Headquarters Daily Report MARCH 10, 1997 *************************************************************************** REPORT NEGATIVE NO INPUT ATTACHED INPUT RECEIVED RECEIVED HEADQUARTERS û REGION I û REGION II û REGION III û REGION IV û PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - REGION II MARCH 10, 1997 Licensee/Facility: Notification: General Electric Company MR Number: 2-97-0015 Nuclear Energy Production Date: 03/10/97 Wilmington,North Carolina Dockets: 00701113 License No: SNM-1097 Subject: SHIPPING CONTAINERS MARKED EMPTY FOUND TO CONTAIN MATERIAL Discussion: On March 6, 1997, the General Electric fuel fabrication facility in Wilmington, NC received a 40 foot long tamper-safed shipping container from Empresa Nacional del Uranio, SA (ENUSA) in Spain. The shipping papers indicated the container held 150 empty BU-J shipping containers. As GE began unloading the shipping container on March 7, they observed that two of the inner BU-J containers were also tamper-safed with seals that appeared to belong to the shipper, ENUSA. Upon opening the two BU-J containers, GE found two 5-gallon containers in each. In BU-J container M3171, the cans were labeled as containing 16.5 kilograms (kgs) and containing 4.4 kgs. In BU-J container M3200 the cans were labeled as containing 22.1 kgs and containing 19.7 kgs. It is not clear at this point whether the weights refer to the oxide or uranium contents. During a radiation survey, GE found 4000 disintegrations per minute per 100 square centimeters of alpha contamination on the outside of one of the 5-gallon cans, but the outsides of the BU-Js and the 40 foot container were clean. GE found no moisture in the BU-Js and there was no damage to the containers. On March 7 at 4:15 pm, GE notified the NRC of the above information. GE tamper-safed the 5-gallon cans and placed them in quarantine. Subsequently GE found another BU-J containing material by performing radiation surveys on the containers and notified the NRC at 8:55 pm on March 7. The third BU-J did not have a tamper seal in place but did have a piece of wire through the bolt as if the seal had been broken. At approximately 8 pm on March 7, ENUSA notified GE that a review of their records indicated that a third BU-J had been shipped; this was the container that GE had identified by radiation surveys. The third BU-J was quarantined without opening. Once GE has obtained sufficient information from ENUSA to safely handle the material, they will prepare a Temporary Operating Instruction to cover the work. ENUSA had intended to ship this material at a later date for recovery. ENUSA is licensed to possess uranium oxide up to 5 percent enrichment. The ENUSA records for this material is that it has enrichments of 3.95 percent and 4.4 percent, and is scrap material to be recovered. ENUSA informed GE that they have notified CSN (the Spanish regulatory agency) and EURATOM. The Department of Transportation has been notified. Regional Action: Region II will review the GE and ENUSA incident reports during the next routine inspection. REGION II MORNING REPORT PAGE 2 MARCH 10, 1997 MR Number: 2-97-0015 (cont.) Contact: G. L. Troup (404)331-5566 _ REGION II MORNING REPORT PAGE 2 MARCH 10, 1997 Licensee/Facility: Notification: MR Number: 2-97-0016 Nutting Engineers Of Florida, Inc. Date: 03/10/97 Boynton Beach,Florida License No: 934-1 Subject: MISSING TROXLER GAUGE FOUND Reportable Event Number: 31889 Discussion: The State of Florida notified NRC, Region II that the Troxler device reported missing on March 4, 1997 had been located. Another contractor working at the temporary job site during the same time period, found the Troxler device and notified the manufacturer. Troxler (the manufacturer) in turn notified the State of Florida and the Licensee that the device had been found. The State reported that the device had been returned to the Licensee, and the issue has been turned over to their Headquarters Office in Tallahassee for follow up actions. Contact: R.L. Woodruff (404)331-5545 _ REGION IV MORNING REPORT PAGE 3 MARCH 10, 1997 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Entergy Operations, Inc. MR Number: 4-97-0027 Waterford 3 Date: 03/09/97 Killona,Louisiana SRI via telephone Dockets: 50-382 PWR/CE Subject: INCORRECT RWSP LEVEL INDICATION Reportable Event Number: 31917 Discussion: This information updates and clarifies the information provided in the report issued for Event Number 31917 on March 9, 1997. The licensee discovered that the starting and stopping of either of the two trains of a ventilation system (CVA) would cause the indication for the reactor water storage pool (RWSP) level to vary. Upon investigation of the cause of this phenomenon, the licensee identified that the reference leg for the RWSP Rosemont level transmitter was vented to one room; whereas, the vent for the RWSP was located in another room. Whenever a CVA train was stopped or started, it would cause a change in the ambient pressure in the room where the transmitter reference leg was located, which in turn resulted in the transmitter sensing a change in the reference leg and this caused a change in the indicated level. To quantify the amount of level change that was experienced, the licensee performed a number of tests with the normal and emergency ventilation systems in operation. As a result, it was noted that, with two trains of CVA in operation, the indicated level would drop below the allowed value provided in the Technical Specifications (TS). This level error is of concern because, under certain accident conditions, the suction for the safety injection pumps may not switch from the RWSP to the containment sump in time to prevent a potential loss of net positive suction head to the pumps. If only one train was in operation, the allowed value would be maintained. To ensure that acceptable indication would be maintained, the licensee disabled one train of CVA such that it would not operate and entered the corresponding 7-day action statement. The licensee is in the process of recalibrating the level transmitters such that they will actuate switchover at the appropriate level. This is an interim action, as a permanent plant modification will be installed in the near future to route the vent of the transmitter to the same room that contains the vent for the RWSP. Regional Action: Routine followup of the licensee's corrective actions. Contact: Greg Pick (817)860-8270 Greg Werner (817)860-8269 _