Headquarters Daily Report JULY 23, 1996 *************************************************************************** REPORT NEGATIVE NO INPUT ATTACHED INPUT RECEIVED RECEIVED HEADQUARTERS û REGION I û REGION II û REGION III û REGION IV û PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - HEADQUARTERS JULY 23, 1996 MR Number: H-96-0055 NRR DAILY REPORT ITEM GENERIC COMMUNICATIONS NRC Information Notice 96-40, "Deficiencies in Material Dedication and Procurement Practices and in Audits of Vendors," dated July 25, 1996. The NRC is issuing this information notice to alert addressees to deficiencies in the dedication practices of manufacturers and suppliers of commercial-grade items such as fasteners, pipe, fittings, and structural shapes that are supplied as components of more complex pieces of equipment. Technical contacts: Uldis Potapovs, NRR (301) 415-2959 Larry Cambell, NRR (301) 415-2976 _ REGION I MORNING REPORT PAGE 2 JULY 23, 1996 Licensee/Facility: Notification: New York Power Authority MR Number: 1-96-0069 Indian Point 3 Date: 07/23/96 Buchanan,New York SRI PC Dockets: 50-286 PWR/W-4-LP Subject: INITIATION OF A PLANT SHUTDOWN REQUIRED BY TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION Discussion: On July 22, at 2:29 p.m., NYPA initiated a plant shutdown when a 24-hour technical specification action statement for an inoperable containment spray valve expired. The shutdown was terminated at 4:36 p.m. at 71 percent power, when the valve was repaired and declared operable. NYPA commenced a power ascension and attained full power at 1:30 a.m. on July 23. On July 21, 1996, one of two parallel valves from the sodium hydroxide (NAOH) spray additive tank to the containment spray eductors showed dual indication in the control room and was declared inoperable. A hole in the diaphragm of the air operator caused the valve to move about 1/4 inch off its fully closed position. NYPA replaced the diaphragm of the air operator, as well as a leaking gasket in the upper spring housing which was identified during the repair activity. However, upon retest, the associated solenoid valve was observed to be leaking and prevented the valve from fully opening. This condition was identified with about four hours remaining to the expiration of the 24-hour action statement. At the time of the solenoid failure, NYPA had completed an operability determination to justify operability with the original air operator problem. The safety function of the valve is to open when a containment spray initiation signal is received. However, NYPA management determined that the new solenoid problem was outside the scope of the operability determination. NYPA determined that the necessary engineering evaluation and process documentation could not be produced within the time remaining in the action statement. During the repair activities, the air was removed from the air operator and the valve was in the full open position which is the required position for accident conditions. Regional Action: Routine resident inspection followup. Contact: Curtis Cowgill (610)337-5233 _ REGION IV MORNING REPORT PAGE 3 JULY 23, 1996 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Washington Public Power Supply System MR Number: 4-96-0079 Washington Nuclear 2 Date: 07/21/96 Richland,Washington Call from licensee to SRI Dockets: 50-397 BWR/GE-5 Subject: UNPLANNED REACTOR POWER TRANSIENT DURING MODIFICATION TESTING Discussion: On July 20, 1996, at approximately 9:07 p.m. (PDT), the WNP-2 facility experienced a rapid change in power of 15 percent in 40 seconds (68 to 53 percent, back to 68 percent). The licensee determined the power transient resulted from testing of the adjustable speed drive (ASD) modification to the reactor recirculation pumps implemented during the recent refueling outage. The ASD modification provides the capability to change reactor recirculation pump motor speed and eliminates the need for recirculation flow control valves. The licensee was preparing to increase reactor flow from 51 to 53 percent. Part of the preparation involved a GE test engineer (nonlicensed) typing computer instructions that would return flow to 51 percent if electrical harmonics in the ASD system were experienced during the flow increase. Once these instructions were typed, a licensed reactor operator would verify the entry and only had to strike the "ENTER" key on a computer keyboard to execute the instruction. In this instance, the GE engineer typed an incorrect value (transposed numbers) and also entered the instruction (by striking the ENTER key). These actions caused reactor flow and power to drop. Immediately after entering the data, the GE engineer recognized the error, and corrected the instruction, increasing reactor power. The participating reactor operator neither authorized nor performed the entry of either instruction. The licensee suspended testing of the ASD modification to investigate the event and implement corrective actions. The licensee notified the resident inspector on July 21, 1996, at approximately 9 a.m. Regional Action: Regional personnel are closely monitoring the licensee's evaluation of the event and plan followup inspection activities. Contact: H. Wong (510)975-0296 R. Barr (509)377-2627 _