Headquarters Daily Report JANUARY 31, 1996 *************************************************************************** REPORT NEGATIVE NO INPUT ATTACHED INPUT RECEIVED RECEIVED HEADQUARTERS û REGION I û REGION II û REGION III û REGION IV û PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - HEADQUARTERS JANUARY 31, 1996 MR Number: H-96-0009 NRR DAILY REPORT ITEM GENERIC COMMUNICATIONS NRC Information Notice 96-08, "Thermally Induced Pressure Locking of a High Pressure Coolant Injection Gate Valve," dated February 5, 1996. The NRC is issuing this information notice to alert addressees to a loss of operational capability and the recently discovered damage to the internal components of a safety-related power-operated gate valve, both apparently caused by thermally induced pressure locking. Technical contacts: Thomas G. Scarbrough, NRR (301) 415-2794 Howard J. Rathbun, NRR (301) 415-2787 Jerry Carter, NRR (301) 415-1153 _ REGION I MORNING REPORT PAGE 2 JANUARY 31, 1996 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Public Service Electric & Gas Co. MR Number: 1-96-0007 Hope Creek 1 Date: 01/30/96 Hancocks Bridge,New Jersey SRI Dockets: 50-354 BWR/GE-4 Subject: Degraded Insulation in Reactor Protection System Wiring Discussion: The licensee discovered degraded wiring associated with the K-14 relays in the reactor protection system (RPS). The unit is currently in a refueling outage. As part of a routine preventive maintenance activity, all of the K-14 relays were to be replaced. While conducting that activity, technicians discovered evidence of overheating, i.e., discoloration and embrittlement of wire insulation associated with the K-14 relays. The cause of the apparent overheating is still under review. Based on licensee discussions with GE, the original wire size was acceptable. The licensee believes that the heat was generated as a result of a high resistance contact at the terminations because of insufficient compression. The 16-gauge wire may also have been marginal for the current being carried. The licensee continues to evaluate the possible generic implications of this deficiency, and has elected to replace the original wire (16-gauge) with new (14-gauge) wire to improve current carrying characteristics and ensure better compression at the contact termination. Regional Action: Follow-up will be performed by a region-based inspector. Contact: Robert Summers (609)935-3850 William Lazarus (610)337-5231 _ REGION I MORNING REPORT PAGE 3 JANUARY 31, 1996 Licensee/Facility: Notification: MR Number: 1-96-0008 Itec Date: 01/31/96 Labelle,Pennsylvania Dockets: 99990001 License No: General Discussion: On January 18, 1996, a Region I inspector visited the ITEC facility in Labelle, Pennsylvania, to examine the security of generally licensed fixed gauges on-site. The company is currently in bankruptcy proceedings and is closed with 24-hour security. An ex-employee knew of the location of six gauges and showed the inspector. One of the gauges was in a below-grade room which was flooded. The gauges were determined to contain cesium-137 and were manufactured by Kay Ray/Sensall. Subsequent telephone conversations with the manufacturer, installer of the gauges, and the trustee-in-bankruptcy determined that a total of 10 gauges had been installed in the plant of which nine are accounted for as of January 30, 1996, and two gauges are in the above mentioned below-grade room. The gauges contain 500 millicuries of cesium-137 each and the room has been flooded for about 5 months. The remaining 8 gauges contain 100 millicuries of cesium-137 each. Regional Action: Region I is continuing to work with the trustee-in-bankruptcy to ensure the safe disposal of the gauges. Contact: S. R. Courtemanche (610)337-5075 _ REGION III MORNING REPORT PAGE 4 JANUARY 31, 1996 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Consumers Power Co. MR Number: 3-96-0016 Palisades 1 Date: 01/31/96 Covert,Michigan RIII LAN Dockets: 50-255 PWR/CE Subject: PLANT START UP FOLLOWING FORCED OUTAGE Discussion: On January 30, 1996, the licensee initiated a plant startup following a forced outage to replace 2400 Vac power supply cables to the vital safeguards bus 1D. At 1:55 p.m. on January 30, 1996, the reactor was declared critical. The turbine was synchronized to the grid at 10:11 p.m. on January 30, 1996. As of 8:00 a.m. on January 31, 1996, the plant is online at 46 percent power. Regional Action: The resident inspectors were onsite and observed criticality and the power ascent. Contact: M.E. PARKER (616)764-8971 _ REGION III MORNING REPORT PAGE 5 JANUARY 31, 1996 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Commonwealth Edison Co. MR Number: 3-96-0017 Zion 2 Date: 01/31/96 Zion,Illinois SRI VIA PC Dockets: 50-304 PWR/W-4-LP Subject: AUXILIARY FEEDWATER EVENTS Discussion: On January 29, with reactor power at approximately 1 percent, operators noted an indicated auxiliary feedwater flow of 104 gpm to the 2A steam generator (T.S. minimum flow requirements are 105 gpm). However, in reviewing the morning status report prepared by the Headquarters Duty Officer, it was noted that the licensee reported that although low auxiliary feedwater flows were being experienced, those flow values were acceptable per technical specification. The resident inspectors questioned the licensee on this and were later informed that the information provided to the Headquarters Duty Officer was incorrect. Unit 2 was actually in a 72-hour LCO action statement as required by Technical Specification 3.7.2. This low flow condition has since been corrected. Following resolution of the low auxiliary feedwater flow, the licensee was performing a return to service run on the 2B motor-driven auxiliary feedwater pump to verify flow indications. While performing this evolution, level in the 2A steam generator increased to 70 percent narrow range causing a P14, "steam generator high level," turbine trip/main feedwater pump isolation signal to be generated. In discussion with the Shift Engineer, the inspectors were informed that the operating shift had recognized the potential to generate the P14 prior to performing the surveillance. Following recovery from this event, the licensee commenced a flow balancing evolution on the 2A turbine-drive auxiliary feedwater pump. While starting the pump, the pump tripped. The apparent cause was due to a sticking governor valve. Unit 2 is currently in a 7-day action statement for the inoperable feedwater pump. Regional Action: The resident inspectors are following up on various questions raised by these events and the licensee's investigation into the root cause of these events. Contact: L.F. MILLER, JR. (708)829-9629 _