Headquarters Daily Report MAY 23, 1997 *************************************************************************** REPORT NEGATIVE NO INPUT ATTACHED INPUT RECEIVED RECEIVED HEADQUARTERS û REGION I û REGION II û REGION III û REGION IV û PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - REGION III MAY 23, 1997 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Commonwealth Edison Co. MR Number: 3-97-0070 Byron 1 2 Date: 05/22/97 Byron,Illinois E-MAIL Dockets: 50-454,50-455 PWR/W-4-LP,PWR/W-4-LP Subject: TECHINICAL SPECIFICATION 3.0.3. ENTRY FOR INOPERABLE CHARGING PUMPS AT BOTH UNITS OF BYRON AND BRAIDWOOD Discussion: On May 22, 1997, during review of a Byron surveillance procedure for implementing technical specification (TS) requirements for venting the emergency core cooling systems (ECCS) the NRC identified that the licensees were not venting the centrifugal charging (CV) pumps (an ECCS subsystem) and discharge piping as required. The CV pumps and discharge piping are required to be vented every 31 days. Subsequent to the identification of this issue several conference calls were held between the licensees and Region III and NRR. As a result of these conference calls the licensees declared all eight CV pumps inoperable and entered TS 3.0.3 on May 22 at 7:00 p.m. (CDT). The licensees also entered TS 4.0.3 that allowed 24 hours to take the required TS action for equipment inoperability resulting from a missed surveillance. The licensees plan to submit a request for a Notice of Enforcement Discretion (NOED) that will allow enough time for a TS change to be issued. The TS change is expected to be submitted early next week. At the time of occurrence Braidwood Unit 1 was in Mode 3 and in the process of starting up from a refueling outage. The licensee plans to put the startup on hold and maintain Braidwood Unit 1 in Mode 3 until the NOED is granted. The licensees plan to commence shutdown of the Byron and Braidwood units prior to the expiration of the 24 hour grace period if the NOED has not been received. Regional Action: The residents walked down systems and reviewed various procedures to support the NRC review of the licensees assessments and plans on this issue. The region staff will work with NRR on the review of the licensees' proposed NOED request and the residents will monitor any onsite activities, as appropriate. Contact: ROGER LANKSBURY (630)829-9631 _ REGION III MORNING REPORT PAGE 2 MAY 23, 1997 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Commonwealth Edison Co. MR Number: 3-97-0071 Braidwood 1 2 Date: 05/22/97 Braceville,Illinois E-MAIL Dockets: 50-456,50-457 PWR/W-4-LP,PWR/W-4-LP Subject: TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.0.3. ENTRY FOR INOPERABLE CHARGING PUMPS AT BOTH UNITS OF BYRON AND BRAIDWOOD Discussion: On May 22, 1997, during review of a Byron surveillance procedure for implementing technical specification (TS) requirements for venting the emergency core cooling systems (ECCS) the NRC identified that the licensees were not venting the centrifugal charging (CV) pumps (an ECCS subsystem) and discharge piping as required. The CV pumps and discharge piping are required to be vented every 31 days. Subsequent to the identification of this issue several conference calls were held between the licensees and Region III and NRR. As a result of these conference calls the licensees declared all eight CV pumps inoperable and entered TS 3.0.3 on May 22 at 7:00 p.m. (CDT). The licensees also entered TS 4.0.3 that allowed 24 hours to take the required TS action for equipment inoperability resulting from a missed surveillance. The licensees plan to submit a request for a Notice of Enforcement Discretion (NOED) that will allow enough time for a TS change to be issued. The TS change is expected to be submitted early next week. At the time of occurrence Braidwood Unit 1 was in Mode 3 and in the process of starting up from a refueling outage. The licensee plans to put the startup on hold and maintain Braidwood Unit 1 in Mode 3 until the NOED is granted. The licensees plan to commence shutdown of the Byron and Braidwood units prior to the expiration of the 24 hour grace period if the NOED has not been received. Regional Action: The residents walked down systems and reviewed various procedures to support the NRC review of the licensees assessments and plans on this issue. The region staff will work with NRR on the review of the licensees' proposed NOED request and the residents will monitor any onsite activities, as appropriate. Contact: ROGER LANKSBURY (630)829-9631 _ REGION IV MORNING REPORT PAGE 3 MAY 23, 1997 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Entergy Operations, Inc. MR Number: 4-97-0044 Waterford 3 Date: 05/22/97 Killona,Louisiana SRI telephone call Dockets: 50-382 PWR/CE Subject: OVERFLOW OF SPENT FUEL POOL Reportable Event Number: 32372 Discussion: At approximately 10:45 p.m. (CST) on May 20, 1997, the control room received an alarm indicating a high level in the spent fuel pool. In response to the alarm, the control room dispatched an auxiliary operator to ensure valves that were potential makeup sources to the spent fuel pool were closed, secured a component cooling water makeup pump, and sampled the spent fuel pool for dilution. No further actions were taken by the operations staff to clear the high level alarm or to ensure that the leakage into the spent fuel pool had stopped. At approximately 2:45 a.m. (CST) on May 21, the control room received reports that water in the spent fuel pool had overflowed into the train bay and seaped under the train bay doors into the protected area, where it wetted the soil and asphalt in the area outside of the train bay doors. The operations staff immediately lowered the spent fuel pool level to stop the spill. Water also entered the storm drain system and, when it was recognized that the spent fuel pool had overflown, the affected portions of the storm drain system were isolated so the water did not enter the drainage canal, which drains outside the protected area. A small amount of low level radioactivity (3.5E-5 microcuries/milliliter) water was detected outside the protected area in a dead-ended portion of the storm drain system (part of the owner controlled area). None of the activity detected exceeded the limits stated in 10 CFR Part 20 for monitored releases. The licensee's preliminary root cause evaluation identified that the cause of the overflow of the spent fuel pool was the improper installation of a tagout, combined with leakage through a valve. An operator added tags to an existing tagout and did not obtain an independent review of the additional tags or obtain permission from a supervisor prior to installing the tags. When the operator installed the tags, a valve was closed in the discharge line of the operating purification pump, which caused the pump to become deadheaded and increased the pressure in the piping. This pressure increase caused the leakage through a valve, which isolates the purification system from the spent fuel pool, to increase. This leakage caused the overflow of the spent fuel pool. The purification system can be aligned such that the system can purify the water in the spent fuel pool or the refueling water storage pool (RWSP). At the time of this occurrence, the purification system was aligned to the RWSP. The licensee is continuing to clean up the water in the drain system and to collect the contaminated soil and asphalt. REGION IV MORNING REPORT PAGE 4 MAY 23, 1997 MR Number: 4-97-0044 (cont.) Regional Action: Routine followup by the Senior Resident Inspector. Contact: Phil Harrell (817)860-8250 Lee Keller (504)783-6253 _