Headquarters Daily Report AUGUST 19, 1997 *************************************************************************** REPORT NEGATIVE NO INPUT ATTACHED INPUT RECEIVED RECEIVED HEADQUARTERS û REGION I û REGION II û REGION III û REGION IV û PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - REGION I AUGUST 18, 1997 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Co. MR Number: 1-97-0045 Haddam Neck 1 Date: 08/18/97 Hartford,Connecticut Telephone 8/17/97 SRI Dockets: 50-213 PWR/W-4-LP Subject: TEMPORARY LOSS OF SPENT FUEL POOL COOLING Discussion: With the plant permanently shutdown for decommissioning and the reactor defueled, a lightning strike at the station at 2:07 a.m. on 8/17/97 caused the loss of spent fuel pool cooling and tripped several plant components. The plant equipment affected included the trip of the operating A spent fuel pool (SFP) cooling system pump, the temporary loss of the plant computer and security lighting, the tripping of several ventilation system fans (control room, switchgear room, spent fuel building, turbine building, administration building), and the tripping of the operating A service air compressor and the sample pumps for stack high range monitor RM-14B. The security diesel generator started and assumed loads. The plant emergency diesels did not start and were not required since there was no loss of the 4KV or 480 volt emergency buses. Plant operators and security personnel responded to the event using abnormal and emergency response procedures to identify offnormal equipment conditions and to restore normal equipment operation. An undervoltage (uv) lockout relay tripped and caused the isolation of service water to the SFP cooling system. The plant computer was restarted and functional by 2:21 a.m. Operators restarted the A SFP cooling pump, reset the timed relay, and restored cooling to the SFP by 2:25 a.m. SFP temperature remained stable at about 100 degrees F. The operators reviewed plant equipment conditions and restored equipment affected by the voltage transient. Plant electricians assisted in a systematic review of all electrical buses and panels. No equipment damage was identified. All equipment affected by the transient was restored. Licensee long term review and followup of the event was in progress as of August 18. Regional Action: The SRI responded to the site to verify plant status and review licensee actions. Region I will follow the licensee's event response. This information is current as of 8:00 a.m. on August 18. Contact: W. Raymond (860)267-2571 E. Conner (610)337-5399 _ HEADQUARTERS MORNING REPORT PAGE 2 AUGUST 19, 1997 MR Number: H-97-0103 NRR DAILY REPORT ITEM GENERIC COMMUNICATIONS NRC Information Notice 97-66, "Failure to Provide Special Lenses for Operators Using Respirator or Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus During Emergency Operations," dated August 20, 1997. The NRC is issuing this information notice to alert addressees to a potential problem associated with procedures or instructions to ensure that licensed operators who require corrective lenses are equipped with the special lenses needed for respirator or self-contained breathing apparatus use. Technical contacts: John L. Pellet, RIV (817) 860-8159 Thomas Koshy, NRR 301-415-1176 NRC Information Notice 97-67, "Failure to Satisfy Requirements for Significant Manipulations of the Controls for Power Reactor Operator Licensing," dated August 21, 1997. The NRC is issuing this information notice to alert addressees that operator license applicants are required to perform at least five significant control manipulations on the facility for which a license is sought [Section 55.31(a)(5) of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR 55.32(a)(5)]. Technical contacts: Brian Hughes, NRR John Pellet, RIV 301-415-1096 (817) 860-8159 Donald Florek, RI Thomas Peebles, RII (610) 337-5185 (404) 562-4638 Mel Leach, RIII (630) 829-9705 _ REGION II MORNING REPORT PAGE 3 AUGUST 19, 1997 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Carolina Power & Light Co. MR Number: 2-97-0064 Harris 1 Date: 08/19/97 Raleigh,North Carolina Dockets: 50-400 PWR/W-3-LP Subject: MANAGEMENT CHANGES Discussion: Carolina Power and Light (CP&L) Harris Site Vice President, W. R. Robinson, announced on August 7, 1997 the following changes in managerial and supervisory positions, effective immediately: Vann Stephenson will be moving from Engineering to become Superintendent-Mechanical/I&C Maintenance, replacing Charlie Rose. Mr. Stephenson is currently Superintendent-Rapid Response Team. Charlie Rose will be transferring from Maintenance into Outage and Scheduling. Cheryl Brown, currently Supervisor-Reliability/Maintenance Rule Team, will assume Mr. Stephenson's leadership role of the Rapid Response Team. Alan Orton, currently Project Lead for Operator Initial Training, will become the Supervisor-Technical Training. Regional Action: For information only. Contact: M. Shymlock (404)562-4540 _ REGION II MORNING REPORT PAGE 4 AUGUST 19, 1997 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Duke Power Co. MR Number: 2-97-0065 Catawba 2 Date: 08/19/97 York,South Carolina Dockets: 50-414 PWR/W-4-LP Subject: REPETITIVE FAILURES OF OPTICAL ISOLATORS IN MANUAL REACTOR TRIPS Discussion: On August 17, Unit 2 was operating at 100% power when the Main Steam Isolation Valve (MSIV) associated with the 'D' steam generator (SG) failed closed at 1:30 a.m. Control room operators manually tripped the reactor in anticipation of an automatic trip. The motor-driven and turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater (AFW) pumps auto-started as designed, and steam dumps controlled pressure. The unit was subsequently stabilized in Mode 3 (Hot Standby). The Resident Inspector responded to the event and reviewed the plant and licensee responses. Unit 2 experienced a similar 'D' SG MSIV failure and manual reactor trip on July 26, 1997. The root cause of the previous MSIV failure was attributed to a Digital Optical Isolator (DOI) failure in the seal-in circuitry associated with the MSIV open switch pushbutton. The DOI failure essentially disrupted or opened the seal-in circuit and allowed the solenoid valves on the MSIV actuator to vent air, causing the MSIV to close. The licensee tested the DOIs (4 per MSIV, 16 total including the failed DOI) in the control circuitry for all four Unit 2 MSIVs and determined that no other DOI had failed. They replaced the failed DOI before restarting from the July 26 trip. The root cause of the August 17 MSIV failure has been attributed to voltage spikes on the output of another DOI in the same seal-in circuit associated with the 2D SG MSIV open switch pushbutton. The licensee has determined that the cause of the DOI failures in both events was the failure of resistors within the DOIs. The first failure was instantaneous, whereas the second failure involved a degraded voltage output (spiking). Following the August 17 failure, the licensee tested all DOIs in the Unit 2 MSIVs' control circuitry using a modified testing methodology that would reveal, over time, voltage oscillations indicative of the second failure type. No other degraded MSIV DOIs were identified, although five were replaced because they were of the same purchase vintage as the first DOI that failed. The removed DOIs were tested successfully after they were removed, as were the replacement DOIs after they were installed in the field application. REGION II MORNING REPORT PAGE 5 AUGUST 19, 1997 MR Number: 2-97-0065 (cont.) Catawba Unit 2 was restarted on August 18. The licensee is continuing their root cause investigation of the DOI resistor failures. In the interim, weekly testing of Unit 2 and Unit 1 MSIV DOIs will be performed using the modified method. The licensee plans to develop procedures to govern the online testing of the MSIV DOIs (using the modified method) and subsequent online replacement of degraded DOIs, if necessary. Regional Action: The Resident Inspectors and a Region II electrical inspector continue to review the DOI problems for root cause of the failures and any generic implications. Contact: S. SHAEFFER (404)562-4510 _