Headquarters Daily Report AUGUST 20, 1997 *************************************************************************** REPORT NEGATIVE NO INPUT ATTACHED INPUT RECEIVED RECEIVED HEADQUARTERS û REGION I û REGION II û REGION III û REGION IV û PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - HEADQUARTERS AUGUST 19, 1997 MR Number: H-97-0103 NRR DAILY REPORT ITEM GENERIC COMMUNICATIONS NRC Information Notice 97-66, "Failure to Provide Special Lenses for Operators Using Respirator or Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus During Emergency Operations," dated August 20, 1997. The NRC is issuing this information notice to alert addressees to a potential problem associated with procedures or instructions to ensure that licensed operators who require corrective lenses are equipped with the special lenses needed for respirator or self-contained breathing apparatus use. Technical contacts: John L. Pellet, RIV (817) 860-8159 Thomas Koshy, NRR 301-415-1176 NRC Information Notice 97-67, "Failure to Satisfy Requirements for Significant Manipulations of the Controls for Power Reactor Operator Licensing," dated August 21, 1997. The NRC is issuing this information notice to alert addressees that operator license applicants are required to perform at least five significant control manipulations on the facility for which a license is sought [Section 55.31(a)(5) of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR 55.32(a)(5)]. Technical contacts: Brian Hughes, NRR John Pellet, RIV 301-415-1096 (817) 860-8159 Donald Florek, RI Thomas Peebles, RII (610) 337-5185 (404) 562-4638 Mel Leach, RIII (630) 829-9705 _ REGION II MORNING REPORT PAGE 2 AUGUST 19, 1997 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Carolina Power & Light Co. MR Number: 2-97-0064 Harris 1 Date: 08/19/97 Raleigh,North Carolina Dockets: 50-400 PWR/W-3-LP Subject: MANAGEMENT CHANGES Discussion: Carolina Power and Light (CP&L) Harris Site Vice President, W. R. Robinson, announced on August 7, 1997 the following changes in managerial and supervisory positions, effective immediately: Vann Stephenson will be moving from Engineering to become Superintendent-Mechanical/I&C Maintenance, replacing Charlie Rose. Mr. Stephenson is currently Superintendent-Rapid Response Team. Charlie Rose will be transferring from Maintenance into Outage and Scheduling. Cheryl Brown, currently Supervisor-Reliability/Maintenance Rule Team, will assume Mr. Stephenson's leadership role of the Rapid Response Team. Alan Orton, currently Project Lead for Operator Initial Training, will become the Supervisor-Technical Training. Regional Action: For information only. Contact: M. Shymlock (404)562-4540 _ REGION II MORNING REPORT PAGE 3 AUGUST 19, 1997 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Duke Power Co. MR Number: 2-97-0065 Catawba 2 Date: 08/19/97 York,South Carolina Dockets: 50-414 PWR/W-4-LP Subject: REPETITIVE FAILURES OF OPTICAL ISOLATORS IN MANUAL REACTOR TRIPS Discussion: On August 17, Unit 2 was operating at 100% power when the Main Steam Isolation Valve (MSIV) associated with the 'D' steam generator (SG) failed closed at 1:30 a.m. Control room operators manually tripped the reactor in anticipation of an automatic trip. The motor-driven and turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater (AFW) pumps auto-started as designed, and steam dumps controlled pressure. The unit was subsequently stabilized in Mode 3 (Hot Standby). The Resident Inspector responded to the event and reviewed the plant and licensee responses. Unit 2 experienced a similar 'D' SG MSIV failure and manual reactor trip on July 26, 1997. The root cause of the previous MSIV failure was attributed to a Digital Optical Isolator (DOI) failure in the seal-in circuitry associated with the MSIV open switch pushbutton. The DOI failure essentially disrupted or opened the seal-in circuit and allowed the solenoid valves on the MSIV actuator to vent air, causing the MSIV to close. The licensee tested the DOIs (4 per MSIV, 16 total including the failed DOI) in the control circuitry for all four Unit 2 MSIVs and determined that no other DOI had failed. They replaced the failed DOI before restarting from the July 26 trip. The root cause of the August 17 MSIV failure has been attributed to voltage spikes on the output of another DOI in the same seal-in circuit associated with the 2D SG MSIV open switch pushbutton. The licensee has determined that the cause of the DOI failures in both events was the failure of resistors within the DOIs. The first failure was instantaneous, whereas the second failure involved a degraded voltage output (spiking). Following the August 17 failure, the licensee tested all DOIs in the Unit 2 MSIVs' control circuitry using a modified testing methodology that would reveal, over time, voltage oscillations indicative of the second failure type. No other degraded MSIV DOIs were identified, although five were replaced because they were of the same purchase vintage as the first DOI that failed. The removed DOIs were tested successfully after they were removed, as were the replacement DOIs after they were installed in the field application. REGION II MORNING REPORT PAGE 4 AUGUST 19, 1997 MR Number: 2-97-0065 (cont.) Catawba Unit 2 was restarted on August 18. The licensee is continuing their root cause investigation of the DOI resistor failures. In the interim, weekly testing of Unit 2 and Unit 1 MSIV DOIs will be performed using the modified method. The licensee plans to develop procedures to govern the online testing of the MSIV DOIs (using the modified method) and subsequent online replacement of degraded DOIs, if necessary. Regional Action: The Resident Inspectors and a Region II electrical inspector continue to review the DOI problems for root cause of the failures and any generic implications. Contact: S. SHAEFFER (404)562-4510 _ HEADQUARTERS MORNING REPORT PAGE 4 AUGUST 20, 1997 MR Number: H-97-0104 NRR DAILY REPORT ITEM SIGNIFICANT EVENTS Subject: ZION, UNIT 1, UNRECOGNIZED REACTIVITY ADDITION DURING PLANT SHUTDOWN CLASSIFIED AS A SIGNIFICANT EVENT The NRR/AEOD Events Assessment Panel meeting on August 12, 1997, has classified the unrecognized reactivity addition at Zion, Unit 1, as a Significant Event. Classification was based on the performance of the control room staff that resulted in an unauthorized reactivity addition during the shutdown of Unit 1. On February 19, 1997, the licensee removed containment spray (CS) pump 1C for maintenance and was unable to restore it to operable condition in the permitted outage time. On February 21, the LCO expired and the licensee entered a 4-hour shutdown action statement for Unit 1. At 2:07 p.m., the main turbine was tripped and the primary nuclear station operator (NSO) inserted control rods continuously for 3 minutes and 48 seconds (232 steps) until power indicated 0.025-percent (point of adding heat). Reactor power continued to decrease as a result of the negative reactivity associated with the control rod insertion. When power reached 0.01 percent and the reactor was substantially subcritical, the primary NSO informed the unit supervisor (US) that he intended to withdraw control rods to stabilize power at 0.025 percent. The primary NSO then proceeded to withdraw control rods continuously for 1 minute and 45 seconds (84 steps) until he was directed to trip the reactor. The shift engineer directed the reactor to be tripped because the CS pump had not been restored to service and Unit 1 was required to be in hot shutdown within the next 6 minutes to comply with the TS. Despite a number of control room indications and alarms, the unit supervisor and the shift engineer were unaware that the primary NSO had continuously inserted control rods a total of 232 steps, which placed the reactor in a substantially subcritical condition, and then continuously withdrew control rods 84 steps in an attempt to re-establish power at the point of adding heat. The AIT inspection identified several weaknesses in the control room staff performance. Management weaknesses that resulted in vague or unclear direction, poor prebriefs and distracting control room decorum contributed to the event. Although the actual event did not pose a risk to the health and safety of the public, the event was considered safety significant from a human performance perspective. With the Unit 1 reactor substantially subcritical, a licensed reactor operator withdrew control rods continuously in an attempt to take the reactor to the critical stage, disregarding established procedural controls for conducting a safe reactor startup. The rod manipulations were conducted without the knowledge of operations supervisors. Proper manipulation of control rods during reactor shutdowns and startups is fundamental to operational safety. An Operating Reactor Events Briefing was held on March 12, 1997 (97-02). HEADQUARTERS MORNING REPORT PAGE 5 AUGUST 20, 1997 MR Number: H-97-0104 (cont.) Information Notice 97-62 Unrecognized Reactivity Addition During Plant Shutdown, was issued on August 6, 1997. Contact: Thomas Koshy, NRR/DRPM/PECB (301) 415-1176 _ REGION I MORNING REPORT PAGE 5 AUGUST 20, 1997 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Northeast Utilities MR Number: 1-97-0046 Millstone 1 2 3 Date: 08/20/97 Waterford,Connecticut LICENSEE PRESS RELEASE Dockets: 50-245,50-336,50-423 BWR/GE-3,PWR/CE,PWR/W-4-LP Subject: APPOINTMENT OF NEW CEO FOR NORTHEAST UTILITIES Discussion: The Board of Trustees of Northeast Utilities System announced the appointment of Michael G. Morris as Chairman, President and Chief Executive Officer, effective immediately. Morris comes to NU from CMS Energy in Dearborn, Michigan, where he served as President and Chief Executive Officer of Consumers Energy, an electric and gas utility. Consumers Energy operates a number of fossil and hydro electric generating plants and two nuclear stations (Palisades and Big Rock Point), for which Morris oversees the operations. Mr. Morris also was recently elected to the board of the Institute for Nuclear Power Operations. Mr. Morris replaces Bernard M. Fox, who had announced his retirement in February pending the appointment of a successor. Regional Action: This Is For Informational Purposes Only. Contact: Jacque Durr (610)337-5224 _