Headquarters Daily Report OCTOBER 18, 1996 *************************************************************************** REPORT NEGATIVE NO INPUT ATTACHED INPUT RECEIVED RECEIVED HEADQUARTERS û REGION I û REGION II û REGION III û REGION IV û PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - REGION I OCTOBER 18, 1996 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. MR Number: 1-96-0093 Nine Mile Point 2 Date: 10/18/96 Lycoming,New York SRI PC Dockets: 50-410 BWR/GE-5 Subject: FOREIGN MATERIAL FOUND IN SUPPRESSION POOL DOWNCOMERS Discussion: Nine Mile Point Unit 2 has a Mark 2 containment. During a random inspection of 10 drywell-to-suppression pool downcomers, foreign material was discovered in 3 of the first 5 downcomers inspected. The licensee expanded the inspection to include all 121 downcomers. The results of the inspection were: 49 downcomers were clean, 48 downcomers had minimal debris (e.g. piece of tape/pen), 17 downcomers had excessive debris (e.g. plastic bags, hard hats, tygon tubing, rubber gloves), and 7 of 8 downcomers locatd directly below the reactor vessel had foam rubber cleanliness covers installed. The foreign material is being removed and the downcomers cleaned. NMPC engineering is reviewing the design basis of the suppression pool to determine the minimum number of downcomers needed for accident analysis and the effect the identified material would have on the ECCS suction strainers. Regional Action: The resident inspectors will continue to follow this issue. Contact: Barry Norris (315)342-4041 Lawrence Doerflein (610)337-5378 _ REGION I MORNING REPORT PAGE 2 OCTOBER 18, 1996 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Gpu Nuclear Corp. MR Number: 1-96-0094 Oyster Creek 1 Date: 10/18/96 Forked River,New Jersey SRI PC Dockets: 50-219 BWR/GE-2 Subject: FAILURE OF THE EXC RELAY ON A NO. 1 EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR Discussion: During the second performance of the Diesel Generator Automatic Actuation Test, OP 636.2.002, the auxiliary contacts in the EXC relay (contactor) failed resulting in the failure of the field to flash. The licensee had installed a modification to both EDGs during the outage to upgrade several components and the EXC relay was one which was replaced with a newer and more robust relay. Two relays for installation in the EDGs and two spare relays were purchased from Power Systems as dedicated components. All components were supplied with a jumper wire installed. As installed in the OC EDG Circuit, between the coil and the auxiliary contactor, that wire would short out the coils of the relays. (The relay has other commercial uses that would include the need for the use of the shorting jumper wire.) Upon receipt, the planner inspected the component, noted the shorting jumper wire, and he recognized the need to remove it prior to installation or use in the EDG application. He depicted the deletion of the shorting jumper wire as part of the modification installation in the "as modified" drawings in the work package, but failed to include the removal of the wire in the wire plan used by the technicians when installing the modifications. During the second performance of the Automatic Actuation test, a 30 amp fuse blew (the negative fuse) and there was a flash and smoke in the area of the relay. The shorting wire was removed, the relay was visually inspected and the blown fuse replaced (the positive fuse which may have seen the same overload condition as the blown fuse was not replaced). Additional testing did not reveal any related problems and No.1 EDG was returned to service after the appropriate operability surveillance was completed. The EDG operated as required during the first Automatic Actuation test even though the auxiliary contact was in degraded condition. The screw that secured the auxiliary contact arm to the block was loose and may have masked the fault during No.1 EDG operation before the failure. The licensee checked the other 3 contact relay assemblies and found the contact arm securing screw loose on one other assembly and 4 of 6 main power contactor (field lead) lugs cross-threaded on one of the assemblies. The licensee is evaluating the sequence of events with respect to EDG operability and possible Part 21 concerns regarding the relay assembly. Regional Action: Residents continue to followup. Contact: Pete Eselgroth (610)337-5234 _