Headquarters Daily Report JUNE 28, 1996 *************************************************************************** REPORT NEGATIVE NO INPUT ATTACHED INPUT RECEIVED RECEIVED HEADQUARTERS û REGION I û REGION II û REGION III û REGION IV û PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - HEADQUARTERS JUNE 28, 1996 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Agreement State Licensee MR Number: H-96-0051 Amersham International Date: 06/28/96 Chicago,Illinois Subject: CORROSION OF 316L STAINLESS STEEL SOURCES IN IRRADIATOR POOLS Discussion: On April 11, 1995, SteriGenics in Tustin, CA notified Amersham that a routine inspection by Nordion International found signs of corrosion on the cobalt-60 sources in their irradiator pool. The plant had sources supplied by Nordion and Amersham in their pool. A few sources were removed for examination. The Nordion sources exhibited some minor pitting corrosion however the Amersham sources exhibited more serious corrosion. NMSS became aware of the corrosion problem through routine interactions with Agreement States and vendors. NRC questions and concerns were submitted to the Illinois Department of Nuclear Safety (IDNS) on May 9, 1996. On June 7, 1996, members of the Sealed Source Safety Section met with representatives from IDNS and Amersham (an Illinois licensee). The purpose of the meeting was to discuss the root cause of the corrosion found on Amersham's 316L stainless steel irradiator sources used in Category IV irradiator facilities. At the meeting, Amersham provided test reports and supporting documentation in response to the questions and concerns raised by NRC. Analysis of the test data and reports revealed that the 316L stainless steel sources were sensitized. Sensitized stainless steel refers to a condition in which there is a depletion of chromium atoms within the grain boundary below the minimum level of 12 percent required for corrosion protection. This condition makes the steel susceptible to intergranular corrosion. Sensitization occurs when 316L steel is heated to a temperature within the critical range of 425 - 850 degrees C and then slowly cooled. The degree of sensitization depends on the time the steel remains in the critical temperature range. As a result of improper loading of these sources in Amersham's shipping container, these sources reached a temperature greater than 425 degrees C and became sensitized. Intergranular corrosion occurred because the steel was in an environment favorable for corrosion (i.e., poor pool water quality). Approximately 125 of these sources located in 2 separate irradiator facilities, one licensed by Illinois and one licensed by North Carolina, could be sensitized according to Amersham records. It is possible that some of these sources may have been transferred to NRC licensed facilities also. Amersham has committed to provide NRC with the serial numbers of the sources that may have been sensitized. IDNS has been in contact with their licensee regarding this matter. NMSS and OSP jointly contacted North Carolina and informed them of the situation and the urgency for their licensee to maintain adequate pool water quality and to consider removing these sources as soon as possible. HEADQUARTERS MORNING REPORT PAGE 2 JUNE 28, 1996 MR Number: H-96-0051 (cont.) Regional Action: NMSS is working with OSP and the Agreement States to verify the disposition of these sources and corrective actions to prevent recurrence. Contact: Thomas W. Rich, NMSS (301)415-7893 _ REGION I MORNING REPORT PAGE 2 JUNE 28, 1996 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Baltimore Gas & Elec Co. MR Number: 1-96-0062 Calvert Cliffs 1 Date: 06/28/96 Lusby,Maryland RI P/C Dockets: 50-317 PWR/CE Subject: UNIT 1 REFUELING OUTAGE EXTENSION TO REPLACE 11B REACTOR COOLANT PUMP MOTOR Discussion: The Unit 1 refueling outage number 12 began on March 30, 1996. The outage was previously extended to allow for expanded eddy-current inspection of the steam generator U-tubes. The plant began heat-up from the outage on June 20, 1996. On June 25, 1996, the plant was cooled down from Mode 3 (greater than or equal to 300 degrees Fahrenheit) to seal weld a leaking threaded pipe connection in the bonnet of the shutdown cooling header return isolation valve 1-SI-652-MOV. While in normal operation during the subsequent plant heat-up, the 11B reactor coolant pump (RCP) tripped on ground overcurrent and phase differential. Preliminarily, the cause of the RCP trip appears to be an electrical short in the stator of the RCP motor. The plant is being cooled to Mode 5 to replace the 11B RCP motor and perform other minor repairs. These repairs are scheduled to be completed during the next 10 days followed by the resumption of plant heat-up and start-up testing. Regional Action: For information only. Contact: Fred Bower (410)586-2626 Lawrence Doerflein (610)337-5378 _ REGION I MORNING REPORT PAGE 3 JUNE 28, 1996 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Gpu Nuclear Corp. MR Number: 1-96-0063 Oyster Creek 1 Date: 06/28/96 Forked River,New Jersey SRI Dockets: 50-219 BWR/GE-2 Subject: IDENTIFICATION OF METAL DEBRIS IN GE NEW FUEL ASSEMBLIES Discussion: On March 26, 1993, General Electric (GE) issued Service Information Letter (SIL) No. 552, "Fuel Failures Caused by Metal Debris" to notify licensees of nuclear fuel damage caused by small (1/8 inch by 1/4 inch) metal debris trapped in fuel assemblies. The licensee was subsequently informed by GE in February 1995 that some fuel assemblies manufactured at a GE facility may contain small metal debris in the lower tie plate. The presence of this debris was apparently due to the lack of a mechanical process to remove the metal debris and inadequate quality inspection methods to discover the condition following fuel assembly manufacturing. Oyster Creek received new fuel from GE (164 assemblies) in June 1994 that was manufactured around the same time that the metal debris problem became evident, and therefore, that fuel was vulnerable to this concern. GE subsequently implemented several process improvements to address the debris issue. The licensee issued a deviation report in March 1995 to document that several nuclear utilities have noticed metal debris in the lower tie plates of GE-9 fuel bundles. Oyster Creek had installed 140 of the 164 June 1994 fuel assemblies into the reactor during the Fall 1994 refueling outage. The remaining 24 fuel assemblies were in dry storage and were spares. The licensee, with support from GE, developed and implemented inspection procedures for the 24 spare fuel assemblies. The inspection was completed in June 1996. Metal debris was found in five of the assemblies. The debris was both straight and curved shavings, apparently from milling and drilling processes. The largest piece found was 9/16 inch long and 0.015 inch thick. During the current cycle 15 operation, there are no indications of fuel damage based on RCS chemistry sample and analysis results and computer modeling. The licensee will continue to closely monitor chemistry for indications of damage. In addition, the core engineering group is completing an engineering evaluation to assess continued operation and to determine whether additional inspections are warranted. The next refueling outage for Oyster Creek is set to begin on September 7, 1996. Regional Action: The residents will continue to follow this issue. Contact: LARRY BRIGGS (609)693-0702 PETER ESELGROTH (610)337-5234 _ REGION III MORNING REPORT PAGE 4 JUNE 28, 1996 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Commonwealth Edison Co. MR Number: 3-96-0070 La Salle 1 2 Date: 06/20/96 Marseilles,Illinois RI VIA TELECON Dockets: 50-373,50-374 BWR/GE-5,BWR/GE-5 Subject: NON-ESSENTIAL SERVICE WATER STRAINER BLOCKAGE UPDATE Discussion: As of June 27, 1996, Region III has initiated a special team inspection comprising four engineering and operations inspectors to review activities at the site which resulted in the injection of expandable grout material into the safety and non-safety-related service water (SW) suction bay. A prior morning report dated June 20, 1996, stated that a corn cob sandblasting material caused high differential pressure (D/P) alarms on the non-safety service water pumps. On June 24, 1996, high SW D/Ps occurred again and subsequently caused a fire pump diesel to overheat. Licensee event investigators identified grouting of cracks in the floor of the intake building as the cause. The grouting was being performed by a contractor without proper work controls. Workers believed they were grouting concrete over earth. Holes drilled by the workers near cracks allowed the grout to become foreign material in the SW bay and clog the strainers. Tests and inspections have found no impact on safety-related equipment; the licensee is using divers and robotics to locate and plan for the removal of the material. The non-safety equipment has been cleaned and inspected and found to not be damaged. Regional Action: A Region III led team is reviewing the causes and observing the licensee's corrective actions for this event. Contact: J. A. GROBE (708)829-9701 M. A. RING (708)829-9701 _ REGION IV MORNING REPORT PAGE 5 JUNE 28, 1996 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Pacific Gas & Electric Co. MR Number: 4-96-0070 Diablo Canyon 1 2 Date: 06/28/96 Avila Beach,California Call From Resident Inspector Dockets: 50-275,50-323 PWR/W-4-LP,PWR/W-4-LP Subject: ANNOUNCEMENT OF MANAGEMENT CHANGES AT DIABLO CANYON Discussion: On June 27, 1996, Pacific Gas and Electric (PG&E) announced that Mr. Jim Molden, Diablo Canyon's current Manager of Maintenance Services, will assume the duties of Manager of Operations Services. The position of Manager of Operations Services was recently opened when it was announced that Mr. Robert Powers, the former manager, would assume the position of Vice President and Plant Manager on July 1, 1996, upon the retirement of the current Vice President, Mr. Warren Fujimoto. Mr. Dave Oatley, the current Mechanical Maintenance Director will be the new Manager of Maintenance Services. Mr. Rodney Curb, the Outage Services Manager, will step into a temporary role as full-time manager of the organizational transition, reporting to Mr. Greg Rueger, the Senior Vice President. Mr. Steve Fridley will rotate into the Outage Service Manager position on a temporary basis. Regional Action: For information purposes only. Contact: M. Tschiltz (805)595-2354 D. Corporandy (510)975-0319 _