Headquarters Daily Report JUNE 03, 1997 *************************************************************************** REPORT NEGATIVE NO INPUT ATTACHED INPUT RECEIVED RECEIVED HEADQUARTERS û REGION I û REGION II û REGION III û REGION IV û PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - HEADQUARTERS JUNE 3, 1997 MR Number: H-97-0063 NRR DAILY REPORT ITEM SIGNIFICANT EVENTS Subject: OCONEE, UNIT 2 - UNISOLABLE PRESSURE BOUNDARY LEAK CLASSIFIED AS A SIGNIFICANT EVENT The NRR/AEOD/RES Events Assessment Panel on May 20, 1997, classified the Oconee, Unit 2, unisolable pressure boundary leak as a Significant Event for the Performance Indicator Program. The significant event classification was based on the licensee's programmatic failures, including weaknesses in their high pressure injection (HPI) line augmented inspection program, that resulted in an unisolable pressure boundary leak. Unisolable pressure boundary leakage is a precursor to a loss of coolant accident. The circumferential crack in the weld between the pipe and safe-end of the HPI line nozzle assembly extended 360 degrees around the inside diameter. Approximately 70 degrees of the crack was through-wall. In 1982, a similar leak had occurred at Crystal River. The Crystal River event was the subject of Information Notice 82-09, "Cracking in Piping of Makeup Coolant Lines at B&W Plants." Inspections performed at other B&W plants, including Oconee, revealed similar cracking. This problem was determined to be generic. Generic Issue (GI) 69, "Make-up Nozzle Cracking in B&W Plants" resulted. Generic Letter 85-20 documented the resolution of GI- 69. The resolution called for the implementation of augmented inspections of the HPI nozzle assemblies at B&W plants. The Oconee licensee failed to fully implement his commitments for augmented inspections. Of those aspects of the inspection program that were implemented, significant process inadequacies were determined to have existed. A special inspection team was dispatched to the site to review this event. This event was the subject of Operating Reactors Events Briefing No. 97-05, held on May 21, 1997. An information notice, which is in final concurrence, has been drafted describing this event. Additional generic action is being considered. This event is viewed as "significant" for the performance indicators program. The licensee's programmatic failures, including weaknesses in their HPI augmented inspection program, resulted in an unisolable pressure boundary leak. Contact: E. Nick Fields, NRR/DRPM/PECB (301) 415-1173 _ HEADQUARTERS MORNING REPORT PAGE 2 JUNE 3, 1997 MR Number: H-97-0064 NRR DAILY REPORT ITEM SIGNIFICANT EVENTS Subject: OCONEE, UNIT 3 - FAILURE OF NON-SAFETY LEVEL INSTRUMENTATION AND SUBSEQUENT LOSS OF HIGH PRESSURE INJECTION PUMPS The NRR/AEOD/RES Events Assessment Panel on May 20, 1997, classified the Oconee, Unit 3, failure of non-safety level instrumentation and subsequent loss of high pressure injection pumps as a Significant Event for the Performance Indicator Program. The significant event classification was based on the potential risk implications of the event and programmatic weaknesses in the licensee's management of the plant. Two high-pressure-injection (HPI) pumps were damaged as a result of an inaccurate letdown storage tank (LDST) level-sensing system. The inaccuracy was caused by a drained reference leg that was shared by both trains of level instrumentation. As a result, the displayed level was significantly higher than actual level resulting in the pumps taking suction on an empty tank. During an actual safety injection actuation, the suction isolation valve to the LDST remains open while the suction isolation valve to the borated water storage tank (BWST) opens on the safety injection signal. All three HPI pumps receive a start signal and take suction on both the LDST and the BWST. With the two tanks cross-tied, the potential existed for the loss of all HPI pumps as a result of gas binding. Loss of all three HPI pumps could complicate the successful mitigation of a loss of coolant accident. Alternate methods for addressing the accident would be required. Loss of all HPI pumps would also result in the loss of normal reactor coolant pump seal injection, normal RCS makeup, and normal boration. A Region II augmented inspection team was dispatched to the site to review this event. This event was also the subject of Operating Reactors Events Briefing No. 97-05, presented May 21, 1997. An information notice, which is in final concurrence, has been drafted describing this event. This event is viewed as "significant" for the performance indicator program. Additional generic action is being considered. Contact: E. Nick Fields, NRR/DRPM/PECB (301) 415-1173 _ REGION II MORNING REPORT PAGE 3 JUNE 3, 1997 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Duke Power Co. MR Number: 2-97-0044 Oconee 1 2 3 Date: 06/03/97 Seneca,South Carolina Dockets: 50-269,50-270,50-287 PWR/B&W-L-LP,PWR/B&W-L-LP,PWR/B&W-L-LP Duke Power Co. Mc Guire 1 2 Cornelius,North Carolina Dockets: 50-369,50-370 PWR/W-4-LP,PWR/W-4-LP Subject: DUKE POWER COMPANY MANAGEMENT CHANGES - UPDATE Discussion: This is an update to the Duke Power Company management changes addressed in Morning Report 2-97-0040. Effective July 1, 1997, Mr. Mano Nazar (most recently McGuire Maintenance Superintendent) will fill the position of Oconee Engineering Manager being vacated by Mr. Joe Davis. Similarly, Ron Jones (currently McGuire Operations Superintendent) will assume the Catawba Station Manager position when Mr. Gary Peterson becomes the Catawba Site Vice President. In turn, Mr. Ashok Bhatnager (currently Catawba Operations Superintendent) will take over Mr. Jones' position at McGuire and Mr. Mike Glover (currently Catawba Mechanical Systems Engineering Manager) will replace Mr. Bhatnager. Regional Action: N/A Contact: R. CARROLL (404)562-4511 _