Headquarters Daily Report MAY 17, 1996 *************************************************************************** REPORT NEGATIVE NO INPUT ATTACHED INPUT RECEIVED RECEIVED HEADQUARTERS û REGION I û REGION II û REGION III û REGION IV û PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - HEADQUARTERS MAY 17, 1996 MR Number: H-96-0039 NRR DAILY REPORT ITEM GENERIC COMMUNICATIONS NRC Information Notice 96-29, "Requirements in 10 CFR Part 21 for Reporting and Evaluating Software Errors," dated May 20, 1996. The NRC is issuing this information notice to alert addressees to the inability of a computer code supplier to contact all of its customers regarding software errors that could be significant to safety. Technical contacts: Walter P. Haass, NRR (301) 415-3219 Egan Y. Wang, NRR (301) 415-1076 _ REGION III MORNING REPORT PAGE 2 MAY 17, 1996 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Toledo Edison Co. MR Number: 3-96-0055 Davis Besse 1 Date: 05/17/96 Oak Harbor,Ohio RI VIA PC Dockets: 50-346 PWR/B&W-R-LP Subject: INADVERTENT EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR START Discussion: On May 15, 1996, at 9:23 a.m. (EDT), while making preparations to conduct Integrated Safety Features Actuation System (SFAS) response testing during the current refueling outage, Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) 2 inadvertently autostarted. The start occurred as a result of connecting test equipment to the EDG start circuit. The subject test equipment was the Data Acquisition and Analysis System (DAAS) manufactured by Joyner Engineering and Special Products, and is comprised of a PC based monitoring system where data is collected via mutiplexer type input units. When the test leads for the DAAS were landed, a spark was noted and the EDG simultaneously started. Operators performed an emergency shut down of the EDG and returned it to a standby condition. A similar DAAS hookup was also attempted on SFAS Channel 2, in support of the same test, and resulted in tripping of 2 of the channel's output modules. The DAAS was then disconnected and the modules were reset. The licensee subsequently made the decision to use brush recorders in lieu of DAAS equipment for all points monitored during the integrated SFAS response test. The licensee determined that a thermistor in the DAAS DC signal input circuit caused the impedance to vary. Initially when the thermistor was cool, input impedance was low, allowing a comparatively large current draw from the monitored circuit. As the thermistor heated up, increasing its resistance, current draw was reduced to more acceptable values. The licensee found, in both the EDG and SFAS output module cases, that the initial current drawn by the DAAS was enough to initiate the associated equipment. Further review is ongoing to determine other applications where DAAS use may be restricted as well. Regional Action: The Resident Inspectors will continue monitoring the licensee's followup actions and have reviewed the evaluation activities to date. Contact: R. D. LANKSBURY (708)829-9631 S. STASEK (419)898-2775 _ REGION IV MORNING REPORT PAGE 3 MAY 17, 1996 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Houston Lighting & Power Co. MR Number: 4-96-0046 South Texas 1 Date: 05/17/96 Wadsworth,Texas Resident Insp Called by Licensee Dockets: 50-498 PWR/W-4-LP Subject: ENTRANCE INTO TS 3.0.3 FOR POTENTIAL CLOGGING OF ECCS STRAINERS Discussion: On May 16, 1996, at approximately 1:30 a.m. (CDT), a licensee health physics technician identified numerous plastic bags, containing contaminated steam generator inspection equipment, within the containment building. The equipment had been moved into the containment during the day shift on May 15 by a contractor in preparation for the upcoming outage starting on May 18. The technician notified his supervisor, who in turn informed the control room operators of the plastic bags within the containment building. At 3:35 a.m. the licensee entered Technical Specification 3.0.3 because all three emergency core cooling system containment sumps were declared inoperable. The declaration was made because of the potential clogging of the suction strainers. The licensee removed the plastic bags and material in them from the containment and exited Technical Specification 3.0.3 at 4:24 a.m.. Additionally, the licensee performed a containment inspection surveillance of all areas outside the reactor containment building bioshield at 5:15 a.m. to ensure that all foreign material located inside the reactor containment building had been removed. At 6 a.m. the Unit 1 manager held a stand down meeting with all site contractors, explaining the event, and emphasizing the potential concerns for equipment degradation. Two condition reports were initiated pertaining to operability and reportability concerns. Also, the licensee formed an event review team to investigate the event. Unit 1 was operating at full power during this event. Regional Action: The region and NRR will review the licensee's evaluations and reviews pertaining to the operability, reportability and significance of the event. Contact: L. Smith (817)860-8183 R. Kopriva (817)860-8104 _