Headquarters Daily Report JANUARY 16, 1996 *************************************************************************** REPORT NEGATIVE NO INPUT ATTACHED INPUT RECEIVED RECEIVED HEADQUARTERS û REGION I û REGION II û REGION III û REGION IV û PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - REGION IV JANUARY 16, 1996 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Entergy Operations, Inc. MR Number: 4-96-0005 River Bend 1 Date: 01/12/96 St Francisville,Louisiana Dockets: 50-458 BWR/GE-6 Subject: PIPE BREAK INSIDE CONTAINMENT Discussion: On January 5, 1996, with the reactor in a shutdown condition for a scheduled refueling outage, an operator inside containment identified that the Residual Heat Removal Train B suppression pool cooling return line had separated at a location approximately 1 foot above the normal suppression pool level. The licensee was flushing the upper pool to the suppression pool to equalize the conductivity of the water when the flushing water noise alerted plant staff. Upon identification of the failure, operators entered the appropriate limiting conditions for operation, including those required for containment integrity. As described in the safety analysis report, the open-ended suppression pool return pipe normally extended 9 feet into the pool, which served as the inboard containment isolation barrier. The licensee determined that the nature of the pipe failure did not render the shutdown cooling system inoperable. Further, the plant conditions when the break was identified prevented any need for suppression pool cooling. The plant had been manually scrammed from 20 percent power several hours earlier and reactor coolant system pressure was 400 psig. The licensee had performed a reactor core isolation cooling system surveillance test following the scram and subsequently, the licensee had operated Residual Heat Removal Train B in suppression pool cooling to remove the excess heat. The licensee determined that the last time the pipe was verified in place was on December 19, 1995. In addition, the licensee had operated suppression pool cooling frequently over the last cycle to maintain suppression pool temperatures since the suppression pool temperatures continued to be elevated because of safety-relief valve leakage. Following discovery of the line break the licensee had a diver inspect the suppression pool liner, the "box" support that limited lateral movement, and locate the pipe segment. The licensee determined that the support was solidly attached, that the liner was not damaged, and recovered the pipe segment. Upon examination of the pipe failure area the licensee determined that the root pass of the shop fabricated bimetallic (carbon to stainless steel) weld had a lack of fusion along 80 percent of the circumference. Subsequent review noted that the original evaluation of the radiographs identified the lack of fussion as a line in the radiographs caused by a piping fitup problem. Both trains of suppression pool cooling had experienced high vibration in the lines and the licensee preliminarily attributed the cause of the pipe failure to high cycle fatigue at the bimetallic weld. REGION IV MORNING REPORT PAGE 2 JANUARY 16, 1996 MR Number: 4-96-0005 (cont.) A potential issue identified by the NRC called into question the decision in 1987 to remove this failed weld from the inservice inspection (ISI), program. The licensee was granted relief to remove this open ended pipe weld from the ISI program as part of a generic request. Regional Action: Actions taken included immediate followup by the resident inspectors until the licensee had achieved Mode 5 and evaluation of the weld failure by region-based inspectors who were onsite on January 8,1996. The region will continue to evaluate the licensee's corrective actions related to sampling of the welds, confirmation of the root cause, and repair of the failed pipe/weld. Contact: P. Harrell (817)860-8250 G. Pick (817)860-8270 _ REGION IV MORNING REPORT PAGE 2 JANUARY 16, 1996 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Union Electric Co. MR Number: 4-96-0006 Callaway 1 Date: 01/16/96 Fulton,Missouri Senior Resident Insp. Via E-Mail Dockets: 50-483 PWR/W-4-LP Subject: PLANT SHUTDOWN TO MODE 2 TO REPAIR MAIN FEED REGULATING VALVE B Discussion: On January 15, 1996, at approximately 12 Noon (CST), operators commenced a controlled plant shutdown at 10 percent per hour from 100 percent power. The shutdown was necessary to repair a problem with the Steam Generator B Main Feedwater Regulating Valve. The valve indicated further open than the feedwater regulating valves for the other steam generators while maintaining programmed level. The licensee initially believed that the valve plug was becoming unthreaded from the valve stem, causing the valve to open more to maintain level. At 9:33 p.m., the licensee removed the main generator from the grid. Shortly thereafter, the plant was stable at approximately two percent power. Following disassembly, the licensee determined that the valve stem had partially unscrewed from the actuator. A locking bar device that secures the stem to the actuator had become loose, allowing the stem to unscrew approximately 3/4 of an inch from the actuator. This caused the valve disc to close down, thereby reducing feedwater flow. The actuator then opened the valve further in order to compensate for the reduced flow. Following repair of the valve, the licensee planned on returning the unit to service at approximately 12 Noon (CST), on January 16, 1996. Regional Action: The senior resident inspector responded to the site to observe the plant shutdown and report the results of the licensee's investigation. The resident inspectors will follow plant startup. Contact: D. Passehl (314)676-3181 _ REGION IV MORNING REPORT PAGE 3 JANUARY 16, 1996 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Washington Public Power Supply System MR Number: 4-96-0007 Washington Nuclear 2 Date: 01/12/96 Richland,Washington Licensee Dockets: 50-397 BWR/GE-5 Subject: NEW QUALITY DIRECTOR ANNOUNCED Discussion: On January 12, 1996, the Washington Public Power Supply System, the licensee for Washington Nuclear Project 2, announced the appointment of Mr. William Barley as its new Quality Director effective January 13, 1996. Mr. Barley's previous position was the corporate Radiation Health Officer. His nuclear experience includes positions as the Assistant Radiation Protection Manager at WNP-2, Vice President of Technical Services for Bartlett Nuclear, NRC Resident Inspector (health physics) at Three Mile Island, and Radiation Protection Manager at Peach Bottom. The Quality Director post was vacated with the appointment of the former Quality Director, Mr. Greg Smith, to the position of Plant General Manager on December 31, 1995. Regional Action: For information only Contact: H. Wong (510)975-0296 D. Corporandy (510)975-0319 _