Headquarters Daily Report JUNE 20, 1996 *************************************************************************** REPORT NEGATIVE NO INPUT ATTACHED INPUT RECEIVED RECEIVED HEADQUARTERS û REGION I û REGION II û REGION III û REGION IV û PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - REGION I JUNE 20, 1996 Licensee/Facility: Notification: U. S. Department Of Energy MR Number: 1-96-0061 West Valley Demonstration Project Date: 06/20/96 West Valley,New York Sr. Radiation Specialist Dockets: 99990081 Subject: Commencement Of Radioactive Operations Discussion: On June 19, 1996, the U.S. Department of Energy authorized the commencement of radioactive operations at the West Valley Demonstration Project Vitrification Facility. This followed a meeting conducted at the office of Alvin L. Alm, Assistant Secretary for Environmental Management (EM-1) with representatives of the DOE West Valley Area Office, Ohio Field Office, and West Valley Nuclear Services (a Westinghouse Company), the primary contractor at West Valley. Radioactive operations of the Vitrification Facility will result in the treatment of high-level waste left at the West Valley site following operation of the only commercial spent fuel reprocessing facility from 1966-1972. Radioactive operations are scheduled to commence on June 24, 1996, and to continue for approximately 30 months. A total of 300 vitrified high-level waste canisters will be created during these operations. Contact: Joseph Furia (610)337-5041 John White (610)337-5114 _ REGION II MORNING REPORT PAGE 2 JUNE 20, 1996 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Babcock And Wilcox MR Number: 2-96-0057 Naval Nuclear Fuels Division Date: 06/20/96 Lynchburg,Virginia Dockets: 07000127 Subject: ACTIVATION OF NUCLEAR CRITICALITY ALARM HOWLERS Discussion: At approximately 6:15 p.m. on June 19, 1996, during a thunderstorm, the criticality alarm howlers activated at B&W NNFD. Plant workers evacuated work areas to the cafeteria, which had been monitored by radiation control technicians and been shown to be free of radiation. Subsequent surveys of plant areas showed no elevated radiation levels. The thunderstorm that moved through the area had significant lightning associated with it. As it moved over the plant, there were reports of a fireball over the electrical substation that feeds the site. This was coincidental with the howler activation. The Emergency Operations Center (EOC) was activated at 6:19 p.m. but no event was declared since the howler system was successfully reset (see below). The resident inspector was notified and responded to the site. It appears that the lighting strike caused numerous detectors in the criticality monitoring system to momentarily spike above their alarm setpoints which activated the howler system. The howler system was successfully reset soon after being activated. Two detectors could not be reset but were not in the same logic pair (note: the system alarms after a 2 out 2 logic in an area is satisfied). Other various alarms (smoke, in-line detectors) caused by the apparent lightning strike were successfully reset. The criticality alarm system was repaired and retested 9:15 p.m. Some damage also occurred to some security alarm systems requiring compensatory measures. The EOC stood down at approximately 9:45 p.m. Regional Action: The Regional Senior Resident Inspector responded to the site and will follow up to monitor the licensee's actions regarding the security systems. Contact: E. McAlpine (404)331-5547 _ REGION III MORNING REPORT PAGE 3 JUNE 20, 1996 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Commonwealth Edison Co. MR Number: 3-96-0066 La Salle 1 2 Date: 06/20/96 Marseilles,Illinois RI VIA TELCON Dockets: 50-373,50-374 BWR/GE-5,BWR/GE-5 Subject: NON-ESSENTIAL SERVICE WATER STRAINER BLOCKAGE Discussion: Both units at LaSalle were forced to decrease power to 77 percent due to degraded non-essential service water pressure. At approximately 6:00 p.m., on June 19, 1996, operators noted that the non-safety related service water header pressure was decreasing. Operations and engineering personnel were dispatched to the lake screen house and found elevated differential pressure across the automatic strainers (at approximately 12 psid). The automatic backwash of the strainers did not function due to degraded materiel condition of the backwash valves. A power reduction was started and various loads such as non essential ventilation systems were secured. Manual backwashing of the strainers began at approximately 9:00 p.m. Strainer differential pressure was decreased to normal values by midnight and the reactor power decrease was stopped. The units are being returned to full power. Material used for sandblasting the exterior of the lake screen house has been determined to be the agent that clogged the strainers. The material is made from corn cobs and when wet becomes sticky. The sandblasted material washed into the forebay due to the excessive rain recently. The non-safety related service water system takes a suction from the intake structure forebay downstream of the travelling screens. An in-line basket stainer provides additional straining of the service water. The system is common for both units and splits into separate headers downstream of the strainers. The licensee has formed a root cause team to followup on the event, and to determine the impact this may have on the safety related service water system. Regional Action: The resident inspectors are following the event and the root cause team activities. Contact: B. CLAYTON (708)829-9602 M. MCCORMICK-BARGER (708)829-9619 _