Headquarters Daily Report AUGUST 21, 1997 *************************************************************************** REPORT NEGATIVE NO INPUT ATTACHED INPUT RECEIVED RECEIVED HEADQUARTERS û REGION I û REGION II û REGION III û REGION IV û PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - HEADQUARTERS AUGUST 20, 1997 MR Number: H-97-0104 NRR DAILY REPORT ITEM SIGNIFICANT EVENTS Subject: ZION, UNIT 1, UNRECOGNIZED REACTIVITY ADDITION DURING PLANT SHUTDOWN CLASSIFIED AS A SIGNIFICANT EVENT The NRR/AEOD Events Assessment Panel meeting on August 12, 1997, has classified the unrecognized reactivity addition at Zion, Unit 1, as a Significant Event. Classification was based on the performance of the control room staff that resulted in an unauthorized reactivity addition during the shutdown of Unit 1. On February 19, 1997, the licensee removed containment spray (CS) pump 1C for maintenance and was unable to restore it to operable condition in the permitted outage time. On February 21, the LCO expired and the licensee entered a 4-hour shutdown action statement for Unit 1. At 2:07 p.m., the main turbine was tripped and the primary nuclear station operator (NSO) inserted control rods continuously for 3 minutes and 48 seconds (232 steps) until power indicated 0.025-percent (point of adding heat). Reactor power continued to decrease as a result of the negative reactivity associated with the control rod insertion. When power reached 0.01 percent and the reactor was substantially subcritical, the primary NSO informed the unit supervisor (US) that he intended to withdraw control rods to stabilize power at 0.025 percent. The primary NSO then proceeded to withdraw control rods continuously for 1 minute and 45 seconds (84 steps) until he was directed to trip the reactor. The shift engineer directed the reactor to be tripped because the CS pump had not been restored to service and Unit 1 was required to be in hot shutdown within the next 6 minutes to comply with the TS. Despite a number of control room indications and alarms, the unit supervisor and the shift engineer were unaware that the primary NSO had continuously inserted control rods a total of 232 steps, which placed the reactor in a substantially subcritical condition, and then continuously withdrew control rods 84 steps in an attempt to re-establish power at the point of adding heat. The AIT inspection identified several weaknesses in the control room staff performance. Management weaknesses that resulted in vague or unclear direction, poor prebriefs and distracting control room decorum contributed to the event. Although the actual event did not pose a risk to the health and safety of the public, the event was considered safety significant from a human performance perspective. With the Unit 1 reactor substantially subcritical, a licensed reactor operator withdrew control rods continuously in an attempt to take the reactor to the critical stage, disregarding established procedural controls for conducting a safe reactor startup. The rod manipulations were conducted without the knowledge of operations supervisors. Proper manipulation of control rods during reactor shutdowns and startups is fundamental to operational safety. An Operating Reactor Events Briefing was held on March 12, 1997 (97-02). HEADQUARTERS MORNING REPORT PAGE 2 AUGUST 20, 1997 MR Number: H-97-0104 (cont.) Information Notice 97-62 Unrecognized Reactivity Addition During Plant Shutdown, was issued on August 6, 1997. Contact: Thomas Koshy, NRR/DRPM/PECB (301) 415-1176 _ REGION I MORNING REPORT PAGE 2 AUGUST 20, 1997 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Northeast Utilities MR Number: 1-97-0046 Millstone 1 2 3 Date: 08/20/97 Waterford,Connecticut LICENSEE PRESS RELEASE Dockets: 50-245,50-336,50-423 BWR/GE-3,PWR/CE,PWR/W-4-LP Subject: APPOINTMENT OF NEW CEO FOR NORTHEAST UTILITIES Discussion: The Board of Trustees of Northeast Utilities System announced the appointment of Michael G. Morris as Chairman, President and Chief Executive Officer, effective immediately. Morris comes to NU from CMS Energy in Dearborn, Michigan, where he served as President and Chief Executive Officer of Consumers Energy, an electric and gas utility. Consumers Energy operates a number of fossil and hydro electric generating plants and two nuclear stations (Palisades and Big Rock Point), for which Morris oversees the operations. Mr. Morris also was recently elected to the board of the Institute for Nuclear Power Operations. Mr. Morris replaces Bernard M. Fox, who had announced his retirement in February pending the appointment of a successor. Regional Action: This Is For Informational Purposes Only. Contact: Jacque Durr (610)337-5224 _ REGION II MORNING REPORT PAGE 3 AUGUST 21, 1997 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Carolina Power & Light Co. MR Number: 2-97-0066 Robinson 2 Date: 08/21/97 Hartsville,South Carolina Dockets: 50-261 PWR/W-3-LP Subject: POTENTIAL EDG INOPERABILITY FOR THREE WEEKS Discussion: On August 20, 1997, the licensee was conducting on-line maintenance on the A train Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) pump room air conditioning cooler. The Safety Injection (SI) and Containment Spray pumps are housed in this room. While this work was on-going, the A train SI and Spray pumps were considered inoperable. At 11:15 a.m., the NRC resident inspector noted that the B train EDG output breaker switch was in an out-of-normal position, i.e., indicating trip position as opposed to its normal mid position between trip and close. The inspector alerted the licensee to the discrepancy and an operability evaluation was initiated by the licensee. The licensee later determined that the switch was in an incorrect position and at 3:44 p.m., the switch was repositioned to normal. It was noted at that time that the switch was partially in the pull to lock position. In this position, the B EDG would have started, but the output breaker would not have closed. Therefore, the licensee determined B EDG was inoperable. The licensee determined that the TS action statement of 3.0.3 had applied between 11:15 a.m. and when the switch was properly repositioned at 3:44 p.m. Following the switch realignment, the B EDG was tested and the output breaker and switch verified to operate properly. The B EDG was believed to have been inoperable for a period of approximately three weeks based on the last time that the switch was operated during routine surveillance operation. The licensee formed an event review team to determine the root cause of this event. The event was reported to the NRC at 4:36 p.m. on August 20, 1997, as a condition outside design basis. Event Number 32791. Work on the A Train ECCS room air cooler was completed and both A and B trains have been restored. Regional Action: The Resident Inspector will continue to review this event. Contact: M. Shymlock (404)562-4540 _ REGION IV MORNING REPORT PAGE 4 AUGUST 21, 1997 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Houston Lighting & Power Co. MR Number: 4-97-0066 South Texas 1 2 Date: 08/20/97 Wadsworth,Texas Resident Inspectors Dockets: 50-498,50-499 PWR/W-4-LP,PWR/W-4-LP Subject: VALVE MANIPULATION ERROR Discussion: On August 20, 1997, at 12:42 a.m. (CDT) an auxiliary operator was placing the chemical and volume control system (CVCS) Cation Demineralizer 1B in service when he inadvertently opened a demineralizer sluice line to the spent resin storage tank valve instead of the demineralizer discharge valve. After approximately 5 minutes, control room operators received a volume control tank (VCT) low level alarm and noted that automatic makeup to the VCT had initiated. The VCT level dropped 16 percent, as approximately 550 gallons were diverted from the CVCS to the spent resin storage tank. The auxiliary operator investigated the condition, identified the error, and corrected the condition. During the event review, the licensee identified that a second valve in the demineralizer sluice line was open when it was procedurally required to be closed. The second valve was positioned open in May 1997, and an equipment clearance order written to track this condition. Operators had submitted a procedure change request, but it had not been implemented. The licensee initiated an Event Review Team to investigate the event. Three issues have currently been identified: (1) there was inadequate self-verification performed by the auxiliary operator; (2) the control room operators were not monitoring control room indications for the CVCS during the valving evolution; and (3) there was clear indication of VCT level decrease. The licensee is reviewing all existing equipment clearance orders in order to identify any other potentially misconfigured valve alignments that are being tracked with caution tags and, as a result, have not received appropriate review and approval. Regional Action: The resident inspectors are reviewing system valve alignments for any immediate safety concerns that may be present due to inappropriate valve alignments and will follow the licensee's investigation of the event. Contact: Joseph I. Tapia (817)860-8243 Ronald A. Kopriva (817)860-8104 _