Headquarters Daily Report FEBRUARY 28, 1996 *************************************************************************** REPORT NEGATIVE NO INPUT ATTACHED INPUT RECEIVED RECEIVED HEADQUARTERS û REGION I û REGION II û REGION III û REGION IV û PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - HEADQUARTERS FEB. 28, 1996 MR Number: H-96-0016 NRR DAILY REPORT ITEM GENERIC COMMUNICATIONS NRC INFORMATION NOTICE 14: Degradation of Radwaste Facility Equipment at Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1, dated March 1, 1996. The NRC is issuing this information notice to discuss degradation of radwaste facility equipment at Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1. Technical contact: Egan Y. Wang, NRR (301) 415-1076 _ REGION I MORNING REPORT PAGE 2 FEBRUARY 28, 1996 Licensee/Facility: Notification: MR Number: 1-96-0014 Syncor Date: 02/28/96 Pittsburgh,Pennsylvania Dockets: 03015134 License No: 37-18467-01MD Subject: Possible Deliberate Contamination Discussion: During an inspection of the Syncor nuclear pharmacy in Pittsburgh, PA, on February 27, 1996, the inspector learned of a contamination incident which occurred on August 10, 1995. An employee discovered contamination levels of about 25,000 counts per minute on his hand while frisking at the end of his work shift. The contamination was believed to come from a lock on the employee's personal locker, which was located in an unrestricted area. Radiation levels measured that day from the lock were approximately 100 millirem per hour, and dropped to 10 millirem per hour the next day. Additional contamination was identified on items which the employee touched after using his locker near the end of his shift, but not on items the employee handled prior to that time. The licensee's investigation concluded that the contamination was technetium 99m, and most likely was deliberate, but was unable to identify the individual responsible. The licensee at the Pittsburgh facility, in conjunction with the corporate safety office in Ohio, took corrective actions that included issuing a memo to the staff about the incident and meeting with employees for re-training. Regional Action: Region I has requested the licensee's documentation of the incident and the dose assessment for the individual, and plans to follow-up on this issue. Contact: E. Ullrich (601)337-5040 _ REGION I MORNING REPORT PAGE 3 FEBRUARY 28, 1996 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. MR Number: 1-96-0015 Nine Mile Point 1 2 Date: 02/28/96 Lycoming,New York Dockets: 50-220,50-410 BWR/GE-2,BWR/GE-5 Subject: Scram Time Testing - Unit 1 Discussion: Due to recent concerns associated with the increase in 5% scram insertion times demonstrated by scram solenoid valves equipped with VITON diaphragms, Nine Mile Point Unit 1 initiated at-power testing of selected control rods. At power scram insertion time testing is not performed at Unit 1, since the Technical Specifications (TS) do not contain testing requirements. The testing being performed was in response to a BWR Owner's Group initiative and commenced following 312 days of continuous plant service. Sixty-four of the one hundred and twenty nine controls rods at Unit 1 are equipped with scram solenoid valves containing the suspect VITON diaphragms. Seven suspect control rods were tested on February 23, 1996, with three control rods exceeding the 0.398 second TS requirement for 5% scram insertion. The average 5% scram insertion time for the seven rods tested was 0.393 seconds. The VITON exhaust diaphragms on the scram solenoid valves for the three control rods that exceeded the TS requirement were replaced, and retested satisfactorily. On February 24, 1996, four more suspect control rods were tested. The 5% scram insertion time for all four control rods exceeded the 0.398 Technical Specification, with an average 5% scram insertion time of 0.453 seconds. The scram solenoid valve exhaust diaphragms for these control rods were also replaced. Based on the number of test failures, the licensee decided to abort the testing and replace all remaining VITON scram solenoid valves exhaust diaphragms. The scram solenoid valve exhaust diaphragm replacements are being performed at power, and as of February 27, 1996, new exhaust diaphragms were installed and successfully retested for 43 control rods. The licensee completed the scram solenoid valve exhaust diaphragm replacement of the affected control rods on February 28, 1996. Licensee review of the test data indicates that scram insertion time limits for 20%, 50% and 90% were not exceeded, nor was a shutdown Action Statement required to be entered. Additionally, the licensee determined from the tested control rods that the Technical Specification for the average scram time for 5% insertion of all operable control rods of 0.375 seconds would not have been exceeded. Nine Mile Point Unit 2 has the T-type scram solenoid valves and is not affected. Regional Action: The resident inspectors have observed testing and repair activities, as well as attended licensee management meetings held to address this issue. Contact: Richard Skokowski (315)342-4041 Harold Eichenholz (610)337-5225 _