Headquarters Daily Report FEBRUARY 15, 1996 *************************************************************************** REPORT NEGATIVE NO INPUT ATTACHED INPUT RECEIVED RECEIVED HEADQUARTERS û REGION I û REGION II û REGION III û REGION IV û PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - REGION III FEB. 15, 1996 Licensee/Facility: Notification: MR Number: 3-96-0023 Advance Medical Systems, Inc. Date: 02/14/96 Cleveland,Ohio NOTIFIED NRC BY TELEPHONE 2/14/96 Dockets: 03016055 License No: 34-19089-01 Subject: BREAK-IN AT ADVANCE MEDICAL SYSTEMS, INC. Discussion: Shortly after 12:00 midnight (ET) on February 14, 1996, the Advanced Medical Systems, Inc. (AMS) facility in Cleveland, Ohio was broken into. According to the AMS Radiation Safety Officer (RSO), entrance to the facility's office was gained by smashing a plexiglas window. A motion detector inside the office then triggered, which resulted in an alarm at AMS' security company. The security company immediately called the Cleveland Police Dept., AMS' RSO and Alternate RSO, and sent a guard to the site. The police were the first to arrive at the facility, but the intruder(s) had already left. It appears that a fax machine was the only item stolen. All interior locked doors remained locked, thus, the intruder(s) did not enter radiologically controlled areas. AMS will replace the window with lexan, and will add additional security devices to the office area. This information is current as of 9:50 a.m. (CT) February 15, 1996. Contact: JOHN MADERA (708)829-9834 MICHAEL WEBER (708)829-9825 _ REGION IV MORNING REPORT PAGE 2 FEBRUARY 15, 1996 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Omaha Public Power District MR Number: 4-96-0019 Ft Calhoun 1 Date: 02/14/96 Fort Calhoun,Nebraska Licensee Dockets: 50-285 PWR/CE Subject: NONQUALIFIED INSTRUMENT AIR PRESSURE REGULATORS PROTECTING SAFETY-RELATED SOLENOID VALVES Discussion: On February 9, 1996, the licensee determined that about 10 air-operated solenoid valves used in safety related applications were protected by nonqualified pressure regulators. The valves in question are designed to operate on less-than-normal instrument air header pressure, which is provided by the nonqualified pressure regulators. The licensee has determined that continued operation is acceptable because the regulators in question have not been observed to fail in a mannner so as to allow full header pressure to be applied to the solenoid valves. The licensee determined that this condition existed through ongoing efforts in response to NRC Generic Letter 91-15. The licensee's review to determine the generic implications and long-term corrective actions is ongoing. The licensee has initiated its internal condition reporting system, which requires resolution within 45 days. The licensee expects to have a detailed schedule for resolution on February 20, 1996. The licensee is also evaluating the reportability of this condition. Regional Action: The Region is following the licensee's actions. Contact: John L. Pellet (817)860-8183 Ronald A. Kopriva (817)860-8104 _ REGION IV MORNING REPORT PAGE 3 FEBRUARY 15, 1996 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Union Electric Co. MR Number: 4-96-0020 Callaway 1 Date: 02/15/96 Fulton,Missouri Senior Res. Inspector via E-Mail Dockets: 50-483 PWR/W-4-LP Subject: LOAD REDUCTION DUE TO STEAM GENERATOR CHEMISTRY PARAMETERS OUT OF SPECIFICATION Discussion: On February 14, 1996, while placing a condensate polisher in service, a cation conductivity spike occurred in the steam generators. The plant was at 100 percent power. Cation conductivity spiked at 7.2 micromhos per centimeter at approximately 2:40 p.m. (CST), placing steam generator chemistry in Action Level 3. Action Level 3 is defined as greater than 7 micromhos per centimeter, and requires a power reduction to less than 5 percent until values are less than Action Level 1 limits (less than 0.8 micromhos per centimeter). Approximately 5 minutes after the onset of the event, cation conductivity was at 6.0 micromhos per centimeter and trending down. By 4:30 p.m., cation conductivity was less than 0.8 micromhos per centimeter, which was within the allowable value for continued operation. In addition, sulfate concentration spiked as a consequence of cation conductivity. The level of sulfates was at 362 ppb at 2:45 p.m. The Action Level 2 limit for sulfates is 100 ppb. The level of sulfate trended down more slowly than cation conductivity, and was less than the Action Level 1 limit (20 ppb) by 7:30 p.m. The licensee discussed the transient with EPRI personnel and other industry personnel and decided to perform the power reduction to ensure removal of contaminants deposited within the crevices of the steam generators. At 4:25 p.m., plant operators commenced the load reduction at 30 percent per hour. By 8:35 p.m. the plant was in Mode 2. The turbine was taken off line shortly thereafter. The licensee believed the source of the contaminants was resins from a condensate polisher. The polisher was removed from service and isolated for followup investigation. Sampling prior to placing the polisher into service had been satisfactory. Plant management gave direction to permit load increase following review and recommendations from chemistry personnel and the suspect condensate polisher remained isolated. As of 7:30 a.m. (CST), on February 15, 1996, power was 55 percent and holding, as Delta I was adjusted prior to continuing the power ascension. Regional Action: The senior resident inspector responded to the site to observe the load decrease and review chemistry data. Contact: D. Passehl (573)676-3181 _