Headquarters Daily Report AUGUST 29, 1996 *************************************************************************** REPORT NEGATIVE NO INPUT ATTACHED INPUT RECEIVED RECEIVED HEADQUARTERS û REGION I û REGION II û REGION III û REGION IV û PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - HEADQUARTERS AUGUST 19, 1996 MR Number: H-96-0063 NRR DAILY REPORT ITEM GENERIC COMMUNICATIONS NRC Information Notice 96-48, "Motor-Operated Valve Performance Issues," dated August 21, 1996. The NRC is issuing this information notice to alert addressees to (1) lessons learned from the Electric Power Research Institute Motor-Operated Valve (MOV) Performance Prediction Program, (2) performance problems with MOV key failures described in a recent NRC Office for Analysis and Evaluation of Operation Data study, and (3) the potential for torque output from MOV actuators to be less than predicted by Limitorque Corporation. Technical contacts: Thomas G. Scarbrough, NRR Chuck Hsu, AEOD (301) 415-2794 (301) 415-6356 Michael T. Bugg, RIII (630) 829-9500 _ REGION III MORNING REPORT PAGE 2 AUGUST 19, 1996 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Commonwealth Edison Co. MR Number: 3-96-0087 Zion 1 Date: 08/18/96 Zion,Illinois SRI VIA PC Dockets: 50-295 PWR/W-4-LP Subject: TURBINE TRIP AND REACTOR TRIP DUE TO LOW LEVEL IN THE "D" STEAM GENERATOR Discussion: On August 18, 1996, at 1133 hours (CDT), Unit 1 tripped on low steam generator level when the 1D MSIV partially closed during quarterly surveillance testing. Steam generator level shrunk to less than the low-low steam generator water level reactor trip setpoint which caused a reactor trip and a subsequent turbine trip. All equipment performed as expected with two exceptions. The rod bottom lights for the D-4 and C-11 control rods came in slow and there was slow response by pressurizer level controller, 1LR-459. The slow rod bottom lights for control rods D-14 and C-11 were subsequently determined to be a problem with the rod position indication system. During the trip transient, pressure surges in the Unit 1 heater drain tank (HDT) caused its rupture disk to rupture. The 1D MSIV test failure was determined to be a failed NAMCO limit switch. The licensee is currently inspecting the other three MSIV NAMCO limit switches. The licensee is working on the HDT rupture disk replacement and plans to restart the unit Tuesday evening. Regional Action: The resident staff are continuing to followup the licensee's investigation and assessment of equipment failures. Contact: L.F. MILLER, JR. (630)829-9629 _ REGION III MORNING REPORT PAGE 3 AUGUST 19, 1996 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Commonwealth Edison Co. MR Number: 3-96-0088 Zion 1 2 Date: 08/19/96 Zion,Illinois SRI Dockets: 50-295,50-304 PWR/W-4-LP,PWR/W-4-LP Subject: OVERFLOW OF LAKE DISCHARGE TANK (LDT) Discussion: On Friday, Aug 16, 1996, at 8:30 p.m. (CDT) approximately 7000 gallons of slightly contaminated water overflowed from the OB lake discharge tank (LDT) to the auxiliary building (AB) floor. When an LDT overflows, it is hard piped to a 200 gal sump. When the sump is full, it causes the floor drains to backup. The overflow was caused by an operator's inattention to detail by failure to close the lake discharge tank inlet isolation valve 0WD- 0118. Regional Action: The resident staff is continuing to followup the licensee's investigation and assessment of the incident. Contact: L.F. MILLER, JR. (630)829-9629 _ REGION IV MORNING REPORT PAGE 4 AUGUST 20, 1996 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Entergy Operations, Inc. MR Number: 4-96-0090 Grand Gulf 1 Date: 08/19/96 Port Gibson,Mississippi PHONE CALL FROM SRI Dockets: 50-416 BWR/GE-6 Subject: END OF SECURITY PERSONNEL STRIKE Discussion: On August 16, 1996, the licensee announced the end of the contractor security personnel strike, which had been in effect since April 7, 1996. Strike contingency plans were implemented at the onset of the labor dispute, which included the hiring of replacement workers. Legal proceedings between the security contractor (Wackenhut) and the Union are still continuing; however, an agreement between the two has been reached to allow the bargaining unit employees to return to work as a result of the employees submitting a written request to return to work unconditionally. Picket lines and signs were removed on August 15. The returning employees must be recertified due to expired qualifications and training. Replacement workers will be let go as union workers return. Regional Action: Inspection followup planned. Contact: J. Tedrow (601)437-4620 _ REGION I MORNING REPORT PAGE 5 AUGUST 21, 1996 Licensee/Facility: Notification: MR Number: 1-96-0080 Dupont Merck Pharmaceutical Co. Date: 08/16/96 North Billerica,Massachusetts Dockets: 03032013 License No: 20-28598-01 Subject: POTENTIAL EXPOSURE IN EXCESS OF 10 CFR 20.1201 Discussion: DuPont Merck radiation safety staff reported on August 16, 1996, a potential exposure in excess of 10 CFR 20.1201 occupational dose limits. Weekly dosimetry results for the week of July 29 to August 4, 1996, indicated an exposure to a badge of 5.53 rem. The dosimetry processor characterized the exposure as from high energy penetrating radiation. DuPont Merck radiation safety staff are in the process of investigating the exposure. The investigation includes: 1) simulating potential exposure scenarios to high energy penetrating radiation; 2) evaluating the potentially exposed employee's work conditions; and 3) interviewing various personnel including the employee and the employee's supervisor. Regional Action: Region I is following the licensee's investigation and will determine the need for further action upon receipt of the licensee's required 30-day report of the incident. Contact: PENNY LANZISERA (610)337-5169 _ REGION III MORNING REPORT PAGE 6 AUGUST 23, 1996 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Wisconsin Electric Power Co. MR Number: 3-96-0089 Point Beach 1 2 Date: 08/23/96 Two Rivers,Wisconsin VIA RI E-MAIL Dockets: 50-266,50-301 PWR/W-2-LP,PWR/W-2-LP Subject: STAND-DOWN DAY DUE TO DECLINING PERFORMANCE Discussion: Licensee management conducted an "All hands" stand-down on 8/23/96. The stand-down involved all plant personnel with the exception of the minimum station complement necessary to continue operation of both units. In addition, corporate personnel with Point Beach responsibilities were included as well. The purpose of the stand-down was to discuss recent declines in station performance and was conducted at an offsite location. Regional Action: The Resident Inspectors observed portions of the meetings. Contact: M. L. DAPAS (630)829-9628 _ REGION IV MORNING REPORT PAGE 7 AUGUST 26, 1996 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Washington Public Power Supply System MR Number: 4-96-0091 Washington Nuclear 2 Date: 08/26/96 Richland,Washington U. S. General Accounting Office Dockets: 50-397 BWR/GE-5 Subject: VISIT FROM U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNT OFFICE REPRESENTATIVES Discussion: Two representatives from the U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO), Messrs. John Cass and William Swick, will visit the WNP-2 site on August 27 and 28, 1996. The GAO representatives will interview licensee representatives and the resident inspectors. The purpose of the visit is to review the effectiveness of the NRC regulatory inspection program. Regional Action: The resident inspectors will support the visit. Contact: R. Barr (509)377-2627 D. Corporandy (510)975-0319 _ REGION I MORNING REPORT PAGE 8 AUGUST 26, 1996 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Maine Yankee Atomic Power Co. MR Number: 1-96-0081 Maine Yankee 1 Date: 08/26/96 Wiscasset,Maine SRI PC Dockets: 50-309 PWR/CE Subject: CONTAMINATED STEEL SUPPLIED TO MAINE YANKEE Discussion: On August 22, 1996, the radiological controls staff at Maine Yankee Atomic Power Station identified low level Co-60 and Cs-137 radioactivity in an approximately 100 square foot piece of 1/2 inch thick steel. The radioactivity appeared to be uniformly distributed in the metal with no associated smearable activity. Direct measurements showed 100-150 net counts per minute (above background) with an end window GM probe, and no measurable gamma or beta dose rates using an ion chamber. The radioactivity was identified during an attempt to remove a piece of the steel from a work shop located in the radiologically controlled area. Review by the licensee determined that the steel was obtained in 1993 from an offsite vendor (Dubose Industrial Products) located in Clinton, North Carolina. The vendor apparently obtained if from an as yet undetermined manufacturer potentially located in NRC Region IV. Maine Yankee has implemented appropriate radiological controls for the material, and has initiated investigations to evaluate potential exposures and to determine what company was actually the original supplier of the steel. Regional Action: Routine Resident Followup. NRC Region II and IV were contacted for possible followup. The State of North Carolina has been informed. Contact: Jimi Yerokun (207)882-7519 Randy Ragland (610)337-5083 _ REGION II MORNING REPORT PAGE 9 AUGUST 27, 1996 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Duke Power Co. MR Number: 2-96-0067 Oconee 1 2 3 Date: 08/27/96 Seneca,South Carolina Dockets: 50-269,50-270,50-287 PWR/B&W-L-LP,PWR/B&W-L-LP,PWR/B&W-L-LP Subject: CONGRESSIONAL VISIT AT OCONEE Discussion: United States Congressman Lindsey Graham from South Carolina is scheduled to be at the Oconee Nuclear Station today (August 27, 1996). As a guest of Duke Power Company, the Congressman will tour the plant and the licensee's independent spent fuel storage facility. Regional Action: The Office of Congressional Affairs has been notified. Contact: R. CARROLL (404)331-5543 _ REGION II MORNING REPORT PAGE 10 AUGUST 27, 1996 Licensee/Facility: Notification: South Carolina Electric & Gas Co. MR Number: 2-96-0068 Summer 1 Date: 08/27/96 Jenkinsville,South Carolina Dockets: 50-395 PWR/W-3-LP Subject: MR. JOHN L. SKOLDS NAMED PRESIDENT AND COO OF SOUTH CAROLINA ELECTRIC & GAS COMPANY (SCE&G) Discussion: Mr. John L. (Jack) Skolds has been elected President and Chief Operating Officer of SCE&G. Mr. Skolds will succeed Bruce D. Kenyon, who has resigned effective September 1, 1996, to become President and Chief Executive Officer of Northeast Nuclear Energy Co., the nuclear power subsidiary of Northeast Utilities System. Mr. Skolds was previously Senior Vice President for Generation for SCE&G. In this new position, he will be responsible for the utility company's day-to-day operations. His previous position as the Senior Vice President for Generation may not be filled. Regional Action: Information only. Contact: G. Belisle (404)331-4196 _ HEADQUARTERS MORNING REPORT PAGE 11 AUGUST 28, 1996 MR Number: H-96-0064 NRR DAILY REPORT ITEM GENERIC COMMUNICATIONS NRC Information Notice 96-49, "Thermally Induced Pressurization of Nuclear Power Facility Piping," dated August 20, 1996. The U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing this information notice to alert addressees to a number of scenarios reported by licensees that involve thermal expansion of fluid in closed piping that could lead to overpressurization of the piping and either degraded operability or loss of function of safety systems. Technical contacts: Jerry Carter, NRR (301) 415-1153 Bill Long, NRR (301) 415-3026 _ REGION I MORNING REPORT PAGE 12 AUGUST 28, 1996 Licensee/Facility: Notification: MR Number: 1-96-0082 Applied Health Physics, Inc. Date: 08/28/96 Bethel Park,Pennsylvania Dockets: 03010859 License No: 37-14600-01 Subject: IRS SEIZES APPLIED HEALTH PHYSICS' BANK ACCOUNTS Discussion: On August 27, 1996, Applied Health Physics, Inc. (AHP), a radioactive waste broker located in Bethel Park, Pennsylvania, informed the NRC that a shipment of 18 drums of radioactive waste scheduled for August 27 would not be accomplished because the IRS had seized AHP's bank accounts. The NRC issued a Confirmatory Order to AHP on March 29, 1996, as a result of the firm's possession of approximately 30 containers of radioactive waste and its declaration of bankruptcy. The Order compelled AHP to establish an escrow account within 30 days and to set aside money into this account for the sole purpose of disposal of the radioactive waste. Since the IRS seized AHP's accounts, AHP cannot use this money for the scheduled disposal. AHP informed the NRC that the escrow account is not a checking account and therefore the money was transferred to its checking account in order to pay for the waste disposal. It was at this time that the IRS seized AHP's bank accounts. Regional Action: Region I has contacted the IRS about the proper way to handle this issue. Contact: Francis M. Costello (610)337-5275 _ REGION III MORNING REPORT PAGE 13 AUGUST 28, 1996 Licensee/Facility: Notification: MR Number: 3-96-0090 Shell Chemical Company Date: 08/25/96 Belpre,Ohio VIA TELEPHONE Dockets: 03005852 Subject: DAMAGE TO GAUGES INVOLVED IN FIRE AND EXPLOSION Discussion: This morning report updates the information in PN number PNO-III-96-054 concerning the damage to several fixed nuclear gauges involved in the fire and explosion at the licensee's facility. The licensee reported that on August 25, 1996, the fire and explosion at the facility may have damaged several 5 millicurie (185 MBq) cesium-137 gauges. A Region III inspector was dispatched to the site on August 26, 1996 and observed the licensee's contractor (gauge manufacturer) test the gauges and remove two 10 millicurie (370 MBq) cesium-137 fixed gauges. Both gauges showed extensive external heat and fire damage and it was determined that the shielding to both gauge shutters had melted along with a small amount of the source shield. Both gauges were leak tested and showed no excessive removable contamination. Both gauges were transported back to the manufacturer's facility (Ohmart) for disposal. No member of the public received radiation exposures as a result of this incident and no overexposures to the licensee's staff occurred. The licensee will submit a written report within 30 days. This information is current as of 10:00 a.m. (CDT) August 28, 1996. Contact: D. G. WIEDEMAN (630)829-9808 ROY CANIANO (630)829-9801 _ REGION IV MORNING REPORT PAGE 14 AUGUST 29, 1996 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Nebraska Public Power District MR Number: 4-96-0092 Cooper 1 Date: 08/28/96 Brownville,Nebraska SRI Dockets: 50-298 BWR/GE-4 Subject: RESIGNATION OF PLANT MANAGER Discussion: On August 28, 1996, John Herron, Plant Manager, Cooper Nuclear Station, announced that he would resign his position to assume the position of Plant Manager, Sequoyah Nuclear Station. He will assume the new position on September 6. The licensee has announced Mike Peckham to replace Mr. Herron as Plant Manager. Regional Action: For information only. Contact: M. H. Miller (402)825-3371 E. Collins (817)860-8291 _ REGION IV MORNING REPORT PAGE 15 AUGUST 29, 1996 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Houston Lighting & Power Co. MR Number: 4-96-0093 South Texas 1 2 Date: 08/28/96 Wadsworth,Texas Resident Inspectors Dockets: 50-498,50-499 PWR/W-4-LP,PWR/W-4-LP Subject: RESIGNATION OF GENERAL MANAGER OF GENERATION SUPPORT Discussion: On August 28, 1996, the licensee informed the Resident Inspectors that Mr. Lew Myers, the General Manager of Generation Support, has resigned and will be taking a postion as a Site Vice President at the Perry Nuclear Station. He will assume that position on September 6, 1996. Currently, the licensee has not indicated any replacement for Mr. Myers. Regional Action: For information purposes only. Contact: Joseph I. Tapia (817)860-8183 Ronald A. Kopriva (817)860-8104 _ REGION II MORNING REPORT PAGE 16 AUGUST 29, 1996 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Tennessee Valley Authority MR Number: 2-96-0069 Sequoyah 1 2 Date: 08/29/96 Soddy-Daisy,Tennessee Dockets: 50-327,50-328 PWR/W-4-LP,PWR/W-4-LP Subject: SEQUOYAH ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE EFFECTIVE SEPTEMBER 23, 1996 Discussion: Bob Adney, Sequoyah Site Vice President, announced the appointment of John Herron as the Sequoyah Plant Manager effective September 23, 1996. John Herron has 18 years experience in the commercial nuclear power industry at various management levels in operations, engineering, and technical support. Mr. Herron was most recently the Plant Manager at the Cooper Nuclear Station. Contact: Mark S. Lesser (404)331-0342 _ REGION II MORNING REPORT PAGE 17 AUGUST 29, 1996 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Virginia Power Co. MR Number: 2-96-0070 North Anna 1 Date: 08/29/96 Richmond,Virginia Dockets: 50-338 PWR/W-3-LP Subject: NORTH ANNA UNIT 1 REACTOR TRIP Reportable Event Number: 30928 Discussion: On August 27 at 10:04 a.m., North Anna Unit 1 tripped from 100 percent power on a high negative flux rate Reactor Protection System signal. All control rods inserted properly, and all safety systems performed as expected. The trip occurred when the B control bank was selected to perform a quarterly rod test. Subsequent investigation revealed that a logic card associated with the B control bank had failed, causing the B control bank rods to deenergize and fall into the core. The card was replaced on August 28, and the surveillance test which was being performed prior to the trip was successfully completed. In their response to Bulletin 96-01, the licensee did not commit to conduct control rod drop time testing at the current fuel assembly burnups. However, control rod drop time testing was performed on August 28 to verify that all control rods performed satisfactorily. The 10 CFR 50.72 report issued concerning this event also discussed an unexpected loss of condenser vacuum. Investigation revealed that steam pressure to the main turbine gland seals was not sufficient to prevent air inleakage through the seals. The reduced pressure was caused by an abnormal valve lineup in the turbine's gland steam system that had been implemented to compensate for leakage through the turbine stop and governor valve stems. Until the valves are repaired, the licensee plans to modify operating procedures to require that during future trips the valve lineup will be restored to the normal configuration. This action should preclude the loss of the main condenser as a heat sink during any future normal transients. The 10 CFR 50.72 report also discussed that a steam dump indication in the control room did not agree with the actual valve position. This indication problem was corrected by replacing a broken limit switch. The reactor went critical at 6:08 p.m. on August 28 and the unit was placed on-line at 2:43 a.m. on August 29. Regional Action: The Senior Resident Inspector responded to monitor the licensee's actions after the trip. Contact: A. Belisle (404)331-4196 _ REGION II MORNING REPORT PAGE 18 AUGUST 29, 1996 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Dubose National Energy Services, Inc. MR Number: 2-96-0071 Dubose National Energy Services Date: 08/29/96 Clinton,North Carolina Subject: FOLLOW UP ON CONTAMINATED STEEL Discussion: On July 26, 1996, Region I notified Region II that contaminated steel was reportedly found at the Maine Yankee Nuclear Plant, and the material was supplied by DuBose National Energy Services, Inc. in Clinton, North Carolina. Region II notified the State of North Carolina, Division of Radiation Protection, and the EPA Region IV Office in Atlanta. North Carolina responded to the event and reported that the steel originally came from Gulf States Steel located in Gadsden, Alabama, and was supplied to DuBose in June of 1993. A shipment was made to Maine Yankee in September 1993. DuBose still has two and a half sheets of the 1/4 inch steel remaining at their Clinton facility. The State performed an on-site survey of the steel at DuBose on August 28, 1996. Measurements were made with a Ludlum, Model 3 survey meter with a pancake probe, and a Ludlum Model 19 microR meter. The surface background levels of the steel was 3 to 5 microR per hour, as compared to 10 to 12 microR per hour background exterior to the building. Smears to detect contamination were also taken. Based upon the direct measurements and smear test results, the State determined the steel to be free of contamination. DuBose has provided a listing of the utilities that received shipments of steel from the suspect batch (heat number 7830138) from Gulf States Steel in June 1993. This information is being provided to Region I and EPA, Region IV Office in Atlanta. The State of Alabama, Division of Radiation Control, was also notified of the potential steel contamination. Alabama reported that the Gadsden facility had not reported any events of contamination, and the State was contacting the Gulf States Plant to confirm the information. Regional Action: Region II continues to follow the State's activities. Contact: R. L. Woodruff (404)331-5545 _