Headquarters Daily Report JULY 23, 1997 *************************************************************************** REPORT NEGATIVE NO INPUT ATTACHED INPUT RECEIVED RECEIVED HEADQUARTERS û REGION I û REGION II û REGION III û REGION IV û PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - REGION I JULY 23, 1997 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Boston Edison Co. MR Number: 1-97-0042 Pilgrim 1 Date: 07/22/97 Plymouth,Massachusetts Dockets: 50-293 BWR/GE-3 Subject: SERVICE WATER SYSTEM SINGLE FAILURE VULNERABILITY OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS Reportable Event Number: 32649 Discussion: On July 18, 1997, and in response to findings from a Region I inspection, the licensee reported a salt service water system single failure vulnerability that represented operation outside the Pilgrim design basis. The failure involved loss of DC power during a loss of coolant accident (LOCA) coincident with a loss of offsite power (LOOP), at specific tidal conditions and bay water temperatures. The salt service water (SSW) consists of five pumps, one of which is considered an additional "swing" pump. The swing pump is arranged to permit, its alignment on either SSW header according to the position of two normally open DC-powered motor-operated valves (MO 3808 and 3813) in the common discharge header. One of these two valves is designed to close upon a LOOP based on a preset position of the Loop Select switch, effectively dividing the SSW system into two independent loops which is consistent with the Updated Safety Analysis Report. In a design basis LOCA/LOOP event, the load sequencer automatically starts only one pump in each loop; pressure switches will automatically start additional pumps (after established time delays) if header pressure is less than 3.3 psig. With a DC power failure affecting the opposite train to which the swing pump is selected to align, both header isolation valves (MO 3808 and 3813) remain open. Therefore, both SSW loops remain cross-tied with the potential for one pump suppling flow to both headers in a runout condition. On July 18 , the licensee instituted a temporary modification to shut one of the header isolation valves, thereby removing the single failure vulnerability. Regional Action: Region I is reviewing the licensee's corrective actions. Contact: Len Prividy (610)337-5140 Rich Conte (610)337-5183 _ REGION II MORNING REPORT PAGE 2 JULY 23, 1997 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Carolina Power & Light Co. MR Number: 2-97-0056 Brunswick 1 2 Date: 07/23/97 Southport,North Carolina Dockets: 50-325,50-324 BWR/GE-4,BWR/GE-4 Subject: CP&L ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGES Discussion: Carolina Power and Light recently announced the following organizational changes that affect Corporate, Brunswick, and H. B. Robinson. CORPORATE: Fred Day is named Senior Vice President of Customer Service Center in Raleigh and the Distribution Engineering & Operations and Transmission departments. Bill Habermeyer previously Vice President Nuclear Engineering is named Vice President of CP&L's Western Region, replacing Mr. Day. BRUNSWICK: Jeff Lyash is named Brunswick General Plant Manager, effective August 1, 1997. Rich Lopriore is named Brunswick Training Manager, effective August 15, 1997. Garry Miller is named Brunswick Engineering Manager, effective August 1, 1997. The Environmental and Radiation Controls organization, at Brunswick, managed by Martha Christinziano will report to the Plant General Manager instead of the Director of Site Operations, effective August 1, 1997. ROBINSON: Garry Miller's replacement as Robinson Engineering Manager has not been identified. Therefore, during the transition, Paul Cafarella, Superintendent - Mechnical System; Paul Gaffney, Superintendent - Electrical Instrumentation and Control System; and Erdal Caba, Superintendent - Rapid Response who previously reported to Garry Miller will report to the Director of Site Operations. Regional Action: For information only. Contact: M. Shymlock (404)562-4540 _