Headquarters Daily Report JANUARY 24, 1997 *************************************************************************** REPORT NEGATIVE NO INPUT ATTACHED INPUT RECEIVED RECEIVED HEADQUARTERS û REGION I û REGION II û REGION III û REGION IV û PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - REGION IV JANUARY 24, 1997 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Entergy Operations, Inc. MR Number: 4-97-0006 Waterford 3 Date: 01/23/97 Killona,Louisiana Senior Resident Inspector Dockets: 50-382 PWR/CE Subject: MANAGEMENT CHANGES Discussion: Entergy Operations, Inc. (EOI) announced on January 23, 1997, that Mike Sellman, Vice President, Operations, would assume the position of Chief Nuclear Officer, Maine Yankee. Chuck Dugger, the current General Manager, Plant Operations, will assume the position of Vice President, Operations at Waterford 3. James Hoffpauir will assume the position of General Manager, Plant Operations on a temporary basis until a permanent replacement can be found. These changes are effective immediately. Regional Action: Information purposes only. Contact: L. KELLER (504)783-6253 P. HARRELL (817)860-8250 _ REGION IV MORNING REPORT PAGE 2 JANUARY 24, 1997 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Washington Public Power Supply System MR Number: 4-97-0007 Washington Nuclear 2 Date: 01/23/97 Richland,Washington Resident Phone Call to Region Dockets: 50-397 BWR/GE-5 Subject: LOSS OF PRIMARY CONTAINMENT DURING OPERATION Reportable Event Number: 31638 Discussion: On January 23, 1997, the licensee discovered that a containment atmosphere control valve which was danger tagged closed to provide maintenance isolation was actually open on its backseat. The two inch manual valve was to be closed because the primary containment isolation valve was deenergized. The effect of the open valve was that containment integrity was lost when the primary containment isolation valve was cycled during maintenance activities. WNP-2 was operating at 68 percent power at the time of this event. The licensee's preliminary investigation revealed that the equipment operator and the independent verifier did not recognize the valve was stuck open on its backseat and concluded that the valve was shut. The licensee estimated that containment integrity had been lost for approximately one minute while the primary containment isolation valve was cycled. The licensee conducted a three hour standdown for each shift of oncoming personnel following this event. Personnel were briefed on attention-to-detail and recent human performance issues at the facility. Licensee management implemented enhanced monitoring of activities. Regional Action: The resident inspectors are following the licensee's investigation of this event and actions to monitor human performance. Contact: B. Olson (510)975-0295 G. Replogle (509)377-2627 _