Headquarters Daily Report JANUARY 06, 1997 *************************************************************************** REPORT NEGATIVE NO INPUT ATTACHED INPUT RECEIVED RECEIVED HEADQUARTERS û REGION I û REGION II û REGION III û REGION IV û PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - HEADQUARTERS JANUARY 6, 1997 MR Number: H-97-0002 NRR DAILY REPORT ITEM SIGNIFICANT EVENTS Subject: REACTOR SCRAM WITH LOSS OF BALANCE OF PLANT LOADS AND RUPTURE OF TURBINE RUPTURE DISK AT FITZPATRICK The NRR/AEOD/RES Events Assessment Panel on November 26, 1996, classified the reactor scram and Notification of an Unusual Event of September 16, 1996, as a Significant Event. The classification was based upon a reactor scram with complications. At 1:10 p.m. on September 16, 1996, a reactor scram occurred at the FitzPatrick Nuclear Plant. An I&C technician inadvertently energized a protective relay which caused the generator output breakers to open which led to the scram. This relay also prevented a fast transfer of the plant electrical buses to reserve power. This led to a loss of balance of plant loads including the circulating water pumps. Condenser vacuum was lost and the condenser became pressurized until the low pressure turbine and feedwater pump steam rupture discs ruptured and released steam to the turbine building. A notification of an Unusual Event was declared based on indication of main turbine seal failure. After an initial decrease in reactor vessel level, High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) and Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) automatically initiated on the lowering level and restored level. Reactor vessel level was subsequently maintained with RCIC. Overall, operators responded well to the event with some exceptions and all safety-related equipment functioned as required with the exception of the D RHR pump breaker which failed to close. The trip was caused by human error. The recovery was complicated by several events including: (1) the slower residual transfer of plant buses which resulted in loss of balance of plant loads, (2) rupture of a low pressure turbine and reactor feed pump rupture disc which resulted in filling the turbine building with steam, a small unmonitored release, and activation of some fire sprinklers, (3) loss of and delayed recovery of the Uninterruptible Power supply bus which caused the loss of the plant address system, security computer, and some control room indications, (4) misdiagnosis of the loss of control room full core display which led to the deenergization of the reactor protection system buses and (5) failure of the D RHR pump. Despite these complications, adequate inventory control and heat removal were maintained at all times during the event and were never threatened. All safety systems functioned as designed with the exception of the failure of one of the four RHR pumps. The D RHR pump was subsequently recovered during the event. The Probabilistic Safety Assessment Branch modeled this event and calculated a conditional core damage probability of 6.4E-6. CONTACT: John R. Tappert, NRR/DRPM/PECB (301) 415-1167 HEADQUARTERS MORNING REPORT PAGE 2 JANUARY 6, 1997 MR Number: H-97-0002 (cont.) _ REGION III MORNING REPORT PAGE 2 JANUARY 6, 1997 Licensee/Facility: Notification: MR Number: 3-97-0001 Abb Industrial Systems, Inc. Date: 12/04/96 Columbus,Ohio VIA INCOMING TELEPHONE CALL Dockets: 03020479 License No: 34-00255-03 Subject: FINAL UPDATE ON TWO SEALED SOURCES MISSING IN INTERNATIONAL SHIPMENTS, (PRELIMINARY NOTIFICATION NO. PNO-III-96-071) Discussion: On December 4, 1996, the licensee reported that a 70 millicurie strontium-90 and 25 millicurie krypton-85 sealed source were lost and/or missing. Both sources were shipped to China in November 1996, however, they never reached their intended destination. The event was documented in Preliminary Notification No. PNO-III-96-071 issued on December 6, 1996. On December 11, 1996, the Corporate Radiation Safety Officer (CRSO) telephoned Region III to report that they just received information that the 70 millicurie strontium-90 source arrived in Mainland China, however, the krypton-85 source was still missing. Subsequently, on January 3, 1997, Region III received a telephone call from the CRSO to report that they received information that the missing 25 millicurie krypton-85 source had also arrived in Mainland China and is accounted for. Therefore, it has now been verified by licensee representatives that both sealed sources reported missing have now been accounted for and are at there final destination in Mainland China. Regional Action: Region I, Office of International Programs and NMSS were notified. Contact: DARREL WIEDEMAN (630)829-9808 JOHN MADERA (630)829-9834 _