Headquarters Daily Report JUNE 11, 1997 *************************************************************************** REPORT NEGATIVE NO INPUT ATTACHED INPUT RECEIVED RECEIVED HEADQUARTERS û REGION I û REGION II û REGION III û REGION IV û PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - HEADQUARTERS JUNE 11, 1997 MR Number: H-97-0068 NRR DAILY REPORT ITEM SIGNIFICANT EVENTS Subject: Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit 2 - Potential Loss of Cooling Capability Due to Inability to Remove Noncondensable Gases On April 29, 1997, the NRR/AEOD/RES Events Assessment Panel classified the potential loss of cooling capability due to inability to remove noncondensable gases at Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit No. 2 (BVPS-2), as a Significant Event for the Performance Indicator Program. On December 2, 1996, sealant was injected into the Head Vent System (HVS) at BVPS-2, to stop leakage of ~15 drops per minute from a blind flange downstream of a 1-inch flow gage isolation valve. Following the leak repair, the reactor was restarted on December 3, 1996. Subsequently, as a result of concerns raised by the NRC regarding the leak tightness of several valves upstream of the valve that was repaired, BVPS-2 was shutdown and the upstream valves leak tested. During this leak testing, it was discovered that one of two parallel downstream valves would not fully stroke. Subsequent investigations determined that the sealant had migrated to the downstream portions of the HVS and had partially plugged one of these valves. Disassembly of the HVS disclosed that almost twice the amount of leak sealant specified in the maintenance work order had been injected into the valve (11 in3 vs 6 in3) and that the injected material was improper for the valve operating conditions. Use of the improper seal material resulted in its failure to harden. This event had two primary causes. First, the licensee's engineering staff provided incorrect information to the vendor performing the repair. Engineers specified operating pressure and temperature instead of the actual conditions under which the repair would be made (close to ambient). As a result, the wrong sealant material was used. Second, the licensee's oversight of vendor activities was inadequate. The licensee performed an inadequate review of vendor procedures and did not exercise sufficient command and control of vendor activities in the field. Specifically, there was no monitoring of the quantity of sealant injected, the injection pressure of the sealant, or the location of the injection port location. Over an extended time interval, the sealant would have hardened, potentially preventing the opening of the HVS flow control valves and venting of noncondensable gases from the vessel head. This would impair the ability of the reactor coolant system to remove decay heat during an accident. Contact: William F. Burton, NRR/DRPM/PECB (301) 415-2853 _ REGION III MORNING REPORT PAGE 2 JUNE 11, 1997 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Commonwealth Edison Co. MR Number: 3-97-0076 Braidwood 1 2 Date: 06/09/97 Braceville,Illinois SRI PC Dockets: 50-456,50-457 PWR/W-4-LP,PWR/W-4-LP Subject: BORIC ACID SILL RESULTS IN AN INOPERABLE AUXILIARY FEED WATER PUMP Discussion: On June 9, 1997, the licensee attempted to drain the Unit 1 boric acid storage tank (BAST) that overflowed the BAST room floor pit then ran across the floor and through a floor penetration resulting in dousing the 2B diesel driven auxiliary feed water (AFW) pump. Upon discovery, the licensee declared the 2B AFW pump inoperable, secured draining the BAST, commenced a cleanup and evaluation of the affect on the AFW pump. This resulted from inadequate planning by not checking the BAST floor pit that was later found to have no drain line. The BAST room filled with several thousand gallons of water that found its way to the 2B AFW pump room below through a floor penetration for the engine exhaust that had the fire/flooding seal missing resulting in dousing the AFW pump and several other pieces of equipment. The licensee declared the auxiliary feed water pump inoperable at 7:04 a.m. which put the unit into a 72-hour LCO. The licensee is currently developing an inspection and testing plan to return the pump to service and verifying other equipment was not adversely effected. Regional Action: The resident inspectors have inspected the rooms and equipment, interviewed operators and engineers, and are following the licensee's corrective action plan progress. Contact: ROGER LANKSBURY (630)829-9631 _ REGION III MORNING REPORT PAGE 3 JUNE 11, 1997 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Wisconsin Public Service Corp. MR Number: 3-97-0077 Kewaunee 1 Date: 06/10/97 Kewaunee,Wisconsin SRI Dockets: 50-305 PWR/W-2-LP Subject: REACTOR STARTUP FOLLOWING EXTENDED OUTAGE Discussion: The reactor was started up June 10 following an extended refueling outage. The outage began September 21, 1996, and was originally scheduled to be completed October 26, 1996. Outage duration was extended when difficulties were encountered in the repair of sleeved steam generator tubes. The unit is expected to be placed onto the grid late Thursday, June 12, 1997. Regional Action: Routine resident inspector followup. Contact: M. J. JORDAN (630)829-9637 _ HEADQUARTERS MORNING REPORT PAGE 4 JUNE 11, 1997 MR Number: H-97-0069 NRR DAILY REPORT ITEM GENERIC COMMUNICATIONS NRC Information Notice 97-33, "Unanticipated Effect of Ventilation System on Tank Level Indications and Engineering Safety Features Actuation System Setpoint," dated June 11, 1997. The NRC is issuing this information notice to alert addressees to the potential to affect instrumentation output for certain transmitters by varying ambient pressure with the operation of plant ventilation equipment. Technical contacts: Phil Harrell, RIV (817) 860-8250 Lee Keller, RIV (504) 783-6253 Charles D. Petrone, NRR 301-415-1027 NRC Information Notice 97-34, "Deficiencies in Licensee Submittals Regarding Terminology for Radiological Emergency Action Levels in Accordance with the New Part 20," dated June 12, 1997. The NRC is issuing this information notice to inform addressees of the issuance of a revised Appendix I to NUREG-0849, "Standard Review Plan for the Review and Evaluation of Emergency Plans for Research and Test Reactors." Technical contact: Lawrence K. Cohen, NRR 301-415-2923 _