Headquarters Daily Report DECEMBER 03, 1997 *************************************************************************** REPORT NEGATIVE NO INPUT ATTACHED INPUT RECEIVED RECEIVED HEADQUARTERS û REGION I û REGION II û REGION III û REGION IV û PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - HEADQUARTERS NOV. 26, 1997 MR Number: H-97-0146 NRR DAILY REPORT ITEM GENERIC COMMUNICATIONS NRC Information Notice 97-82, "Inadvertent Control Room Halon Actuation Due to a Camera Flash," dated November 28, 1997. The NRC is issuing this information notice to alert addressees to an inadvertent actuation of the Halon fire suppression system inside the control room at the Haddam Neck Plant. Technical contacts: Richard J. Conte, RI E. L. (Monte) Conner, RI (610) 337-5183 (610) 337-5399 Patrick M. Madden, NRR Chuck Petrone, NRR 301-415-2854 301-415-1027 Eric J. Lee, NRR 301-415-3201 _ REGION IV MORNING REPORT PAGE 2 NOVEMBER 26, 1997 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Entergy Operations, Inc. MR Number: 4-97-0090 Grand Gulf 1 Date: 11/26/97 Port Gibson,Mississippi Resident Inspector Dockets: 50-416 BWR/GE-6 Subject: CONTAMINATION EVENT AND UNMONITORED RELEASE Discussion: At approximately 6 p.m. on November 24, 1997, two workers who were exiting the protected area alarmed the portal monitors at the security access point. The individuals had contamination on their shoes. Licensee investigation traced the contamination to the area around the condensate storage tank, where a skid mounted hydro laser unit was set up. This hydro laser had been used to provide wash water in the cask wash area of the spent fuel pool. The licensee suspects that a small quantity of water may have siphoned from the spent fuel pool the previous Friday. The hydro laser wand had been lowered to the bottom of the cask wash area. Pressurized water was supplied to the wand to stir up sediment in order that it could be vacuumed from the cask wash area. At one point, the wand began floating towards the surface. The pressurized water was secured for approximately a 2-minute time period. The licensee believes that during this 2-minute period the static head from the spent fuel pool may have caused a siphon effect to occur. The licensee estimated that the amount of contaminated water that could have migrated outside the radiological controlled access area onto the concrete and gravel area was less than 7 gallons. Surveys of the area found contamination levels as high as 60,000 counts per minute. This was the result of a direct frisk of a foot pedal for the hydro laser unit. The smearable contamination level for this pedal was approximately 30,000 disintegrations per minute. The licensee roped off the area as a contamination area. Surveys detected contamination in a gravel area at a nearby storm drain. Upon opening the drain cover and performing a large area survey in the drain, the licensee detected contamination levels in the range of 1,500 disintegrations per minute. This indicated that there was likely an unmonitored release from the radiological controlled access area. The drain flows to a hold up basin on site, outside the protected area on the owner controlled area. The water from the hold up basin eventually flows to the river. There has not been any rain since Friday. There was no work in the area over the weekend. The licensee has implemented interim measures in anticipation of rain. The measures included sealing the concrete surfaces by painting and digging up and removing contaminated rocks and gravel around the drain. Regional Action: The resident inspectors will continue to follow up on the licensee's investigation of this event and corrective actions. REGION IV MORNING REPORT PAGE 3 NOVEMBER 26, 1997 MR Number: 4-97-0090 (cont.) Contact: Kathy Weaver (601)437-4620 David Corporandy (510)975-0319 Tom Andrews (817)860-8242 _ REGION III MORNING REPORT PAGE 3 NOVEMBER 26, 1997 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Northern States Power Co. MR Number: 3-97-0115 Monticello 1 Date: 11/26/97 Monticello,Minnesota SRI VIA PC Dockets: 50-263 BWR/GE-3 Subject: MANUAL REACTOR SCRAM DUE TO DECREASINGCONDENSER VACUUM Discussion: On November 25, 1997, at about 3:00 p.m., the electrical power supply breakers to non-safety related motor control centers 115, 116, 124, and 125 tripped. This resulted in a trip of the A and B recombiner trains and all offgas auxiliary systems. Control room operators immediately reduced reactor power from 100 percent to about 57 percent. With the recombiners inoperable, the operators were concerned with condenser vacuum. At 3:10 p.m., the operators inserted a manual reactor scram when it became apparent the power supply breakers would not be restored immediately. All systems responded as expected. Reactor vessel water level decreased to about 9 inches and resulted in a Containment Isolation Group II and Group III isolation. Water level returned to normal levels using the feedwater and condensate systems. Operators reset the reactor scram at about 3:20 p.m. The licensee decided to reduce reactor pressure to less than 600 psi to prevent a scram as condenser vacuum continued to decrease. However, at 4:49 p.m., the condenser vacuum approached the trip setpoint and operators inserted another manual scram since reactor pressure was greater than 600 psi. Preliminary investigation shows a phase to phase fault on the line from the power supply to motor control centers 115 and 124. These MCCs are located in the off-gas storage building. Regional Action: The residents were in the control room during this event and will monitor the licensee's root cause investigation and corrective actions. Contact: J. MCCORMICK-BARGER (630)829-9872 _ HEADQUARTERS MORNING REPORT PAGE 4 DECEMBER 1, 1997 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Part 21 Database MR Number: H-97-0147 General Electric Date: 12/01/97 Subject: Part 21 - Discrepancy between turbine control valve closing rate design requirement and system vendor manual Discussion: VENDOR: General Electric PT21 FILE NO: 97-83-0 DATE OF DOCUMENT: 10/29/97 ACCESSION NUMBER: 9711030239 SOURCE DOCUMENT: LETTER REVIEWER: PECB, J. Carter NEW ISSUE. The Clinton licensee reports a discrepancy between the GE design requirement and the vendor manual for the closing rate of the turbine control valves. _ HEADQUARTERS MORNING REPORT PAGE 5 DECEMBER 1, 1997 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Part 21 Database MR Number: H-97-0148 Limitorque Date: 12/01/97 Subject: Part 21 - Defective T-drains on environmentally qualified motor operated valves Discussion: VENDOR: Limitorque PT21 FILE NO: 97-84-0 DATE OF DOCUMENT: 11/17/97 ACCESSION NUMBER: SOURCE DOCUMENT: EN 33273 REVIEWER: PECB, N. Fields NEW ISSUE. The Indian Pt. 2 licensee reports defective T-drains on environmentally qualified motor operated valves. The T-drains were not drilled through and would act as pipe plugs rather than pipe drains. _ REGION IV MORNING REPORT PAGE 6 DECEMBER 1, 1997 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Omaha Public Power District MR Number: 4-97-0091 Ft Calhoun 1 Date: 12/01/97 Fort Calhoun,Nebraska SRI via telephone Dockets: 50-285 PWR/CE Subject: FIRE IN RELAY IN PRESSURIZER LEVEL CIRCUITRY Discussion: At approximately 5 a.m. (CST) on November 29, operators in the control room detected an odor similar to an electrical component overheating. During the subsequent investigation, at approximately 5:15 a.m., Relay AI4A-K11, inside control room Panel CB1,2,3 caught fire. It was extinguished within one minute with a hand-held fire extinguisher. Failure of this relay caused pressurizer level controller Channel X to fail low and resulted in the isolation of the letdown system. Operators selected the alternate channel of level control and restored letdown to service. The relay was subsequently replaced and the pressurizer level control system was restored to normal operation. The failed relay was a continuously energized, 120 VAC, General Electric relay, Model CR120A. The licensee is evaluating the cause of the relay failure and any generic implications. Regional Action: The resident inspectors are monitoring the licensee's followup actions. Contact: Wayne Walker (402)426-9611 William Johnson (817)860-8148 _ REGION IV MORNING REPORT PAGE 7 DECEMBER 1, 1997 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Wolf Creek Nuclear Oper. Corp. MR Number: 4-97-0092 Wolf Creek 1 Date: 12/01/97 Burlington,Kansas Senior Resident Inspector Dockets: 50-482 PWR/W-4-LP Subject: RESTART FROM REFUELING OUTAGE Reportable Event Number: 33325 Discussion: At 5:39 a.m. (CST), on December 1, 1997, the main generator output breakers were closed, ending the ninth refueling outage for Wolf Creek Generating Station. Major work accomplished during the outage included upgrade of the fuel transfer mechanism; seal replacement on a reactor coolant pump; replacement of the motor, pump, and seal on a second reactor coolant pump; overhaul of the turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump; inspection of Steam Generators A and D; refurbishment of a low pressure turbine and a main feedwater pump; and integrated safeguards testing. The reactor was taken critical at 10:17 p.m. on November 27 but was returned to Mode 3 at 2:45 a.m. on November 28 due to noise on a channel of the reactivity computer during physics testing. The reactor was taken critical again at 5:18 a.m. on November 28. At 2:37 p.m. on November 29, a reactor trip occurred from approximately 7 percent reactor power when an intermediate range channel spiked high (Event Notification 33325). The channel spiking was determined to be the result of the detector compensation voltage being set high in the normal range, causing unexpected spikes in detector output. The voltage was adjusted downward and the reactor was restarted at 6:22 p.m. on November 30. Regional Action: The resident inspectors are monitoring the licensee's followup activities, including the setting and adjusting of intermediate range compensating voltage. Contact: J. F. Ringwald (316)364-8653 W. D. Johnson (817)860-8148 _ REGION III MORNING REPORT PAGE 8 DECEMBER 2, 1997 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Northern States Power Co. MR Number: 3-97-0116 Monticello 1 Date: 12/02/97 Monticello,Minnesota SRI Dockets: 50-263 BWR/GE-3 Subject: UNIT STARTUP FROM 6-DAY FORCED OUTAGE Discussion: On December 1, 1997, the licensee initiated a Unit startup from a forced outage which began on November 25, 1997. The forced outage resulted from an electrical fault in power cables running from the plant to the off-gas storage building. At about 1:15 p.m. (CST), the Unit was made critical and is anticipated to be at 100 percent power later on December 2. During the 6-day forced outage, the licensee ran new cables from the plant to the off-gas storage building. Other work completed included repair of a packing leak on the high pressure coolant injection outboard isolation valve and replacement of the Number 15 intermediate range monitor (IRM) detector, the Number 16 IRM pre-amp, and 13 scram solenoid pilot valves. Regional Action: The residents observed numerous outage-related and startup activities. Contact: J. MCCORMICK-BARGER (630)829-9872 _