number: H-97-0146 NRR DAILY REPORT ITEM GENERIC COMMUNICATIONS NRC Information Notice 97-82, "Inadvertent Control Room Halon Actuation Due to a Camera Flash," dated November 28, 1997. The NRC is issuing this information notice to alert addressees to an inadvertent actuation of the Halon fire suppression system inside the control room at the Haddam Neck Plant. Technical contacts: Richard J. Conte, RI E. L. (Monte) Conner, RI (610) 337-5183 (610) 337-5399 Patrick M. Madden, NRR Chuck Petrone, NRR 301-415-2854 301-415-1027 Eric J. Lee, NRR 301-415-3201 _ REGION III MORNING REPORT PAGE 2 NOVEMBER 26, 1997 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Northern States Power Co. MR Number: 3-97-0115 Monticello 1 Date: 11/26/97 Monticello,Minnesota SRI VIA PC Dockets: 50-263 BWR/GE-3 Subject: MANUAL REACTOR SCRAM DUE TO DECREASINGCONDENSER VACUUM Discussion: On November 25, 1997, at about 3:00 p.m., the electrical power supply breakers to non-safety related motor control centers 115, 116, 124, and 125 tripped. This resulted in a trip of the A and B recombiner trains and all offgas auxiliary systems. Control room operators immediately reduced reactor power from 100 percent to about 57 percent. With the recombiners inoperable, the operators were concerned with condenser vacuum. At 3:10 p.m., the operators inserted a manual reactor scram when it became apparent the power supply breakers would not be restored immediately. All systems responded as expected. Reactor vessel water level decreased to about 9 inches and resulted in a Containment Isolation Group II and Group III isolation. Water level returned to normal levels using the feedwater and condensate systems. Operators reset the reactor scram at about 3:20 p.m. The licensee decided to reduce reactor pressure to less than 600 psi to prevent a scram as condenser vacuum continued to decrease. However, at 4:49 p.m., the condenser vacuum approached the trip setpoint and operators inserted another manual scram since reactor pressure was greater than 600 psi. Preliminary investigation shows a phase to phase fault on the line from the power supply to motor control centers 115 and 124. These MCCs are located in the off-gas storage building. Regional Action: The residents were in the control room during this event and will monitor the licenseeþs root cause investigation and corrective actions. Contact: J. MCCORMICK-BARGER (630)829-9872 _ REGION IV MORNING REPORT PAGE 3 NOVEMBER 26, 1997 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Entergy Operations, Inc. MR Number: 4-97-0090 Grand Gulf 1 Date: 11/26/97 Port Gibson,Mississippi Resident Inspector Dockets: 50-416 BWR/GE-6 Subject: CONTAMINATION EVENT AND UNMONITORED RELEASE Discussion: At approximately 6 p.m. on November 24, 1997, two workers who were exiting the protected area alarmed the portal monitors at the security access point. The individuals had contamination on their shoes. Licensee investigation traced the contamination to the area around the condensate storage tank, where a skid mounted hydro laser unit was set up. This hydro laser had been used to provide wash water in the cask wash area of the spent fuel pool. The licensee suspects that a small quantity of water may have siphoned from the spent fuel pool the previous Friday. The hydro laser wand had been lowered to the bottom of the cask wash area. Pressurized water was supplied to the wand to stir up sediment in order that it could be vacuumed from the cask wash area. At one point, the wand began floating towards the surface. The pressurized water was secured for approximately a 2-minute time period. The licensee believes that during this 2-minute period the static head from the spent fuel pool may have caused a siphon effect to occur. The licensee estimated that the amount of contaminated water that could have migrated outside the radiological controlled access area onto the concrete and gravel area was less than 7 gallons. Surveys of the area found contamination levels as high as 60,000 counts per minute. This was the result of a direct frisk of a foot pedal for the hydro laser unit. The smearable contamination level for this pedal was approximately 30,000 disintegrations per minute. The licensee roped off the area as a contamination area. Surveys detected contamination in a gravel area at a nearby storm drain. Upon opening the drain cover and performing a large area survey in the drain, the licensee detected contamination levels in the range of 1,500 disintegrations per minute. This indicated that there was likely an unmonitored release from the radiological controlled access area. The drain flows to a hold up basin on site, outside the protected area on the owner controlled area. The water from the hold up basin eventually flows to the river. There has not been any rain since Friday. There was no work in the area over the weekend. The licensee has implemented interim measures in anticipation of rain. The measures included sealing the concrete surfaces by painting and digging up and removing contaminated rocks and gravel around the drain. Regional Action: The resident inspectors will continue to follow up on the licensee's investigation of this event and corrective actions. REGION IV MORNING REPORT PAGE 4 NOVEMBER 26, 1997 MR Number: 4-97-0090 (cont.) Contact: Kathy Weaver (601)437-4620 David Corporandy (510)975-0319 Tom Andrews (817)860-8242 _