Headquarters Daily Report DECEMBER 08, 1997 *************************************************************************** REPORT NEGATIVE NO INPUT ATTACHED INPUT RECEIVED RECEIVED HEADQUARTERS û REGION I û REGION II û REGION III û REGION IV û PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - REGION I DEC. 08, 1997 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Public Service Electric & Gas Co. MR Number: 1-97-0062 Hope Creek 1 Date: 12/08/97 Hancocks Bridge,New Jersey SRI PC Dockets: 50-354 BWR/GE-4 Subject: HOPE CREEK TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.0.3. SHUTDOWN Reportable Event Number: 33356 Discussion: On December 5, 1997, with the plant in Operational Condition (OPCON) 1 at 18 percent power, during a restart from RFO7, operators commenced a plant shutdown in accordance with TS 3.0.3 because of the simultaneous inoperability of the high pressure coolant injection (HPCI) and the reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) systems. Both systems failed TS-required 18 month inservice pump tests at normal reactor plant operating pressure. Both systems had passed their low pressure operability runs earlier in the week. The RCIC system was declared inoperable at 5:29 a.m. on December 5 when the turbine governor valve failed to respond to control room demand signals. The HPCI system was manually tripped off-line at 2:03 p.m. at the request of a field operator who detected rubbing and high vibration on a turbine gland seal. Since the Hope Creek TS do not permit OPCON 1 operation with both HPCI and RCIC inoperable, operators reduced reactor power and pressure to the point at which the associated LCO's do not apply. Within six hours, the plant was stabilized at 3 percent power and 135 psig in OPCON 2. As of December 8, the reactor plant conditions remain essentially the same. Through the weekend, licensee personnel developed and implemented detailed fact finding and troubleshooting plans. PSE and G currently believes that the RCIC failure was attributed to thermal growth of the governor valve stem (Inconel) and carbon steel spacers in the packing gland causing interference and "sticking." Improper adjustments of the linkage between the hydraulic servo and the governor valve were also identified. As for the HPCI system, maintenance personnel are continuing to evaluate as-found conditions (i.e. measuring bearing clearances, analyzing vibration data, etc.). PSE and G has contracted an outside HPCI/RCIC system expert to assist in problem diagnosis and resolution. Hope Creek operators do not expect to operationally test either system or resume plant start up activities for at least another 24 hours. Regional Action: Routine resident inspector follow up. Contact: Scott A. Morris (609)935-3850 James C. Linville (610)337-5129 _ REGION I MORNING REPORT PAGE 2 DECEMBER 8, 1997 Licensee/Facility: Notification: New York Power Authority MR Number: 1-97-0064 Fitz Patrick 1 Date: 12/08/97 Lycoming,New York SRI PC Dockets: 50-333 BWR/GE-4 Subject: MAINTENANCE OUTAGE Discussion: On December 6, 1997 the plant began reducing power to shutdown for a scheduled maintenance outage and was in cold shutdown at 4:00 a.m. on December 8, 1997. The major reason for the shutdown was to replace 3 safety relief valve (SRV) pilot assemblies and one SRV main body which were leaking. Additional activities include the replacement of the recirculation pump A and B seal purge flow control valves, recirculation motor generator and control rod drive maintenance; and other preventive maintenance. The plant is scheduled to return to service on December 12, 1997. Regional Action: The resident inspectors observed the plant shutdown and are monitoring plant activities. Contact: Gordon Hunegs (315)342-4907 Richard Barkley (610)337-5065 _ REGION II MORNING REPORT PAGE 3 DECEMBER 8, 1997 Licensee/Facility: Notification: MR Number: 2-97-0089 Birmingham Steel Date: 12/08/97 Birmingham,Alabama Subject: RADIATION ALARM FROM RAIL CAR EXITING STEEL MILL Discussion: On December 2, 1997, the NRC was informed by the State of Alabama that Birmingham Steel reported to them that a railroad car loaded with bag house dust set off a radiation monitor alarm. The rail car was isolated on-site at the Birmingham facility for further evaluation. A consultant responded to Birmingham Steel to perform surveys. Contamination was detected in the rail car and the bag house, but not in the rest of the facility. Samples collected by the consultant showed the dust to be contaminated with cesium-137. The facility was shut down on the night of December 2 for the removal of the contaminated dust from the bag house, and the brick liners in the kiln were replaced. The facility was restarted, and all bag house dust is being collected in hoppers and analyzed for contamination. The contaminated dust is being collected in secured, covered rail cars. Two Radiation Specialists from the Alabama Division of Radiation Control responded to the site on December 3 and performed surveys, and collected samples for analyses. The State samples confirmed that the bag house dust was contaminated with cesium-137 ranging from 50 to 100 picocuries per gram. The samples also contained trace amounts of americium-241 and the State is following up with additional surveys and evaluation of the slag materials to determine if there is any other contamination. Regional Action: Region II will continue to coordinate with the State. Contact: R. Woodruff (404)562-4704 _ REGION III MORNING REPORT PAGE 4 DECEMBER 8, 1997 Licensee/Facility: Notification: MR Number: 3-97-0117 Cancer Treatment Center Partners Date: 12/05/97 Wooster,Ohio VIA TELEPHONE Dockets: 03030843 Subject: AECL THERATRON 780 TELETHERAPY UNIT MALFUNCTION Discussion: The licensee reported that a patient receiving a treatment using a Theratron model 780 Co-60 teletherapy unit was overexposed when the unit failed to retract the source into the safe position. The patient was receiving the third of twenty prescribed treatment fractions at 200 cGy per fraction. The licensee approximates that the patient received an additional 30 seconds of exposure as a result of the incident, which resulted in approximately 30 cGy greater than the 200 prescribed. This did not result in a misadministration. The licensee secured the room and performed surveys of surrounding unrestricted areas to verify radiation levels were at safe levels, and called the manufacturer for assistance in returning the source to the safe position. A representative of the manufacturer arrived in the evening of December 5, 1997, and successfully returned the source to its shielded position. The cause of the malfunction was determined to be a failure of the cord reel, which is a component of the source retraction mechanism. The licensee will not treat patients until the unit is repaired. After repair, a full calibration will be performed. Regional Action: This event will be reviewed further during the next routine inspection. Contact: KEVIN NULL (630)829-9854 JOHN MADERA (630)829-9834 _