Headquarters Daily Report OCTOBER 31, 1996 *************************************************************************** REPORT NEGATIVE NO INPUT ATTACHED INPUT RECEIVED RECEIVED HEADQUARTERS û REGION I û REGION II û REGION III û REGION IV û PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - HEADQUARTERS OCTOBER 31, 1996 MR Number: H-96-0081 NRR DAILY REPORT ITEM SIGNIFICANT EVENTS Subject: HEATER DRAIN STEAM LINE RUPTURE AND SIGNIFICANT INJURY TO PLANT STAFF AT OCONEE, UNIT 2, CLASSIFIED AS A SIGNIFICANT EVENT On October 15, 1996, the NRR/AEOD/RES Events Assessment Panel classified the heater drain steam line break and significant injury to plant staff at Oconee, Unit 2, as a Significant Event. Classification was based on the programmatic failure evidenced by the continued inattention to water hammer events at similar locations and inadequate corrective actions that prevailed for almost two years. On September 24, 1996, an 18-inch second stage reheater drain line ruptured while the plant staff was manually aligning heater drain tank water from main condenser to feedwater heaters. The line to feedwater heaters was very long and it had loop seals that contained water at room temperature, and water steam mixtures. The licensee believes that when the feedwater heater valves were opened, the water and steam in the loop seals flowed backwards to the main condenser. It is hypothesized that collapsing steam in colder pipes further accelerated the water in the loop seals and the collision of the water slug with the upstream water caused the rupture. Seven members of the licensee staff suffered significant injury and four of them remained in critical condition for several weeks. The augmented inspection team concluded that a history of water hammer events at these and similar locations were not appropriately addressed, and the licensee had not provided sufficient guidelines to avoid water hammer based on the past successful performance of this plant evolution. The other two operating units were shutdown based on the indications of similar vulnerability. CONTACT: T. Koshy, NRR/DRPM/PECB (301) 415-1176 _ HEADQUARTERS MORNING REPORT PAGE 2 OCTOBER 31, 1996 MR Number: H-96-0082 NRR DAILY REPORT ITEM GENERIC COMMUNICATIONS NRC Information Notice 96-57, "Incident-Reporting Requirements Involving Intakes, During a 24-Hour Period That May Cause a Total Effective Dose Equivalent in Excess of 0.05 Sv (5 rem)," dated October 30, 1996. The NRC is issuing this information notice to remind recipients of certain incident notification requirements found in 10 CFR 20.2202(b)(1)(i) relating to intakes received during a 24-hour period that may cause a Total Effective Dose Equivalent in excess of 0.05 Sv (5 rem). Technical contacts: Cynthia G. Jones, NMSS (301) 415-7853 James E. Wigginton, NRR (301) 415-1059 NRC Information Notice 95-59, "Potential Degradation of Post Loss-of-Coolant Recirculation Capability as a Result of Debris," dated October 30, 1996. The NRC is issuing this information notice to alert addressees that the suppression pool and associated components of two boiling-water reactors have been found to contain foreign objects that could have impaired successful operation of emergency safety systems using water from the suppression pool. Technical contacts: Richard Lobel, NRR (301) 415-2865 Jerry Carter, NRR (301) 415-1153 _ REGION I MORNING REPORT PAGE 3 OCTOBER 31, 1996 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Consolidated Edison Co. Of N.Y. MR Number: 1-96-0097 Indian Point 2 Date: 10/31/96 Buchanan,New York SRI PC Dockets: 50-247 PWR/W-4-LP Subject: GRID DISTURBANCE IN NEW YORK CITY AREA Discussion: On October 30, 1996, a disturbance on the 345kV grid caused a radiation monitor to spike, resulting a containment isolation (EN 31247) and the temporary loss of some minor balance of plant equipment at Indian Point 2. The disturbance, which affected both Indian Point 2 and 3, was caused by a fire in the Sprain Brook substation in Yonkers, New York. Both plants remained on line. Indian Point 3 also experienced the tripping of various plant support equipment, including the spent fuel pump, the primary auxiliaries building ventilation system, hot penetration blowers, and some balance of plant equipment. Power was restored to all equipment within several minutes. No increase in spent fuel pool temperature was noted. The plant was at 70 percent power to support instrumentation troubleshooting and work on the main generator foundation, and remained at that power level during the initial event and during a period of grid instability that followed. Regional Action: The resident inspectors will review any licensee follow-up action for this event. Contact: Curtis Cowgill (610)337-5233 _ REGION II MORNING REPORT PAGE 4 OCTOBER 31, 1996 Licensee/Facility: Notification: MR Number: 2-96-0107 Baxter Healthcare Date: 10/31/96 Aibonito,Puerto Rico Dockets: 03019882 License No: 52-21175-01 Subject: SAFETY INTERLOCK DISABLED ON ROOF PLUG Discussion: On October 29, 1996, Region II inspectors identified that two roof plug interlock switches had been disabled at the licensee's facility in Puerto Rico. The facility is an irradiator room with approximately 4 million curies of cobalt-60. The sources are raised and lowered into a pool of water for storage. The roof plug switches are part of the safety system to assure that the sources return to safe storage in the pool if the roof plug is removed. Two wires from the roof plug interlock switches were found to be disconnected, and the roof plug interlock wires leading to the control console were spliced, bypassing the failed switches. The roof plug is removed once a year for Co-60 replacement and was in place at the time of the discovery. The roof plug was last removed during source replacement in December of 1995. In addition to the disabled interlocks, NRC found two failed switches during testing of the safety system for product carrier collision with the source rack. The licensee, in consultation with the irradiator manufacturer, replaced the defective switches during the inspection, restoring operability to the safety systems. Regional Action: Region II inspectors verified that safety systems were operational during the inspection. Region II is issuing a Confirmatory Action Letter to the licensee on October 31, 1996. Contact: J. POTTER (404)331-5571 _ REGION II MORNING REPORT PAGE 5 OCTOBER 31, 1996 Licensee/Facility: Notification: MR Number: 2-96-0108 General Electric Co. Date: 10/31/96 Wilmington,North Carolina Dockets: 07001113 License No: SNM-1097 URANIUM FUEL FABRICATION Subject: URANIUM MATERIAL ACCUMULATION IN VENTILATION Reportable Event Number: 31249 Discussion: On October 30, 1996, the licensee reported, to the NRC Operations Center, the discovery of the accumulation of material, containing, uranium-235, in ductwork downstream from a process scrubber. The scrubber is used to remove uranium that may be exhausted into the ductwork from centrifuge operations in the chemical processing area. The ductwork is first six inches and then becomes eight inches in diameter. The events that lead to the discovery are recounted below. On October 28, 1996, a radiation protection technician observed discoloration on the filter of a stationary air sampler in the chemical processing area. When maintenance checked the adjacent process ventilation exhaust lines on October 29, 1996, they found the duct downstream partially blocked. Approximately 16 kilograms of material were removed from the six inch duct. An additional 11.6 kilograms of material were removed from the eight inch duct. The quantity of uranium in this material was estimated to be 16.6 kilograms of approximately three percent uranium-235. Licensee examination of the process exhaust scrubber revealed that the water spray nozzle was partially plugged, reducing the efficiency. The scrubber and ductwork on the other, four process lines were inspected. Two spray nozzles were partially plugged and one nozzle was not installed properly. Material removed from the various ducts ranged from two kilograms to 17.4 kilograms total weight. As corrective actions, the licensee cleaned all nozzles and installed them properly. An inspection of the scrubber water flow each shift was initiated. Process lines restarted on the evening of October 30, 1996. In response to the air sampler discoloration, the licensee, has determined that individuals were not exposed to higher than normal airborne levels of uranium. Regional Action: The Region will review the licensee's incident investigation report and corrective actions during the next routine inspection. Contact: G. L. Troup (404)331-5566 _ REGION II MORNING REPORT PAGE 6 OCTOBER 31, 1996 Licensee/Facility: Notification: MR Number: 2-96-0109 Portsmouth General Hospital Date: 10/31/96 Portsmouth,Virginia License No: 45-09102-02 Subject: MISSING CESIUM 137 SOURCE Reportable Event Number: 31244 Discussion: On October 30, 1996, the licensee notified the NRC Headquarters Operations Center of a missing radioactive instrument calibration source, containing 142 microCuries of cesium 137. The source was last accounted for during an audit performed by the licensee's consultant on July 15, 1996. The cesium 137 is incorporated in an epoxy resin contained in a plastic vial that is one and one half inches in diameter and four inches long. Radiation levels from the source are approximately 0.04 millirem per hour at one meter. The licensee is continuing to search for the source. Regional Action: Region II will followup on the licensee's action, including an onsite inspection. The Commonwealth of Virginia has been notified. Contact: C. Hosey (404)331-5614 _ REGION III MORNING REPORT PAGE 7 OCTOBER 31, 1996 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Toledo Edison Co. MR Number: 3-96-0114 Davis Besse 1 Date: 10/30/96 Oak Harbor,Ohio VIA RESIDENT PC/TELECON Dockets: 50-346 PWR/B&W-R-LP Subject: EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE DISCOVERED IN OWNER CONTROLLED AREA Discussion: On October 30, 1996, plant personnel discovered what appeared to be undetonated explosive ordnance in the owner controlled area. The ordnance involved 11 shells/projectiles that were found in a marsh area near the edge of Lake Erie, the closest shell being approximately 500 yards from the plant's protected area. The ordnance was identified during an emergency preparedness drill when a radiation monitoring team (RMT) entered the marsh area to collect samples and noted the shells/projectiles. The licensee postulates that the ordnance was from nearby Camp Perry's artillery test range. Since World War II, artillery has been fired from Camp Perry to a target area in Lake Erie a short distance from Davis-Besse. As a result, shrapnel and unexploded ordnance occupy the lake bottom near the plant site. Because of lake currents, etc., some of the submerged ordnance has gradually shifted towards the shoreline. In addition, due to high wind conditions at the time of discovery, Lake Erie water level had receded sufficiently to expose the subject ordnance. Similar findings along the lakeshore or in the nearby Toussaint River have been made in the last several years. Following discovery of the shells/projectiles, plant security cordoned off the areas, conducted additional inspections of the shoreline, and restricted access to the marsh. The explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) unit at Wright- Patterson Air Force Base was contacted and a group of explosives experts were dispatched to disposition the discovered items. Upon arrival, the EOD unit was able to characterize the 11 rounds as follows: 2-106mm, 2-155mm, and 7 bazooka (rocket) type rounds. The ordnance was subsequently detonated in 5 separate explosions, indicating that at least several of the rounds were live. Regional Action: The Resident Inspectors monitored the licensee's followup actions. The inspectors also verified that detonation of the ordnance would not adversely impact plant operation. Contact: J. M. JACOBSON (630)829-9736 _ REGION IV MORNING REPORT PAGE 8 OCTOBER 31, 1996 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Arizona Public Service Co. MR Number: 4-96-0113 Palo Verde 1 2 3 Date: 10/31/96 Wintersburg,Arizona Phone Call from Resident Inspector Dockets: 50-528,50-529,50-530 PWR/CE80,PWR/CE80,PWR/CE80 Subject: MANAGEMENT CHANGES AND FUTURE STAFFING LEVELS Discussion: On October 15, 1996, Arizona Public Service Company announced that Dave Smith had been selected to the position of Operations Director at the Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station. The position had been vacated by the promotion of Bill Ide to Vice President, Nuclear Engineering. Mr. Smith had been the Outage Director at Palo Verde. Terry Radtke will replace Mr. Smith as the Outage Director. Arizona Public Service also announced future Palo Verde staffing levels to be in place by the end of 1998. Through attrition, staffing levels at Palo Verde will decrease by 291 to a future staff level of 2236. Regional Action: This morning report is submitted for information. Contact: D. Kirsch (510)975-0290 K. Johnston (602)386-3638 _