Headquarters Daily Report FEBRUARY 16, 1996 *************************************************************************** REPORT NEGATIVE NO INPUT ATTACHED INPUT RECEIVED RECEIVED HEADQUARTERS û REGION I û REGION II û REGION III û REGION IV û PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - REGION III FEB. 16, 1996 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Commonwealth Edison Co. MR Number: 3-96-0024 La Salle 2 Date: 02/14/96 Marseilles,Illinois RESIDENT INSPECTIONS VIA PHONE Dockets: 50-374 BWR/GE-5 Subject: RESTART PROBLEMS FOLLOWING A MANUAL SCRAM Discussion: ON FEBRUARY 4, 1996, THE OPERATORS MANUALLY SCRAMMED UNIT 2 FROM APPROXIMATELY 55 PERCENT POWER DUE TO THE LOSS OF COOLING TO THE 2E MAIN POWER TRANSFORMER (MPT) (EVENT NO 29936). THE ROOT CAUSE WAS A MISSING CAP (BELIEVED FROM ORIGINAL CONSTRUCTION) FROM A CONDUIT CARRYING THE CONTROL POWER CABLE TO THE MPT COOLING FANS. WATER HAD GOTTEN INTO THE CONDUIT AND FROZE DURING THE EXTREME COLD WEATHER CAUSING THE CABLE TO FAIL. THE LICENSEE TOOK APPROPRIATE CORRECTIVE ACTIONS, INCLUDING INSPECTING OTHER CABLES ASSOCIATED WITH THE TRANSFORMERS, AND REMOVAL OF SNOW AND ICE FROM THE CABLE VAULT. THE LICENSEE EXPERIENCED SEVERAL EQUIPMENT PROBLEMS IN RESTARTING THE UNIT THAT ARE CONSISTENT WITH THE GENERAL MATERIAL CONDITION OF THE PLANT. STARTUP COMMENCED ON FEBRUARY 7, 1996. MAIN TURBINE CONTROL VALVE (TCV) NO. 4 WOULD NOT OPEN DUE TO A FAILED SERVO VALVE. THE UNIT WAS SHUT DOWN ON FEBRUARY 8 AND THE SERVO VALVE WAS REPLACED. ON FEBRUARY 9, 1996, THE UNIT WAS STARTED UP AGAIN. ROD PULLS WERE SUSPENDED, HOWEVER, FOR SEVERAL HOURS DUE TO FLOW OSCILLATIONS IN THE CONTROL ROD DRIVE SYSTEM. THE LICENSEE DETERMINED THAT A PREVIOUSLY IDENTIFIED LEAK ON AN AIR OPERATED VALVE WAS CAUSING THE OSCILLATIONS. THE LEAK WAS REPAIRED AND ON FEBRUARY 10, STARTUP CONTINUED. THE MAIN TURBINE WAS TRIPPED AND EHC SECURED, HOWEVER, DUE TO AN EHC LEAK FROM A FITTING ON THE NO. 1 TCV. ON FEBRUARY 11, 1996, UNIT 2 TURBINE ROLL RESUMED. HOWEVER, THE OPERATORS TOOK THE TURBINE OFFLINE FEBRUARY 12 WHEN IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT MPT MANUAL DISCONNECT CONTACTS HAD NOT MADE GOOD CONTACT WHEN THE OPERATOR HAD MOVED THE HANDWHEEL TO THE CLOSE POSITION DURING PRE-DAWN DARKNESS CONDITIONS. THE DISCONNECTS WERE MANUALLY RECLOSED AND STARTUP WAS COMPLETED WITHOUT FURTHER 2 INCIDENT. ADJUSTMENT OR REPAIR OF THE DISCONNECT OPERATING DEVICE WAS ADDED TO THE FORCED OUTAGE LIST. Regional Action: ROUTINE INSPECTION FOLLOWUP Contact: B. CLAYTON (708)829-9602 _ REGION III MORNING REPORT PAGE 2 FEBRUARY 16, 1996 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Commonwealth Edison Co. MR Number: 3-96-0025 Quad Cities 1 Date: 02/16/96 Cordova,Illinois E-MAIL Dockets: 50-254 BWR/GE-3 Subject: PRIMARY CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY DEGRADED DURING LOCAL LEAK RATE TESTING. Discussion: On February 10, primary containment integrity was degraded during local leak rate testing (LLRT) on both trains of the Unit 1 residual heat removal (RHR) systems. The LLRT was on valves in the RHR test return line to the torus. During the testing, a 3/4 inch manually operated vent valve on the RHR test return line was opened and closed several times. Opening the vent valve allowed the torus to communicate directly with the reactor building basement atmosphere. Technical specification (TS) 3.7.A.2 required primary containment integrity be maintained with the reactor critical or coolant temperature above 212 degrees Fahrenheit (F). During the testing, the reactor was being shut down for a refueling outage and was critical at about 200 MWe when the A-RHR train was tested and coolant temperature was above 212 degrees F during testing on both RHR trains. The licensee made several "voluntary" entries into TS 3.0.A when the vent valve was open and then exited the TS after the valve was closed. The control room operators' log revealed four separate entries and exits into the TS. The longest entry was 3 minutes. Regional Action: Resident inspectors and regional management are continuing to review the event and evaluate the licensee's response. Contact: P. L. HILAND (708)829-9603 _