Headquarters Daily Report FEBRUARY 06, 1997 *************************************************************************** REPORT NEGATIVE NO INPUT ATTACHED INPUT RECEIVED RECEIVED HEADQUARTERS û REGION I û REGION II û REGION III û REGION IV û PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - REGION III FEB. 06, 1997 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Commonwealth Edison Co. MR Number: 3-97-0018 Dresden 3 Date: 02/05/97 Morris,Illinois SRI VIA PHONE Dockets: 50-249 BWR/GE-3 Subject: UNIT 3 CORE FLOW CALIBRATION Discussion: Dresden Unit 3 was in a power ascension following a forced outage. On February 5, 1997, while performing flow calibration, the licensee determined that the indicated total core flow (WT) was significantly below actual; indicated was 75.8 Mlbm/hr, actual was 92.0 Mlbm/hr. Preliminary evaluation by the licensee indicated that all thermal limits remained within analyzed and approved limits at all times during the startup. The licensee was aware that the core flow calibration would reveal a discrepancy between indicated and actual flow, but did not expect such a large magnitude. The licensee placed a hold on reactivity maneuvers on both units and formed an investigation team to evaluate the event. Regional Action: The resident inspectors are monitoring the licensee's investigation. Contact: P. L. HILAND (630)829-9603 _ REGION III MORNING REPORT PAGE 2 FEBRUARY 6, 1997 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Wisconsin Electric Power Co. MR Number: 3-97-0019 Point Beach 1 2 Date: 02/06/97 Two Rivers,Wisconsin 10 CFR 50.72 REPORT Dockets: 50-266,50-301 PWR/W-2-LP,PWR/W-2-LP Subject: SAFETY INJECTION PUMP TRIP DURING LOOP-SI TESTING Reportable Event Number: 31737 Discussion: The licensee identified that on February 4, 1997, the Unit 2 #2P15A High Head Safety Injection Pump tripped during the performance of the Operation Refueling Test-3 (ORT-3) for safety injection (SI) with loss of engineered safeguards AC power (LOOP-SI). The trip appeared to be caused by an overcurrent condition resulting from the operation of the related emergency diesel generator (EDG) under light load with droop permanently set on the EDG governor. This condition also exists on the "A" train for Unit 1; therefore, the licensee declared the Unit 1 "A" train SI pump inoperable and entered a three day limiting condition for operation. The Unit 1 "B" train SI pump was not affected by this condition because the licensee relies on a recently installed EDG with a different governor controller and on a different SI pump trip relay scheme. An operational safety team inspection (OSTI) was performed at Point Beach during December 2-20, 1996. During that inspection, the OSTI identified an apparent violation concerning the licensee's failure to test its EDGs under full load conditions during LOOP-SI testing. They also raised concerns about routinely operating the EDGs with droop permanently set on the governors. Although the licensee begin testing its EDGs under full load conditions which resulted in the identification of this problem, they choose to continue to operate the older EDGs with droop. To address the immediate concern, the licensee is planning to raise the overcurrent alarm and time delay setpoint to account for the higher current that occurs when the SI pump is operated with a lightly loaded EDG with droop. The licensee also plans to re-review its policy of operating the older EDGs with droop permanently set. Regional Action: The Region has assigned a senior electrical specialist to review this event and the licensee's corrective actions. In addition, resident inspectors and regional management are monitoring the licensee's investigation. Contact: JAMES MCCORMICK-BARG (630)829-9872 _ REGION IV MORNING REPORT PAGE 3 FEBRUARY 6, 1997 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Arizona Public Service Co. MR Number: 4-97-0015 Palo Verde 1 2 3 Date: 02/06/97 Wintersburg,Arizona Licensee notified the SRI Dockets: 50-528,50-529,50-530 PWR/CE80,PWR/CE80,PWR/CE80 Subject: MANAGEMENT ORGANIZATION CHANGE AT ARIZONA PUBLIC SERVICE CO. Discussion: Arizona Public Service Co. has decided to eliminate the position of Vice President, Nuclear Support, which will be vacated by Mr. Jack Bailey, effective February 10, 1997. Effective February 10, 1997, the following persons currently reporting to Mr. Bailey will report as follows: Mr. John Velotta, Director of Nuclear Training, will report to Mr. Gregg Overbeck, Vice President of Nuclear Production. Mr. Craig Seaman, Director of Emergency Services and Ms. Angela Krainik, Department Leader of Regulatory Affairs will report directly to Mr. James Levine, Senior Vice President, Nuclear. Regional Action: Information purposes only. Contact: D. Kirsch (510)975-0290 K. Johnston (602)386-3638 _