Headquarters Daily Report OCTOBER 16, 1996 *************************************************************************** REPORT NEGATIVE NO INPUT ATTACHED INPUT RECEIVED RECEIVED HEADQUARTERS û REGION I û REGION II û REGION III û REGION IV û PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - HEADQUARTERS OCTOBER 16, 1996 MR Number: H-96-0075 NRR DAILY REPORT ITEM SIGNIFICANT EVENTS Subject: NITROGEN IN REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM AT HADDAM NECK CLASSIFIED AS A SIGNIFICANT EVENT The NRR/AEOD/RES Events Assessment Panel on October 8, 1996 has classified the nitrogen bubble identified in the reactor coolant system at Haddam Neck as a Significant Event for the NRC Performance Indicator Program. On August 28, 1996, during the alignment of a required boric acid injector path, the operators inadvertently opened chemical and volume control system (CVCS) valve BA-V-355. Opening this valve allowed nitrogen in the volume control tank (VCT) to inject approximately 500 gallons of CVCS system water into the reactor coolant system (RCS). It appears that following this valve misoperation that the operator may have failed to fully seat valve BA-V-355. This allowed nitrogen from the VCT, which was being maintained at a pressure of 30 psig, to leak via the normal charging system injection path, into the RCS. The nitrogen then migrated through the bypass hole in the lower internals to the top of the reactor vessel. The nitrogen gas should then have been discharged through the temporarily installed reactor vessel head vent system. However, the vent system apparently was unable to vent off nitrogen faster than the nitrogen was being added to the reactor vessel and a nitrogen bubble accumulated in the vessel head region. On September 1, 1996, in response to high nitrogen usage, operators isolated nitrogen to the VCT. Subsequent to this action, the level in the pressurizer decreased off scale low. This decrease was surmised to be caused by the partially effective vent header venting nitrogen gas from the reactor vessel head area, thus emptying the water volume in the pressurizer into the reactor vessel. Six RCS makeups were required to stabilize pressurizer level within the normal range. An AIT was sent to the site, and the AIT discovered numerous weaknesses in operator performance and management oversight. The intrusion of nitrogen into the RCS could potentially result in a common mode failure of the RHR pumps and the charging pumps (needed to fill the RCS prior to opening the loop stop valves) as well as potentially impacting the ability to use steam generator cooling. A mitigating circumstance at Haddam Neck is that the low pressure coolant injection pumps, which draw suction from the refueling water storage tank, are separate from the RHR system and were operable during this event. The basis for Significant Event classification are weaknesses in the licensee's management of the plant, including several missed opportunities to identify the presence of nitrogen in the RCS and less than timely response to the event. An information notice is being prepared to alert licensees to the hazards HEADQUARTERS MORNING REPORT PAGE 2 OCTOBER 16, 1996 MR Number: H-96-0075 (cont.) of noncondensible gas intrusion into the RCS as evidenced by this event. Additional information on this event is available in AIT Inspection Report 50-213/96-80. Contact: Eric J. Benner, NRR/DRPM/PECB (301) 415-1171 _ REGION I MORNING REPORT PAGE 2 OCTOBER 16, 1996 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. MR Number: 1-96-0090 Nine Mile Point 1 2 Date: 10/16/96 Lycoming,New York SRI PC Dockets: 50-220,50-410 BWR/GE-2,BWR/GE-5 Subject: Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation (NMPC) and Rochester Gas and Electric (RG&E) Form the New York Nuclear Operating Company Discussion: On October 15, 1996, NMPC and RG&E announced plans to form a joint nuclear operating company to support and manage the operations of RG&E's Ginna Nuclear Power Station and NMPC's Nine Mile Point nuclear units 1 and 2. The initial focus of the nuclear operating company will be to provide support services to each other; such as quality assessment, engineering, and emergency preparedness. Ultimately, the operating company plans to jointly manage the three plants. Ralph Sylvia, currently the NMPC executive vice president and chief nuclear officer, has been initially selected to head the operating company. Consolidated Edison Co. of New York Inc., owner and operator of the Indian Point 2 plant, has expressed an interest in joining the new venture and is expected to make a decision in the near future. The New York Power Authority, owner and operator of the James A. FitzPatrick nuclear plant and the Indian Point 3 nuclear plant, has also been invited to participate to form a statewide nuclear operating company. Regional Action: None Contact: Barry Norris (315)342-4041 Peter Drysdale (315)524-6935 Lawrence Doerflein (610)337-5378 _ REGION II MORNING REPORT PAGE 3 OCTOBER 16, 1996 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Tennessee Valley Authority MR Number: 2-96-0096 Sequoyah 2 Date: 10/16/96 Soddy-Daisy,Tennessee Dockets: 50-328 PWR/W-4-LP Subject: SEQUOYAH UNIT 2 WATER HAMMER FOLLOWING MANUAL REACTOR TRIP Discussion: Following a manual reactor trip from approximately 47 percent power on October 11, 1996, (Reference: PN 96-071), Sequoyah Unit 2 experienced a water hammer in a piping run to one of twelve steam dump valves. The water hammer resulted in support hangers being displaced and damaged. The licensee also identified a small crack (approximately 1 inch in length) around the transition section of piping that ties the main steam line to the steam dump piping (the crack was in the weld from the main steam line to the transition piece, and there was no through-wall leakage). The licensee has attributed the crack to the water hammer event. The licensee plans to replace the entire section of piping (approximately 35 feet) and supports associated with the affected steam dump valve. In addition, continuing investigation of the cause of the water hammer, affect on this particular steam dump line, and extent of condition reviews are being conducted by the licensee. Regional Action: A Region-based inspector has been dispatched to the site to assist the resident inspector in reviewing licensee activities. Contact: Mel Shannon (423)842-8001 _ REGION II MORNING REPORT PAGE 4 OCTOBER 16, 1996 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Florida Power & Light Co. MR Number: 2-96-0097 Turkey Point 3 4 Date: 10/16/96 Miami,Florida Dockets: 50-250,50-251 PWR/W-3-LP,PWR/W-3-LP Florida Power & Light Co. Saint Lucie 1 2 Florida Dockets: 50-335,50-389 PWR/CE,PWR/CE Subject: FLORIDA POWER AND LIGHT MANAGEMENT CHANGES Discussion: On October 15, 1996, Florida Power and Light Company announced that Mr. Patrick Higgins was transferred from Turkey Point to become the Manager of Work Control at St. Lucie. Mr. Richard Rose, Materials Management Manager at Turkey Point, replaced Mr. Higgins as the Manager of Work Control at Turkey Point. These changes became effective on October 15, 1996. Regional Action: For Information Only. Contact: S. NINH (404)331-5583 _ REGION III MORNING REPORT PAGE 5 OCTOBER 16, 1996 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Bp Oil Company MR Number: 3-96-0112 Bp Oil Toledo Refinery Date: 10/14/96 Toledo,Ohio TELECON TO HQ DUTY OFFICER Dockets: 03028576 License No: 34-07269-02 Subject: FIRE INVOLVING A NUCLEAR DENSITY GAUGE Discussion: At 7:00 p.m. (EDT) on October 12, 1996, a fire occurred in the licensee's facility, an oil refinery located near Toledo, Ohio. The fire, which lasted until 5:00 a.m. on October 13, 1996, engulfed a crude oil vacuum vessel. This vessel had an Ohmart Corporation density gauge mounted on it's exterior, which contained a 3.7 gigabequerel (100 millicurie) cesium-137 sealed source. The gauge is used, during normal operations, for measuring crude oil density within the vessel. After the fire was extinguished on October 13, 1996, the Radiation Safety Officer restricted personnel entry into the facility until the area was surveyed for contamination. Texas Nuclear, a manufacturer of similar gauges and a service licensee, was contacted by the licensee to remove the cesium-137 source from the damaged gauge so work could be done on the damaged vessel. Texas Nuclear also performed radiation surveys of the gauge and found the lead shielding inside the gauge had melted away. The highest survey reading reported was 70 millirem per hour at one foot from the open shutter. Gross contamination wipe surveys were performed and no contamination was found on the gauge or source. Subsequently, on October 13, 1996, the gauge manufacturer, Ohmart Corporation, Cincinnati, Ohio, arrived at the facility and surveyed the sealed source and gauge for cesium contamination. No evidence of contamination was found. Ohmart Corporation personnel removed the gauge from the vessel and brought both the source and the gauge to their Cincinnati, Ohio facilities. Further analysis of wipe surveys, at the Ohmart facilities, revealed no contamination. Regional Action: Region III will review the licensees 30 day report, and will follow up during the next scheduled routine inspection. The State of Ohio and the NRC Office of Nuclear Materials Safety and Safeguards have been notified. Contact: JOHN R. MADERA (630)829-9834 _ REGION IV MORNING REPORT PAGE 6 OCTOBER 16, 1996 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Arizona Public Service Co. MR Number: 4-96-0107 Palo Verde 1 2 3 Date: 10/16/96 Wintersburg,Arizona Phone Call from Resident Inspectors Dockets: 50-528,50-529,50-530 PWR/CE80,PWR/CE80,PWR/CE80 Subject: MANAGEMENT CHANGES AND FUTURE STAFFING LEVELS Discussion: On October 15, 1996, Arizona Public Service Company announced that Dave Smith had been selected to the position of Operations Director at the Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station. The position had been vacated by the promotion of Bill Ide to Vice President, Nuclear Engineering. Mr. Smith had been the Outage Director at Palo Verde. Terry Radtke will replace Mr. Smith as the Outage Director. Arizona Public Service also announced future Palo Verde staffing levels to be in place by the end of 1998. Through attrition, staffing levels at Palo Verde will decrease by 291 to a future staff level of 2236. Regional Action: For information purposes. Contact: D. Kirsch (510)975-0290 K. Johnston (602)386-3638 _