Headquarters Daily Report DECEMBER 23, 1996 *************************************************************************** REPORT NEGATIVE NO INPUT ATTACHED INPUT RECEIVED RECEIVED HEADQUARTERS û REGION I û REGION II û REGION III û REGION IV û PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - REGION I DEC. 23, 1996 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Maine Yankee Atomic Power Co. MR Number: 1-96-0110 Maine Yankee 1 Date: 12/23/96 Wiscasset,Maine SRI PC Dockets: 50-309 PWR/CE Subject: MAINE YANKEE PRESIDENT RESIGNS Discussion: On December 20, 1996, Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company, the owner of Maine Yankee Atomic Power Plant, announced that it's President, Charles D. Frizzle had submitted his resignation. The announcement was made on behalf of the Maine Yankee Board of Directors by Chairman David T. Flanagan who is also President and Chief Executive Officer of Central Maine Power, which holds 38 percent of Maine Yankee. In a press release issued by Maine Yankee on December 20, a number of additional comments were attributable to Mr. Flanagan, including: (1) Frizzle's resignation followed a meeting during which Maine Yankee's board voted unanimously to ask for Frizzle's resignation. Flanagan further said that Maine Yankee needed new leadership to deal with deep-rooted cultural issues, a changing regulatory environment and unprecedented financial pressures; and (2) that replacing the plant's leadership is part of Maine Yankee's response to a Nuclear Regulatory Commission report that was critical of the utility. Charles Frizzle is expected to remain at the company until a replacement is selected next year. He has been with the company for 25 years and has been the President since 1989. Flanagan indicated that the challenges facing Maine Yankee require a Chief Executive Officer with experience at a larger nuclear utility. He stated that the board would rely on a search agency and other sources to help find a utility executive with a good grasp of both national power and regulatory issues. He also stated that a further shakeup of top management is likely in the coming months. Regional Action: The NRC will continue to monitor licensee actions and performance to ascertain that changes do not affect nuclear safety. Contact: Jimi Yerokun (207)882-7519 Richard Conte (610)337-5183 _ REGION I MORNING REPORT PAGE 2 DECEMBER 23, 1996 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Gpu Nuclear Corp. MR Number: 1-96-0111 Oyster Creek 1 Date: 12/23/96 Forked River,New Jersey RI PC Dockets: 50-219 BWR/GE-2 Subject: Oyster Creek 50.72 Report Clarification Reportable Event Number: 31494 Discussion: On 12/20/96, GPUN reported that two reactor water cleanup (RWCU) system valves have thermal overloads that may prevent the valves from closing under certain high energy line break (HELB) conditions. In response to a GE Service Information Letter (No. 604), the licensee determined that if a RWCU line break were to occur at less than about 88% reactor power, the temperature profile in the reactor building would exceed the current setting for the valves' motor thermal overloads. The valves would then not respond to either an automatic (primary containment isolation) or manual close signal to isolate the break. The recently completed analysis assumes no operator action for 10 minutes following initiation of the break, and that the feedwater (FW) system will have sufficient capacity to provide makeup to the reactor in response to the inventory loss from the RWCU system. In this scenario, the FW makeup allows the event to continue without reaching the automatic low reactor water level reactor scram, and a higher temperature profile in the reactor building would occur due to the steam release. (The RWCU system does not automatically isolate on high temperature conditions.) For a RWCU line break occurring at greater than 88% power, the FW system cannot continue to maintain vessel level, and an automatic scram due to low level would occur. The plant response following the reactor scram would be such that the temperature profile in the reactor building would not exceed current design assumptions and the break would be able to be isolated. The GPU 50.72 report for Event #31494 stated "the system is considered operable as long as the reactor is at 100 percent power," which mistakenly implies inoperability at all levels below 100 percent power. The licensee provided interim guidance to the operators to address the postulated event. If reactor power is reduced to 90% or less, they were instructed to remove from service and isolate the RWCU system. In addition, if a reactor building high temperature alarm is received, the operators are to likewise isolate the RWCU system. GPUN is currently processing a modification to bypass the thermal overloads for the two valves of concern. Regional Action: The resident inspector is following up on this report. Contact: Pete Eselgroth (610)337-5234 Stephen Pindale (609)935-3580 _