Headquarters Daily Report JULY 29, 1996 *************************************************************************** REPORT NEGATIVE NO INPUT ATTACHED INPUT RECEIVED RECEIVED HEADQUARTERS û REGION I û REGION II û REGION III û REGION IV û PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - REGION I JULY 29, 1996 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. MR Number: 1-96-0071 Nine Mile Point 1 Date: 07/29/96 Lycoming,New York SRI PC Dockets: 50-220 BWR/GE-2 Subject: FORCED OUTAGE TO REPAIR SHAFT-DRIVEN FEEDWATER PUMP Discussion: At 12:21 a.m. on July 29, 1996, Nine Mile Point Unit 1 commenced a normal reactor shutdown to inspect and repair the friction clutch and Philadelphia gear on the shaft-driven feedwater pump. Initial drywell entry occurred at approximately 1:00 a.m. to repair an inoperable SRV acoustic monitor and thermocouple. On July 19, 1996, the shaft-driven feedwater pump was secured as a result of a scheduled power reduction to inspect and clean the main turbine condenser water box. On the morning of July 22, the shaft-driven feedwater pump failed to adequately engage with the friction clutch, resulting in the inability to achieve required speed (RPM). Since that time, the unit has been operating at approximately 45 percent rated thermal power. Additional work during the forced outage includes repacking of a main steam isolation valve, steam leak repairs, stub tube inspections, and packing adjustment and testing of core spray isolation MOVs. The licensee anticipates the duration of the outage to be approximately 88 hours, with a planned startup on Thursday, August 1. Regional Action: The resident staff is following the forced outage and monitoring licensee activities. Contact: Terry Beltz (315)342-4041 Thomas Moslak (610)337-5290 _ REGION IV MORNING REPORT PAGE 2 JULY 29, 1996 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Arizona Public Service Co. MR Number: 4-96-0083 Palo Verde 1 2 3 Date: 07/25/96 Wintersburg,Arizona Call from RIs Dockets: 50-528,50-529,50-530 PWR/CE80,PWR/CE80,PWR/CE80 Subject: POTENTIAL COMMON MODE FAILURE OF TWO OF FIVE OFFSITE POWER LINES Discussion: The licensee discovered that a 500 KV power line was installed over Palo Verde's Westwing 1 and 2 power lines at a location approximately 20 miles northeast of the Palo Verde site. Accordingly, the licensee postulated that a common single failure could cause the failure of both Westwing lines. The Palo Verde site is serviced by five offsite lines, including the two Westwing lines. The licensee's Updated Final Safety Analysis Report analyzes the failure of one offsite line and, accordingly, the common failure of two lines is not postulated. The licensee is reviewing the potential for the 500 KV line to fall and short both the Westwing lines. Technical Specifications require two offsite power sources. Therefore, the three remaining sources, in the event of losing the Westwing lines, still satisfy Technical Specification requirements. The licensee is analyzing the capability of the remaining three lines to carry the combined full power electrical output of Palo Verde and the effects on Palo Verde with the postulated sudden loss of the Westwing lines. The licensee is continuing to review this issue to identify an appropriate resolution. Regional Action: The Region will coordinate with NRR to monitor the licensee's resolution of this issue. Contact: D. Kirsch (510)975-0290 K. Johnston (602)386-3638 _